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Title:  The Fripe as Urban Economy: Market- and Space-Making in Tunis 
 




“Fripe” is the term used to refer to a heterogeneous array of imported second-hand donations and fast-
fashion cast-offs in Tunisia that are part of the global second-hand trade. This thesis builds an account 
of the fripe as a singular urban economy in Tunis, the capital city. Firstly, it comprises a hitherto 
unwritten analysis of the fripe’s historical constitution as a contested urban economy; demonstrating its 
distinct political economy and constructing counter-histories of urban renewal that reveal the role of the 
fripe trade and its rural migrant constituencies in remaking post-independence Tunis. These histories 
expose the systems of differentiation that operate to exclude the fripe from formally delimited realms 
of ‘the national economy’ and ‘the planned urban order’, while also partially incorporating it into modes 
of government and city-making. Secondly, it investigates the entanglements of contemporary processes 
of market- and space-making that position the fripe economy as a central agent of urban change, as 
captured in the vernacular word creation “fripisation”. The ethnography of economic practices 
underpinning this investigation starts with the unstable commodity status of fripe imports, examining 
the situated processes of valuation that allow diverse garments and objects to enter renewed cycles of 
commodity circulation and exchange in Tunis. Centring on what is termed ‘valuation work’ by diverse 
market-makers in the fripe economy, emphasis lies on how the economy is enacted in urban space and 
becomes constitutive to socio-spatial relations. Three ‘collective enactments’ of fripe valuation 
demonstrate how the economy drives localised urban transformations; creates interdependencies and 
rhythms connecting disparate actors and sites; and allows the staging of temporary publicness. Overall, 
this thesis advances a perspective on the economy as operating through and as constitutive to urban 
space, positing the ‘urban economy’ as a tool to expand what can be brought to matter as economy in 
present-day cities. 
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Note on transliteration and translation: 
 
All direct interview quotes in the thesis are translated from Tunisian Arabic or French by the author. Quotations 
from non-English academic texts have been translated by the author. Cursive is used for Arabic and French terms 
that appear in the text and direct translation by the author is provided in brackets. For ease of reading, Arabic 
plural forms are sometimes rendered by adding -s. Tunisian Arabic terms are transcribed phonetically (these also 
include French terms used in Tunisian Arabic). Frequently recurring Tunisian Arabic terms in the text – many of 
which belong to the particular vocabulary of the fripe economy – are listed in this glossary. 
 
 
al- = Arabic definite article 
arsh = clan, tribe 
arushiya = clan-based solidarity, collective identity 
bala = tarpaulin bale in which fripe are packaged 
baladiya = municipality 
batenda = license (for trading; a shop space) 
berwita = handcart 
brocante = antiques 
chinwa = made-in-China (often indiscriminately used for cheaply manufactured commodities) 
cité = a planned (government) housing estate 
crème (krema) = high-end fripe merchandise 
diwana = customs authorities 
farz = (fripe) sorting  
faraza / (pl.) farazet = sorting worker 
faubourg = suburb (used for the historic suburbs of the Tunis medina) 
fripier(s) = fripe traders 
gourbiville = slum settlement 
hakim = government, also used to refer to the police and the state more broadly 
halan al-bala = bale opening 
hamla = campaign 
houma = local neighbourhood 
iqtisad (mwazi) = (parallel) economy 
jaou = (good) atmosphere 
marché = market, French term used for planned (municipal) markets in Tunis 
marché aux puces = second-hand market 
medina = historic old city of Tunis 
nassab / (pl.) nassaba = itinerant/street vendor 
nuzuh = derogatory term for rural migrants 
oukala = sub-divided and dilapidated historic housing in the Tunis medina 
ruba fikia = (old term for) second-hand clothes  
sabkha = salt lake  
sachet = here, see-through zipper bag, packaging for high-end fripe merchandise 
shkara / (pl.) shkair = white tarpaulin bag, packaging for fripe 
silaa (kontra) = (counterfeit) merchandise 
souk / (pl.) aswak = market, Arabic term used for open-air and weekly markets in Tunis 
tahrib = smuggling  
thawra = revolution (with definite article “al-” often designating the 2011 Tunisian revolution) 
qitaa = sector 
wilaya = governorate 
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In early July 2017, the Tunis governorate launched a campaign of unprecedented scale against informal 
markets (Middle East Monitor 2017; Économiste Maghrébin 2017). Timed to coincide with the Aid 
festivities at the end of the fasting month Ramadan, when many vendors had left Tunisia’s capital city 
to visit their families, massive police deployments rapidly dismantled the dense street markets that had 
come to characterise the central city. The demolition of informally built-up market infrastructures, the 
confiscation of merchandise, and the arrest of dozens of vendors trying to resist the clearance was 
branded a “clean-up campaign” by the then-governor of Tunis Omar Mansour (Le Monde 2017). One 
of the central targets of the clearance campaign was the so-called “fripe” trade, the umbrella term used 
to designate a heterogeneous array of imported second-hand garments, used objects, as well as new, 
unsold textile stocks. A vernacular word creation, combining the term “fripe” with the ending “-isation” 
into “fripisation”, prominently featured in discourses justifying the violent clearance. Shop owners in 
the central city and members of the citizens’ initiative “Winouetrottoir” (lit. where is the sidewalk), 
who had jointly lobbied the local authorities to clamp down on the proliferating markets, employed the 
term fripisation to describe what they considered to be a process of rapid urban degradation caused by 
the unchecked expansion of fripe trading and the associated presence of rural migrant traders in urban 
public space1.  
 
At first sight, this 2017 campaign in central Tunis appeared as one more example of the repressive 
governance of ‘informal markets’ or ‘street vending’ that has been amply documented in Arab cities in 
the aftermath of the 2011 revolutions (Abaza 2014; Brown et al. 2017; Bouhali 2017; Nagati and Stryker 
2016), as well as in other cities across the African continent in recent years (e.g. Morange 2015; Spire 
and Choplin 2017; Steck et al. 2013; Young 2017). However, a closer look at the clearance’s specific 
target, namely the urban fripe trade, complicates this narrative. Instead of an ‘informal trade’ or a 
marginal type of ‘street vending’, the fripe represents a ubiquitous and historically consolidated 
commercial activity in Tunis. Heterogeneous fripe imports – from second-hand shoes and fast-fashion 
cast-offs, to used objects spanning toys, kitchenware or accessories – are today traded in diverse urban 
marketplaces; from open-air, weekly souks on the urban peripheries, to covered markets in upper-
middle-class residential areas, and historical fresh food markets in the inner-city that have gradually 
transformed into specialised fripe trading spaces. In differentiation from portrayals of the second-hand 
clothes trade as a mere subsistence economy of the urban poor (Brooks 2012), the fripe trade is 
structured as a hierarchical and differentiated economy in Tunisia that guarantees innumerable jobs and 
substantial profit margins to well-positioned importers, wholesalers and retail traders. As a consumer 
good, the fripe evokes not only “relations of need”, but also “of desire” (Stamatopoulou-Robbins 2019: 
81), with 83.4% of urban dwellers in Tunis buying regularly from the fripe2. 
 
The Tunisian word creation fripisation captures this complex positioning of the fripe in Tunis. The term 
describes the popularity, ubiquity and seemingly uncontrolled proliferation of fripe trading in the city, 
conferring a central role to the fripe in tangible processes of on-going urban change. Yet equally, the 
term’s pejorative connotations associate the fripe trade with urban degradation and social marginality, 
positioning the fripe as an inherently unwanted presence and problem of urban governance. This thesis 
takes this tension as a productive entry point for reconsidering the fripe as an economy worthy of inquiry 
in its own right. Rather than reducing fripisation to a process of informal market proliferation, the thesis 
 
1 Appendix I., Interview 1; 
2 Unpublished consumer survey of the INC (Institut National de Consommation), April 2018 (see Appendix I. Interview 2): 
30.4% of Tunis urban dwellers buy ‘always’ from the fripe, 53% buy ‘regularly’ from the fripe; 
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takes the deliberate linkages the term establishes between the fripe economy and specific processes of 
urban change to investigate the fripe as a singular urban economy in Tunis. Three central empirical 
questions arise from the tensions opened by the term fripisation: first, how does a global flow of 
heterogeneous second-hand and fast-fashion cast-offs translate into the ‘fripe’; an evolving commodity 
form with distinct historicity and situated meanings that creates a specific realm of practice in Tunis? 
Second, how can the fripe’s framing as ‘informal’ or ‘unplanned’ economy be reconciled with its 
consolidation as both a formally delimited economic sector and highly differentiated urban market 
form? Third, how can an apparently marginal realm of market-making and its diverse actors take centre 
stage in processes that co-constitute the contemporary city?  
 
 
1. From global second-hand to urban fripe economy: unmaking scales to research the 
singular 
 
The term fripisation derives from the unstable and heterogeneous product category of the fripe, which 
forms an ever-evolving material basis for the fripe economy in Tunisia. The mix of used garments, 
unsold fast-fashion stocks, second-hand objects and waste materials arriving on board of container ships 
in Tunisia share origin stories of discard, donation or disposal, mainly in Europe and North America. 
For diverse reasons, the materials were “cast out or judged superfluous in a particular space-time”, and 
turned into “excess matter” (Gidwani and Reddy 2011: 1636, 1649), to become part of charity or 
commercial collection and subsequent export. Through their transnational circulations, fripe materials 
highlight the importance of thinking across - or rather beyond - scales for researching the fripe as a 
singular urban economy in Tunis. The evolving import materials firmly anchor the fripe economy in 
the global second-hand trade, and indeed underline Tunisia’s prominent positioning in this rapidly 
growing market. Yet the oscillation of these import materials between discard and commodities 
demonstrates the situated processes of “commoditisation” (Kopytoff 1986: 66) that contingently 
requalify the discarded materials for cycles of circulation and exchange as ‘fripe’ specifically in Tunis.  
 
As the following section sets out, transnational fripe circulations position Tunisia in a rapidly growing 
global second-hand economy, and thus on one of “the active frontiers of contemporary capitalism” (Roy 
2011: 229). Yet, as the second section argues, a refusal to simply translate ‘fripe’ as ‘second-hand’ 
opens the multiple, situated meanings of the term, demonstrating the power of language in 
understanding the singular articulations of the global second-hand economy in Tunis. The third section 
elaborates on these evolving meanings of the term ‘fripe’, examining the heterogeneous imports it has 
described over time and the changing cultural significations it has taken on as a consequence. In 
combination, these sections develop an understanding of the ‘urban’ neither as a fixed scale of inquiry 
nor as an administratively delimited territory, but as an open and hybrid relational construct, 
“constituted through interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny” (Massey 
2005: 9). By researching the singular urban articulations of a global economy, this research therefore 
engages in the “making and un-making of scale” (Tsing 2011: 58) from Tunis. 
 
 
a. Tunisia in the global second-hand economy 
 
Insisting on the singularity of the fripe, and thus its specificity to the city of Tunis, by no means implies 
investigating it as separable from, or “alternative” to, global capitalism (Gibson-Graham 1996). On the 
contrary, the fripe must be situated firmly in the global second-hand economy, and thus as an inherent 
element of a broader transnational waste, recycling and reuse economy that is a product of “capitalist 
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surplus accumulation” (Gidwani and Reddy 2011: 1625). In such transnational “geographies of waste” 
(Moore 2012), diverse discard materials and objects – for instance, electronics (Lepawsky 2015), 
plastics (Furniss 2015), or ships (Gregson et al. 2010) – form the basis of economic processes at the 
‘back end’ of global value chains. The fripe specifically is part of the global second-hand clothes trade, 
which not only includes used garment circulations from the Global North to the Global South (Brooks 
2015; Hansen 2000(b); Norris 2010), but also diverse cross-border economies (Sandoval-Hernandez 
and Loureiro 2017; Milgram 2008; Sandoval-Hernandez and Rosenfeld 2019; Stamatopoulou-Robbins 
2019) and complex geographies of second-hand trade linking places around the world (Abimbola 2012; 
Kouakou 2017). The largest suppliers of used garments continue to be charity organisations in Europe 
and North America, but global geographies of second-hand trading are changing rapidly, with former 
importers like China developing into net exporters, and with ever-larger quantities of unsold fast-
fashion stocks entering cycles of second-hand trade (Hansen 2019: 51). Official estimates put trading 
volumes of used garments at roughly 4 million tons annually, but data on the economy remains 
notoriously patchy (Minter 2019: 134). 
 
Tunisia’s role in the global second-hand clothes trade has thus far attracted little scholarly interest. This 
is despite the country of a population of less than 12 million ranking amongst the largest importers and 
re-exporters of used garments on the African continent3. Only Hansen’s overview of the global 
dynamics of the used garment trade mentions Tunisia in passing, declaring the country an “exception 
in Muslim-dominated North Africa” due to its large import volumes (Hansen 2000(b): 252). Linked to 
the alleged cultural and religious unacceptability of second-hand consumption in Muslim-majority 
countries (ibid), the relative unimportance of used garment imports in North Africa compared to Sub-
Saharan Africa has been reiterated (Haggblade 1990: 508-509). With the exception of Dubai’s main 
container port Jebel Ali, the MENA region has thus remained a relative blind spot on the map of the 
global second-hand trade (Gregson and Crang 2015: 165).  
 
In fact though, Tunisia and other North African states were similar to other countries in colonial 
dependency that began to receive European used garment exports from the 19th century onward, when 
European technological innovation gradually resulted in apparel surplus production and reduced local 
demand for second-hand clothes (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 228; Hansen 2000(a): 69; Lemire 
2012: 61). Tunisia received contingents of European used garments from the early 20th century onwards, 
and large-scale fripe imports began in 1943, when war-time surplus materials from France, and later 
the other Allied Forces, were shipped to different destinations in North Africa. Such military fripe 
imports were then replaced by civilian clothing, and the United States became a key supplier of Tunisia 
from the 1960s onwards. The 1995 decision of then-president of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to 
grant fripe import and re-export activities an offshore status4 set Tunisia apart from its neighbouring 
countries in its positioning in the global second-hand clothes trade. The 1995 law exonerated the fripe 
from import taxes in Tunisia, encouraging the relocation of labour-intensive sorting processes of 
second-hand clothes from Europe to Tunisia to save labour costs, in the context of a six-fold growth of 
second-hand clothes exports globally between 1980 and 1995 (Hansen 2000(a): 115). Tunisian migrant 
entrepreneurs in particular, who had begun to specialise in commercial used garment collection and 
export in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s, were now encouraged to reinvest in Tunisia (Boubakri 
2002: 8). From 1995 to 1999, 54 factories for the systematic separation, sorting and re-packaging of 
used garments were newly licensed as industrial enterprises in Tunisia5, establishing the country as a 
 
3 Data from the Observatory for Economic Complexity on used clothes imports in Africa between 2015-2017, 
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/show/all/6309/2015/, accessed July 2nd 2019; 
4 Decree N°1995–2396 of the 2nd of December 1995; 
5 Official list of Association de la Promotion de l’Industrie et de l’Innovation (APII), (Appendix I. Interview 3); 
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major re-export hub for second-hand clothes, predominantly coming from Europe and with end 
destinations in West Africa. 
 
Today, Tunisia remains doubly imbricated in the global textile market. Firstly, export-oriented textile 
manufacturing has been encouraged in Tunisia through offshore legislation since 1972 (Dlala 2006), 
turning the country into the 5th largest supplier of apparel to the European market6, especially for fast-
fashion giants like Inditex (APII 2017). Secondly, 47 fripe sorting factories continue to operate in 
Tunisia and an unprecedented increase in fripe import volumes – with estimates varying widely from 
120,000 to 150,000 tons a year7 – occurred between 2015 and 2018. The development of global “fast-
fashion systems of provisions” that accelerated turnover cycles on the clothing market not only 
conferred a competitive advantage to Tunisia as a cheap and geographically proximate manufacturing 
location, it also triggered a surge in second-hand exports (Brooks 2015: 89, 69) that increased Tunisia’s 
importance as sorting and re-export location, as well as end consumer market. Ever-greater quantities 
of fripe merchandise on the domestic market combined with the growing percentage of ‘new’ unsold 
fashion stocks amongst the imports (LeBorgne 2020) testify to escalating surplus production and a 
growing disposal problem in the global textile industry (Bloomberg 2018). In turn, this underpins record 
predicted growth levels for the global second-hand economy (Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2017; Info 
durable 2019; thred-UP 2020) and has fuelled recent “trade wars” over second-hand exports (Aljazeera 
2019; The New York Times 2020; Quartz Africa 2018).  
 
Sorted fripe clothes are thus exported from Tunisia across the globe. While high-end fripe merchandise 
is increasingly re-exported to Europe to supply the burgeoning vintage market8, wearable garments are 
dispatched all over West Africa and the Near and Middle East, and rag materials are shipped mainly to 
India and Pakistan9. A significant part of the imports is also sold on to Algeria, where fripe imports 
have been outlawed since 2009 (Liberté Algérie 2017). Yet, despite quotas limiting domestic sales, the 
bulk of fripe imports makes its way onto the Tunisian market and in particular to the capital city, 
entering into cycles of valuation, circulation and exchange that provide the basis of this research into 
the fripe as singular urban economy. 
 
 
b. Researching the singular urban articulations of a global economy 
 
The complex transnational connections constituting the global second-hand and reuse economy define 
the fripe as “objects-in-motion” (Appelgren and Bohlin 2015(a): 148). Rather than investigating the 
transnational trajectories of discard (e.g. Gregson et al. 2010; Lepawsky and Mather 2011), this thesis 
develops a situated approach to researching global connections as articulated through “friction” (Tsing 
2011: 5) in a particular urban environment. It examines the place-specific cycles of valuation, 
circulation and exchange that define the fripe as an urban economy, rather than a mere local case-study 
of the global second-hand trade. By studying the singular articulations through which supposedly 
universal market forces become articulated in particular localities, this research builds on ethnographies 
that have debunked the myth of global capitalism as an homogenising process (e.g. Gidwani 2008; Li 
 
6 The textile sector remains the single largest source of (predominantly female) industrial employment in Tunisia; 
7 Quantitative data on used clothing imports is unreliable, and yet a net annual increase in both used garments imports and 
exports to and from Tunisia can be observed since the 1990s (UN Comtrade, 1995, 1998, accessed August 2019, available 
at: https://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQueryResults.aspx?px=S3&cc=2690&r=788&y=1998), import volume estimates 
remain disputed between different Ministries and the OCT (Office du Commerce Tunisien) (Appendix I. Interview 7) and 
the interval here provided thus represents the average of all government estimates obtained; 
8 Interview with vintage shops in Paris (Appendix I. Interview 4) and two Tunisian importers (Appendix I. Interview 5, 6); 
9 Both import and re-export locations vary annually, so this only provides a crude overview of chief destinations; 
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2014; Tsing 2011). To research such articulations, this thesis explores how the entry of diverse discard 
materials into Tunisia enables their translation into ‘fripe’ and thus their open-ended remaking into new 
commodity forms. 
 
The contingent translations of discard objects into fripe thus form part of broader “material cultures” in 
which “the contradictions held within general concepts such as the domestic or the global are in practice 
resolved in everyday life” (Miller 1998(a): 19). The fripe is therefore approached as a heterogeneous 
object category with an unstable “commodity situation”, foregrounding an understanding of value as 
malleable and context-specific (Appadurai 1986: 13). Such cultural translation processes frequently 
involve linguistic translation, as demonstrated by anthropological research on the processes of 
appropriation, adjustment and innovation that occur through transnational commodity circulation. For 
instance, the transformation of the Indian “rickshaw” into the Egyptian “touktouk” illustrates the 
production of “creole technologies” and their situated economies (Tastevin 2012: 11). In literature on 
second-hand economies, the local terms for used garments – like “salaula” in Zambia (Hansen 
2000(a)), “asamsé” in Equatorial Guinea (Valenciano-Mane 2018) or “baleh” in Palestine 
(Stamatopoulou-Robbins 2019) – similarly provide an entry point for examining the specific cultural 
meanings and practices that emerge around second-hand imports.  
 
This research draws upon such perspectives to insist on the importance of language and the inherent 
untranslatability of the vernacular Tunisian term ‘fripe’. The term ‘fripe’ itself is the starting point for 
developing this approach: first, the term fripe has been used consistently over time despite the evolution 
of the material imports it describes, from military surplus materials to second-hand donations and fast 
fashion cast-offs. Consequently, the political, economic and cultural associations of the term have also 
changed. Second, the term fripe has extended its meaning from this initial designation of heterogeneous 
import products, to denote specific market forms and a consolidated economic sector in Tunisia. In 
addition, the meanings of the term have expanded through its adaptation or integration into vernacular 
word creations, such as the term fripisation that is central to this thesis because it opens up connections 
between market- and space-making in contemporary Tunis. Beyond this single term, the wider language 
of the fripe is a tool for researching the singular articulations of the global second-hand economy in 
Tunis. Specific vocabulary offers entry points for researching the practices of the fripe economy, 
revealing in turn how the economy is constituted through continuous meaning-making. Together, these 
terms form a contingent structure – or temporary stabilisation of meanings – that renders legible and 
knowable the fripe as singular urban economy.  
 
Language is thus a vehicle that makes visible the singular that emerges in the articulation of a global 
flow of discard in a particular urban context. Beyond a mere insistence on local specificity, vernacular 
language as a basis for knowledge production exposes the dominant “vocabulary of the economy as 
political construction that needs contesting” (Massey 2013: 7). It thus is not only a means of countering 
claims of homogenisation, but also to change what can be recognised as an object of economic analysis 
and how economies can be rendered knowable. Ontologically, an intentional decision to “expand 
vocabularies” therefore signals “an expansion of the life-worlds under consideration” (Bhan 2019: 2), 
bringing diverse spatial, social and cultural processes of the fripe into the realm of the economy. 
Epistemologically, staying with the specific language of the fripe implies drawing attention to the 
generative aspects of imperfect translation, opening up an “orientation toward the singular” (Jazeel 
2019: 6). This approach to knowledge production is the basis for understanding the fripe as ‘urban 
economy’, giving it a distinct politics. Instead of showing the ‘urban’ as a prefix that denotes a fixed 
scale of economic activity, the composite of the ‘urban economy’ opens up the productive tension 
inherent to the fripe between the global and the singular. 
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c. The ‘fripe’: stable terminology for an unstable product group 
 
Unpacking the multi-layered meanings of the term fripe in Tunis is therefore crucial for researching the 
fripe as urban economy, when language is considered as “immanent and material” (Gidwani 2008: 163) 
and thus constitutive to the object of inquiry.  In Tunisia, the French term “fripe” or “friperie”10 entered 
common language and official records with the onset of large quantities of war-time surplus materials 
during the final years of WWII. Designated as “fripe militaire” (military fripe), a diverse array of 
second-hand military equipment from soldier boots to uniforms, as well as camp beds, blankets or 
nursing uniforms were imported by the Allied Forces, mainly France and the United States, to Tunisia. 
As the import of “fripe” materials from abroad gradually superseded local systems of used garment 
collection in Tunisia, the term fripe replaced the older designation “ruba fikia”. Derived from the Italian 
“roba vecchia” (old stuff), ruba fikia had been in use since at least the 19th century11 (Clancy-Smith 
2012: 61), denoting a circular system of used clothes collection and resale that was predominantly based 
on door-to-door bartering. The term fripe explicitly referred to imported – rather than locally collected 
– second-hand materials, with heterogeneous garments, textile materials and objects held together by 
their shared trajectories of transnational circulation on container ships. The term then became 
vernacularised through its use with the Arabic definite article, becoming “al-fripe” in Tunisian Arabic. 
 
While the terminology for fripe materials has therefore remained stable in Tunisia since the 1940s, the 
category of products it describes has in fact evolved considerably since then, entailing a shift of 
meanings and perceptions attached to the term. First, the content of transnational shipments of fripe 
materials changed radically over time: military surplus materials were initially replaced by post-war 
used garment shipments from the US during the 1960s (Van Groen and Lozer 1976: 4) and then by 
increasing amounts of commercially collected second-hand products from Europe, especially France 
and Italy, during the 1980s and 1990s. Subsequently, the growing importance of Tunisia as an 
intermediary location for the sorting and re-export of second-hand clothes – mainly travelling from 
Europe to West Africa – during the second half of the 1990s led to a rapid increase in the quantity, but 
also in the breadth of choice of second-hand garments and used objects sold as fripe on the Tunisian 
market. In addition to growing contingents of what is referred to as “fripe de luxe” – high-end brand 
articles at times traded for elevated prices – fripe imports today also comprise ever-growing contingents 
of new, unsold garment stocks.  
 
As a consequence, the fripe evades any straightforward or fixed definition as a product category: first, 
the imports continuously evolve with cycles of donation and discard in Europe and North America, thus 
mirroring changing consumer habits ‘elsewhere’ and varying trade relations as commercial collection 
and import locations vary over time. Second, the contemporary legal definition of the fripe in Tunisia, 
established in 1995 and amended in 200512, digresses considerably from what is actually imported and 
traded as fripe. Not only are many of the imported second-hand objects banned from sale on the 
domestic market – from shoes, to toys and leatherwear – the legal category of fripe only comprises 
‘used garments and objects’, therefore excluding growing contingents of leftover unsold fast-fashion 
stocks that are now traded as fripe. Finally, the often-blurry lines between used garments and textile 
 
10 According to the French historical dictionary Le Littré, (Littré 2007), the term originates from the ancient French term 
“freppe” which translates as “rag” and derives from the Latin word “faluppa”, designating a “piece of textile” but also “a 
thing without value”; the term fripe continues to be used in most francophone contexts to designate second-hand clothes 
(Bredeloup 2016); 
11 A type of Creole Italian, referred to as “Italian of Barbary”, constituted an important lingua franca in Tunis at the time; 
12 The 2005 amendment of law n°2005–2038, Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne, 26 July 2005: 1896; 
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waste, especially in shipping containers, allow for the import of waste products under the label of fripe 
and their subsequent illicit disposal in Tunisia13.  
 
The changing content of container loads of fripe imports to Tunisia has also altered cultural perceptions 
of the fripe. While second-hand trade and consumption in the Global South have often been understood 
primarily as a source of subsistence (Brooks 2012), scholarly work has also stressed the differentiated 
cultures of consumption that have emerged through used garment imports in different contexts (Hansen 
2000(a); Isla 2013). Contrary to predictions that a surge in made-in-China garment imports would 
reduce demand for second-hand clothes (Bredeloup and Lombard 2007), the prevalence of cheaply 
manufactured Asian imports increased the appeal of ‘second-hand’ in diverse contexts, with consumers 
valuing durability and brand authenticity (Ayimpam 2016; Stamatopoulou-Robbins 2019). Similarly, 
the fripe in Tunisia evolved from charity destined for the needy and banned from commercial sale 
during the 1940s, to a ubiquitous commercial good and mainstream consumer choice. In differentiation 
from many other MENA region cities, where second-hand consumption remains associated with a sense 
of “‘ayb” (shame) (Stamatopoulou-Robbins 2019: 64), long genealogies of fripe consumption in 
Tunisia have destigmatised it as a consumer good. Today the fripe appeals to urban dwellers of diverse 
age groups, gender and social class, increasingly becoming incorporated into elite consumer cultures14 
of an urban upper-middle-class clientele (Meshkal 2020). 
 
As an evolving import category and heterogeneous grouping of materials, the fripe thus resists 
unequivocal definition or clear-cut delimitation. The multi-layered meanings of the term fripe in Tunisia 
hold open the relations between transnationally circulating materials, distinct genealogies of second-
hand trade and consumption, and contemporary cultural meanings and situated practices that have come 
to define the fripe as an unstable commodity form that animates cycles of circulation and exchange in 
Tunis. Shifts in the economy’s discursive constitution and evolving significations reflect not only 
evolving material circulations and changing urban and economic configurations. They also signal the 
participation of diverse actors in producing, contesting or manipulating knowledge of the fripe economy 
over time. These inherent instabilities and ambiguities that have characterised the term fripe direct 
inquiry to the economy’s discursive and performative constitution as ‘black box’, or as a realm evading 
attempts of systematic knowledge production. Simultaneously, however, the vernacular term al-fripe 
has come to designate historically consolidated economic structures and urban forms that counter 
contemporary framings of fripisation as ephemeral proliferation and a bracketing of the fripe as 
‘informal urban economy’. 
 
 
2. Beyond informality: the fripe as economic and spatial formation 
 
As the word creation fripisation became incorporated into post-2011 discourses decrying the 
degradation of the urban environment through sprawling fripe markets, it took on an increasingly 
pejorative tone. During the 2017 clearance campaign, discourses of fripisation thus positioned the fripe 
trade as an illegitimate agent of urban change, similar to other ‘informal markets’ in the city. In addition, 
local decision makers and the media prominently portrayed the fripe trade as a mafia-like business, 
associating the phenomenon of fripisation with various illicit trading and profit-making practices 
(Espace Manager 2016(b); Inkyfada 2014; Kapitalis 2018). In spite of the fripe’s undisputed popularity 
 
13 Interview with shipping company in the Rades container port (Appendix I., Interview 8) and observations on illegal 
dumping ground in proximity of fripe sorting factory in Bizerte (Appendix I., Interview 5);  
14 New forms of fripe retail, such as high-end chain stores, cater specifically to this clientele (Appendix I, Interview 40); 
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as a consumer good, the prominence of its marketplaces, and the trade’s long urban legacy in Tunis, the 
term fripisation thus seemed to straightforwardly describe an informal urban economy. 
 
However, as this section explores, a closer examination of the fripe’s historical constitution as an urban 
economy in present-day Tunis precludes such a-priori framings, instead unsettling the very 
“epistemologies of the formal and informal” (Roitman 2007: 159). The use of al-fripe to describe a 
sector of the Tunisian economy and a specific urban market form renders visible the fripe as an 
historically constituted economic and spatial structure, posing the question of why its present-day 
positioning as urban economy remains contested. To address this question, the following sections 
outline how researching the fripe as an urban economy necessitates interrogating the systems of 
differentiation that determine what can be ‘known’ as, first, ‘the economy’ and, second, ‘the planned 
urban order’.  
 
 
a. The fripe as ‘unknowable economy’?  
 
Writing on the performativity of economic knowledge has demonstrated how the tools, devices and 
models provided by the discipline of economics played a crucial role in bringing ‘the economy’ into 
being (Callon 1998; Mitchell 2014), turning it into an “object of knowledge and power” during the 20th 
century” (Mitchell 2008: 1117). Calculative models and devices (Caliskan and Callon 2009, 2010) thus 
underpinned processes of “framing” (Callon 1998: 17) that performatively delimited the economy from 
other realms of human life. Diverse “technologies of organization, measurement, calculation, and 
representation" then helped to enact such aggregates as “the national economy” (Mitchell 2008: 1120). 
Consequently, managing “future predictions” – on the basis of diverse indicators and measurements for 
the ‘national economy’ – came to “stipulate government decisions in the present” (Mitchell 2014: 492). 
 
Authoritative knowledge production, underpinned by the expertise of economists, therefore defined the 
contours of ‘the economy’ and diverse legal provisions helped to fix such definitions. This system of 
differentiation naturally excluded diverse ‘economic activities’ – in the broad sense of managing 
resources – from the realm defined as ‘the national economy’. Consequently, all those “production 
processes that represent complex cultural and social machines and for which economics has little 
concepts, language or methods to engage with” began to be “bracketed as grey zones, infra-economies 
or informal economies that were left to anthropologists and geographers to describe” (Peraldi 2018: 7). 
At times, the alleged absence of production processes in the classical sense – for instance in waste and 
reuse economies – became the basis for relegating certain economies to the status of “infra-economies” 
that were “denied recognition by the state and civil society” (Gidwani and Maringanti 2016: 114). 
Highlighting waste as a transient category (Thompson 1979: 85), waste economies point to an “excess 
that capital can never fully capture (…) as it exceeds the waste-value dialectic” and thus constitutes a 
potential “threat” to logics of capitalist accumulation (Gidwani 2013: 779). The exclusion of waste 
economies from realms of official state knowledge has underpinned tendencies to approach waste or 
reuse economies as “non-state or informal economies” in scholarly work (Grant and Oteng 2012: 4), 
with an emphasis on the role of “informal actor-networks” in enabling transnational circulations 
(Peraldi 2018: 8). 
 
The global second-hand clothes economy constitutes one of the reuse economies that has often been 
positioned outside the realm of ‘the formal economy’. First, this is due to a lack of official knowledge 
on the economy: the indeterminate classification of ‘used clothes’ enables practices of non- or mis-
declaration and thus renders international trading statistics unreliable (Hansen 2019: 50). In addition, 
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the ban of used clothing imports in many contexts means that the trade remains often undeclared 
(Abimbola 2011; Machado and Loureiro 2015; Milgram 2008), which has earnt it the reputation of a 
“shadow world” (Brooks 2015: 72). Second, the absence of a productive process in the classical sense 
or the often-asserted detrimental effect of used clothing imports on apparel production (Brooks and 
Simon 2012; Frazer 2008) have often disqualified second-hand clothes from being considered part of 
the ‘national economy’. Similarly, the fripe economy in Tunisia is frequently portrayed as “sanduq 
akhal” or “boite noire” (black box), and thus as a realm both undeserving, and evasive, of formal 
knowledge production. Tunisian institutions charged with knowledge production on ‘the economy’ – 
from diverse ministries, to the customs authorities, to public research and statistics institutes –hence 
underscore the absence of knowledge on the fripe. This is often justified by the fripe’s unproductive 
character and thus lack of added value to ‘the economy’, differentiating it from “qitaat adiya” (normal 
economic sectors), most prominently industrial sectors like “quitaa al-nasij” (the textile sector)15. 
Relatedly, the fripe is prominently framed as “iqtisad mawazi” (parallel economy), and thus as a realm 
beyond government oversight and control. 
 
Yet, despite such portrayals, the term al-fripe today also designates a hierarchically structured and 
formally delimited sector of the Tunisian economy. In fact, the incorporation of the fripe into Tunisia’s 
post-independence political economy progressively expanded the meaning of al-fripe, from a 
heterogeneous import category to the designation of a wider set of economic practices around the 
materials, from sorting to distributing and trading. Gradually, the fripe thus became officially 
constituted as “quitaa al-fripe” (the fripe sector), most comprehensively defined in the 1995 framework 
legislation that remains in place today. The fripe as a ‘formal sector’ has since come to describe a 
particular import and customs regime, industrial sorting processes, and centrally regulated licensing and 
taxation procedures for wholesalers and retailers. At the same time, however, the term al-fripe always 
designated a much wider set of practices, actors and locations than those comprised by the legal 
definition of the fripe as “quitaa rasmi” (formal sector).  
 
To illuminate this conundrum of the fripe as a “multiply governed” economic sector that nevertheless 
retains an “ungoverned quality” (Stamatopoulou-Robbins 2019: 19), this research offers an 
investigation into the fripe’s evolving political economy. The mismatch between al-fripe as a formally 
circumscribed economic sector and as an actual realm of economic activity requires interrogating the 
politics that have underpinned the fripe economy’s ambiguous positioning between “the normal” and 
“what needs to be disciplined” (Das and Poole 2004: 8). Through an historically attuned analysis, the 
state becomes visible as a dispersed actor with often-contradictory agendas (Sharma and Gupta 2006) 
that actively constituted and perpetuated the fripe’s performative constitution as a ‘black box’, or as a 
realm beyond state knowledge and control. This in turn draws attention to the apparent “margins of 
state power” as crucial sites for unpacking the performativity of governance (Roitman 2004: 193) and 
for reconsidering “illegality as evolving political construct” (Bennafla 2014: 1340).  
 
 
b. From ‘informal market proliferation’ to the fripe as realm of city-making  
 
The systems of differentiation that have positioned the fripe on the margins of shifting delimitations of 
‘the economy’ also pushed the urban fripe trade beyond “the limits of recognition, archives and 
recording” (Roy 2011: 227) that delineate what can be considered part of the historically constituted 
‘urban order’ in Tunis. The performative framings that exclude certain economic activities from ‘the 
 
15 Industrial fripe sorting is regulated as part of the Tunisian textile sector and is thus under the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Industry; 
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national economy’ thus work simultaneously to omit them from urban planning or development 
policies. Consequently, such economic activities remain confined to ‘informal’ occupations of space 
that in turn renders them ‘transgressive’ of urban property regimes and so vulnerable to eviction or other 
forms of repressive governance. 
 
While there is no single, established body of scholarship on urban economies, what is called ‘urban 
studies’ has discussed how diverse forms of ‘economy’ are not only located in, but also actively reshape, 
contemporary cities. Two distinct scholarly foci mirror the systems of differentiation set out above, with 
a first strand of research focusing on economic forces that are intentionally accommodated, and thus 
‘included’ in urban planning and development policies, and a second strand investigating economies 
that remain ‘excluded’ and are often repressively governed as ‘informal economies’. The first strand 
has discussed relationships between hegemonic market forces and city-making, for instance through 
speculative urban development (Shin and Kim 2016), creative urban economies as drivers of neoliberal 
growth agendas (Peck 2005), or the production of aesthetic registers deemed conducive to urban 
competitiveness and ‘world city’ status (Ghertner 2011). Such research has also drawn attention to the 
exclusions produced by such policies, resulting not only in displacements of residents (Leitner and 
Sheppard 2018; Lees et al. 2015), but also of forms of economic activity judged incompatible with 
development agendas. From the closure of mills and factories in Bangalore for freeing up space for 
speculative real estate development (Goldman 2011; Gupta and Medappa 2020), to the mass 
displacement of small-scale manufacturing workshops in Cairo to attract financial capital and develop 
modern consumption spaces (Abaza 2001; Denis 2009; Elyachar 2005); the systems of differentiation 
drawing lines between desirable and undesirable ‘urban economies’ often translate into the top-down 
imposition of radical urban change processes. 
 
The second strand of research in urban studies has focused – explicitly or implicitly – on ‘informal 
economies’, often in cities in the Global South. This research has frequently explored people’s 
livelihood-making strategies in conditions of urban uncertainty, from practices of “hustling” (Di Nunzio 
2019; Thieme 2013, 2017), to the art of striking alliances or “knotting” (De Boeck 2015(b)), to devising 
mechanisms of “navigating the city” (McFarlane and Silver 2017). Such ethnographic analysis 
highlights the imbrication of diverse income-generating activities in webs of social, cultural and 
political relations that unfold in, and are constitutive to, urban space. Certain research has also focused 
more specifically on informal markets and street vending. Setting out from transgressions of formal 
property regimes (Brown et al. 2015; Steck et al. 2013) and infringements on public space (Anjaria 
2006), such scholarly work often emphasises the contested urban governance of informal trading 
activities. Moments of confrontation, such as clearance and relocation campaigns, therefore frequently 
become starting points for exploring the political agendas (Huang et al. 2014; Young 2017) and urban 
development strategies (Boonjubun 2017; Spire and Choplin 2017) underpinning the repressive 
governance of ‘informal economies’. 
 
Dominant framings of the fripe associate it with such ‘informal urban economies’, both in categorising 
the economic activities and the spatial forms that mark its presence in the city. This research however 
constructs an account of the fripe as urban economy that interrogates the prefix of the ‘informal’. It 
emphasises the fripe economy’s role in structuring urban space, taking issue with the association of “the 
informal” with “a lack of form”, which has at times translated into a focus on “pure improvisation, 
transience and simplicity” (Gago 2017: 15, 48), or a disproportionate emphasis on “the kinetic” over 
“the static” (Mehrotra 2002: 98). Countering such portrayals, the fripe is shown to be an historically 
constituted market form, building upon scholarship that has examined the historicity of marketplaces 
that otherwise tend to be approached as ephemeral or devoid of structure (Monteith 2019). In Tunis, the 
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term al-fripe has come to denominate distinct and stable market forms, demonstrating the fripe trade’s 
capacity to lastingly alter urban space. Beyond a narrow focus on marketplaces, or general terms such 
as “street trading” that have often precluded “an interest in economic activities per se” (Morange 2015: 
253), this thesis deliberately investigates how specific economic processes can order urban space. It 
therefore extends research on North African cities that has examined the role of trade with made-in-
China commodities in structuring not only marketplaces, but entire commercial districts (Bouhali 2016, 
2018) or urban conglomerations (Gherbi et al. 2016).   
 
Rather than an exclusive focus on urban commerce though, this thesis also draws upon studies that have 
examined how dispersed production activities and their networks of distribution – for instance in Delhi’s 
pirate media economy – restructure urban space, “making use of old and new spatial forms” and 
“producing urban density” (Sundaram 2004: 65). Similarly, the fripe’s functioning as an urban economy 
here becomes the basis for analysing its role in city-making. Diverse processes of spatial production in 
the fripe economy – from the auto-construction of markets to the adaptation of existing infrastructures 
– have occurred in defiance of planning regulations or policies and thus remain illegible as forms of 
‘urban order’. Yet this research insists on rendering legible the mechanisms of incorporation that have 
allowed the fripe economy to play a constitutive and structuring role in city-making, thus unsettling 
stable notions of ‘planned’ and ‘unplanned’ or ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ urban space. 
 
 
3. Market- and space-making: the fripe’s enactment as urban economy 
 
The vernacular word creation fripisation explicitly captures this sense of the fripe as a process of city-
making, and although employed in diverse contexts and with diverging meanings, the term always 
confers agency to the fripe – as an unstable object group or an evolving spatial and economic 
configuration – in processes of change. While it can be used to designate the fripe’s growing prominence 
in consumption habits, private wardrobes, or working lives, fripisation is most prominently employed 
to relate the fripe to on-going urban transformations. Capturing interrelations between a particular 
material object, economic processes and urban change, fripisation opens the contemporary 
entanglements of market- and space-making in the fripe economy in Tunis. 
 
To comprehend how economic processes in the fripe structure urban space, this research provides a 
close-up analysis of market-making, drawing upon marketization approaches. As a realm beyond formal 
representations of ‘the market’, researching the fripe necessitates an ethnography of economic practice 
that analyses the contingent forms of valuation work that underpin market-making and situate it in urban 
space. This draws attention to the diverse market-makers involved in fripe valuation, advancing an 
understanding of the economy as collectively enacted in, and constitutive to, urban space. By using this 
approach for understanding the fripe’s constitution as contemporary urban economy, this research opens 
a new perspective on urban transformation in Tunis, where an allegedly marginal urban trade like the 
fripe has rarely been considered an agent of city-making. 
 
 
a. Market-making as ‘valuation work’ and the production of urban space  
 
A conceptual and empirical understanding of the economy as constituted in-process is foregrounded in 
approaches that show how “the economy” and “the market” are not stable and autonomous but rather 
are performatively constituted through the discipline of economics (Callon 1998; Mitchell 1998). 
Fripisation thus echoes writing on “marketization” or “market-making”, which has investigated the role 
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of diverse calculative agencies, technologies and mechanisms of representation in contingently enacting 
the market, and in altering and renegotiating its delimitations over time (Berndt and Boeckler 2009, 
2011; Çalışkan 2010; Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 2010). While this thesis shares a focus on processes 
of market-making, it departs from marketization approaches in two ways. First, as objects oscillating 
between discard and commodity, the fripe preclude a conception of market-making as a hegemonic 
project of representation conditioned by economics as a discipline. Instead, the fripe’s unstable 
commodity status necessitates an ethnographic examination of the processes of valuation that form the 
basis for market-making. Second, fripisation foregrounds an understanding of market-making as a 
spatial practice, setting it in distinct and evolving urban geographies. 
 
The empirical focus on the fripe as a material basis of the economy requires attention to market-making 
practices with discarded objects, hence drawing attention to a sphere of the market that often eludes 
calculation attempts. Fripisation thus draws attention to economic processes rather than their 
representation, digressing from notions of homogenising ‘market expansion’ or imaginaries of 
“perfectly competitive markets” (Garcia-Parpet 1986). Rather, the fripe as unstable commodities in-
process (Kopytoff 1986: 64) elucidate the diverse social, cultural and political processes that “lie inside 
the frame” of the market, avoiding the risk of “mistaking a representation of economic life for its 
practice” (Miller 2002: 219). Instead, empirical emphasis lies on comprehending “the actual practice of 
economies” (ibid: 224) through “observations of what people actually do with things” (ibid 1998(a): 
12). Processes of valuation – or contingent requalification – that enable the fripe to recirculate as 
commodities and to enter renewed cycles of exchange in Tunis, thus take centre stage. While most fripe 
materials remain physically intact, or even unchanged, in their trajectories of circulation in Tunis, 
intangible “processes of translation” (Tsing 2013: 23) – such as sorting, re-packaging, or staging in the 
marketplace – allow objects to become “enrolled in new configurations” (Gregson et al. 2010: 853) that 
requalify them as commodities.  
 
In addition, the prominent role fripisation confers to the fripe in driving change processes that become 
tangible or physically manifest in the urban environment requires an exploration of market-making as 
operating both in and through urban space. Marketization literature has been critiqued for its relative 
disinterest in “market spaces and their material means of realisation” or the way in which “place matters 
to the performance of markets” (Barnes 2008: 1443). By establishing an explicit link between economic 
processes and urban space, fripisation invites a deliberately spatial analysis of market-making, relating 
"circuits and networks of value” to the “practice and performance of economic geographies” (Lee 2006: 
414). To investigate market-making as a spatial process, this inquiry builds on a conception of space as 
a “product of interrelations (…) that is always in the process of being made” and thus remains open to 
change (Massey 2005: 9), here specifically through diverse forms of fripe valuation.  
 
Consequently, the approach to market-making developed in this thesis explicitly relates an ethnographic 
analysis of fripe valuation to situated processes of spatial transformation. Central to this perspective is 
valuation work, a term that is chosen to emphasise the distributed efforts, or multiple individual and 
collective performances, required to retrieve or generate value from the fripe, thus animating new cycles 
of circulation and exchange in Tunis. The term ‘work’ holds together diverse economic practices – 
beyond habitual distinctions between formal labour and informal work, or production and consumption 
– thus expanding the possible market-making agencies and highlighting the often-incommensurable 
registers of value and modes of calculation that co-exist and collide in the making of a particular urban 
economy. As this research demonstrates, situated valuation work around diverse fripe objects co-
constitutes the urban locations in which it occurs, as particular working processes structure urban space, 
alter its uses and meanings, and at times become manifest in the urban built environment or in 
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consolidated socio-spatial ordering patterns. At the same time, valuation work is never approached as 
contained in particular urban locations, but rather is examined for how it sets in motion diverse 
circulations that generate linkages and interdependencies between geographically distant actors and 
sites, producing urban space relationally. 
 
 
b. Socio-material relations and the ‘collective enactment’ of the urban fripe economy 
 
Market-making is often understood as a process of framing or disentanglement, intended to neatly 
delimit ‘the market’ as a bounded set of agencies. This thesis takes a different approach, placing 
emphasis on the multiple relations that connect seemingly disparate sites and actors of valuation work 
and together constitute a basis for market-making in the contemporary urban fripe economy. Following 
conceptions of “waste as infrastructural”, in the sense that its circulation “facilitates processes, affects 
and practices” (Stamatopoulou-Robbins 2019: 23), the fripe as a hybrid discard-commodity here 
becomes the starting point for connecting situated processes of valuation. This implies centring on the 
ways in which diverse actors are connected through their involvement in valuation work with fripe 
objects across the city, foregrounding the socio-material relations of market-making. 
 
Researching ‘urban space’ as relationally constituted through particular socio-material assemblages 
draws on ethnographic research on urban infrastructures. Such scholarship has explored how diverse 
forms of infrastructure – from networked, material systems to seemingly immaterial social relations – 
can variably connect and separate distant and proximate sites and actors, producing effects of both urban 
integration and fragmentation (e.g. Anand 2011; Mains 2012; Björkman 2015; Guma 2020; Larkin 
2008; Fredericks 2018; McFarlane 2008). Some of this research has discussed cities in the MENA 
region, often with an emphasis on the – at times deliberate – incompleteness or uneven distribution and 
reach of infrastructural systems, bringing to the fore a contested politics of infrastructure (e.g. Arefin 
2019; Elyachar 2010; Günel 2019; Nolte and Yacobi 2015; Nucho 2016; Verdeil 2009). This thesis 
builds upon such infrastructural approaches insofar as it examines how processes of fripe valuation 
“enable circulations and distributions of goods, knowledge, meaning, people, and power” (De Boeck 
2012). It thus comprehends valuation processes as interconnected socio-material arrangements that 
become structuring to the urban economy. 
 
The starting point for analysing these structuring processes of the economy is an ethnographic 
examination of the often mundane practices through which different actors perform valuation with fripe 
objects. This research therefore draws upon scholarship that has insisted on the importance of analysing 
“the everyday” (Graham and McFarlane 2015: 2) as revelatory of the continuous making and unmaking 
of the basic infrastructures of urban living (e.g. Ayimpam 2014; De Boeck and Plissart 2004; De Boeck 
2015(a), 2015(b); Simone 2004, 2018). Such studies have insisted on an ethnographic focus on micro-
level urban practices for detecting the contingent emergence of forms of order that “impose their own 
spatial and temporal logic on the city” (De Boeck 2012). It is the tension between individual practices 
of adaptation and improvisation, and the enabling forms of social collectivity that produces the “deep 
relationality” (Simone 2018: 65) constitutive to the urban order.  
 
Similarly, this research comprehends valuation work not as isolated or contained ‘individual practices’ 
but rather analyses what it terms ‘collective enactments’. By connecting situated urban processes of 
valuation work, such collective enactments draw attention to the relational nature of market-making, 
while simultaneously bringing an analysis of precise economic practices to the above-mentioned 
approaches of thinking the urban as constituted through shifting socio-material relations. Analysing 
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valuation work as an integral part of wider collective economic processes and structures has two main 
implications: first, it positions valuation work as always-specific expert practice that is variably enabled 
or constrained by different forms of social organisation structuring such occupations. This shifts 
attention from capacities of adaptation and improvisation – often prevalent in the above-mentioned 
literature – to inter-generational trader lineages, urban kinship configurations, or specific occupational 
identities that structure valuation work in the urban fripe economy. Second, situating such processes in 
the evolving “field of power” of the market (Çalışkan 2010: 202) highlights the hierarchies and often-
contested micro-politics of valuation that determine opportunities for market-making in the urban fripe 
economy. Distinct “power geometries” (Massey 1991: 28) thus create differentiated opportunities for 
participating in valuation work and shape the collective enactments of the fripe economy in urban space. 
 
 
c. Tunis and the fripe as urban economy 
 
Linking diverse sites and actors of valuation work by examining the fripe’s collective enactment in 
urban space deliberately connects processes of market- and space-making in the urban fripe economy. 
Beyond the situated transformations that come to the fore through an examination of fripe valuation 
work in particular urban locations, collective enactments highlight the economy’s wider role in 
structuring urban space, generating patterns and temporalities of circulation that render visible 
interrelated urban geographies of fripisation in contemporary Tunis. Through a close-up analysis of 
such collective enactments of valuation work in urban space, this research examines the singular 
articulations of the fripe as urban economy. The economic and demographic primacy of Tunis and its 
historical role as a hub of the fripe economy provide the rationale for focusing on this particular city, 
without however approaching it as a neatly circumscribed ‘field site’ or administratively defined spatial 
container. Rather, by drawing upon scholarship that has stressed the ever-evolving contours of the city, 
this account extends the typical focus on housing in studying urban transformation in Tunis, centring 
instead on the role of a particular economy in co-producing on-going processes of change. 
 
Tunisian geographers have long underlined the capital city’s primacy in both demographic and 
economic terms (Belhedi 2004: 2). Structural inequalities between Tunisia’s industrialised coastal 
regions and its predominantly rural interior – theorised as a “spatial divide” – were exacerbated due to 
French colonial planning and investment decisions (ibid 2004, 2012). The disproportionate channelling 
of funds into the development of the capital city as the centre of political and economic power and home 
to the majority of French “colons” (settlers) (Signoles et al. 1980) consolidated the primacy of Tunis. 
Combined with mass expropriations of agricultural land, this accelerated migration to the capital city 
from the 1930s onwards (Mejri 2004), a trend that continued unabated until the 1970s (Miossec 1985; 
Signoles 1987). Counting 540,000 inhabitants at independence in 1956, Tunis grew to 1.4 million in 
1984 (Lafi 2017: 51), with largely informal urban sprawl transforming the compact city into an 
urbanising, metropolitan region (Stambouli 1996). Today, the four governorates and 34 municipalities 
that form Greater Tunis16 count more than 2.5 million inhabitants, and over 30% of Tunisia’s total 
population are concentrated in the Tunis metropolitan area that incorporates two rings of peri-urban 
settlements and a first ring of secondary cities (Dlala 2011). 
 
This demographic and economic primacy explains why, from the onset of commercial fripe imports in 
1964, over 50% of all imports were distributed in the capital city, with the second largest city Sfax 
receiving only 10% (Van Groen and Lozer 1976: 6). As a direct consequence of this distribution policy, 
 
16 Greater Tunis, in Fr. “Grand Tunis”, in Ar. “Tounis al-Koubra” is the term used to refer to the metropolitan area of the 
capital city, but does not designate an instance of metropolitan governance;  
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wholesalers began to cluster in Tunis from the 1960s onwards and the first sizable, permanent fripe 
markets emerged in the capital city. While new legislation adopted in 1995 sought to distribute import, 
wholesale and retail licenses evenly across the national territory, this never reversed the concentration 
of the fripe economy in and around the capital city. Especially the pre-eminence of the Tunis container 
port Rades – today the only official import location for fripe in Tunisia – prompted the location of 
sorting factories on the capital city’s peripheries. Until the present day, the largest fripe wholesale hub 
of Tunisia is located in the centre of Tunis and attracts traders from across the country, as well as from 
neighbouring Algeria. Finally, the unparalleled differentiation of fripe retail spaces in Tunis – with a 
diverse array of markets and shops catering to different income groups and specialised in different 
products – attracts customers from far beyond the capital city. 
 
Scholarship on the Tunisian capital city provided a crucial knowledge base for constructing this account 
of the fripe economy as agent of urban change. In the absence of research on the fripe17, and the scarcity 
of scholarly work on urban markets or economies in Tunisia more broadly, research on urban history 
and development constituted a central pillar for developing this account of the fripe as ‘urban economy’. 
Tunisian and, to a lesser extent, French scholarship on urban history (e.g. Ammar 2017; El Ghali 2010; 
Ferjani 2017; Sebag 1998), housing policies and informal settlements (e.g. Chabbi 1986, 2012; Legros 
2003; Miossec 1988; Tayachi 1988), and rural-urban migration (e.g. Sethom 1995; Signoles 1987) 
provided an important backdrop for tracing the fripe’s distinct socio-spatial histories in the capital city. 
In addition, research on contemporary metropolitan growth (e.g. Taleb 2018; Zerai 2019), real estate 
development and speculation (e.g. Barthel 2008; Barthel and Signoles 2006; Ben Othman 2009(a), 
2011; Ben Jalloul 2017), and changing uses of urban public space (e.g. Ben Othman 2009(b); Sebastiani 
and Turki 2016) embedded the analysis of contemporary processes of fripisation, drawing attention to 
shifting notions of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ or blurred boundaries between the ‘urban’ and the ‘rural’ 
which the fripe economy co-produces in Tunis. Finally, research on particular urban districts enhanced 
this thesis’ engagement with localised urban transformations caused by the fripe trade, providing insight 
into the urban policies, renewal or development projects, or changing socio-cultural dynamics that 
allowed different market-makers to invest and reshape such urban spaces (e.g. Abdelkafi 1986, Ben 
Medien 2003, Berry-Chikhaoui 1994).  
 
 
17 At the time of writing, the only available research on the fripe in Tunisia comprised a 1976 survey of the fripe sector (Van 
Groen and Lozer), a case study of a fripe migrant entrepreneur (Boubakri 2002), and a recent book chapter on young men’s 
working lives in the fripe (Gruntz 2019); Library searches in public universities in Tunis, Sfax and Sousse, as well as 
interviews with Tunisian scholars (see Appendix I., Interview 9-15) complemented my search for existing sources on the 









Figure I.2   The city centre of Tunis and the perimeters of the medina 
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4. The structure of the thesis 
 
To investigate the fripe’s constitution as singular urban economy in Tunis, this thesis sets out to answer 
the three questions posed at the beginning of this introduction: in short, it examines the fripe’s 
constitution as distinct and evolving commodity form; its consolidation – and yet contested positioning 
– as a formally delimited sector of the economy and a particular urban market form; and the processes 
that underpin the fripe’s prominent role in co-producing urban change in contemporary Tunis. In order 
to do so, this thesis is structured in two main parts, with each bringing different methods and 
perspectives to understanding the fripe as a singular urban economy. This thesis is based on 
ethnographic research conducted primarily in two main phases, between June and December 2017, and 
between April 2018 and March 2019. This was complemented with regular follow-up visits to particular 
archive spaces, research sites and key interlocutors in 2019 and 2020. The two parts of this thesis feature 
separate introductions, giving space to an in-depth reflection on the mechanisms of knowledge 
production – and their conceptual and political implications – that underpin this account. The structure 
of this thesis thus not only reflects an insistence on attending to historically consolidated political and 
spatial structures for comprehending a contemporary urban economy; it also refuses to bracket 
methodological choices from the arguments constructed, careful to avoid a usage of the term 
“ethnography” that risks “casting a shroud over research practices, spiriting them away from the 
presented analysis and allowing them to escape any scrutiny” (Hitchings and Latham 2020: 978). 
 
The first part of this thesis consists of two chapters (I + II), which examine the historical trajectories 
that position the fripe on the apparent margins of both the formal economy and the contemporary urban 
order. Through an investigation into the fripe’s political economy and socio-spatial histories in post-
independence Tunis, the two chapters challenge the fripe’s performative constitution as ahistorical 
‘black box’ by providing detailed insight into its contingent development as both economic and urban 
realm. They also unpack the distinct motives and politics that have underpinned the fripe’s positioning 
as an ambiguous grey space, deprived of full incorporation into the economy and planned urban order, 
while simultaneously remaining entangled with diverse modes of governing and urban co-production. 
The second part consists of three chapters (III + IV + V), which explore the fripe’s contemporary, 
processual enactment as ‘urban economy’. Setting out from the unstable commodity status of the fripe, 
the three chapters investigate collective enactments of valuation work in Tunis, providing insight into 
market-making as spatial and relational process. Valuation work is therefore examined as constitutive 
to both situated urban transformations – often captured with the vernacular term fripisation – and to 




a. Tracing the fripe’s historical constitution as contested urban economy 
 
The first part of this thesis provides two distinct perspectives on the fripe’s historical constitution as a 
contested ‘urban economy’, interrogating the systems of differentiation that continue to partially 
exclude it from ‘the economy’ and the contemporary ‘urban order’ in Tunis: the first chapter offers an 
investigation of the fripe’s political economy in post-independence Tunisia, and the second chapter 
writes urban counter-histories of the fripe trade as a realm of city-making in the capital.  
 
Chapter I constructs a political economy of the fripe as ‘black box’, investigating three critical 
conjunctures in Tunisia’s post-independence history that provide insight into the fripe’s – always partial 
– incorporation into ‘the economy’ and formal systems of governance. Emphasis lies on the role of 
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different political regimes and state actors in establishing and delimiting the fripe as “qitaa” (formal 
economic sector), while simultaneously producing forms of exclusion that perpetuated framings of the 
fripe as ‘ungovernable’ or ‘illicit’ economy. This chapter analyses how diverse “processes of framing” 
(Callon 1998: 17) – allegedly designed to neatly delimit ‘the economy’ as separately existing and 
measurable sphere – in fact represented performative acts of imperfect delimitation that consistently 
positioned the fripe between the ‘formal’ and the ‘informal’. Such blurry and permanently contested 
delimitations of the fripe as economy were key to open up opportunities for both direct state intervention 
and indirect modes of state participation in the economy over time. This provides an understanding of 
the state as a dispersed and evolving actor not only in the constitution of the fripe economy, but also in 
on-going processes of market-making in which the state intervenes at different levels and in diverse 
formal and informal capacities. 
 
Chapter II traces counter-histories of the fripe trade as a realm of city-making by rewriting the history 
of two flagship urban renewal projects in post-independence Tunis. It examines two centrally located 
Tunis neighbourhoods that featured large-scale urban renewal and development operations post-
independence, and have today become consolidated as hubs for fripe retail and wholesale activities. 
Officially, the fripe trade’s long-standing presence at the heart of both former renewal sites remains 
unaccounted for. Drawing on the life histories of fripe traders whose trajectories of rural-urban 
migration and livelihood-building in the capital intersected with the history of the two flagship projects, 
the chapter recounts the auto-construction and gradual consolidation of fripe markets at the core of the 
urban development sites. Tracing the mechanisms of partial incorporation and pragmatic co-production 
that gradually turned the fripe traders from illegitimate encroachers into project stakeholders, these 
counter-histories reposition an allegedly marginal urban trade and its ‘rural’ migrant constituencies as 
central to the making of the modern urban order. In doing so, this account contests linear narratives of 
post-independence modernisation as a quest against the “ruralisation” of Tunis (Berry-Chikhaoui 1994: 




b. The fripe’s contemporary enactment as singular ‘urban economy’  
 
The second part of this thesis centres on valuation work and its collective enactments as an empirical 
entry point to understanding the co-production of the urban and the economic that comes to the fore 
through contemporary processes of fripisation in Tunis. Three chapters structure the investigation into 
market-making in the fripe as relational and spatial process, each of which examines a particular 
collective enactment of valuation work in present-day Tunis. Just as these collective enactments render 
visible diverse and entangled market-making agencies across contemporary Tunis, they also show how 
market-making co-constitutes urban space, beyond common understandings of fripisation as informal 
market proliferation in the Tunis inner-city.  
 
Chapter III explores distributed processes of valuation work around fripe shoes, a commodity that is 
nominally banned from circulation on the Tunisian domestic market but is in fact widely traded and 
represents one of the most sought-after and expensive fripe items in Tunis marketplaces. While the 
chapter provides an analysis of the situated valuation work accomplished with fripe shoes in three key 
sites of the contemporary urban fripe economy, it also examines the multiple circulations – of 
merchandise, credit, cash, people or information – that connect these urban locations and actors of 
valuation work. Beyond a careful analysis of the localised urban transformations that occur in sites of 
fripe shoe valuation, the chapter thus sheds light on the webs of relations that come to the fore through 
 20 
a close-up examination of fripe shoe valuation. Honing in on a nominally ‘illicit commodity’ renders 
particularly apparent the diverse forms of state participation in the contingent mechanisms of movement 
and stoppage that structure unequal opportunities for value extraction from fripe shoe circulations in 
present-day Tunis. 
 
Chapter IV then investigates the collective enactment of a formerly residential street in central Tunis as 
a specialised fripe marketplace, and thus as a site for valuation work with diverse fripe objects. 
Empirical emphasis lies on the agency of diverse fripe traders in devising synchronised mechanisms of 
circulation that enabled the street’s rapid fripisation, or transformation into a densely occupied market. 
Setting out from a close-up analysis of the patterns of coordination that became consolidated in distinct 
market forms, the chapter explores why processes of fripisation remain nevertheless on-going, with 
periodic shifts in density and market proliferation constituting the marketplace as a spatial entity in 
process. By honing in on the routinised practices of boundary making and boundary transgression of 
traders with different positions in market hierarchies, this analysis provides insight into the 
marketplace’s functioning in a complex tension between consolidation and movement. Such insights 
allow for a critical reconsideration of the fripe markets’ long-standing definition as a problem of urban 
governance. Historical legacies of governing urban marketplaces through the imposition of fixed spatial 
enclosures are brought to bear on a contemporary relocation campaign in the street market here 
analysed, to illustrate the impossibility of abstracting market forms from market processes.  
 
Chapter V focuses on the collective performance of ‘bale opening’ – the moment of disclosure of new 
fripe merchandise – in a particular Tunis marketplace. It examines how fripe vendors, market customers 
and a mix of curious spectators and passers-by jointly enact the marketplace as a stage for valuation 
work on these bi-weekly occasions. Strictly synchronised temporalities and ritualised interactions stage 
the bale opening as a recurrent event that is central to comprehending the appeal of fripe markets to 
diverse urban dwellers, not only as sites of fripe consumption but also as spaces of leisure, sociability 
and unexpected socio-material encounters. The temporary togetherness emerging in these ritualised 
events offers opportunities for ‘being in public’ that set the fripe apart from other urban marketplaces. 
The norms of collective fripe valuation not only temporarily push into the background the markers of 
difference that typically structure social interactions, but also offer opportunities for public appearance 
and participation to gender and social groups whose access to the public realm often remains restricted. 
In addition, the bale openings become the stage for contingent processes of cultural co-production. 
Inherently unpredictable encounters with heterogeneous fripe objects from ‘elsewhere’ become the 
basis for open-ended attempts of incorporation, resulting at times in the remaking of the fripe into new 
commodity forms and at others in failures of translation that disqualify the fripe from market exchange. 
In such moments of failed translation, the fripe is exposed as discard, providing the basis for the 
articulation of a distinct politics of fripe consumption. 
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Figure 2   Fripe display in front of a demolished building in central Tunis (2019) 
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Part One: Introduction  
Histories of the present: researching a contested urban economy 
 
 
The introduction to this thesis set out an approach to researching the fripe as a singular urban economy 
that foregrounds the multiple temporal and spatial processes that co-constitute it as an evolving realm 
of the contemporary city. While the term fripisation highlights the continuous entanglements between 
market- and space-making that position the fripe at the forefront of contemporary urban change 
processes, the urban fripe economy also consists of economic and spatial structures that have been 
consolidated over time. Comprehending the fripe as a present-day urban economy therefore necessitates 
an explicit engagement with the historical processes through which the term al-fripe turned from a 
simple designator for second-hand materials into the name for a distinct economic sector in Tunisia and 
of particular urban trading spaces. The two chapters forming Part One of this thesis thus address 
particularly the first and second research question set out in the introduction, examining the fripe’s 
historicity as an evolving commodity form in Tunis and its inherently contested delimitation as a sector 
of the Tunisian economy. They also trace back the histories of market- and space-making that account 
for the fripe trade’s prominent, and yet often unwanted, presence at the heart of the contemporary 
capital.  
 
A variety of methodological challenges arose, however, in the attempt to construct historical accounts 
of the fripe’s changing political economy and the fripe trade’s role in urban change processes in Tunis. 
As the first section below explicates, conventional empirical points of departure for researching the 
fripe as evolving economic sector, and as historically constituted socio-spatial realm of Tunis, proved 
unsuccessful. This required a fundamental shift in research methods and a turn towards alternative 
historical sources and forms of historical knowledge, as discussed in the second section. The final 
section then examines the epistemological questions that emerged from the patchwork of methods and 
sources used to construct accounts of the urban fripe economy with temporal depth. 
 
 
1. Encountering the fripe as ‘black box’ 
 
Examining the role of the state in the fripe’s constitution as economy, and investigating the distinct 
urban histories of the fripe trade in Tunis were two crucial starting points for my research. As the 
following section sets out, both of these points of departure in fact stood in contrast to, first, typical 
framings of second-hand economies as ‘non-state economies’ and, second, informal urban economies 
as devoid of knowable historical structures. Despite similar framings of the fripe in the Tunisian context, 
the next section explores why an explicit engagement with the state as actor in the economy, and an 
examination of the fripe trade’s entanglement with processes of urban change and development was 
indispensable. It then discusses how I initiated research, and how both attempts resulted in an impasse, 
confronting me with urgent methodological questions. 
 
 
a. The fripe beyond realms of official state knowledge 
 
Prominent framings of the fripe as “iqtisad mwazi” (parallel economy) in Tunisia, and thus as realm of 
the economy that lies by definition beyond state oversight, reflect broader framings of second-hand 
clothes economies as informal economies: “problematic categorizations of used and discarded goods” 
(Gregson and Crang 2015: 161) have often resulted in high levels of mis-declarations, resulting in a 
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lack of reliable statistics and data required to quantify the global used garment trade. This has earned 
the global second-hand trade the label of a “shadow world” that “is associated with deviant economic 
activity that continues the long-term connection with criminality” (Brooks 2015: 72, 157). Relatedly, a 
focus on cross-border smuggling of used garments (Ayimpam 2014; Hernandez and Loureiro 2017; 
Machado and Loureiro 2015; Milgram 2008) and informal diaspora trading networks (Abimbola 2011; 
Kouakou 2017; Rosenfeld 2019) in scholarly work emphasises a functioning of the economy beyond 
state control. This mirrors tendencies to comprehend waste economies as “separate economic realms” 
that function outside the dominant logics of value creation in the ‘formal economy’ and are thus often 
approached as a priori “non-state economies” (Grant and Oteng 2012: 2, 3).  
 
However, in the context of Tunisia, insight into the prominent involvement of the state in the economy 
precluded a framing of the fripe as a non-state or parallel economy from the outset: first, I discovered 
legislation and government regulation that clearly delimited the fripe as “qitaa rasmi” (official sector) 
of the economy in Tunisia, and revealed the implication of diverse state institutions – from ministries 
to the customs authorities and local government – in the regulation of the contemporary fripe economy. 
Second, my research with diverse actors in the fripe revealed the varieties of state involvement and 
intervention in the economy, directly contradicting the idea of the fripe as “realm distinct from state 
power” (Roitman 2004: 192).  I therefore tried to gain access to state institutions and agencies in the 
beginning of my research. At first, I contacted the state bodies responsible for formal knowledge 
production on the Tunisian economy, and subsequently, I attempted to schedule interviews with the 
state institutions officially involved in the regulation of the fripe economy. Yet, both attempts were met 
with little success. Not only was I denied access to written materials and state institutions for direct 
interviews, I was also repeatedly confronted with a denial of state involvement in – or state knowledge 
of – the fripe economy. 
 
I began by directing information requests for reports and data on the fripe economy to diverse state 
agencies habitually charged with knowledge production on the economy. When these remained 
unanswered, I paid direct visits to diverse formal institutions, for instance the National Consumer 
Agency (INC), the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), or the Foreign Investment Promotion 
Agency (FIPA) in the hope of gaining direct access to information on the fripe economy through 
interviews. However, written data and reports were either declared unavailable or undisclosed for the 
fripe sector, and many institutions did not consider the fripe as lying within their organisational remit, 
due to its status as iqtisad mwazi. As a second step, I traced the responsibilities of five different state 
ministries, as well as branches of the local state, in regulatory oversight of the fripe economy on the 
basis of the 1995 framework legislation for the sector. My requests for interviews with these state 
institutions remained however mostly unanswered or immediately rejected, often by the receptionists 
of the respective state institution when I resorted to direct visits after unsuccessful phone and email 
contact. The few favourable answers often entailed long hours of waiting and eventually resulted in 
last-minute cancellations or futile meetings with public relations officials unwilling or unauthorised to 
refer me to more specialized staff. In the few instances where interviews actually did take place, this 
was either due to a misunderstanding – for instance, being mistaken as a German investor – or 
increasingly vague formulations of my research interests that had state actors agree to discuss the textile 
sector. More targeted inquiries about the fripe risked prematurely ending the conversation, or resulted 
in the ever-same portrayal of the fripe as ‘black box’ or realm evading state regulation, oversight and 
knowledge. Such portrayals were often contrasted to “qitaat adiya” (normal sectors) of the economy, 
most prominently “qitaa al-nasij” (the textile sector) which was differentiated from the fripe on the 
basis of its character as “sinaa” (productive industry) and for which an abundance of different state 
reports and data were readily available. 
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These setbacks confronted me with a methodological challenge: While state involvement in the 
contemporary fripe economy was clearly important and diverse state actors had delimited and shaped 
the fripe as ‘formal sector’ in Tunisia over time, state knowledge of the fripe economy seemed either 
unavailable or inaccessible. Consequentially, what other methods and sources could I find for 
researching the role and agency of the state – or rather diverse state actors – in the fripe economy in 
both past and present? 
 
 
b. The fripe’s absence from urban history 
 
Discourses of fripisation prominently associate the urban fripe trade with “fawda” (chaos) and on-going 
processes of arbitrary encroachment and proliferation in the city, thus positioning fripe marketplaces as 
clearly ‘outside’, or even subversive to, the planned urban order.  This mirrors portrayals of informal 
urban economies in diverse contexts, where “informality” automatically translates into “a perceived 
lack of form or structure” (Gago 2017:15). Emphasis on processes of flexible improvisation, adaptation 
and appropriation in scholarly work on informal markets and informal vending (Evers and Seale 2015; 
Racaud et al. 2018; Young 2017) has often highlighted the ephemeral and kinetic over the enduring and 
static. Informal urban markets have therefore often been described as “places of transient inhabitation”, 
that generate an “accelerated space” (Mörtenböck and Mooshammer 2008: 348), reinforcing their 
positioning as inherently subversive – rather than constitutive – to whatever is defined as ‘planned urban 
order’. Consequentially, few studies have explicitly engaged with the historicity of “informal” 
marketplaces from a perspective that opens up an understanding of their structuring role to urban space 
over time (Monteith 2016; 2019).  
 
However, in the case of the urban fripe economy in Tunis, it became rapidly evident that many 
prominent marketplaces in the city were consolidated decades ago, with the oldest permanent markets 
having remained in the same spaces since the 1960s. In addition, I learnt that many of the traders had 
been working on the same stalls or in the same marketplace for their entire working life, and that many 
had passed on their business to their sons or other younger family members. This stability directly 
contradicted discourses of fripisation as ephemeral proliferation and pointed to the long and complex 
socio-spatial history of particular fripe marketplaces in the city. In addition, the fact that many of these 
fripe marketplaces were located at the very heart of the city – and indeed, on the sites of prominent 
post-independence urban renewal projects – went counter to the idea of fripe markets existing on the 
margins of the city and its planned ‘modern order’. Therefore, I set out to examine the fripe’s distinct 
socio-spatial histories in Tunis and, more specifically, its relation to urban planning in the capital city. 
For this purpose, I first began a systematic search for primary and secondary historical sources on the 
fripe trade in the city of Tunis. Second, I undertook targeted research on urban spaces where the fripe 
trade is today prevalent in Tunis, attempting to consult specialised public and private urban archives, as 
well as organisations, planners, architects, urbanists and local decision-makers who had been directly 
involved in or witnessed urban transformations of these particular sites or neighbourhoods. However, 
both avenues for research led to a dead end, confronting me with a seemingly complete absence of 
historical material and a general unwillingness to discuss the fripe’s role in shaping the modern urban 
order. 
 
Tedious procedures of formal registration and introduction marked the slow start of my search for 
historical sources. Once I had gained access, I searched the National Archives, the National Library, 
and the libraries and existing catalogues of doctoral and Master’s theses of public universities in Tunis, 
Sousse and Sfax. Once my independent research proved unsuccessful, attempts to direct my inquiries 
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about the fripe directly to staff of the different institutions of knowledge production and knowledge 
storage were unexceptionally met with astonishment, triggering at times laughter and at times outright 
annoyance. Regardless of the reaction, the absence of historical sources on the fripe was then mostly 
affirmed without further probing or verification, and was explained to me by its status as “tijarat al-
zwawila” (poor people’s trade) that had never entered official records or been considered a subject 
worthy of research in its own right. Similarly, targeted investigations about the history of particular 
urban fripe marketplaces – for instance in private planning and architecture offices, two heritage 
preservation organisations in the Tunis medina, or an association for traditional crafts18 – produced few 
tangible results. Some of my interlocutors were explicit that the fripe was not considered part of 
“turath” (heritage) or “taqalid” (traditions), and contrasted it with other urban crafts and noble trades 
– such as silk weaving or the chechias19 – for which they claimed a distinct “tarikh omrani” (urban 
history) that linked them to particular urban spaces of production and trade. Others, particularly 
planners, urbanists and architects, proved unwilling to discuss the fripe’s central presence in the midst 
of the urban renewal sites to which they had contributed. At best, I obtained accounts of the fripe trade 
as a scapegoat for the perceived failure or perversion of initial urban planning visions. 
 
Once again, I was faced with a methodological challenge: While the fripe’s contemporary ubiquity at 
the heart of the capital city called for an explicit engagement with its urban history and relation to 
planning and other processes of urban change, the fripe appeared to have “dropped out of history” 
(Tsing 2015: 20) in the capital. How should I go about finding alternative historical sources that could 
account for the fripe’s ubiquitous, and yet contested, positioning in the city?  
 
 
2. Alternative methods for knowing the fripe as urban economy 
 
Responding to the challenges emerging from this first phase of research, I shifted the focus of empirical 
inquiry towards the diverse materials, processes and practices that co-constituted the fripe as 
contemporary urban economy in Tunis. This never implied losing sight of the state’s role in the 
economy, or the fripe trade’s distinct urban histories. Rather, the goal was to re-engage with the state 
and diverse registers of historical knowledge from a new perspective and through different channels of 
access. As the next two sections outline, a second phase of ethnographic research between April 2018 
and March 2019 opened up new ways for investigating the state as an actor in the urban economy and 
for researching the multi-layered socio-spatial histories of the fripe in Tunis. First, strategies and 
channels for accessing informal registers of knowledge within formal institutions now took centre stage, 
as did engagements with the state as a dispersed actor encountered at multiple levels and in diverse 
capacities. Second, a “patchwork process” (Bou Akar 2018: 14) juxtaposing diverse storylines and oral 




a. Re-engaging the state as a central actor in the fripe economy 
 
Explicit attempts to re-engage with the high-level state institutions I had sought to solicit at the 
beginning of my research followed after several months of intensive, ethnographic research on the 
 
18 Association de la Sauvegarde de la Medina (ASM), Institut National du Patrimoine (INP), Office National de l’Artisanat 
Tunisien (ONAT) see Appendix I, Interview 16–18; 
19 The chechia is the national head covering of Tunisia and its manufacture in the Tunis medina dates back to the 15th 
century; 
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circuits of economic activity that co-constitute the contemporary urban fripe economy of Tunis. This 
re-engagement was now based on numerous, external accounts of the state as complex and multi-layered 
actor in the fripe economy in the past and present. As a consequence, emphasis no longer lay on 
accessing formal knowledge on the fripe economy such as quantitative data or reports. Rather, I now 
sought to access diverse registers of informal knowledge within state institutions that could help to trace 
the role of different political regimes and state actors in delimiting the fripe as a contested realm of the 
economy over time. I complimented this with attempts to comprehend the various layers and capacities 
of involvement that rendered the state a dispersed economic actor and participant in the urban fripe 
economy. 
 
In contrast to portrayals of the fripe as a non-state economy, encounters with the sector elite in the fripe 
had in fact opened direct access to various state ministries. Powerfully-placed fripe importers and 
wholesalers often established the first contact on my behalf, taking on a gatekeeper role and vouching 
for my good intentions. In addition to such preferential access points to high-level positions in the 
ministries, several strategies now helped me to gain insight into more informal registers of state 
knowledge. First, shifting interview locations from offices to cafes or restaurants in the surroundings of 
state institutions proved central to generating more informal conversations, with shared lunch breaks 
constituting the most favourable setting for relaxed discussions. Second, I now abstained from recording 
and often kept my notebook stored away until the conversation was in full swing and I was certain that 
my note-taking would no longer interrupt the flow of speech. Third, a switch from French – the language 
I had first used for engaging with state officials – to Tunisian Arabic changed both the tone of 
engagement and expanded the scope of conversation to personal anecdotes, inside jokes and rumours. 
In addition, I had learnt variably to show off or to understate my knowledge of the fripe economy: at 
times, feigning relative ignorance allowed for hearing ‘the full narrative’ of my interlocutors, often 
revealing their distinct positioning or the limits of their insights into the economy. At other times, 
demonstrating – or even exaggerating – my knowledge of the economy and its actors established a 
shared knowledge base that built trust and allowed for in-depth discussions. My identity as a foreign, 
female researcher was often helpful in arousing the curiosity of the almost exclusively male and middle-
aged state interlocutors, and simultaneously signalled a status as non-threatening ‘outsider’ in 
ministries, state agencies and in the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT). At the same time, my 
foreign passport resulted in denied access, at times for alleged ‘security reasons’ as was the case in the 
Ministry of Interior or the Tunis container port, and at others for suspicions of being a foreign journalist, 
for instance in the customs authorities. 
 
In addition to ethnographic encounters with national-level state institutions, I now investigated various 
forms and levels of state involvement in the urban fripe economy simultaneously. I thus met different 
levels of the local state in Tunis, including members of the governorate and the municipal council, that 
were involved in licensing procedures and in the contested governance of urban fripe marketplaces. 
Simultaneously, my research in fripe marketplaces, wholesale areas and sorting factories now meant 
that I was confronted with various branches of the state that actively participated in everyday practices 
and processes in the urban fripe economy. At times, I encountered the state in formal capacities of 
regulatory oversight or tax collection, and began interactions with municipal employees responsible for 
the everyday governance of specific marketplaces. At other times, I now confronted diverse state actors 
alongside my interlocutors in the fripe economy. Actors in the fripe economy often refer to the state as 
“al-hakim” – a term that tellingly conflates the ‘government’ with the ‘police’ and ‘jurisdiction’ – 
showing how the lines between formal and informal state action blur, with various state actors being 
prominently associated with tedious negotiations, illegitimate extractive practices and violence.  
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b. Uncovering the multiple urban histories of the fripe  
 
Similar to re-engagements with the state during the second phase of ethnographic research, the failure 
to track down a written urban history – or even historical sources – on the fripe as urban economy 
demanded alternative methods of constructing urban histories. While the fripe remained absent from 
official accounts of urban development and history in Tunis, it soon revealed itself as a multi-layered 
realm of stories, urban legends and mythical figures. In stark contrast to contexts where the second-
hand economy evokes shame and thus represents an unpopular topic of discussion (Stamatopoulou-
Robbins 2011:66), the fripe proved a fruitful conversation starter with urban dwellers of diverse age 
groups, gender and social class in Tunis. The vast majority of urban dwellers voluntarily offered stories 
about the “monde de la fripe” (universe of the fripe), often mixed with personal anecdotes linked to 
particular marketplaces, curious finds or encounters. The absence of formal historical knowledge stood 
thus in stark contrast with innumerable, diverging storylines that brought the fripe to life as a realm of 
urban experiences, memories and imaginaries, in which nothing is known for certain. 
 
These multiple and at times contradictory storylines provided new impetus for constructing particular 
historical accounts of the fripe as a distinct realm of market- and space-making in Tunis. The 
predominance of family lineages in the fripe economy – including the often-remarkable endurance of 
traders in particular urban locations across generations – turned into the single most important basis for 
constructing accounts with temporal depth. From powerfully positioned import- and wholesale 
dynasties to father-to-son lineages of market traders, ethnographic engagement with traders across two, 
and in one exceptional case across three generations, became a crucial component of this research. First, 
such intergenerational encounters provided insight into the fripe’s evolving political economy in post-
independence Tunisia, especially its shifting hierarchies and working identities. Second, targeted 
interviews with trader lineages that had remained anchored in the same urban location over generations 
became a basis for tracing back the fripe’s trade’s role in distinct processes of urban change.  
 
Access to the life stories of the older generation of fripe traders drew my attention to the rural migrant 
origins of the vast majority of those who built livelihoods in the urban fripe trade in Tunis during the 
1960s and 1970s. A more close-up and explicit engagement with such life histories required the gradual 
build-up of trust, and only after months – and in two cases, a year – of regular engagement did I dare to 
ask for permission to record the accounts of such individual trajectories. Explaining my endeavour to 
record such personal accounts in order to reconstruct histories of the urban fripe trade as both a realm 
of livelihood- and city-making in Tunis encouraged traders to participate, allowing them to tell a story 
that remained unknown or unrecognised. While my gender often seemed to present a disadvantage to 
my engagements with predominantly male interlocutors in the fripe economy, being female and 
relatively young in relation to the traders whoe life histories I recorded helped to open up intimate 
conversations, in which I was often referred to as “binti” (my daughter) and took on the role of a patient 
listener. I recorded 7 life history accounts of unequal length, with the longest one recorded over three 
sittings in both the market stall and private home of the trader. The accounts allowed my interlocutors 
to construct subjective storylines, with myself retreating to the position of periodically recentring their 
accounts to the precise urban sites – of market- and space-making – around which their life trajectories 
revolved. 
 
Anchoring such storylines in contemporary urban spaces of the fripe economy allowed me to triangulate 
information and to relate subjective accounts of the past to broader processes of urban change that had 
reshaped space in the post-independence city. As two of the most prominent fripe markets of Tunis are 
located at the heart of former urban renewal projects, recorded life histories with traders enabled a 
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rewriting of the fripe and its constituencies into accounts of urban development.  On this basis, I was 
then able to re-solicit particular archive spaces, as well as official stakeholders of urban development, 
such as planners, urbanists, architects and local decision-makers. Both the capacity to challenge 
framings of the fripe as ahistorical ‘black box’ with highly precise information, and a focus on informal 
access routes, produced greater success than at the start of my research. For instance, several Tunisian 
academics I had met and – on one occasion, worked with – now acted as gatekeepers to archive spaces, 
most importantly the National Archives where I was subsequently able to access un-indexed boxes. 
Similarly, individual stakeholders involved in the urban renewal projects I was researching helped me 
gain access to planning documents and evaluation reports. More importantly still, their accounts helped 
me fill the gaps in the official narratives of urban renewal from which the fripe trade and its 
constituencies remained absent. Overall, research duration was a central factor in enabling access to 
urban histories of the fripe: both because stakeholders in the fripe and in the urban renewal projects 
only revealed stories gradually with rising levels of trust, and because the careful construction of 




3. Constructing a historical account of the fripe as urban economy 
 
The different research methods and patchwork of sources that were combined to construct historical 
accounts of the fripe as urban economy in Chapter I and II raise a series of crucial epistemological 
questions. First, while these methods enable the construction of accounts with temporal depth, how do 
they differ from conventional ‘history’-writing and what particular notion of ‘temporality’ or ‘time’ 
underpins them? Second, how do the methods used to research the state as an evolving actor over time 
influence understandings of ‘the state’ and ‘state action’, and how does this effect the political economy 
account Chapter I constructs? Finally, why can the accounts of urban renewal produced in Chapter II 
be understood as ‘counter-histories’ that challenge dominant epistemologies of ‘the urban’? 
 
Addressing the first question, it is necessary to acknowledge that there was no written ‘history’ that 
could have formed a starting point for this research, also implying no standard ‘periodisation’ nor 
‘chronology’ of the fripe that could have structured the inquiry. The goal of this research was never to 
construct an untold ‘history of the fripe’ that would start from some pre-determined origin point in the 
past. Rather, it aimed to build a history, or rather histories, of the present, thus adopting a genealogical 
approach. Consequentially, the attempt to gain an understanding of the urban fripe economy with 
temporal depth was here initiated by a problem posed in the present, namely the fripe’s prominent, and 
yet contested positioning as both ‘economy’ and ‘urban presence’ in contemporary Tunis. To do this, 
an “archaeological method” (Krarup 2021: 19) that pieced together different  historical sources and 
knowledge to enable a comprehension of the fripe’s present-day positioning as urban economy took 
centre stage. This included ethnographic encounters and oral accounts in an approach to “history as 
human story-telling practice” (Tsing 2015: 168) that is always subjective, often characterised by 
intentional or unintentional lacunae, and must be understood in the context of the particular spaces and 
situations in which it is recounted, recorded or written. Both chapters follow the archaeologist’s method 
of using particular finds or elements for making connections and assembling a larger storyline, while 
remaining aware of the performative act of construction that underpins the final accounts. Confronted 
with multiple, and at times contradictory, storylines, my goal was not simply to triangulate them to 
discern verifiable ‘facts’. Rather, the interpretation of my interlocutors’ accounts as multiple, 
performative acts of constructing histories revealed crucial information about the dominant narratives 
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and epistemologies that order understandings of the past and present and thus co-determine the fripe’s 
present-day positioning as contested urban economy. 
 
Concerning narration and history then, both chapters explicitly abstain from marking any type of origin 
story. Multiple other alternative beginnings – and endings – could have been chosen to construct 
accounts of both the fripe’s political economy and its urban histories in Tunis. The intention is not to 
strive for completeness or linearity, but instead to use distinct temporal conjunctures and particular 
urban spaces to comprehend change processes over time. While the phrase “post-independence” is 
adopted in the following two chapters to refer to the overall temporal scope of the accounts, this does 
not imply a simplified understanding of the moment of Tunisian independence in 1956 as a neat rupture. 
On the contrary, this research emphasises how colonial legacies of both economic governance and urban 
planning lie at the heart of comprehending the fripe’s political economy and positioning in the capital 
city post-independence. This research is also aware of the important pre-colonial and colonial histories 
of ruba fikia trade that could have been narrated. The temporal focus on “post-independence” Tunisia 
and Tunis in the following accounts is thus, first and foremost, a pragmatic choice that reflects the 
importance of oral sources – and especially contemporary witnesses – for constructing these histories. 
In addition, the onset of large-scale imports of civilian used clothing during the first decade after 
independence marks an important moment of change that can be used as a form of beginning for the 
accounts here constructed. Unprecedented amounts of commercial fripe imports during the 1960s posed 
both a question of governance to the newly independent Tunisian state and led to a proliferation of fripe 
trading in the capital, coinciding with the ‘era of the plan’ when Tunis was reshaped by large-scale 
urban renewal.  
 
Regarding the second question, the methods used to examine the evolving government of the fripe as 
realm of the Tunisian economy foreground a particular epistemology of ‘the state’. The deliberate 
engagement with informal registers of state knowledge that underpins this research emphasises the 
performativity of governing, demonstrating the co-existence of diverse – official and unofficial – 
discursive state practices in the fripe economy. This draws attention to performative processes of 
inclusion and exclusion that shifted the remit of the state’s responsibility and knowledge over time, 
delimiting the fripe variably as formal sector of the economy or as parallel economic realm and ‘black 
box’. In addition, encounters with the state at different levels and in highly different capacities and roles 
in the fripe economy necessitate an understanding of the state as a dispersed and non-unitary actor 
(Sharma and Gupta 2006) operating through a wide register of interventions in the fripe economy, 
spanning law-making to direct extractive practices. This informs the understanding of the state as an 
actor in the contemporary urban fripe economy (expanded upon in Part Two) and influences the account 
of the fripe’s post-independence political economy constructed in Chapter I: drawing upon 
“genealogical approaches” that refute “the certitudes of given categories” (Gidwani 2008: xvii), ‘the 
state’ and ‘the economy’ are considered to be constituted in-process, with multiple entanglements, but 
also performances of alterity, periodically collapsing or enacting boundaries between them. 
 
Concerning the third question, the methods used to construct an account of the fripe trade and its social 
constituencies as agents of urban renewal in Chapter II reveal ‘counter-histories’ of urban 
transformation in post-independence Tunis. Examining two prominent urban renewal sites that 
inadvertently turned into major fripe trading centres, the histories Chapter II traces run counter to the 
official discourses of post-independence planning and modernisation in Tunis. Methodologically, the 
focus on individual life trajectories of fripe traders becomes a mechanism for reading such subjective, 
oral accounts against written project documentation, planning discourses and archival material. In doing 
so, these counter-histories confer central agency to rural migrant constituencies in the fripe trade that 
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not only remain absent from historical accounts, but also continue to be positioned outside the 
recognised ‘urban order’. The comparison and confrontation of such diverse forms of data for rewriting 
the histories of two particular urban sites thus counters normative categories of “progress” and “order” 
underpinning habitual epistemologies of “urban planning” (Bou Akar 2018: 4). Rather, the counter-
histories here constructed demonstrate how official processes of city-making strategically incorporated 
the alleged margins to produce urban change. The empirical focus on two particular marketplaces 
enables the anchoring of critiques of dominant accounts of urban transformation in precise locations. In 
doing so, the counter-histories unsettle the dualisms between planned and unplanned space, and official 
city-makers and encroachers, that continue to define the fripe trade as subversive, rather than 









Figure 3   Discarded fripe materials behind a Tunis sorting factory (2017) 
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Chapter I 
Constructing a political economy of the fripe as ‘black box’ 
 
 
In December 2017, Chokri Chniti, a well-known fripe importer and sorting factory owner, was arrested 
at Tunis airport for suspected money laundering and illicit import activities, as part of the “anti-
corruption campaign” of Tunisia’s then-prime minister Youssef Chahed (Le Temps 2018). This high-
level arrest – reported in all mainstream media – was followed by the closure of Chokri Chniti’s large 
fripe sorting factory in Mornaguia, on the peripheries of Tunis in January 2018. The mostly female 
factory workers subsequently staged a sit-in at the factory gates, protesting the sudden closure of the 
factory by the “diwana” (customs) and the loss of their last quarter wages. Simultaneously, the customs 
authorities raided different warehouses linked to Chokri Chniti’s fripe distribution business in Zahrouni, 
the main fripe wholesale quarter of Tunis, while fires in larger, unofficial warehouses across the Western 
peripheries of the capital city pre-empted similar raids. As an official charged with the ‘fripe file’ in the 
Ministry of Industry commented during a lunch break some months after the incidents, “when you see 
fires, you know there is a confrontation between “al-dawla” (the state) and the mafia of the fripe”. And 
after a short silence he added: “What I oversee as “qitaa al-fripe” (the fripe sector) has nothing to do 
with the “monde de la fripe” (world of the fripe) out there, these are two completely different things”. 
 
This chapter foregrounds such persistent contradictions, between the fripe as formally delimited 
economic sector and the fripe as a ‘black box’, a realm beyond state knowledge and oversight. It 
investigates the agency of the Tunisian post-independence state – or rather, the diverse political power 
configurations dominating the state at different times – in bringing into existence, and shaping the 
specific contours of the Tunisian fripe economy over time. In doing this, the chapter deliberately opens 
the ‘black box’ of the fripe to demonstrate its distinct political economy in post-independence Tunisia. 
By constructing the fripe as an object of political economy, the state’s agency in constituting a realm 
from which it remains nominally ‘absent’ is illustrated, drawing attention to the performativity of state 
governance and, more specifically, to the performative acts of delimiting the economy (Callon 1998; 
Mitchell 2008). Emphasis is placed on state practices of “enframing”, or the performative production of 
differentiations between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that are “constitutive to power” (Mitchell 1988: 44). 
Shifting acts of delimitation show how the state – at times accidentally, but often deliberately – 
positioned the fripe outside of ‘the economy’, precluding full incorporation and thus perpetuating its 
status as ‘black box’. While this performatively constituted the fripe as ‘ungovernable’, it in fact opened 
up diverse opportunities for state intervention and participation in the economy. 
 
Constructing a political economy of the fripe therefore necessarily focuses on the evolving systems of 
differentiation through which the fripe was included or excluded from the realm of ‘the national 
economy’. To understand the fripe as a contested realm of the present-day economy, it is necessary to 
ask how the state defined ‘the fripe’ at particular points in time, requiring a methodological approach 
that combines multiple written and oral sources for tracing critical conjunctures, rather than discrete 
origins. The chapter comprises three specific conjunctures, each of which provide particular insight into 
different forms of state agency in constituting the fripe as a contested realm of the present-day 
‘economy’. These three conjunctures can be roughly situated in the three main phases through which 
post-independence governance in Tunisia is normally recounted: First, the paternalistic authoritarian 
regime of independent Tunisia’s first president Habib Bourguiba (1956–1987); second, the authoritarian 
regime of his successor Zine Ben Abidine Ben Ali (1987–2011); and finally, the period of democratic 
transition that followed the 2011 Tunisian revolution, also denominated the ‘Jasmine revolution’ or 
known as the beginning of the ‘Arab spring’. However, rather than constructing a chronology of state-
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economy relations that merely reproduces such periodisation, each conjuncture asks how the state 
defined the fripe at different points in time: as an object oscillating between charity and commodity, but 
also as a realm of commerce, and later, as a formally regulated sector of the economy. Emphasis lies on 
variegated state practices of performative delimitation – from law-making, to selective political 
incorporation and sector reform – through which particular objects, actors and practices of the fripe were 
selectively included or excluded from the realm of formal state knowledge and governing. 
 
By examining the state’s role in strategically delimiting the fripe as an economic sector, the chapter 
demonstrates how the state is itself a shifting power configuration, in search of possibilities for economic 
and political gain-making through variably defining the fripe as either a ‘problem space’ to be 
repressively governed or a ‘field of opportunity’ to be cultivated. The shifting systems of differentiation 
shaping the fripe economy over time altered possibilities for state agency in the economy, opening up 
diverse modes of – formal and informal – governing. The alleged ‘non-governance’ of the fripe is thus 
repositioned as a particular mechanism in the exercise of state power. The next section briefly situates 
the three conjunctures here analysed historically, and reflects on the opportunities and limitations that 
arise from a genealogical inquiry as basis for constructing a political economy. The following section 
then revisits the onset of large-scale fripe imports to Tunisia in the aftermath of WWII to examine how 
the ambiguous status of the fripe between charity and commercial good established from early on a 
system of partial incorporation that opened up opportunities for political leverage and economic rent-
extraction. This provides a crucial backdrop for the subsequent analysis of three post-independence 
conjunctures, namely the beginning of commercial fripe imports from the United States in 1962, the 
adoption of framework legislation for the fripe sector in 1995, and a period of failed reform attempts 
between 2014 and 2018.  
 
 
1. Tracing state agency in the ambiguous delimitation of the fripe as ‘economy’ 
 
In the absence of any unequivocal origin story or history of the fripe in Tunisia, this inquiry has no 
chronology or temporal frame from which to depart, nor an archive of formal knowledge on how the 
fripe was defined by the state at different points in time. As the object of inquiry thus remains uncertain, 
a genealogical approach to constructing this political economy of the fripe as ‘black box’ is necessary 
that foregrounds, rather than obfuscates, epistemological and methodological uncertainties. 
Epistemologically, the specific actors, practices and processes constituting the political economy of the 
fripe in post-independence Tunisia are up for question. Methodologically, collecting information on a 
realm of the economy that has been deliberately excluded from systematic knowledge production or has 
been framed as opaque poses particular challenges. 
 
Standard accounts of Tunisia’s political economy are habitually structured into neatly separable phases, 
each associated with a dominant economic policy and often a central political figure: state socialism 
during the 1960s, associated with Ahmed Ben Salah; economic liberalisation beginning with the term 
of prime minister Hédi Nouira in 1970; and neoliberal reform under president Ben Ali often dated to the 
beginning of structural adjustment policies in 1986. Such classical political economy analysis thus tends 
to construct a narrative in which both ‘the state’ and ‘the economy’ remain relatively stable units of 
analysis (Anderson 1986; Bellin 2002; Murphy 1999). In discussions of Tunisia’s post-independence 
regimes, the state is often moreover equated to “the authoritarian regime” as a unitary actor controlling 
all power and decision-making (Camau and Geisser 2003). As a consequence, the actual workings of 
state power in economy and society have often remained “exogenous” to political economy analysis in 
Tunisia (Hibou 2005: 9). 
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The most sustained scholarly critique of such conventional political economy analysis of Tunisia has 
originated in ethnographic research along Tunisia’s Southern and Western borders over the past two 
decades (Boubakri 2001; Doron 2018; Gallien 2019; Meddeb 2012; Saadaoui 2018). Disputing official 
narratives of ‘state absence’ in Tunisia’s borderlands, this scholarship systematically demonstrates the 
intricate regulatory systems through which different state actors participated in the constitution of 
allegedly ‘illicit’ border economies in Tunisia from the 1980s onwards. By constructing this ‘political 
economy of the margins’ – both geographically marginal and at the margins of legality – such accounts 
inform this political economy of the fripe. They similarly foreground a more complex understanding of 
the state as both formal and informal economic actor, enmeshed at multiple scales in processes and 
practices that are performatively positioned beyond the reach of the state.  
 
Rather than merely countering narratives of state absence on the margins however, this research 
emphasises the systems of differentiation – similar to Mitchell’s (1988: 44) notion of “enframing” – 
through which the state defines shifting notions of legibility and illegibility, here in a specific realm of 
‘the economy’. In addition to Mitchell’s emphasis on the importance of legible forms of order for the 
exercise of government – or more specifically, colonial control – this account also draws upon writing 
that has highlighted the “sustained illegibility” of the state as a deliberate strategy of governing (Das 
2004: 231). The “margins” are thus approached as important “sites of practice”, revelatory of the state’s 
diverse “modes of order” (Das and Poole 2004: 8) and capable of expanding the range of actors, 
processes and overlapping temporalities than can be taken into account in constructing a political 
economy. Writing the political economy of the fripe as supposed ‘black box’ thus constitutes a 
performative act: first, it counters framings of “informality” that situate the bulk of contemporary 
economic activities in Tunisia beyond formal state knowledge (Gallien 2018:4), investigating the fripe 
instead as a sphere of contested governance that is worthy of inquiry in its own right. Second, it opens 
a different perspective on political agency, exposing the state’s politics of performative delimitation and 
placing it at the heart of a political economy analysis.  
 
The epistemological questions arising from this political economy of the fripe are also accompanied by 
methodological challenges. This account relies on a multiplicity of written and oral sources – from 
archival material, to legislation and interim ministerial reports, to interviews with diverse state and non-
state actors. As discussed in the introduction to this first part of the thesis, informal registers of state 
knowledge were crucial to building this account. In addition to filling gaps in official knowledge, 
conversations with diverse state actors added layers of meaning to seemingly conventional repertoires 
of state practice, bringing into view habitually disregarded or invisible mechanisms of governing. Both 
formal and informal state practices, from law-making to economic extraction, can thus be considered 
side-by-side to examine the performative delimitation of the fripe as economy over time. Finally, 
although explicitly interrogating the state’s role in constituting an allegedly non-state economy, the state 
cannot be understood as clearly separable from the complex and often highly personalised networks that 
constitute the fripe as what Peraldi terms “une économie des acteurs”20 (2018: 9). Therefore, interviews 
with non-state actors in the fripe economy provided an important additional viewpoint on the changing 
contours and effects of state action. The ethnographic engagement with family lineages of fripe 
importers and wholesalers in particular made apparent how the state was encountered in different 
capacities and functions in the fripe economy over generations, from law enforcer, to economic investor, 
or rent extractor. 
 
 
20 Meaning an economy structured predominantly by social networks, rather than formal state regulation; 
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The political economy constructed through this genealogical inquiry exists as a response to a specific 
problem in the present: how it is that the state presides over and indeed co-produces an allegedly 
‘ungovernable’ sphere of the Tunisian economy. The chapter further specifies, rather than resolves, the 
contradiction comprising the fripe’s contemporary positioning in the Tunisian economy. The account 
therefore unfolds through “conjuncture and contingency as components of historical time” (Tsing 2015: 
168), with the three structuring conjunctures analysed as critical moments of intersection. Rather than 
linking the three conjunctures through a coherent narrative that traces change over time, the focus is on 
what each conjuncture reveals about the state’s contingent role in performatively delimiting the fripe 
economy through evolving systems of differentiation. Therefore, each conjuncture provides distinct 
insight into the contingencies of state agency in the economy, unsettling both ‘the state’ and ‘the 
economy’ as stable units of analysis. By honing in on selective moments of governing in the fripe, 
shifting loci of power within and beyond the state come into focus, as do the multi-layered 
entanglements that blur boundaries between state- and non-state actors, or formal and informal 
mechanisms of governing. Although the three conjunctures each fit neatly into separate Tunisian post-
independence political regimes, this analysis disputes simplistic narratives of ‘regime change’, 
highlighting instead the continuities that shaped the fripe’s performative constitution as ‘ungovernable 
sphere’ over time. 
 
Before elaborating these conjunctures, the next section returns to the onset of large-scale fripe imports 
to Tunisia after WWII, albeit not to provide a – certainly misleading – ‘origin story’. Rather, colonial 
archival records from the 1940s21 demonstrate how the fripe’s ambiguous status between charity and 
commercial good led to the rapid formation of a flourishing ‘black market’, thus establishing the fripe 
performatively as a ‘black box’. This colonial legacy is then crucial to comprehending the fripe’s post-
independence political economy: the first conjuncture analyses President Bourguiba’s decision to 
encourage commercial fripe imports from 1962 onwards, positioning a small group of entrepreneurs in 
the privately-run import business, while instrumentalising the fripe’s legacy as charity for political 
leverage. The second conjuncture jumps to a decade of structural adjustment policies under the Ben Ali 
regime, examining the 1995 framework legislation for the fripe that performatively incorporated it into 
Tunisia’s dual market model, but in fact served as a tool for selective political incorporation and the 
domestic fripe sector’s governing as ‘parallel economy’22. The third conjuncture examines the failed 
reform process of the fripe economy in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution in Tunisia, revealing the 
powerful alliances within and beyond the state that perpetuate the fripe’s constitution as ‘black box’. 
 
 
2. The military fripe as contested commodity in post-war Tunis 
 
The onset of military fripe imports from the Allied Forces, mainly France and the United States, in 1943 
resulted in the emergence of a complex system of centralised storage and subsequent distribution under 
the French colonial powers in Tunisia. While the fripe materials were officially reserved for charitable 
purposes, flourishing channels of commercial distribution rapidly constituted the fripe as “marché noir” 
(black market) during the 1940s. Based on an analysis of archival material – including detailed economic 
records, government communication and media articles – the following section explores how, from the 
beginning of their import, the ambiguous status of the fripe between charity and commercial good turned 
it into a subject of contestation and even national polemic. This legacy of the fripe as a contested realm 
 
21 Part of the colonial archives (Régence de Tunis/ Protectorat Français) in the Archives Nationales de la Tunisie (National 
Archives of Tunisia) Tunis; 
22 Over time, the terminologies describing the fripe’s exclusion from the realm of ‘the economy’ varied: From “marché noir” 
(black market), to “iqtisad mawazi” (parallel economy) and the more recent term ‘informal economy’; 
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‘outside’ of the official economy is crucial to comprehend consecutive conjunctures of governing the 
fripe in post-independence Tunisia.  
 
 
a. Military surplus and textile shortages 
 
Reports from the 1930s suggest that by 1935, Tunisia already imported 1094 tons of used clothes and 
459.3 tons of used shoes from abroad, most probably military surplus material from the First World War 
(Liauzu 1976: 615), as was the case in other African colonies at the time (Hansen 2000(a): 10)23. 
However, systematic records in the National Archives of Tunisia are only available from 1943, when 
the inventories of the French protectorate authorities begin to list “fripe militaire” (military fripe) 
imported from France and the United States. The imported military surplus included diverse kinds of 
machinery, furniture, tents and camp beds, but the single largest contingent consisted of used clothes 
and textiles. In addition to towels, bed linen or medical uniforms, most used garments were of military 
character and almost exclusively for men24. These imports were the direct result of a “surplus problem” 
of the Allied Forces – principally clothing overproduction of the United States – which constituted a 
threat to domestic market prices and a hurdle to the re-establishment of a peace-time economy. The 
1940s thus saw unprecedented quantities of used garments being shipped to countries in colonial 
dependency, with the largest contingents arriving on the African continent (Hansen 2000(a): 63). While 
second-hand exports therefore fulfilled a vital economic function for the exporting countries, they were 
coated in a language of charity, and the military fripe in Tunisia were often labelled as “aides 
américaines” (American aid).  
 
The “fripe militaire” were indeed urgently needed to tackle Tunisia’s severe war-time shortages of both 
manufactured garments and primary materials for garment production. These shortages must be 
understood as a direct product of a colonial economic model25 that had led to the demise of local textile 
production and had rendered Tunisia completely dependent on European imports (Croisier and Granger 
1951: 1,2). In addition, restrictive economic policies of the French protectorate authorities deliberately 
exacerbated shortages by impeding a revival of local textile production that could have replaced 
European imports: harsh import restrictions for primary materials required for textile production were 
upheld to guarantee quasi-monopolies to a few French wholesale companies, like SOTUMATEX26. 
Even the “resident general” of France in Tunis complained in a 1946 letter to the Secretary-General of 
the Government about the intentional hurdles to imports that had exacerbated the clothing crisis in 
Tunisia, advocating for “locally produced garments that can meet the needs of the native population, 
with freedom of sales and price-setting granted to the traders”27.  
 
Clothing was rationed in Europe during WWII, meaning that most deliveries of military fripe to Tunisia 
originated in the US and were thus recorded as “surplus américain” (American surplus) or “friperie 
américaine” (American used clothes)28. While some of the military surplus made available in Tunisia 
 
23 Second-hand clothes turned into an export commodity during the late 19th and early 20th century, with the development of 
“the European commodified fashion system” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 228); 
24 Inventories of “fripe militaire”, from El-Aouina and Djebel Djelloud, the only women’s wear included were shoes and 
uniforms for nurses (Appendix III, Source 1); 
25 In fact, import dependency for cloth pre-dated French colonialism in Tunisia, with a doubling of cotton goods, woollens 
and silk imports from Europe through the Tunis port between 1848-1860 (Abu Lughod 1980:103); 
26 Appendix III, Source 2; 
27 Appendix III, Source 3; 
28 Appendix III, Source 4; 
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was simply left behind by the departing Allied forces, the majority was imported on cargo ships through 
dedicated government agencies in charge of managing surplus in America and France29.  
 
 
b. Charitable distribution or commercial good? 
 
In theory, all military fripe were to be distributed to people in need through charitable or religious 
associations and various state enterprises and public institutions. While the “fripe militaire” was thus 
clearly defined as charity, parallel channels of commercial distribution in fact emerged as early as 1943, 
implicating state actors in the gradual emergence of a flourishing for-profit business with second-hand 
clothes.  
 
Officially, charitable fripe distribution in Tunisia was administered through the highly bureaucratic 
system of war-time rationing and provisioning that had been put in place by the protectorate authorities. 
Accordingly, the import and distribution of military fripe materials was overseen by the “direction de 
l’économie générale” (central economic administration) which strictly regulated all imports and exports 
to and from Tunisia and held central control over most production processes and price-setting under the 
French protectorate. The “ravitaillement général” (general provisioning), which had managed supplies 
of food, clothing and other necessities through a system of “bons d’achats” (purchase vouchers) and 
“tickets de rationnement” (ration coupons) in war-time Tunisia, was now charged with distributing a 
part of the fripe materials. In addition, a dedicated “office de la récupération” (collection office) oversaw 
the central collection, inventories and subsequent distribution of “fripe militaire” to various government 
institutions, professional organisations and charities. From 1943, systematic records of imported surplus 
materials and of their distribution to public enterprises, state institutions and non-governmental 
associations testify to the central role of these state institutions in managing supplies and distribution 30.  
 
As diverse letters from the 1940s demonstrate, the clear priority of the American and French surplus 
agencies was the rapid disposal of fripe materials on the Tunisian market to protect their economies in 
the transition to peace-time. The end recipients of the alleged aid deliveries in Tunisia were thus of 
minor importance and the rapid emergence of commercial channels of distribution were of no major 
concern to the American or French authorities. At the same time, the French colonial administration in 
Tunisia became actively involved in both the charitable – and parallel, commercial – distribution of 
military fripe, a process that was politically contested from the outset. Countless letters of complaint 
illustrate this, accusing government agencies of unfair treatment and favouritism in charitable 
distribution, or denouncing incomplete deliveries because parts of the materials had been siphoned off 
for commercial sale by the government agencies. Fierce competition between public companies, such 
as the Tunisian railway, charitable associations, as well as organisations for agricultural workers 
emerged over contingents of fripe clothes31. On numerous occasions, the “directeur de l’économie 
générale” (director of economic affairs) directly intervened to resolve conflicts, often through informal 
arrangements and compromise. 
 
In addition to continuous accusations of political favouritism in official channels of charitable 
distribution, a flourishing commercial market for fripe products developed during the 1940s. In a context 
of general scarcity, the military fripe represented a desirable commercial good and government officials 
 
29 The National Planning Association in the United States and the “Société Nationale de Vente des Surplus” in France were 
charged with managing the rapid export of military surplus to avoid any damage to domestic markets; 
30 Created on the 5th of August 1943, see Appendix III, Source 5; 
31 Appendix III, Source 6;  
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and members of the colonial administration thus became involved in establishing lucrative, parallel 
distribution systems. In addition to the systematic implication of the state in “trafficking with the “bons 
d’achats”” reserved for the poor, government documentation confirms  selective state authorisations for 
the commercial sale of contingents of military fripe32. The ambiguous positioning of the fripe between 
charity and commercial good, combined with the confusion that reined over which contingents were 
authorised for commercialisation and which were destined for the needy, created an opaque sector that 
offered ample space for profit-sharing agreements between state officials and various private 
entrepreneurs. The subcontracting of private businessmen by the American surplus agency, and their 
direct involvement in the fripe export-import in Tunisia, further contributed to blurring the lines between 
charitable goods and commodities. While the fripe thus officially entered Tunisia as charitable donation, 
collaborations between state- and non-state actors in fact established a commercial domestic fripe 
market, resulting in the proliferation of military fripe in marketplaces across the country. This dual 
system of charitable distribution and commercial sales opened diverse opportunities of political leverage 
and economic gain-making by the colonial authorities and local administration. 
 
 
c. The fripe as a performatively constituted ‘problem space’  
 
To conceal this systematic involvement of the state in rent extraction from charitable fripe imports, 
performative framings of the fripe as “marché noir” (black market) – and thus as realm beyond 
government oversight – were frequently employed by the colonial authorities. Whenever the fripe turned 
into the object of nationwide polemic and scandal – which happened repeatedly during the 1940s – the 
authorities staged a spectacular intervention that helped to portray the fripe as a ‘problem space’ marred 
by unlawful practices and corruption. Reducing government mismanagement to individual ‘corruption 
scandals’ – rather than exposing the systematic ambiguity in the governance of the fripe as both charity 
and commercial good – allowed the colonial authorities to uphold a performance of periodic law 
enforcement and oversight. Through the prosecution of individual government officials for 
mismanagement of fripe distribution for personal gains, the state performatively dissociated itself from 
a realm of commerce that had allegedly developed beyond its control. 
 
Prominent media reporting played a central role in conjuring up such scandals, then triggering 
spectacular moments of state intervention: for instance, a widely mediatised “scandale de la friperie” 
(fripe scandal) in 1944 resulted in a whole series of judicial proceedings against state officials at the 
highest level33. Two officials in the central economic administration were impeached for having traded 
“bons de livraison” (delivery vouchers) for the fripe in exchange for bribes on a large scale. As the 
scandal directly implicated foreign businessmen and both French and local members of the 
administration, it created an uproar beyond Tunisia and was even reported in French and Algerian 
newspapers at the time 34 . Subsequent government investigations speak of “lawlessness” in the 
“ravitaillement général” and the “économie générale” 35 , and these reports were followed by the 
temporary freezing of all fripe imports to Tunisia. Such measures never lasted however, and were merely 
 
32 The illegal commercialisation of fripe, the trafficking of vouchers or the disappearance of garments, as well as the “fripe 
scandal” are documented in numerous press articles (see Appendix III, Source 7 and 8); 
33 Ibid; 
34 Letter of Inspecteur Général du Ravitaillement Tunisien: “Cette affaire s’ébruite ; c’est ce qu’on appelle déjà, non plus 
seulement à Tunis, mais dans tous les pays et jusqu’en Algérie, le scandale de la friperie” (see Appendix III, Source 9); 
35 Report of Inspecteur général des services administratifs: “En bref, le premier résultat acquis par les enquêtes indique qu’une 
anarchie coupable règne dans le Service chargé de la répartition du Textile à l’Économie Générale” (see Appendix III, Source 
10); 
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intended to calm the waves while allowing diverse levels of the state to perpetuate their routinised 
participation in the commercial fripe business. 
 
The ambiguous status of the fripe between charitable donation and commodity therefore became the 
basis for a dual system of distribution that served the interests of different members of the colonial 
administration, local state officials and foreign and local entrepreneurs. On the one hand, turning charity 
into commodities produced a highly lucrative income source for the state; on the other hand, the selective 
distribution of fripe as charity or of purchase vouchers enabled state actors to garner political support. 
Opening spaces for both political power generation and economic profit-making, the fripe thus became 
a strategic tool for governing during the 1940s. Contestations over the commercial distribution of a 
charity good resulted in scandal and polemic, pushing the authorities to frame the fripe as ‘black market’ 
that had slipped out of government control. Such post-war legacies of the fripe as contested commodity 
are vital for understanding its post-independence political economy, and its persisting constitution as 
‘black box’, illustrated through the three conjunctures below. 
 
 
3. The American fripe as a tool of paternalistic government  
 
The first decade of nation-building in Tunisia was characterised by an “implicit social contract” based 
on “economic performance and social recovery” as the basis of “state legitimacy” (Gherib 2020: 5). A 
form of “state corporatism” (ibid: 6) underpinned this development model, with the unitary party 
Socialist Destourian Party (PSD) 36 mediating between representatives of the general labour union, a 
narrow capitalist class and the political elite37. As the first section demonstrates, the fripe became 
integrated into such governing mechanisms, with the state encouraging commercial used garment 
imports from the United States from 1962 onward. While the importing companies were state-owned, 
the management of the fripe business was in fact delegated to a narrow group of private entrepreneurs 
who benefitted from their quasi-monopoly position. Nonetheless, the state retained regulatory oversight 
over fripe imports, distribution and trade, framing it as a ‘strategic resource’ in light of persisting 
clothing shortages. In particular, the attribution of fripe wholesale and retail trading licenses – on the 
basis of vaguely defined social criteria – turned into a tool for strengthening local branches of the post-
independence party-state. 
 
The paternalistic governance of the first president of independent Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba, was 
bolstered by an elaborate personality cult (Ben Achour 1987). The second section demonstrates how the 
fripe became incorporated into strategies of such paternalistic governance during the 1960s, with the 
fripe’s ambiguous status between commodity and charity opening opportunities for political gain-
making at zero cost to the post-independence state. Through intentionally conflating the commercial 
fripe imports with other ‘American aid’ provided by the United States to Tunisia post-independence, 
the fripe was systematically portrayed as a ‘present of the president’ and thus as a charity good despite 
its de-facto commercial character. 
 
 
a. The fripe as a ‘strategic resource’ for the post-independence state 
 
The dissolution of the “ravitaillement général” in 1947 marked the end of post-war rationing and of the 
centrally managed import and distribution of surplus materials in Tunisia. It also translated into the end 
 
36 The unitary party Neo-Destour was renamed in 1964 to signal the government’s commitment to socialist ideals; 
37 For a detailed discussion of the period of “state corporatism” post-independence, see Ayari (2003: 130); 
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of systematic records and inventories of fripe imports to Tunisia, resulting in a gap in the archives during 
the 1950s. In post-independence Tunisia, the first existing records of used garment imports then point 
to 1962 as the beginning of large-scale, commercial fripe imports. Like elsewhere on the African 
continent, civilian clothing donations had now replaced military surplus materials, resulting in a more 
diverse and less gendered selection of used clothing arriving on container ships, particularly from the 
United States where surplus production was greatest (Hansen 2000(a): 11).  
 
In Tunisia, fripe imports were fully established as commercial business during the 1960s, building on 
pre-existing import relations between the American East Coast and Tunisia from the post-war years. 
The state-owned company SOTAPEX was established in 1962 in the coastal city of Sousse to oversee 
the import and sorting of used clothing from the United States. While the company was set up as a public 
enterprise, it was in fact jointly managed as a for-profit company through an American-Tunisian private 
partnership. The state retained formal control over import volumes, at the time largely dispatched from 
New York and New Jersey harbour. Packaged in unsorted cotton bags of 100 kilo each (Van Groen and 
Lozer 1976: 118), the used clothes were first taken to the SOTAPEX warehouse in Sousse, repackaged 
into smaller bags and then distributed to wholesalers. Until the 1970s, only one other government-owned 
company – famously managed by the Tunisian entrepreneur family Shamam – imported fripe materials 
from the United States, conferring a quasi-monopoly position to the two importers, as well as a small 
group of politically-connected fripe wholesalers who cooperated closely with the Bourguiba 
government38.  
 
While the de-facto privatisation of the fripe import business freed the state from direct responsibility in 
managing used clothing supplies, persisting textile shortages in Tunisia and the allegedly social function 
of the imports became the grounds for legitimising state control over the sector. Tunisia’s first 
government had initiated import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policies to reduce the country’s 
heavy dependence on agriculture and to bolster its weak industrial base that rendered it highly import-
dependent. While the promotion of local textile production constituted an important component of state 
plans for endogenous industrialisation39, Tunisia’s textile shortages were acute and the policies were 
going to take at least a decade to show their first effects (Dlala 1997: 87, 93). Consequently, the fripe 
were framed as a ‘basic necessity’ and thus a resource of strategic importance, justifying its direct 
monitoring through the central state. A state commission therefore determined the exact quantities of 
fripe to be distributed across the national territory every 6 months (Van Groen and Lozer 1976: 7).  
 
More importantly still, the state retained control over fripe wholesale and retail licenses, which were to 
be attributed on the basis of vaguely defined ‘social criteria’, as a form of state assistance to the 
unemployed. The fripe trading licenses thus rapidly turned into a tool of political leverage that was 
delegated from the central state to strengthen newly created instances of decentralised state power40 in 
different parts of the national territory. First, the attribution of wholesale licenses was delegated to the 
24 governors of Tunisia, who were directly appointed by the president and constituted the most 
important representation of central state power across the national territory. Allowing the governors to 
decide over selective access to the fripe wholesale business, which yielded substantial profit margins 
during the 1960s41, thus constituted one way of expanding the governors’ power base. Second, retail 
licenses for fripe trading were handed out by the local cells of Bourguiba’s unitary party PSD. With 
 
38 Appendix I, Interview 5; 
39 Outlined in the first 10-year plan for economic development, the “Perspectives Décennales de Développement”, from 
1962-1971; 
40 Tunisia was highly centralised, so the governorates should be defined as “deconcentrated” state power, indicating a 
distribution of responsibilities without delegation of power from the central government to the regions, see Belhedi (1989); 
41 Appendix I, Interview 5; 
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more than 1000 local party cells, the unitary party replaced institutions of local governance in post-
independence Tunisia, serving both as mechanisms of political control and administering local 
development and state benevolence (Gherib 2020: 6). Fripe retail licenses fell under the latter category, 
as they were to be attributed to “the disabled, the long-term unemployed or the elderly with no children 
or other income sources”, as one of the traders who participated in the trade during the 1960s 
recounted42. However, as the ‘social criteria’ for license attribution remained vaguely defined, the same 
trader confirmed numerous other stories attesting to license attribution as both a flourishing for-profit 
business and a tool of political patronage: as a now-retired importer remarked, “most of those who joined 
the business either had money to pay or knew someone, especially amongst the wholesalers”43.  
 
While fripe imports were managed as a for-profit business and provided an urgent source of affordable, 
civilian clothing at zero cost to the post-independence state, the fripe’s ambiguous status between charity 
donation and commercial good also allowed the state to exploit it politically. In addition to overseeing 
the fripe’s equitable repartition across the national territory, retaining control over the attribution of 
trading licenses strengthened the political leverage – and expanded the income sources – of Tunisia’s 
governorates and local cells of the unitary party. By positioning a narrow group of politically-connected 
importers in a quasi-monopoly position that was only selectively expanded during the 1970s, President 
Bourguiba meanwhile produced a class of entrepreneurs, often called “les barons de la fripe”, whose 
family lineages dominate parts of the fripe economy to the present day.  
 
 
b. The fripe’s discursive constitution as ‘president’s present to the people’ 
 
The discursive framing of the fripe as ‘charity good’ was meanwhile used to symbolically incorporate 
it into the personality cult of Bourguiba as benevolent ‘father of the nation’. A fictitious narrative of the 
fripe as “president’s present to the people” intentionally conflated the used clothes with American aid 
delivered to Tunisia during the 1960s and turned the fripe into a central tool of paternalistic governance. 
As its status as commercial good was simultaneously extended, the fripe became a powerful tool of the 
post-independence state for garnering popular support at minimal cost. 
 
When prompted to explain the origins of the fripe, especially elderly fripe traders in Tunis marketplaces 
often recount how “al-zaim Bourguiba” (the leader Bourguiba) – as he often continues to be referred to 
respectfully – travelled to America to ask for assistance “for the Tunisian people” and brought back the 
fripe as “a present” 44. This fictitious narrative originated during the 1960s, and was intentionally 
cultivated in order to incorporate the fripe symbolically into a broader discourse portraying Bourguiba 
as benevolent provider to the nation. The narrative not only obfuscated the fripe’s colonial legacies in 
Tunisia and falsely credited Bourguiba with having brought the fripe from the United States, it also 
intentionally framed the fripe as ‘charity good’, glossing over its factual status as commercial good in 
post-independence Tunisia. 
 
The fabrication of this narrative was bolstered by the fripe’s systematic conflation with American aid 
deliveries to Tunisia during the 1960s. The so-called “musaadat amrikaniya” (American aid deliveries) 
arrived in Tunisia from the year of independence in 1956 onwards, comprising technical assistance, 
financial aid, and in-kind material donations to support Bourguiba’s ambitious reform programme, 
 
42 Appendix II, Interlocutor 1 and 2; 
43 Appendix I, Interview 19; 
44 This formulation is particularly prominent in the discourses of elderly fripe traders in Tunis; it was also used in an 
interview with a Tunisian historian (see Appendix I, Interview 12); 
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particularly the expansion of health care and free schooling across the national territory45. Between 1956 
and 1961, 239.2 million dollars of direct aid, in addition to in-kind deliveries reaching from durable 
food such as milk powder to clothing donations, were provided by the United States to the Tunisian 
government (Demerdash 2019: 126). The white cotton bags in which the American aid was distributed 
– habitually inscribed with “not for sale nor exchange” – became emblematic for “America’s special 
partnership to Tunisia” and the newly independent Tunisian state as benevolent provider to its people 
(Rupert 1986: 138). The American origins of the fripe imports facilitated their conflation with such 
American aid deliveries, as did the inclusion of the fripe into government voucher systems for people 
in need that guaranteed supplies with basic necessities.  
 
The government thus intentionally played on the fripe’s ambiguous status between commodity and 
charity. The post-independence regime of Habib Bourguiba deliberately used aid deliveries and forms 
of social assistance for garnering popular support and the fripe’s false portrayal as charity served the 
same political goal. The fripe thus became part of the president’s image as ‘father of the nation’, helping 
to materialise plausible narratives of the president as provider in people’s everyday lives. As Hansen 
remarked in the context of post-independence Zambia, “clothing is central to people’s experiences of 
well-being” and the state’s capacity to provide affordable clothes thus became a highly symbolic quest 
for young, post-independence states (Hansen 2000(a): 86). Also in Tunisia, the fripe rapidly assumed a 
crucial social function as both affordable consumer good and vital employment opportunity – especially 
for rural migrants with no other access to the urban labour market in Tunis. The rapid proliferation of 
fripe marketplaces – denominated “souk Kennedy” (Kennedy market) for their specialisation in 
American clothing otherwise unavailable on the Tunisia market – thus turned into visible reminders of 
the president’s benevolent provision of both income and clothing to the poor. In addition, the distribution 
of trading licenses in the fripe as a form of ‘social assistance’ deliberately framed employment in the 
fripe markets as part of state charity. 
 
Persisting evocations of the fripe as ‘present of president to the people’ testify to Bourguiba’s successful 
framing of the fripe as ‘charity good’ during the 1960s, despite its factual transformation into a 
commercial commodity. While fripe imports were thus run as a private for-profit business by a narrow 
group of politically connected entrepreneurs, the fripe’s ambiguous status between charity and 
commodity was used intentionally to differentiate, and thus partially exclude, it from what became 
delimited as normal sectors of the ‘national economy’. Keeping the fripe performatively on the ‘outside’ 
of Tunisia’s economy allowed the state to turn the fripe into a tool of paternalistic governance: on the 
one hand, the distribution of trading licenses through local branches of the state and the unitary party 
became a mechanism of political patronage and rent extraction that helped expand the power of the 
newly created state entity across its territory. On the other hand, the fripe’s discursive association with 
foreign aid and state care turned them into a symbol of the often-evoked implicit social contract between 
“al-dawla” (the state) and “al-mwatinin” (the citizens), conferring to the fripe a particular political 




45 American aid deliveries gained in importance after the suspension of French financial aid to Tunisia in 1964; aid distribution 
built on legacies of American food aid and clothing deliveries during the First and Second World War (Arnoulet 1984: 52), 
but was mainly channelled through public schools and directed to impoverished, rural areas under Bourguiba; 
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4. Performances of market incorporation and the fripe’s constitution as ‘parallel 
economy’  
 
This second conjuncture begins with the adoption of framework legislation for the fripe economy, signed 
by then-president of Tunisia Zine Ben Abidine Ben Ali46 on the 2nd of December 199547. The 1995 law 
must be understood as a performative act of delimitation, defining the fripe as “qitaa rasmi” (official 
sector), and transforming it into a dual economy: nominally, the fripe sector was now divided into an 
export-oriented fripe sorting industry and a domestic commercial sector. While the legislation paid lip 
service to economic liberalisation and signalled Tunisia’s inclusion into a flourishing global second-
hand clothes business, the dual economy it professed to create never materialised. Instead, the law 
became a tool for selective political incorporation, with the partial offshore status for export-oriented 
import and sorting activities translating into lucrative advantages for cronies of Ben Ali’s regime.  
 
Although the fripe’s transformation into a ‘dual economy’ never occurred in practice, the domestic fripe 
trade was nevertheless regulated by a series of new legal provisions from 1995 onwards, many of which 
directly contradicted long-established practices in the sector. The resulting mismatch between formal 
regulations and existing economic practices allowed for a framing of domestic fripe commerce as 
“iqtisad mwazi” (parallel economy), and thus as a realm beyond state oversight. Such framings absolved 
the state of direct responsibility, while ensuring continuity in the flourishing trade at a time of 
exacerbating socio-economic crisis. Yet simultaneously, the fripe’s performative exclusion from the 
economy became the basis for establishing distinct mechanisms of state intervention and participation 
in the sector, pointing to the “highly regulated” character of what became framed as “informal economy” 
in Tunisia from the 1990s onwards (Meddeb 2015: 72). 
 
 
a. The ‘dual economy’ as a tool for selective political incorporation 
 
The rationale for law-making in 1995 lies at least in part in the six-fold growth of worldwide exports of 
second-hand clothing that occurred between 1980 and 1995 (Hansen 2000(a): 115). Due to sinking costs 
of international container shipping, and a surge in charitable clothing collection in Europe and North 
America that became increasingly professionalised and indirectly subsidized through tax deductions 
(Bhardwaj and Fairhurst 2010: 168; Bigsten and Wicks 1996: 379), exports of used garments from the 
Global North to the Global South grew exponentially from the mid-1980s onwards (Mangieri 2008: 15). 
By 1992, 100 million tons of used clothes were donated in the United States alone, more than half of 
which were resold in bulk to commercial export companies (Hansen 2000(a): 102). Meanwhile, 
Tunisian migrants in Europe had established commercial collection and export companies for used 
garments, with some pioneering entrepreneurs recognising the cost-saving opportunities that lay in 
relocating labour-intensive clothes sorting processes to Tunisia (Boubakri 2002: 8, 9). Tunisia thus 
became a strategic stopover location for second-hand clothes between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the world’s single largest export market for used garments (Brooks 2015: 145). 
 
The 1995 legislation aimed to capitalise on this positioning, modelled on export-orientated economic 
growth policies first initiated under prime minister Hédi Nouira who took office in 1970 (Anderson 
1986: 240). Tunisia’s economy had been systematically re-organised as a “dual economy” since then, 
 
46 Ben Ali took power from Bourguiba in a bloodless coup in 1987; 
47 Decree n°95-916; 95-2396 of 2 December 1995, “Loi relative aux modalités d’importation, de transformation et de 
distribution de la friperie”, published in the Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne, 8 December 1995: 2258; 
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consisting of a separation of “offshore zones” for export-oriented production from the domestic market48 
(Kaboub 2013: 534).  The 1995 law used the same mechanism, dividing the fripe sector into an export-
oriented ‘industrial sector’ – nominally to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) – and a domestic 
‘commercial sector’. By defining fripe sorting and recycling as “partially export-oriented” activity, the 
import of fripe materials became exempt from import tax, albeit under the condition that a minimum of 
30% of imported materials must be re-exported and another 20% must be recycled. Consequently, fripe 
import licenses were now tied to the possession of “maamal al-farz” (sorting factories) and as export-
oriented ‘offshore industries’, these factories were placed under the oversight of the “Direction Générale 
de la Douane” (customs authority) and the Ministry of Industry. No overall import ceiling was specified 
for these sorting factories.  
 
While the 1995 law thus upheld a façade of economic liberalisation – using the tools and language of 
economic restructuring that had earned Tunisia the status of a “poster child” of the World Bank (WB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Mossallem 2015: 4) – a closer look at the law’s 
implementation from 1995 to 1999 reveals a different reality. In fact, the legislation must primarily be 
understood as a tool for political incorporation, with the fictitious dual economy model providing 
economic advantages to a “new integrated class of entrepreneurs” that had been “incorporated into the 
various formal and informal circuits of the Tunisian economy” (Ben Romdhane 2011: 104) to bolster 
the Ben Ali regime. While existing fripe importers were incorporated into the new legal framework to 
prevent conflict, 38 new fripe sorting factories were licensed between 1995 and 1998, increasing the 
number of active sorting factories in Tunisia from 12 to 50.  Only three of the factories were foreign 
operated, with the rest of the licenses attributed to businessmen with close connections to the Ben Ali 
regime or members of the regime’s extended family clan49. For example, Hayet Ben Ali, the president’s 
sister, became a main shareholder of a fripe factory in Sousse, and several members of the president 
wife’s family started to run import and sorting businesses in Sidi Bouzid and Tunis. Only 4 years after 
the adoption of framework legislation, in 1999, the fripe sector was then declared “saturated” and was 
closed to further investment50, effectively conferring a monopoly position to the 50 licensed importers. 
As was the case with alleged economic liberalisation reforms under structural adjustment elsewhere in 
North Africa (Mitchell 1999: 31), the Ben Ali regime thus used the fictitious dual market reform to 
create “ihtikar al qitaa” (a sector monopoly) that created unprecedented profit margins. Protective 
measures like the investment restrictions in the fripe sector were used systematically to cement the 
control of a narrow political and business elite over various sectors of the economy in Tunisia during 
the 1990s (Freund et al. 2014: 6, 9), but drew no major criticism from the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) overseeing structural adjustment so long as macro-economic indicators remained 
stable (Mitchell 2014: 484). 
 
In addition to serving as a tool for the selective incorporation of cronies into the now-flourishing second-
hand business, the fictitious dual economy reform codified the involvement of multiple state actors in 
the sector. While the separation between offshore activities and the domestic market was never realised 
in practice, the complex legal provisions that came with it allowed for the involvement of five state 
ministries, the customs authorities, an inter-ministerial committee, as well as the governorates, in 
overseeing the fripe economy. The nominal separation of the domestic and industrial sector, for instance, 
resulted in an ambiguous division of tasks between the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of 
 
48 The 1972 law n°72-38, referred to as “loi du textile” set the precedent by transforming export-oriented textile production 
into an offshore activity; 
49 Leila Trabelsi, the wife of president Ben Ali, integrated her extended family into the fripe sector and a wider system of 
corruption that spanned most sectors of the Tunisian economy; for a detailed discussion, see Hibou (2006: 195); 
50 This freeze was extended to purely export-oriented businesses in 2003, and the fripe sector has remained closed to new 
investment since; 
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Industry, removing parts of the sector from each ministry’s orbit of responsibility. While the 1995 law 
thus involved new state actors in the fripe economy, it also guaranteed control of the central state over 
the strategic sector: Tasking “al-wilayat” (the governorates) with the new licensing procedures for 
wholesale and retail, the law retained the direct link between the presidency and “al-wali” (the governor) 
as the central mechanism of territorial control. In addition, the Ministry of Interior, the principal instance 
of the “police state” that had been established under Ben Ali (Geisser and Gobe 2008: 349), was granted 
veto power in all matters concerning the fripe sector. 
 
The performative delimitation of the fripe as ‘dual economic sector’ that occurred through the adoption 
of comprehensive legislation in 1995 must thus be interpreted as part of Ben Ali’s systematic 
instrumentalization of economic liberalisation reforms that were “generously lubricated by external 
grants and concessionary loans" during structural adjustment (Pfeifer 1999: 26). Although the 1995 law 
ostensibly performed market incorporation, it in fact served as a tool for expanding the group of 
monopolists in the fripe import business, while rapidly blocking access to the sector for competitors.  
 
 
b. Governing the domestic fripe sector as a ‘parallel economy’ 
 
The symbolic act of market incorporation performed through the adoption of the 1995 law ostensibly 
sharpened the formal contours of the fripe as “qitaa rasmi” (official sector) and translated into the 
production of detailed legal provisions pertaining to all aspects of the economy. At the same time 
however, these new legal provisions produced exclusions – now framed as “informality” in the language 
of IFIs – especially because they went contrary to most established economic practices in the domestic 
fripe trade. With the legal separation between the export-oriented sorting and recycling business and the 
domestic fripe market failing to materialise in practice, the rapid increase in fripe imports during the 
late 1990s resulted in an explosion of fripe wholesale and retail activities in Tunisia. Digressing from 
the 1995 legal provisions, these commercial activities were now framed as “mwazi” (parallel) or as 
“informal” in the reports of IFIs and foreign donors, and were thus designated as “lying in the shadow 
of the state” (Elyachar 2005: 79). As was the case with other commercial activities at the time, this 
system of differentiation served the state in two ways: First, it allowed for governing the fripe as negative 
‘outside’ to the formal economy. This not only opened periodic opportunities for rent extraction, but 
allowed for the establishment of a “regulated form of informality” (Meddeb 2015: 72), with different 
state actors assuming distinct roles and responsibilities, albeit divergent from those codified in the law.  
Second, it constituted a welcome mechanism of “self-help” (ibid: 9), supplying affordable goods and 
employment at a time of exacerbating socio-economic crisis at zero cost to the state. 
 
The intentional governance of the domestic fripe commerce as a ‘parallel economy’ must be understood 
in the context of an unprecedented unemployment crisis in Tunisia as a consequence of structural 
adjustment. Privatisations and public spending cuts had caused a net loss of formal wage labour (Pfeifer 
1999: 26), and reforms skewed in favour of large-scale industrial farming had exacerbated unequal 
access to land in rural areas (King 2003: 38). Exploding youth unemployment confronted the Ben Ali 
regime with a political challenge, and ad hoc policies of containment represented the dominant state 
response. So-called “programmes d’occupation” (occupation programs), providing temporary 
employment on fictitious construction sites, combined with the violent repression of any form of 
discontent through the police state, thus came to dominate interactions between the state and broad 
sections of society (Hibou 2015: 107). In the absence of structural solutions to the unemployment crisis, 
commercial activities came to play a vital role in providing income to a rapidly growing pool of surplus 
labour (Meddeb 2012: 326). As a fast-expanding trade with increasing import volumes post-1995, the 
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fripe was one of the commercial sectors that gained new importance in the provision of jobs and supply 
of affordable consumer goods. The government thus had an interest in guaranteeing uninterrupted fripe 
supplies, and in incorporating growing numbers of retailers and wholesalers into the flourishing trade. 
The domestic fripe trade therefore became one of the Ben Ali regime’s mechanisms of governing “at a 
distance” and through “delegation at lowest cost” (Hibou 2015: 114), buying social peace while allowing 
regime cronies to syphon off the bulk of the profits in the sector. While this surge in commercial 
activities was directly encouraged by the state, it was described as the “growth of the informal sector” 
in World Bank reports, discursively disassociating the formal state from the diverse, nominally 
‘informal’ economic activities that were now providing livelihoods to the majority of the population 
(Elyachar 2005: 9, 79). Accordingly, in a World Bank report on Tunisia in 1995, a large proportion of 
economic activity, namely 40% of all non-agricultural employment and 95% of all existing small-scale 
enterprises were bracketed within the “informal economy” (King 2003: 37). 
 
Such framings were bolstered by the imposition of legal provisions in 1995 that both created grey areas 
open to diverse interpretations, and actively produced different forms of ‘illicitness’. First, the new 
legislation effectively rendered a substantial part of the fripe merchandise traded in Tunisia illicit, with 
article 11 banning the sale of diverse leatherwares, shoes and used toys from sale on the domestic market 
and stipulating their complete re-export from Tunisia. Second, the 1995 law contained complex 
regulatory provisions that went contrary to long-established economic practices. This deliberate 
production of ‘illicitness’ provided openings for rent extraction by different levels of the state, as is for 
instance illustrated by the new regulations for the fripe wholesale trade. By stipulating the even 
distribution of wholesale licenses across all Tunisian governorates, the law gave renewed political 
leverage to the governors through the distribution of licenses. At the same time, the law imposed a rule 
of non-movement between governorates for the wholesalers, forcing them to buy exclusively from 
sorting factories located within the governorate’s boundaries. This entailed a flourishing trade in 
licenses, with wholesalers ‘leasing’ their licenses to wholesalers from other governorates to allow them 
to increase their radius of operation. In addition, lucrative arrangements with the “hars al-watani” (the 
national guard), responsible for guarding national roadways, as well as “al-diwana” (the customs) 
stationed at the port and in sorting factories, allowed the security forces to earn a substantive rent from 
the lucrative wholesale business from 1995 onwards.  
 
The mismatch between legal text and economic practices that resulted from the adoption of the 1995 
legal framework hence allowed for governing the domestic fripe trade as “iqtisad mwazi” (parallel 
economy). Locating domestic commercial activities in the fripe performatively beyond the “qitaa 
rasmi” (official sector) – now delimited by the 1995 framework legislation – thereby achieved a 
convenient double-effect for the Ben Ali regime. First, it propagated the idea of ‘state absence’, 
effectively absolving the state of any direct responsibility for managing the bulk of economic activity 
in the sector, underlining its inherently unknowable, and thus ungovernable character. Second, it 
provided a justification for periodic state intervention and distinct mechanisms of governing, often 
framed as attempts to reign in various forms of transgression or illicitness. The prism of security and 
stability thus justified the direct implication of the Ministry of Interior in the fripe sector, as well the 
governorates as direct representatives of the central state in the different regions of Tunisia. 
Simultaneously, day-to-day oversight of the fripe trade was delegated to the “diwana” (customs 
authorities), the “hars al-watani” (national guard) and the “shurta” (police). As literature on flourishing 
cross-border trade with Libya during the 1990s demonstrated, the Ben Ali regime thus never simply 
turned a blind eye to the commercial activities framed as “tahrib” (smuggling), but instead established 
indirect control through various mechanisms of informal governance that nurtured Ben Ali’s powerful 
police state (Boubakri 2001; Meddeb 2012). Similarly, the emerging systems of lucrative rent extraction 
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and political interference of different state actors in the fripe economy from 1995 must be understood 
not as individual cases of mismanagement or corruption, but as highly systematic and regulated forms 
of governing through informality.   
 
The 1995 framework legislation for the fripe thus highlights the state’s ambiguous role in delimiting 
‘the economy’. Formal and informal registers of action functioning in parallel show the state to be a 
dispersed economic actor that intervenes through different mechanisms and at different scales. On the 
surface, the performative act of law-making in 1995 allowed Ben Ali to pay lip service to structural 
adjustment stipulations underpinning debt financing, by transforming the fripe into an offshore sector 
guaranteeing advantages to foreign investors. In reality however, the fripe’s restructuring into a fictive 
dual economy allowed for political incorporation, expanding a highly lucrative monopoly position to a 
narrow group of businessmen connected to the Ben Ali regime. Simultaneously, the state withdrew from 
its responsibility in managing the domestic fripe economy by framing the bulk of established economic 
activities as ‘illicit’ on the basis of the 1995 legal provisions. Governing the fripe commerce as a 
‘parallel economy’ facilitated its integration into the regime’s “systematic clientelist policy of selective 
redistribution of resources” at different scales (Ayeb 2011: 468). While the flourishing fripe trade thus 
came to subsidise the local and central state – and most of all the inflated security apparatus – its 
performative constitution as ‘black box’ officially removed it from the realm of government. 
 
 
5. Opening the ‘black box’? Internal blockage and the defence of the status quo 
 
The 2011 revolution and demise of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia marked the end of direct regime 
participation in the fripe sector because members of the family clan either went into exile or hiding. In 
addition, the resulting power reconfigurations at the head of the state translated into a weakening of 
informal mechanisms of oversight. Consequently, an unprecedented surge in import volumes and 
unchecked entry of wholesalers and retailers to the sector post-2011 increasingly constituted the fripe 
as a ‘problem space’ for the newly elected government, and the disappearance of the political taboo that 
had long surrounded the sector now triggered attempts to open the ‘black box’ of the fripe and to initiate 
reform.  
 
The following section analyses this conjuncture of attempted sector reform, focusing on a temporally 
fragmented and circular process of internal debate, blockage and then escalating conflict between 2014 
and 2018. These processes are in part on-going, remaining without clear outcome, and so foreground 
the contested role of the state in the contemporary fripe economy. On the one hand, the state has recently 
sought to intervene as a regulator and law-maker, attempting to redraw the contours of the fripe as formal 
economic sector. On the other hand, such attempts have been thwarted by the multi-layered involvement 
of various state actors in governing the ‘black box’ of the fripe, meaning that powerful vested interests 




a. The emergence of the fripe as a problem space with disputed contours 
 
Before 2011, direct regime participation in the fripe economy and a strict division of tasks between 
different levels of the state and the security forces had guaranteed a degree of oversight, and thus 
stability, in the fripe economy. Diverse informal control mechanisms had for instance tempered 
competition between importers and wholesalers, controlled price-setting on the domestic market, and 
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limited entry to the sector and increases in imports. The breakdown or temporary weakening of such 
informal control mechanisms in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution resulted in rapid changes in the 
fripe sector, most notably an unchecked increase in fripe imports that catapulted annual imports to an 
estimated 150,000 tons, with actual quantities being potentially higher due to important non-, and mis-
declarations51. In addition, numerous unlicensed wholesalers entered the market post-2011 and some 
already established wholesalers began to import fripe materials without intermediaries, managing their 
own container transport and buying supplies directly from the port52. “Complete anarchy now reigns in 
the sector”, an official in the Ministry of Commerce declared in 2018, “and their (the fripe importers’ 
and wholesalers’) greed has no limits, which is why we now see completely inflated prices and ever-
greater quantities of fripe on the market (…), we really need to stop this” 53. 
 
The fall of the Ben Ali regime also allowed the fripe to turn into a topic of public debate and controversy 
for the first time because taboos about systemic state corruption in Tunisia were removed. As one of the 
sectors closely intertwined with the old regime, the fripe sector now came under public scrutiny, 
especially because unprecedented quantities of fripe imports began to materialise in sprawling retail 
landscapes all over Tunisia’s towns and cities. The Tunisian media associated such tangible changes 
with corrupt practices that had outlasted the 2011 revolution and with the weakness of the post-
revolutionary state (Huffingtonpost 2013; Inkyfada 2014). In addition, lobby groups of the textile and 
shoe producing industries like the Tunisian Chamber for Textile and Clothing Production (FTTH) used 
the newly unfolding public debate about the fripe to launch a vociferous campaign against the 
continuation of used garment imports (African Manager 2016)54. While post-revolutionary closures in 
the textile sector mainly concerned export-oriented industries that were in fact unrelated to the domestic 
market55, the textile lobby blamed the fripe for the crisis, asking the government to curb imports and 
halt the expansion of a sector portrayed as harmful to the national economy. 
 
By 2014, the newly elected government56 was thus confronted with increasing pressures to take action 
and demonstrate the capacities of the post-revolutionary state to intervene effectively as a law-maker 
and regulator. A growing number of voices in the government, and particularly the Ministry of 
Commerce, called for a complete overhaul of existing legislation in order to counteract the glaring 
mismatch between outdated legal provisions and the sector’s present-day reality. Signalling the priority 
position the fripe sector had gained on the government’s reform agenda, a special inter-ministerial 
committee – habitually simply referred to as “al-lajna” (the committee) – was assembled by the 
presidency to elaborate reform proposals for the fripe sector. As one of the committee members 
confirmed, the lajna was instructed to treat the fripe as “issue of primary importance” and to set an end 
to the sector’s association with corruption and mismanagement57. The existing legal framework from 
1995 guaranteed the direct involvement of five state ministries58 and multiple government agencies in 
decision-making on the fripe economy, meaning that the endeavour of sector reform involved a drawn-
out process of multi-actor coordination and negotiation. The Ministry of Commerce was put in charge 
of leading the reform process. 
 
51 Diverging estimates were provided in interviews with the Ministry of Commerce between May and July 2018; Official 
information requests for import data in 2018 and 2019 at the customs authorities were declined; 
52 Appendix I, Interview 20; 
53 Appendix I, Interview 21; 
54 Appendix I, Interview 22; 
55 Most closures affected purely export-oriented companies created under the 1972 textile law and were due to exacerbated 
competition after the scrapping of the multi-fibre agreements (MFAs) in 2005, as well as social movements post-2011 that 
prompted transnational firms to shift to subcontractors in other countries (Aliriza 2020(a)); 
56 The first free parliamentary elections were held in October 2014, and a month later, Beji Caid Essebsi was elected 
president; 
57 Appendix I, Interview 23; 
58 Directly involved are the Ministries of Commerce, Industry, Finance, The Interior and Social Affairs; 
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While the fripe had thus transformed into a ‘problem space’, its exact contours remained disputed 
because those charged with the “dossier de la fripe” (fripe file) in different ministries lacked reliable 
information on the sector. They confronted a framework legislation that had remained virtually 
unchanged since 1995, barring minor amendments in 200559, and had lost any relation to reality. As the 
person entrusted with the fripe file in the Ministry of Commerce recounted, “we inherited a black box 
(…). Because the sector belonged to the Trabelsiya60, no one dared to open this file.” Expressing 
embarrassment about the “unrealistic and outdated numbers” available for the sector, he eventually 
laughed heartily about the official quota for domestic consumption that had remained unaltered since 
1999, remarking that “even multiplying it by ten will not give you a realistic number”61. While different 
ministries and state agencies agreed on the acute lack of data and statistics, their varying estimates – for 
instance for import volumes, employment numbers in the sector, or domestic consumption – diverged 
considerably and produced immediate conflict within the inter-ministerial reform committee. Angered 
by such disagreements, an official in the Ministry of Industry exclaimed: “Tell me, how can you start 
designing a reform without having a “taqrir rasmi” (official report)? And how can you produce an 
official report without “muraqaba” (oversight)?” 62 . Reflecting such statements, many state 
representatives foregrounded the fripe’s ‘unknowable’ character to highlight the impossibility of reform, 
with the absence of a shared base of information depriving the state of its capacity to ‘govern’ the fripe63. 
 
To overcome this impasse, the inter-ministerial reform committee charged the Ministry of Commerce 
with elaborating a sector study in 2014. This study was to provide comprehensive information and up-
to-date numbers on all aspects of the fripe economy, and was to become the basis for designing reform 
proposals that would enable a full incorporation of the fripe into “al-iqtisad al-rasmi” (the formal (lit. 
official) economy).  
 
 
b. Internal resistance to knowledge production and reform 
 
While the inter-ministerial committee explicitly asked all ministries to cooperate with the Ministry of 
Commerce to facilitate the sector study’s speedy completion, many state actors in fact refused such 
cooperation or even actively impeded the study’s realisation. Two main reasons underpinned the various 
forms of internal blockage and sabotage that hindered systematic knowledge production on the fripe 
economy. First, internal competition between the different ministries and other state actors involved in 
governing the fripe economy since 1995 meant that the study was not perceived as a neutral process of 
knowledge production, but rather was considered to be skewed in favour of the Ministry of Commerce 
and its particular interests. Second, rendering the fripe ‘knowable’, and allowing for quantification and 
measurement, posed a threat to existing monopolies of knowledge that had underpinned complex 
governing arrangements between diverse state- and non-state actors. 
 
Attempts to produce reliable information on the fripe economy were thus first and foremost impeded by 
competing interests within the state. While commissioned by the inter-ministerial committee, other state 
actors immediately dismissed the study as a partisan project of the Ministry of Commerce, which was 
 
59 The 2005 amendment (decree n°2005-2038, Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne, 26 July 2005: 1896) only makes 
minor changes to the existing 1995 legal framework;    
60 The term “Trabelsiya” is used to refer to president Ben Ali’s wife’s family clan that controlled large parts of Tunisia’s 
economy until 2011; 
61 Appendix I, Interview 24; 
62 Appendix I, Interview 25; 
63 Similar statements were evoked in interviews with the Ministries of Industry, Commerce and Social Affairs between May 
and August 2018; 
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accused of utilising it strategically to expand its sphere of influence in the fripe economy. Consecutive 
narratives of who was to blame for blocking the sector study thus shifted from one state interlocutor to 
another. One key culprit identified by several state actors was the Ministry of Industry, which was said 
to have feared that the sector study would mean its responsibilities in overseeing the industrial sorting 
processes in the fripe sector would be diminished. As a result, the Ministry of Industry was said to have 
deliberately blocked access for information gathering by delays and repeated non-appearances at 
planned inspections of sorting factories. These crucial sites for comprehending the contemporary fripe 
economy – providing insight into import, sorting, recycling and re-export activities – are under the 
Ministry of Industry’s tutelage so that Ministry of Commerce could not conduct factory inspections 
without its approval and company. Similarly, the Ministry of Finance and the subordinated customs 
authority were blamed for having repeatedly ignored information requests from the Ministry of 
Commerce, thus impeding information gathering on imports and re-exports, preserving Tunisia’s main 
container port Rades as a ‘black box’ with no access granted to the other state agencies. An official of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, himself a member of the inter-ministerial committee for fripe sector 
reform but claiming to have a “neutral standpoint”, summarised the inter-ministerial competition and 
blockage as follows: “This is all about the fripe’s offshore status. Everyone knows it has to be abolished 
and the fripe must be taxed like other imports, but it means the customs (under the Ministry of Finance) 
and the Ministry of Industry are out. The fripe will be what it actually is, a commercial sector under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce”.  
 
In addition to blockage from within the state, the sector study immediately faced the opposition of 
different fripe sector representatives and influential importers and wholesalers. Rather than forming a 
united front, the different actors of the fripe economy were themselves divided and had built strategic 
alliances to specific state actors over time 64 . The two chambers representing fripe importers and 
wholesalers in Tunisia’s employer association UTICA since the 1990s65 interpreted the study as an 
attempt to “find justifications for outlawing the fripe”, as the head of the wholesale chamber put it, and 
thus squarely opposed the initiative from the beginning. Sector representatives had however split post-
2011, with a new inter-professional grouping of fripe importers, wholesalers and retailers seceding from 
the two existing chambers in 2013 to join the newly founded employers’ association CONECT. 
Differentiating themselves intentionally from “al-nukhbat al-qdima bil qitaa” (the old sector elites), as 
their chairman put it, they showed themselves open to reform and even actively lobbied the Ministry of 
Industry to champion their reform proposals66. They nevertheless opposed the commissioned sector 
study as biased in favour of the textile lobby, and accused the Ministry of Commerce as acting “as 
representatives of the textile sector”. The inter-professional CONECT grouping thus commissioned its 
own sector study and received an invitation by the Ministry of Industry to present the findings, openly 
challenging the Ministry of Commerce’s lead on knowledge production on the sector. 
 
Rather than clear fault lines between ‘the state’ and fripe sector representatives, cross-cutting alliances 
and enmities thus characterised the debates over opening the black box of the fripe. On the one hand, 
internal competition highlighted the state’s hybrid constitution, consisting of diverse actors representing 
partisan interests and aiming to preserve or expand their own sphere of influence. On the other hand, 
strategic alliances between state and non-state actors testify to the multiple, formal and informal 
governance arrangements that had come to govern the fripe sector since 1995 and had resulted in the 
 
64 Appendix I, Interview 22, 26–28; 
65 The “chambre nationale des importateurs, exportateurs et transformateurs de la friperie” and the “chambre nationale des 
commerçants grossistes de friperie” are organised within UTICA (Union Tunisienne des Industries, du Commerce et de 
l’Artisanat); 
66 Appendix I, Interview 26; 
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emergence of vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Both the resistance to the production of a 
sector study, and competing projects of knowledge creation underline the crucial political and economic 
stakes that had become tied up with the fripe’s professed ‘ungovernability’, or delimitation as parallel 
economy, over time. As the next section outlines, such vested interests effectively curtailed the state’s 
capacity to act as a formal law-maker and regulator, forging alliances between state- and non-state actors 
that intervened strategically to pre-empt reform. 
 
 
c. Governing the fripe as a security risk and preserving the status quo 
 
The production of competing data concerning the fripe sector and internal sabotage prevented the 
Ministry of Commerce from completing the sector study. Nevertheless, the Ministry began to produce 
different confidential documents from 2015 onwards, setting out proposed reform scenarios for the fripe 
sector. Innumerable inter-ministerial meetings under the lead of the special committee ensued, with 
opposing factions precluding opportunities for constructive debate. This tedious process of inter-
ministerial concertation continued until autumn 2016, when the process was intentionally thwarted, most 
probably by an alliance of state actors and fripe sector representatives. Making strategic use of the fripe’s 
political salience as a popular consumer good and crucial source of employment, leaked information 
resulted in a national polemic, triggering a return of the security governance of the fripe and immediately 
stalling all reform attempts. 
 
Divergent accounts exist over who derailed the reform process in October 2016. Officials and employees 
of the Ministry of Commerce, for whom the 2016 escalation translated into a stalling of already-
elaborated reform proposals, blame members of the special inter-ministerial committee for having 
leaked confidential information to fripe sector representatives. As an official in the Ministry of 
Commerce confided, he suspected representatives of the Ministry of Industry or Finance, as they felt 
threatened by a proposed overhaul of the fripe’s ‘offshore’ status that had been put forward to the 
committee in September 201667. The Ministry of Industry of course refuted such claims, arguing instead 
that members of the committee had divulged information directly to the media. Whatever the 
information channels, the chairmen of the chambers representing fripe wholesalers and importers in 
UTICA organised a press conference on the 5th of October 2016 to denounce what they called the 
government’s “mashrouaa qanun” (legislative project) for the fripe sector. Declaring that the reform 
“will pose a lethal threat to the fripe business and thus hundreds of thousands of jobs” (BusinessNews 
2016), they intentionally stoked fears over an imminent import ban. To underline the severity of the 
situation, both chambers threatened the government with strike action, and called upon traders and 
consumers to mobilise for what they termed “a basic right to affordable clothing” (Économiste 
Maghrebin 2016). While the Ministry of Commerce attempted to quell rumours about a planned import 
ban, the sector representatives had successfully caused public uproar and had gained widespread 
attention in the media. In response, spontaneous protests erupted in fripe marketplaces in Tunis and 
other Tunisian cities (ibid), underlining the risk of more widespread mobilisation. 
 
In light of this escalating conflict, a swift, top-down reaction by the Ministry of Interior forced the 
Ministry of Commerce to immediately stall all reform plans and to halt inter-ministerial consultations 
until further notice. While this decision took place behind closed doors and most state interlocuters 
simply recounted pressures “min fawq” (from above), others directly named “al-dakhiliya” (The 
Ministry of Interior) as responsible for halting the reform process. Evoking the imminent political risk 
 
67 The loss of the ‘offshore’ status would have removed the fripe from the sphere of influence of both ministries (customs and 
industrial enterprises); 
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of social unrest, the Ministry of Interior acted on the grounds of national stability, mirroring a 
perpetuation of the politics of “risk avoidance and containment” that had dominated the late Ben Ali 
regime (Marzouki 2014). The fripe sector representatives – and their potential allies within the state – 
had thus successfully demonstrated the enduring political salience of the fripe as both a consumer good 
and a vital source of employment, both of which could immediately transform it into a ground for 
mobilisation. The primacy of national security – and more specifically, the fear of popular discontent – 
thus shut down a temporary opening for political decision-making, marking continuity with the fripe’s 
governance through a security lens under Ben Ali’s police state.  
 
The stalling of reforms in 2016 through the Ministry of Interior was at first seen as a temporary measure. 
However, ongoing political instability in Tunisia has reproduced similar scenarios ever since. While the 
Ministry of Commerce produced a “taqrir nihai” (final report) proposing three options for sector reform 
that was to be tabled in the inter-ministerial reform committee in January 2018, the eruption of 
countrywide protests once again postponed the debate. The rapid devaluation of the Tunisian Dinar and 
government plans to curb subsidies as part of new austerity measures imposed by the IMF had caused 
mobilisations across the country (Middle East Eye 2018; Chatham House 2018). As a representative of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs in the presidential committee put it at the time, “people are out and angry 
because their money cannot buy them what it used to. If you touch the fripe now, you will have a second 
Revolution”68.  Consecutive government attempts to intervene as a regulating force in the fripe economy 
– for instance through import ceilings imposed by the Ministry of Commerce, or customs decrees 
reigning in the flourishing trade in banned fripe materials – repeatedly resulted in escalating conflict. At 
times, nation-wide mobilisations of traders and strike action by wholesalers and importers ensued, as 
was the case in November 2019 when the customs authorities attempted to crack down on the 
burgeoning second-hand shoe trade (La Presse de Tunisie 2019). Once again, the proposal was 
eventually revoked because of pressure from the Ministry of Interior behind closed doors. 
 
The sector study of the Ministry of Commerce thus remains incomplete to date69, and reform attempts 
for the fripe sector have remained stalled. As a consequence, the 1995 law codifying diverse layers of 
state participation and guaranteeing the monopoly position of a narrow group of importers has remained 
virtually unchanged to the present day. While these legal provisions have only ever nominally governed 
the fripe sector, the preservation of this status quo in fact protects multiple layers of informal governing 
arrangements that have developed under its guise over the past decades. As this conjuncture of failed 
reform attempts demonstrates, powerful vested interests both within and beyond the state opposed 
projects of systematic knowledge production that could have become a basis for the fripe’s performative 
incorporation into the realm of the ‘governable’. Instead, discrete alliances in defence of the fripe’s 
constitution as ‘black box’ instrumentalised its contemporary political salience to impede legal reform 
and thus to protect their spheres of influence in the economy. Rather than a confrontation between ‘the 
state’ and ‘the fripe’, the contestations here described blur such boundaries and underline the highly 
contingent politics that underpin shifting differentiations between the ‘formal’ and the ‘informal’, or the 




68 Appendix I, Interview 29; 
69 An information request submitted on November 28th 2019 to the Ministry of Commerce on behalf of the Tunisian NGO 




The three conjunctures analysed in this chapter reveal the shifting systems of differentiation through 
which the state has shaped the contours of the fripe as ‘economy’ in post-independence Tunisia. Through 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, the state variably delimited the fripe as both ‘official sector’ 
and as ‘black box’ over time. Such differentiation has become the basis for distinct modes of governing 
the fripe, and thus is central to comprehending its political economy: under the post-independence 
regime of Bourguiba, the fripe’s ambiguous character as ‘charity good’ kept it under tight state control 
and framed it as a form of state benevolence, rather than an ‘ordinary commercial good’. Subsequently, 
the fripe’s transformation into a dual market in 1995 enabled the nominal separation of a lucrative 
offshore business from the domestic fripe commerce, which began to be governed predominantly as an 
‘informal economy’ under the new legal provisions. Finally, resistances to the attempted opening of the 
‘black box’ for sector reform post-2011 revealed the entrenched governing arrangements between 
various state and non-state actors that have emerged under the guise of the fripe’s ‘ungovernability’ and 
that would be threatened by its full incorporation into the Tunisian economy.  
 
The distinct political economy that emerges from these three conjunctures shows the historical 
constitution of the fripe through evolving political configurations, and thus situates it within a national 
politics. Further, the chapter demonstrates the state’s central role in constituting the fripe as a contested 
realm of the contemporary urban economy in Tunis. While the state’s practices of “enframing” are 
typically understood as attempts of “rendering legible” (Mitchell 1988: 60), this account foregrounds 
the – more or less intentional – forms of illegibility produced by the shifting lines of inclusion and 
exclusion drawn by the Tunisian state around the fripe as a realm of the economy. Analysing the 
evolving political and economic motives that underpinned the performative constitution of the fripe as 
‘ungovernable’ sphere sheds light on the state and its modes of operation in the economy: first, the three 
conjunctures emphasise the contingencies inherent in state action, as diverse entities and multiple layers 
of the state participate in governing the fripe, and as their partisan interests and agendas are often 
incompatible with or inextricably linked to actors positioned beyond the formal delimitations of the 
state. Second, the different conjunctures render visible the state in highly differentiated capacities, not 
merely as a law-maker or regulator, but also as a rationally calculating – and often profit-driven – 
participant and market-maker in the fripe economy.  
 
Both perspectives on the state as an actor in the fripe economy in Tunisia’s post-independence history 
matter to understanding its contemporary role in shaping the urban fripe economy in Tunis. The 
following chapters mainly hone in on “parochial sightings of the state” (Das and Poole 2004: 6), 
meaning the different forms and agencies of the state as encountered in the practices and processes that 
co-constitute the present-day fripe economy. While many of the state actors discussed in the rest of this 
thesis thus operate at the local rather than the national level, their modes of participation or intervention 
in the fripe economy are conditioned by, and inseparable from, the forms of state agency explored in 
this political economy of the fripe. For instance, while the last conjuncture of failed reform attempts 
post-2011 conveys a sense of blockage and standstill, the conflicts it describes in the hallways of state 
ministries were also played out in other spaces of the urban fripe economy. Beyond the polemic over 
planned reform in 2016 and 2019, instances of arrest like the one of Chokri Chniti discussed in the 
introduction to this chapter point to the unprecedented volatility of relations with the state that have 
characterised the “slow and chaotic process of transformation” (Marzouki and Meddeb 2016: 127) in 
Tunisia since 2011. Insight into the fripe’s political economy in post-independence Tunisia is therefore 
crucial to comprehending contemporary power reconfigurations in the fripe economy. Against 
interpretations of the 2011 revolution as a ‘neat rupture’, an understanding of the ‘regulated’ 
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mechanisms of informal governance that characterise interactions between diverse state and non-state 
actors in the fripe economy renders visible subtle readjustments of alliances, fault lines and competition 
over recent years. Rather than a confrontation between ‘the state’ and ‘a criminal individual’, Chokri 
Chniti’s arrest – and indeed the recent prosecution of other “barons de la fripe”, as the old elite of fripe 
importers are often referred to – thus exposes a shift in political and economic power relations and 
alliances in which the law becomes a tool for selective inclusion or exclusion. Similarly, the customs 
raids, market clearances, or new methods of extraction discussed over the following chapters must thus 
be read as indicative of a weakening of the – often-tacit and invisible – regulations that had governed 








Figure 4   The entrance to the Hafsia fripe market in the Tunis medina (2019) 
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Chapter II 
Counter-histories of city-making: the fripe trade in the Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun 
 
 
The large wooden desk is entirely covered in different layers of planning documents that Mr. F. has 
gradually unfolded over the course of the hour-long conversation and he sits down, visibly exhausted70. 
Taking a sip from the glass of cold tea that balances on the edge of his desk, he then says, as if to 
conclude: “The Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun (projects) were amongst the most remarkable modernisation 
efforts we had in the capital city after independence. The Hafsia became the first large rehabilitation 
project in the medina71 and Ibn Khaldoun was the first comprehensive housing project that tried to 
integrate rural populations from the gourbivilles72 (slum settlements) and offered them a new lifestyle. 
We didn’t have anything like it before or after”, Mr. F. sighs while readjusting his glasses. Taking his 
words as an invitation to get up, I remark it will be interesting to go back to both areas after having 
familiarised myself with the original plans. Mr. F.’s expression changes to a scowl as he gets up abruptly 
and grumbles, “there is absolutely nothing left to see of these projects, both areas are ruined”, and after 
a short pause he adds, “grâce à la fripe” (thanks to the fripe). 
 
Indeed, the sites of the two flagship projects Mr. F. described are today chiefly known to inhabitants of 
Tunis for their sprawling fripe markets. Both in the rehabilitated, historic inner-city quarter of the Hafsia 
and in the 1970s housing estate Ibn Khaldoun, fripe traders occupy the centre of the neighbourhood and 
the surrounding wholesale storages and retail supplies turn the areas into specialised commercial 
districts. Originally, the rehabilitation of the Hafsia was designed as an exemplary intervention in the 
city’s historic urban fabric. Meanwhile, the construction of the housing estate Ibn Khaldoun on a blank 
slate was to become a replicable model for a new urban housing policy. Both flagship projects were 
part of modernisation efforts that aimed to dispel fears of a “ruralisation of the capital city” post-
independence (Berry-Chikhaoui 1994: 238). Proliferating fripe trading was seen as one of the indicators 
of this advancing ruralisation, because the commerce had turned into an important income-earning 
niche for rapidly increasing numbers of rural migrants in Tunis from the 1960s onwards. Given that the 
fripe was thus emblematic of the backward, rural lifestyles that were to be eradicated by the flagship 
projects, how can its prominent, contemporary presence at the heart of both of the renewal sites be 
accounted for? 
 
Official project documentation makes no mention of the fripe trade, and most planners, architects or 
decision-makers involved in the flagship projects either squarely refuse to discuss the matter, or evoke 
the fripe and its migrant trader constituencies merely as encroachers that subverted original planning 
visions. To account for the fripe’s presence as a ‘rural migrant economy’ at the heart of the two urban 
renewal sites, this chapter therefore constructs counter-histories of the flagship projects of the Hafsia 
and Ibn Khaldoun in post-independence Tunis. It does so by centring on selected trajectories of 
particular rural migrant traders who built livelihoods in the fripe trade and at the heart of the two renewal 
sites. Such counter-histories thus depart from framings of rural migrants as the “constitutive outside” 
(Roy 2016: 813) or negative foil for visions of ‘urban development’ in post-independence Tunis, and 
simultaneously aim to reposition them as central agents of urban change. Through a close-up analysis 
of the fragmented implementation processes by which abstract planning visions translated into 
 
70 Appendix I., Interview 30; 
71 The term medina lit. means “city” in Arabic but is here used to designate the historic old city of Tunis, an area of 270ha 
built up from the 7th century and expanded through a Northern and Southern “faubourg” (suburb) during the middle ages;  
72 Sebag coined the term “gourbiville” - derived from the word “gourbi” describing a particular form of mud housing – in 
his pioneering study of Borgel in Tunis (1958); 
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contingent urban transformations, these counter-histories shed light on the opportunities for partial 
incorporation and co-production that emerged for those nominally excluded from the renewal projects. 
This unsettles binaries between planned and unplanned space, and official city-makers and encroachers 
that have long underpinned understandings of the ‘urban order’ and continue to sustain the fripe’s 
contested positioning in present-day Tunis, denoted by pejorative uses of the term fripisation.  
 
Before turning to the two flagship renewal projects in the Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun, the first section 
explains how this chapter constructs “counter-histories” of urban transformation in post-independence 
Tunis by centring on the role of the fripe trade. For this purpose, it traces the fripe’s history as ‘rural 
migrant economy’ in the capital and examines the dichotomy between ‘rural, backward’ and ‘urban, 
modern’ forms that dominated urban planning and renewal policies in Tunis after independence. The 
subsequent sections then recount the two counter-histories in parallel, jumping between the two urban 
renewal sites and the four central protagonists whose particular trajectories structure this account. The 
two renewal projects are markedly different in their scope, objectives and temporal and spatial 
parameters. Nonetheless, telling these counter-histories side by side has two important effects: first, it 
underlines the always-singular and often unanticipated configurations that underpin urban 
transformation; and, second, it gestures beyond a unique example, highlighting a broader urban process 
through which a specific economy came to co-produce the modern urban order. The chapter therefore 
offers a particular perspective on urban transformation, using these counter-histories to demonstrate 
how urban marketplaces are social and spatial structures that participate in city-making. 
 
 
1. Counter-histories of urban transformation in post-independence Tunis 
 
The fripe’s persistent absence from official accounts of urban development in contemporary Tunis must 
be understood through its positioning as a marginal ‘migrant economy’ in the post-independence city. 
As the first section below outlines (1a), post-independence urban modernisation in Tunis was based on, 
and in turn reproduced, clear binaries between the planned and the unplanned, the backward and the 
modern, and the rural and the urban. The “urban” and “rural” therefore turned into juxtaposed 
“governmental categories” (Roy 2016: 814) that underpinned planning ideologies and guided urban 
policies in the capital city. As the fripe was considered “tijarat al-zwawila” (a poor people’s trade), it 
became an important income-earning niche for rural migrants arriving in the capital city and soon turned 
into an emblem for the ‘rural backwardness’ that ambitious modernisation plans for the post-
independence capital city set out to either eradicate or assimilate into a new urban order. To unsettle 
the neat binaries between “the rural” and “the urban” that conditioned the fripe’s contested positioning 
in the city then and now, the second section (1b) sets out how the rewriting of the history of the Hafsia 
and Ibn Khaldoun renewal projects provides an alternative account of urban transformation.  
 
 
a. The fripe as ‘migrant economy’ and emblem of ruralisation 
 
In post-independence Tunis, the fripe had negative connotations as a poor people’s trade because it was 
associated with both a legacy of post-war charity deliveries and house-to-house collection of “ruba 
fikia” (old clothes). From colonial times, the ruba fikia collectors of Tunis, who bartered people’s used 
garments and shoes against household items, copper or other objects, were often considered as 
“populations incontrôlables” (uncontrollable populations), associated with “illegal trade, garbage 
collection, waste picking, but also gang crime” who inhabited slum settlements like Mellassine outside 
the gates of the medina (Liauzu 1976: 611). As the resale of used garments was mainly organised as an 
 58 
itinerant trade, ruba fikia traders invaded public space and faced frequent arrest by the police, adding 
to their portrayal as a nuisance and as an unwanted population (ibid). With the onset of commercial 
fripe imports during the 1960s (Van Groen and Lozer 1976: 6), fripe trading proliferated in the capital 
city, but constituted an undesirable occupation layered with social stigma. This was reinforced by the 
distribution of trading licenses as social assistance (noted in Chapter I), blurring the lines between 
charity and urban commerce, and thus positioning the fripe as a ‘poverty trade’. In addition, the fripe’s 
persistent exclusion from formally planned urban marketplaces relegated the trade to the fringes of 
other urban markets or public squares and streets where traders temporarily squatted to sell their clothes 
on sheets spread on the ground. Frequent confrontations with the police turned the trade into a highly 
precarious income source, reinforcing its marginal positioning in the city. 
 
Due to its negative reputation as poverty trade, the fripe thus turned into a niche for rural migrants who 
lacked the necessary skills to enter the formal labour market in the city (Sebag 1960: 7, 83). Rural 
populations migrating to Tunis had been framed as threats to the urban order – and more specifically, 
as sources of crime, disorder and disease – since the 1930s, when colonial policies of land expropriation 
and restrictions on the freedom of movement of nomadic tribes caused an unprecedented rural exodus 
(Mejri 2004: 5). Such framings, and associated policies of slum demolition and forced deportation were 
upheld post-independence, with a decree in 1957 ordering the return to the countryside of all those 
unable to prove regular employment (Sethom 1995: 204). In spite of such policies, a further acceleration 
of rural-urban migration occurred during the 1960s73, worsening the existing housing crisis in the capital 
and resulting in what was pejoratively framed as “débordement de la campagne sur la capitale” 
(“spillover of the countryside into the capital”) (Abdelkafi 1986: 230). In the eyes of the authorities, the 
threat posed by the increasing rural migrant population was two-fold: first, as captured in the pejorative 
term “nuzuh” (lit. displaced), rural migrants were seen as uprooted and uncontrollable populations that 
infringed upon systems of land and property registry, erecting sprawling squatter settlements referred 
to as gourbivilles (Sebag 1958). Second, as expressed by a second derogatory designation, “jabri”, 
(ignorant, uneducated), rural migrants were seen as culturally and socially backward and were “denied 
the capacity to construct themselves as modern urban subjects” (Berry-Chikhaoui 2009:15).  
 
Post-independence planning must thus be understood as an effort to contain the threatening ruralisation 
of Tunis. “Aménagement urbain” (urban planning) became a key tool for devising a modern urban 
order74 that would result in both spatial and social transformation (Hizem 1999: 57). During the first 
decades after independence, often called the ‘era of the plan’, urban modernisation was infused with an 
ideology of assimilation that lay at the heart of Bourguiba’s project of nation-building, aiming to efface 
all particularities in favour of an homogenous national identity (Bessis 2019: 362). Modernising the 
capital city and creating a form of universal “citadinité” (lit. urban citizenship) that would assimilate 
“diverse rural lifestyles” (Sethom 1995: 199) was considered a central pillar of this larger political 
project. The new, homogeneous modern urban order was to be achieved, first, through large-scale 
demolitions of substandard housing, mainly slum settlements and dilapidated historic housing (Chabbi 
1989: 250). The interventions in the historic Hafsia quarter discussed in this chapter formed part of 
such demolition operations, framed as “dé-densification” (de-densification) and executed under slogans 
of “public hygiene and order” in a dense urban fabric deemed uninhabitable (Berry-Chikhaoui 1994: 
 
73 For a discussion of the collectivization of agriculture and push-factors for rural-urban migration during the 1960s, see 
Chabbi (1989) and Signoles (1987);   
74 The Ministère de l'Urbanisme (Ministry of Urbanism) and the Ministère des Travaux Publics et de l'Habitat (Ministry of 
Public Works and Housing) were put in charge of devising a new spatial order for Tunis;  
 59 
237). In addition, unprecedented investment in public housing construction75 was to enable the 
relocation of those displaced by demolition orders to planned government housing built predominantly 
on expropriated agricultural land on the urban peripheries (Sethom 1995: 204).  The build-up of the Ibn 
Khaldoun housing estate, the second urban project discussed in this chapter, was planned as a relocation 
site for an adjacent gourbiville and as a new model for public housing development that would integrate 
different social classes and privately-owned and social housing. 
 
Second, urban modernisation efforts targeted itinerant trading and different forms of open-air souks that 
were considered “backward spaces without added value to the national economy” (Jemmali 1986: 54). 
As a migrant economy that was unaccommodated in planned marketplaces, the fripe trade was one of 
the backward forms of urban commerce that became the target of police repression and clearance 
campaigns. The open-air souks of Tunis had always functioned as crucial rural-urban interface and had 
attracted rural migrants as traders or day labourers, at times resulting in the emergence of settlements 
in their surroundings (Chérif 2006: 431). Since the colonial era, souks had thus been considered 
ungovernable spaces, triggering a policy of forced enclosure that resulted in the emergence of a 
dichotomy between the new market infrastructures – denominated with the French term “marché” – 
and the souks of the ‘native population’ (expanded upon in Chapter IV). The post-independence 
government re-enacted this dichotomy, initiating a policy of “désoukalisation”, that either forcibly 
enclosed and relocated, or violently dismantled, urban trading spaces that didn’t correspond to the new 
planning and hygiene norms imposed (Berry-Chikhaoui 1994: 237). Police campaigns against itinerant 
traders – including many fripe vendors – were thus considered a crucial part of efforts to “educate those 
unfamiliar with the codes of behaviour of the city” (Berry-Chikhaoui et al. 2000: 17). 
 
 
b. Constructing counter-histories of urban renewal 
 
The two post-independence flagship projects in the Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun are situated within this 
context of post-independence modernisation. Despite their ostensible differences, both projects were 
designed to break up dense “rural pockets in the city” (Abdelkafi 1986: 358), namely an overcrowded 
and impoverished quarter of the Tunis medina and one of the most ill-reputed gourbivilles of Tunis, 
Djebel Lahmar, and to juxtapose them with an entirely new urban environment. While the renewal 
projects thus nominally reproduced normative distinctions between ‘the rural’ and ‘the urban’, the 
counter-histories constructed in this chapter unsettle such neat differentiations. Instead, these counter-
histories open up a more complex understanding of urban transformation: firstly, they focus on the 
agency of rural migrant traders as city-makers; secondly, they foreground marketplaces as spatial and 
social organising structures for these migrant constituencies; thirdly, in doing so, they position the fripe 
trade as part of the contingent processes of urban co-production that reshaped post-independence Tunis.  
 
First, the counter-histories centre on rural migrant constituencies as city-makers, approaching them 
primarily as market-makers not as home builders and shifting the focus of inquiry from the edges of the 
city to renewal projects at the urban core. Writing on African cities has long emphasised the crucial role 
of “the rural” in the making and remaking of “the urban”, often emphasising the role of self-builders of 
housing in shaping new forms of “suburbs” and thus processes of urbanisation on the edges of the city 
(Mercer 2017: 3). Research on the transformative effects of rural-urban migration to North African 
cities has also focused predominantly on informal, peripheral housing development (Berry-Chikhaoui 
et al. 2000; Deboulet 1994; Signoles et al. 2014). Similarly, in urban scholarship on Tunis, rural 
 
75 Public housing policies were now administered through the public housing agency Société Nationale Immobilière de 
Tunisie (SNIT); 
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migrants have mainly been considered as informal home-builders on the urban outskirts, accelerating 
the unauthorised build-up of agricultural land and urban sprawl (Chabbi 1986; Miossec 1999). The 
counter-histories in this chapter centre on the same migrant constituencies, but encounter them 
primarily as market-makers and traders in the fripe economy. While processes of auto-construction are 
similarly central to comprehending their role in city-making, empirical emphasis lies on collective 
efforts to consolidate physical market structures. In addition, by shifting the focus of inquiry from the 
urban peripheries to urban planning and renewal projects at the heart of post-independence Tunis, this 
account challenges the relegation of rural migrants to processes of ‘informal city-making’ or forms of 
“quiet encroachment” (Bayat 2010: 56, 60).  While research on Tunis has examined the agency of rural 
migrants in reshaping nominally ‘unplanned space’ – such as the rapidly growing “quartiers 
populaires” (working-class areas) – this account traces their role in shaping the ‘planned urban order’ 
of central Tunis. 
 
Second, this account’s focus on collective processes of market building and consolidation foregrounds 
the role of ‘marketplaces’ as spatial and social ordering structures for migrant constituencies in the city. 
Examining the fripe as an urban trade that was never officially accommodated in urban planning, this 
account emphasises how market-making in the fripe required migrant traders to devise “cooperative 
hierarchies” (Keshavarzian 2007: 21) that became the basis for the shared organisation of economic 
circuits and physical trading spaces in post-independence Tunis. The counter-histories hence underline 
how specific forms of social organisation and collective identity-building amongst rural migrant traders 
in the fripe became inextricably linked to their capacities for market-making and thus their agency in 
co-producing urban space. This account extends urban scholarship that has investigated forms of rural 
migrant solidarity that draw both on “rural pasts” and “assertions of agency in the urban environment” 
(Zeiderman 2006: 213). Rather than reducing communal ties amongst rural migrants to pre-existing and 
fixed kinship ties, such literature has underlined the emergence of “urban kin arrangements” in cities 
(Pfirsch and Araos 2017: 4). Writing on urban trade has emphasised the importance of such variable 
forms of migrant identity as an “evolving organisational resource” (Gago 2017: 99) for occupying 
economic niches. Similarly, this chapter explores how a tribal identity originating in Tunisia’s rural 
North-West took on a new signification in the urban fripe trade, serving as a basis for collective agency 
in city-making. 
 
Third, this chapter shows how the blurred lines between official city-makers and encroachers come to 
the fore by exploring how migrant trader constituencies in the fripe became incorporated into renewal 
projects that nominally excluded them. This account therefore speaks to a long tradition of critical 
scholarship in urban studies that has advanced a conception of planning as a non-linear and contingent 
process of co-production that is always underpinned by political power structures (e.g. Bou Akar 2018; 
Fawaz 2014, 2017; Roy 2003). Such scholarship has demonstrated how abstract planning visions 
translate into a discontinuous implementation process, so that "the consolidation of planning remains 
messy and fraught with unanticipated twists and turns" (Simone 2016: 188). Planning projects thus 
often provide opportunities to seize and transform urban space for social constituencies originally 
disregarded as stakeholders of renewal (Berry-Chikhaoui and Deboulet 2000), or seen as unwanted 
populations to be displaced (Ghannam 2002). In a similar way, this account shows how two flagship 
urban renewal projects in post-independence Tunis translated into fragmented processes of urban 
change that resulted in forms of incorporation turning ‘encroachers’ into stakeholders. By positioning 
the fripe trade at the heart of these accounts of urban transformation, this chapter rewrites the history of 
two flagship projects whose official narratives have consistently obfuscated the role of migrant traders 
in turning them into ‘success stories’. 
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To explore such micro-level agencies of city-making, the chapter relies primarily on extended life 
history interviews with migrant traders in the fripe economy, structured around four protagonists. Their 
stories cannot be read as ‘exemplary’ but must be engaged with as subjective renderings of how 
individual migrant trajectories became bound up with, and constitutive to, broader processes of urban 
change in Tunis. Close-up insight into differentiated agencies of city-making of different trader 
constituencies at the heart of the Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun flagship projects foregrounds the necessarily 
singular social and political configurations that co-determined processes of space-making and their 
outcomes in different urban areas. Simultaneously, this method of constructing a counter-history 
positions rural migrants as agents of urban change in Tunis more broadly. It highlights how their distinct 
forms of economic and social organisation came to structure urban space and became constitutive to 
the contemporary urban order, including beyond these two flagship projects. 
 
Constructing an alternative history of these two urban flagship projects required a careful reading of the 
subjective accounts of diverse fripe traders against a patchwork of other written and oral sources on the 
Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun renewal projects and the ensuing processes of urban change. This meant 
connecting the dots and reading between the lines, tracing back how particular project components or 
time gaps provided openings for participation or cooperation. In addition, interviews with official 
stakeholders of renewal – from architects to local decision-makers – helped to contrast the fripe traders’ 
viewpoints, and to either triangulate or contradict information gained from traders. The resulting 
counter-histories are characterised by gaps and contradictions that are rendered explicit in this final text. 
Making no claims to completeness or neutrality, they should be read as partial in their quest to trace 
how two flagship projects provided the grounds for incorporating stigmatised social groups and their 




Figure II.1   The two urban renewal sites and the former gourbiville of Djebel Lahmar 
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2. Two incomplete flagship projects and the production of urban interstices 
 
This section examines the onset of two of the most prominent urban renewal projects of post-
independence Tunis that inadvertently became the sites for the consolidation of the first permanent fripe 
markets in the capital city. Both the rehabilitation of the historic Hafsia quarter in the Tunis medina and 
the construction of the model housing estate Ibn Khaldoun on a hill top North of the city centre were 
intended to intervene in urban areas that were perceived as emblematic of urban poverty and a “new 
form of undesirable cultural diversity” (Sethom 1995: 199) resulting from the settlement of rural 
migrants. While in the Hafsia, emphasis lay on rapid demolition and reconstruction, the new Ibn 
Khaldoun estate was comprehensively planned as new urban neighbourhood that would become a 
resettlement location for inhabitants of the adjacent gourbiville Djebel Lahmar (Darde 1955).  
 
The section sets out the imperfect translation of initial planning visions into urban interventions in the 
Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun, showing how both renewal projects in fact paid little or no regard to the 
existing forms of order which they were designed to replace. The confrontation of planning visions with 
diverse geographical, financial and political constraints rapidly thwarted initial plans, resulting in a 
discontinuous and incomplete implementation process. This produced temporal gaps between different 
phases of project implementation and physical openings in the – new and old – urban fabric. The 
incomplete renewal interventions thus unintentionally opened up opportunities for market building at 
the core of the two renewal sites by migrant constituencies earning a living as fripe traders.  
 
 
a. The Hafsia: Emergency intervention and the creation of a ‘hole’ in the urban fabric 
 
While the entire Tunis medina had suffered from systemic neglect under the French protectorate, the 
Hafsia quarter, part of which formed part of the former Jewish “ghetto” – called the “hara” – of Tunis 
(Sebag 1959: 9), was particularly notorious for its slum-like living conditions and the extreme 
degradation of its built environment. As a hotbed of urban poverty and arrival site for impoverished 
migrants in the heart of the city, the Hara-Hafsia constituted a priority for state intervention post-
independence, triggering rapid emergency demolitions and subsequent disagreement about the future 
of the historic area and its inhabitants. In the process, a temporal gap in renewal operations and a 
physical gap – in the form of a large hole in the urban fabric created through demolitions – provided 
unanticipated opportunities for space-making to fripe traders whose presence in the neighbourhood had 
been completely disregarded in the renewal plans.  
 
From Jewish ghetto to arrival site for rural migrants in the inner-city 
 
The Jewish hara (ghetto) dates back to the 10th century, when the patron saint of Tunis, Sidi Mehrez, is 
said to have attributed a confined but unwalled quarter of the Tunis medina to the city’s Jewish 
population (Abdelkafi 2017: 73). Consecutive waves of immigration, consisting of Jews fleeing 
persecution in Europe during the 14th and 15th century, but also of wealthy Jewish traders from Leghorn, 
soon caused severe overpopulation in the Jewish ghetto (Sebag 1959: 13). By the mid-19th century, a 
growing schism between the predominantly working-class Tunisian Jewish population and wealthier 
European Jewish immigrants had emerged, and overcrowding pushed many Jewish families to acquire 
property in the adjacent Hafsia neighbourhood, resulting in the denomination Hara-Hafsia. With the 
onset of the French protectorate, many wealthier Jewish families left the dilapidated former ghetto and 
moved to the colonial-era quarters (Hagège and Zarca 2001: 25). The departure of most Jewish 
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inhabitants of Tunis after independence meant that the Hara-Hafsia had lost most of its original 
population by the 1960s (Ben Achour 2019; Memmi 2015). 
 
Instead, the urban poor of all confessions moved into the Hara-Hafsia, which began to be described as 
a “quartier insalubre” (slum) from as early as 1918 (Sebag 1959: 21). At the time, a report by the 
protectorate authorities highlighted the appalling hygiene conditions in the Hara-Hafsia, initiating a 
sanitization reform that resulted in widespread expropriations between 1918 and 1928 and first 
demolitions in the area (Abdelkafi 1986: 530). 400 families were relocated to a row of newly 
constructed five-storey apartment blocks in 1939, but the outbreak of the war interrupted the renewal 
operations, leaving behind an empty patch of land in the midst of the Hafsia (Sebag 1959: 26). While 
local inhabitants mobilised in a “defence committee” after the war to protest the lack of compensation 
for expropriations and halt further demolitions, their appeals remained unsuccessful and a public 
hygiene commission reconfirmed the need to raze the entire neighbourhood (ibid: 29).  
 
When demolitions resumed in 1961 in the form of an ‘emergency intervention’ by the Ministry of Public 
Works, the social fabric of the medina had changed dramatically: radical demographic changes in post-
independence Tunis triggered an unprecedented concentration of poor rural migrants in the dilapidated 
medina (Signoles 1987: 505) and historic houses were now rented out room by room to impoverished 
migrant families, a phenomenon described as “oukalisation”76 that triggered further degradation and 
overcrowding (Lafi 2017: 52) Particularly for young men arriving in the capital in search of work, the 
Hafsia became a crucial access point to the city, as it offered cheap rental accommodation and an 
unparalleled “density of opportunities”, especially informal work in and around the souks of the medina 
(Berry-Chikhaoui 1994: 448). 
 
Demolitions and disagreements: emptying out the core of the neighbourhood 
 
The new wave of demolitions targeted not only the remaining housing of the Hara but also historic 
market infrastructures, like the “Souk El Hout”, which was completely demolished in 1962 (Abdelkafi 
1986: 534). Resembling renewal operations elsewhere in the medina at the time, the ‘emergency 
intervention’ was underpinned by “hard lines between the modern and the backward” and by a focus 
on rapid demolition and reconstruction (Vasile 1997: 119). Standardised housing blocks were to replace 
the deteriorated historic housing and the dense urban fabric was to give way to a grid-like plan adapted 
to car-based mobility. The continuation of demolitions – largely on land already expropriated by the 
municipality before World War II – thus displaced not only local inhabitants but also diverse traders, 
including shop owners from the historic covered souk and a large number of itinerant vendors who had 
appropriated the empty patch of land in the midst of the Hara-Hafsia. Especially used good traders and 
door-to-door collectors of “ruba fikia” (second-hand clothes) had brought their merchandise to the 
dusty open grounds, as they lay on a strategic axis between two major souks of the Tunis medina and 
many of the poor local inhabitants bought from what began to be referred to as “marché aux puces” 
(flea market) (Abdelkafi 1986: 531).   
 
By 1963, the relentless destruction of the city’s historic inner-city triggered mounting resistance. 
Evicted residents staged protests to claim compensation or in situ relocation and architects and urbanists 
mobilised to protect the city’s unique built heritage. When Hassib Ben Ammar assumed office as mayor 
of Tunis in 1963, the latter faction won a powerful ally. As a consequence, plans to dissect the medina 
 
76 The term “oukala” came to describe the renting out of individual rooms to workers and families; by 1968, 65% of 
household heads in the Tunis medina were born in rural areas and 30% of all houses were occupied by 4–12 families; 
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with large access roads were averted and demolition operations were gradually suspended, including 
those in the Hara-Hafsia77. The ancient Hara had however already been destroyed by the time 
demolitions were halted, leaving behind a gaping ‘hole’ – or rather a large field of dust and rubble – at 
the former centre of the historic neighbourhood (Abdelkafi 1986: 535). Ensuing discussions about 
alternative approaches to the rehabilitation of the Tunis medina culminated in the foundation of the 
Association de la Sauvegarde de la Medina (ASM) (Association for the Preservation of the Medina) in 
1967. In the same year, the mayor commissioned a multi-disciplinary team of architects, urbanists and 
researchers to elaborate a large-scale rehabilitation scheme for the Hafsia. In the duration between the 
stalling of demolitions and the elaboration of alternative rehabilitation plans, the physical opening that 
had emerged through the emergency interventions in the dense urban fabric provided unanticipated 
opportunities for space-making for those displaced or disregarded by the renewal operations. 
 
 
b. Ibn Khaldoun: From model housing estate to incomplete resettlement location 
 
The Cité Ibn Khaldoun was never planned as just another public housing estate, or what was referred 
to as “cités populaires programmés” (Tayachi 1988) in post-independence Tunis. Rather, the estate was 
conceptualised as autonomous “city within the city” (Ben Medien 2006) that could accommodate 
diverse social classes and would become a replicable model for a new public housing policy across 
Tunisia. Named after the Tunisian historian Ibn Khaldoun, who had researched the transition from rural 
to urban society in the 14th century, the flagship project was designed to educate rural migrants to a new 
“citadinité” (urban citizenship) by integrating them alongside urban middle-classes into a communal 
living environment. Ibn Khaldoun was thus intentionally planned on a hill top just North of one of the 
most notorious gourbivilles of Tunis, Djebel Lahmar, and was to become a resettlement location for 
some of its burgeoning population. In reality however, the visionary plans for the model estate as a self-
contained urban quarter never materialised. Far fewer people than initially envisaged were relocated, 
and an exclusive focus on housing production resulted in the creation of a residential estate with an 
empty core. 
 
From the gourbiville to the model estate: planning for the transition from rural to urban life 
 
By the time plans for the Cité (estate) of Ibn Khaldoun were unveiled in the early 1970s, the government 
had abandoned attempts to demolish the city’s sprawling gourbivilles and the auto-constructed quarters 
became consolidated, with the initial “gourbis” (shacks) giving way to reinforced brick and concrete 
housing (Chabbi 1989: 261). The flagship project Cité Ibn Khaldoun was designed to mark a rupture 
with earlier policies of demolition and relocation: planned as an autonomously functioning mixed-use 
environment, Cité Ibn Khaldoun was envisioned as a new type of housing project that would remedy 
the segregated urban landscapes inherited by colonialism and produce social harmony (Ben Medien 
2006). A combination of social housing for relocated families and middle-class housing sold on the 
private market not only promised to cross-finance the overall project, it also guaranteed “mixité sociale” 
(“social mixing”), through the integration of resettled rural migrants with their middle-class neighbours 
(Ben Slimane 1995: 268).  Reflecting the goal to produce a replicable urban model that could appeal to 
all Tunisians irrespective of social class and origin, the estate’s architecture and urban design 
intentionally mimicked the Tunis medina and thus allegedly the most “authentic” form of urban living 
(Ben Medien 2003, 2006). While anachronistically developed by a French lead architect, ‘traditional 
 
77 Appendix I, Interview 31; 
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architectural elements’ like the central patio or small neighbourhood units were integrated into the 
estate’s design to allow for a “reconciliation with a traditional way of life” (Ben Slimane 1995: 266).  
 
Designed as a relocation site for Djebel Lahmar, one of the oldest and largest gourbivilles of Tunis 
(Sebag 1960: 8), the direct spatial juxtaposition of the newly planned Ibn Khaldoun estate with the 
dense and dilapidated area was intentional. Since the first gourbis had been erected on the steep hillside 
to the North of the Tunis medina – that came to be called “Djebel al-Ahmar” (“the red mountain”) due 
to its red soil – during the 1930s, the area had turned into an emblem for poverty and crime (ibid). While 
a census from 1943 counted just 6000 people living in Djebel Lahmar, its population had increased to 
23,100 at independence (Abdelkafi 1986: 206). By the 1970s, the auto-constructed quarter had 
developed into one of the most populous informal settlements of central Tunis, inhabited by consecutive 
waves of rural migrants originating mainly in Tunisia’s North-West78 (Berry-Chikhaoui 1994: 67). 
Shared origins and kinship – mainly identified with the “’arsh” (clan) or “qabila” (tribe) of “Ayar”  
– thus played an important role in the social and economic organisation of the neighbourhood. While 
kinship networks and communal ties had in fact gained new importance in the dense and harsh urban 
living environment of Djebel Lahmar, the authorities considered such “dominant tribal identities” as 
both security threat and dangerous remnant of ‘rurality’ highlighting the urgency of intervention (Sebag 
1960: 77–81). 
 
Creating a housing estate with an empty core 
 
The public housing agency SNIT, which was put in charge of constructing the Ibn Khaldoun estate, was 
a technical agency focused on the rapid and cheap delivery of government housing and thus had little 
regard for lofty planning visions. Accordingly, the agency focused on the rapid development of a 
maximum number of housing units in Ibn Khaldoun, building on earlier experiences of government 
housing provision. In the first phase, between 1972 and 1974, the engineers and construction experts of 
the SNIT finalised 1500 out of 5000 housing units. Unexpected costs, in part linked to building materials 
and the difficult hilly terrain, meant that the SNIT urgently needed to sell housing units for a profitable 
price on the private market to launch the second phase of the project79. Exclusive priority was thus 
given to housing construction, and most units were reserved for sale on the private market and were 
thus destined for the upwardly-mobile urban middle classes. The disproportionate focus on housing 
production in the implementation process of the Ibn Khaldoun estate produced a spatial reality that 
differed markedly from original planning documents. Most importantly, what had been planned as 
“centre urbain principal” (main urban centre) with public facilities, services and commercial offer 
remained completely unbuilt by the time relocation from Djebel Lahmar started (Ben Slimane 1995: 
266).  
 
Application for relocation to Ibn Khaldoun took place on a purely voluntary basis and only a small 
proportion of families from Djebel Lahmar that wished to transfer to the modern estate could in fact be 
resettled. Between 1972 and 1973, 1400 applications for relocation from Djebel Lahmar to social 
housing in Ibn Khaldoun had been approved and registration was subsequently closed (ibid: 267). While 
resettlement to Cité Ibn Khaldoun had been envisioned as a seamless integration into an autonomously 
functioning neighbourhood, the first families relocated from Djebel Lahmar in fact found themselves 
in an unfinished housing estate with an empty core. While the housing units themselves were completed 
 
78 By 1984, 43,6% of all migrants in the capital city came from Tunisia’s North-West, the area most heavily affected by 
colonial land expropriations and the attempted collectivization of Tunisian agriculture during the 1960s, see King (2003) 
for a detailed discussion;  
79 Appendix I, Interview 32; 
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and linked to basic infrastructure, the estate lacked communal facilities and commercial offer, and vast 
patches of empty land characterised the neighbourhood (Ben Medien 2003). Mirroring imaginaries of 
‘modern urban lifestyles’ based on car-based mobility, the Ibn Khaldoun estate was connected 
exclusively through roads to the rest of the city, accommodating the car-owning middle-classes whose 
urban lives were based on a strict spatial separation of work, home and leisure (ibid).  
 
While the Ibn Khaldoun housing estate had been intentionally designed to help those relocated from 
the gourbivilles to “adapt to a more sophisticated lifestyle” (Ben Slimane 1995: 269), the unfinished 
character of the neighbourhood and the complete lack of a walkable mixed-use environment effectively 
isolated resettled families from their social and economic lives in the city. The incomplete housing 
estate thus confronted resettled families from Djebel Lahmar with significant challenges, but also 




3. Migrant traders as market-makers: shaping collective identities and urban space 
 
The stalled renewal operations in the Hafsia and incomplete urban development in Ibn Khaldoun 
resulted in empty patches of urban land – located at the core of both neighbourhoods – that allowed for 
unanticipated processes of auto-construction. In the Hafsia, rural migrants who had been making a 
precarious living as itinerant fripe vendors and were periodically dispersed by the police, seized the 
centrally located ‘hole’ that had emerged in the urban fabric. In Ibn Khaldoun, rural migrant families 
resettled from Djebel Lahmar who found themselves cut off from former employment opportunities, 
began to auto-construct a fresh food and fripe market at the empty core of the housing estate. 
 
To explore how different constituencies of rural migrants succeeded in consolidating the first permanent 
fripe marketplaces of the capital city at the heart of the Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun renewal projects, the 
following sections centre on the trajectories of particular fripe traders who became integral agents of 
the urban change processes that transformed the two neighbourhoods. They trace shared processes of 
market-making, comprising both the joint establishment and consolidation of market infrastructures and 
their embedding in broader circuits of the urban fripe economy. Such processes of market-making were 
both underpinned by – and in turn reinforced – forms of social organisation and collective identity 
amongst rural migrants who built urban livelihoods through the fripe trade. Such nuanced modes of 
spatial and social organisation lastingly transformed both the Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun neighbourhood, 
as well as the positioning of migrant trader constituencies at the heart of the two renewal sites. 
 
 
a. Transforming the ‘hole’ of the Hafsia into the first permanent fripe market of Tunis 
 
In the time gap between the halting of demolitions in the Hafsia in the early 1960s and the resumption 
of urban renewal almost ten years later, traders occupied the ‘hole’ produced in the area’s dense urban 
fabric and transformed it into the first permanent fripe marketplace of Tunis. Denominated “souk 
Kennedy”, the Hafsia market rapidly transformed into a major point of attraction in central Tunis. Most 
of the traders involved in the auto-construction and gradual consolidation of the marketplace came to 
the Hafsia in search of work and cheap accommodation and had migrated to the capital from all over 
Tunisia. Despite diverse origins and a lack of pre-existing social ties amongst traders, the shared 
occupation of the trading grounds and their transformation into a specialised fripe marketplace 
generated a “compendium of shared knowledge” (Gago 2017: 99) that created lasting bonds amongst 
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the Hafsia traders and enhanced their capacity to endure and gradually improve their positioning at the 
heart of the renewal site. 
 
From ephemeral appropriations to the consolidation of a marketplace 
 
Hamadi80, who was subletting a cheap room in one of the oukalas of the Hafsia with several other 
young men from his home village close to Jendouba in the early 1960s, remembers how “the hole of 
the Hafsia”, as they used to call it, was rapidly occupied by itinerant traders. Hamadi earned an irregular 
income as a day labourer on construction sites, but often struggled to find work and was thus forced to 
complement his income by trading ruba fikia on the fringes of the nearby Halfaouine square. Living 
directly adjacent to the demolition grounds, Hamadi observed how traders who had been displaced from 
the demolished Souk El Hout and other itinerant vendors from the central city encroached upon the 
empty patch of land to sell their wares. He recounts that those trading in fripe and “brocante” (used 
goods) rapidly clustered next to the Sidi Sridek market for fresh produce. A pre-existing cluster of shops 
selling fripe in the Hafsia (Sebag 1959: 11) accelerated the emergence of a specialised used clothing 
section on the appropriated trading grounds, creating an informal, open-air extension of the existing 
textile trading centre in Souk El-Grana81. 
 
As Hamadi faced constant police harassment as an itinerant trader, the open grounds provided a unique 
opportunity for him to occupy a permanent trading space. As he recounts, he arrived, “when there was 
still a lot of empty space, just rubble and sand (…). I knew some of the other fripe vendors from nearby, 
they were also renting rooms in the neighbourhood”, Hamadi explains, “so I joined them, I just added 
my (linen) sheet on the ground and started selling there”. Most of the traders were young men like 
Hamadi, who had arrived from across Tunisia in search of work, with no material resources nor the 
necessary skills required for the urban labour market. Hamadi laughs as he remembers the different 
accents spoken on the fripe trading grounds, and remarks that “we all looked different and spoke in 
different ways, but we now lived together and traded together in the Hafsia”. Hamadi explains how the 
precarious occupation of the trading grounds immediately persuaded the traders to collaborate. To make 
sure the trading spaces wouldn’t be seized by other traders or the authorities overnight, they began to 
take turns guarding “the field”. Hamadi vividly remembers the nights spent alongside other young men 
on the trading grounds, playing cards, drinking coffee and smoking cigarettes. 
 
On a photo taken 7 years later, in 1970, fripe traders have fully occupied the ‘hole’ of the Hafsia, 
offering their wares on the ground and sitting under haphazardly erected structures that provide 
protection against the sun (reproduced in Abdelkafi 2017: 79). In the background, auto-constructed 
shacks are visible that functioned both as fripe shop spaces and as storages for the fripe bales that 
supplied the different traders in the square (ibid). As Hamadi explains, the transformation of the open 
trading grounds into an auto-constructed marketplace consisting of wooden stall structures occurred 
incrementally and started with the erection of shared storage infrastructures. While the ASM was thus 
elaborating alternative proposals for urban renewal in the Hafsia, the fripe traders gradually 
consolidated their marketplace.  
 
 
80 Appendix II. Interlocutor 2; 
81 The textile market was named after the “Grana”, a denomination given to Jewish traders from Leghorn settling in the 




Figure II.2   The Hafsia fripe market in 1970, reproduced from Abdelkafi (2017: 79) 
 
 
Migrant solidarities and the organisation of a specialised fripe marketplace  
 
The consolidation of the fripe market not only depended on a gradual reinforcement of stall structures, 
but also on the transformation of the “physical space” of the market into a “social space of cooperation” 
(Keshavarzian 2007: 21). Reflecting the Hafsia’s status as an arrival site for rural migrants from across 
Tunisia, the diversity of origins amongst traders in the square was remarkable. As Hamadi stresses, it 
was thus the shared experience of living in the crammed oukalas of the inner-city and of being excluded 
from the city’s formal labour market that created common stakes in consolidating the marketplace 
amongst the young migrant traders. “We knew this was our only chance”, Hamadi remembers, “there 
weren’t many opportunities for us, many of us had struggled for years without proper income.”  
 
In addition to the joint protection of the appropriated trading grounds and their step-by-step physical 
reinforcement into a built-up marketplace, the fripe traders joined forces to position themselves in the 
rapidly developing urban fripe trade. Already in 1964, shortly after the appropriation of the demolition 
grounds, the fripe traders began to devise a shared system for receiving fripe merchandise. The goal of 
the traders was to apply for “bons d’achats” (purchasing vouchers) that would allow them to receive 
fripe merchandise directly from the two sorting factories that had begun to import second-hand civilian 
clothing from the United States (Van Groen and Lozer 1976: 9, 16).  Over 100 fripe traders in the Hafsia 
registered and applied collectively for purchasing vouchers from the Ministry of Commerce, with some 
of the more established shop owners leading negotiations. The traders’ success in ensuring direct 
supplies without intermediaries and in thereby obtaining a de-facto regularisation of their trade was 
crucial to the subsequent success of the Hafsia fripe market. Once regular, joint supplies had been 
organised, Hamadi explains, other mechanisms of coordination fell in place almost automatically. 
Especially those without permanent shops or starting capital pooled resources for purchasing fripe 
bales, constructed common storage infrastructures and helped one another with the incremental 
improvement of their stall spaces. The joint organisation of fripe deliveries and distribution thus welded 
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together the traders into what Hamadi evokes as a form of “arushiya” (clan-based solidarity) – a term 
usually evoked for kinship-based solidarity –, which in turn reinforced the traders’ clout within the fripe 
economy and vis-à-vis the authorities. 
 
At the same time, the social ordering mechanisms emerging in the marketplace reproduced stark 
hierarchies amongst different constituencies of migrant traders. Fripe traders with pre-existing shops in 
the Hafsia who led negotiations with importers were especially quick to expand their control over the 
open trading grounds, positioning family members or employees strategically in the market and later 
joining the profitable wholesale business. While traders like Hamadi possessed nothing but their stall 
spaces and were thus in a weaker position, they had formed lasting alliances amongst each other that 
allowed them to secure their permanent trading positions and construct stable livelihoods on this basis. 
Subsequent generations of young migrants who arrived in the market in search of work and shelter 
occupied the lowest position in the emerging trader hierarchy. Najib82 was only 16 years old when he 
arrived in Tunis in spring 1972, having escaped his family farm near Siliana after a fallout with his 
father. Getting off the train without money, contacts or previous knowledge of the capital city, he was 
directed to the Hafsia market by other young migrants. At first, Najib began to help with fruit and 
vegetable deliveries in the adjacent Sidi Sridek market, and was sleeping rough. Through a chance 
encounter with an acquaintance from his village, who had seized a trading space in the fripe market, 
Najib then found work in the marketplace. He slept under the market stall to guard the merchandise 
overnight and worked as a shop assistant for the trader during the day. 
 
For consecutive generations of migrants, the fripe marketplace in the Hafsia thus became an access 
point to the city and a stable centre around which social and economic lives could be structured, albeit 
from highly divergent starting positions. Those who were able to seize permanent trading spaces in the 
Hafsia achieved the most significant social ascension: by 1975, Hamadi had not only fortified his 
market stall with a corrugated iron roof and a lockable barrack, he had also set aside savings that allowed 
him to leave his dilapidated room in the Hafsia and rent an apartment for himself and his wife, who 
originated from the same village and joined him in Tunis after their wedding. As Hamadi’s and Najib’s 
accounts underline, the Hafsia fripe market represented far more than a mere income source to rural 
migrants arriving in the capital. Rather, the marketplace provided both a stable work space and dense 
social networks that became the basis for diverse support systems, turning it into “a common resource 
and institution” (Monteith 2018: 7) that became the centre of the migrants’ urban lives. This is reflected 
in the assertion of a collective identity as “fripe vendors of the Hafsia” by both Hamadi and Najib, 
which is underpinned by feelings of pride for having established and consolidated the oldest fripe 
market of Tunis. Especially for the first generation of traders like Hamadi – most of whom have now 
passed on their stalls to younger family members – the story of how they turned a field of rubble into a 
flourishing fripe market also served as an affirmation of their legitimacy on squatted, municipal land. 
It thus came to play a crucial role in defending their presence and confronting the authorities by the 
time rehabilitation operations were resumed in the Hafsia by the mid-1970s. 
 
 
b. Market-making in a middle-class estate: establishing an urban core in Ibn Khaldoun  
 
When the first families from Djebel Lahmar were resettled to Ibn Khaldoun in the mid-1970s, what had 
been planned as a self-sufficient “city within the city” in fact resembled a peripheral housing 
development with an empty core, destined to become a mere “dortoir” (“dormitory”) for its inhabitants 
 
82Appendix II. Interlocutor 1; 
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(Ben Medien 2003). While this accommodated the lifestyles of a car-owning middle class that had 
purchased private housing in the estate but worked and shopped elsewhere, resettled families from 
Djebel Lahmar found themselves isolated from the rest of the city and cut off from vital income-earning 
opportunities and social networks.  
 
In response to the challenges posed by the incomplete built environment, a group of men from Djebel 
Lahmar began to auto-construct a marketplace on a site originally earmarked for public facilities in Ibn 
Khaldoun. Benefitting from a quasi-monopoly over local supplies, the marketplace rapidly turned into 
the missing ‘centre’ of the estate. It reconstituted a sense of “houma”, the Tunisian Arabic term used to 
describe “a sort of semi-public, semiprivate domestic space characterised by intense, day-to-day 
exchanges” (Clancy-Smith 2012: 36), for resettled families. Those involved in market-making 
gradually rebuilt livelihoods centred around their auto-constructed stalls, and the portioning of the 
marketplace into specialised sub-sections translated into new forms of communal organisation. The 
following account hones in on a particular lineage of fripe traders to examine how they mobilised the 
notion of kinship – and particularly an assertion of their identity as “Wulad Ayar” (lit. sons of Ayar)83- 
for jointly organising their trading space and for subsequently expanding their influence from the 
inconspicuous Ibn Khaldoun marketplace to weekly souks across Tunis. 
 
Relocation and disruption: rebuilding livelihoods through market-making 
 
Adel84, today in his late 50s, grew up in Djebel Lahmar and was a teenager when his family relocated 
to the Ibn Khaldoun estate. He remembers that it felt as if someone had moved them “into nowhere 
(…), away from our neighbours and friends”. For Adel’s family, the move marked a considerable 
improvement in housing conditions, but also came with a whole series of challenges. While Adel 
quickly made new friends with other boys resettled from Djebel Lahmar and remembers playing 
football in the vast open spaces of the new estate, his mother was uprooted from her social environment 
and could no longer complete her daily chores on foot or visit family and neighbours. Adel’s father, 
who, like most inhabitants of Djebel Lahmar, had no “khidma rasmiya” (official work), had earned the 
family income as a day labourer and trader in the markets of the central city. Like other male 
breadwinners, he now struggled to commute to and from the city centre due to a lack of public transport 
connections.  
 
As has been the case in resettlement sites in diverse contexts, gradual processes of “auto-construction 
and alteration” (Ghannam 1998: 266) played a crucial role in appropriating the alien living environment 
and in rebuilding livelihoods in the unfinished estate. Soon after relocation, Adel’s father and other men 
relocated originally from Djebel Lahmar began to set up improvised market stalls adjacent to the 
unfinished youth centre at the empty core of the housing estate. Adel remembers helping his father with 
the construction, and proudly recounts that they were the first to erect a roofed, wooden market stall at 
the centre of the empty plot. Devoid of any public infrastructure, the traders had to gradually connect 
the site to water, sewage and, later, electricity, and established a system of cost sharing as well as 
communal tasks, especially for waste collection in an area that wasn’t regularly served by the 
municipality. Most of the traders setting up stalls had decided to supply the estate with fresh produce, 
at first fruit and vegetables, and later, meat and other animal products as surrounding housing units 
were gradually transformed into shop spaces. A few traders, amongst them Adel’s father, decided to 
trade in fripe as they had experience in used clothes trading from the markets of the central city. Adel’s 
 
83 The Wulad Ayar are the dominant kinship group in Tunisia’s North-Western region, located mainly between the cities of 
El Kef and Makthar; 
84 Appendix II. Interlocutor 3; 
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father had often worked on hire for wholesalers or well-positioned traders in the Hafsia, who needed 
someone to resell their leftover merchandise on the market peripheries. From age 10, Adel had followed 
his father around different Tunis marketplaces, reselling used garments and shoes on large cotton sheets 
on the ground. 
 
Due to the complete absence of commercial offer apart from a supermarket in the lower part of the 
housing estate, the auto-constructed marketplace in the middle of Ibn Khaldoun proved an immediate 
success. In addition to offering affordable supplies and income-earning opportunities for those resettled, 
the market rapidly turned into what Adel describes as “woust al-houma” (“the centre of the 
neighbourhood”), imparting a sense of communal life on the otherwise anonymous living environment. 
Located at the highest point of the neighbourhood, the souk granted a degree of continuity with 
neighbourhood life in Djebel Lahmar, particularly for women for whom the marketplace constituted a 
vital space of encounter in a neighbourhood that often made them feel out of place as it was 
predominantly geared to a wealthier social class 85. The market also turned into an important point of 
connection with Djebel Lahmar as young men came to sell supplies like home-baked bread and other 
products still unavailable in the new estate.  
 
Rather than merely satisfying immediate socio-economic needs, the marketplace demonstrated how 
“auto-construction can transform the resettlement project” (Ghannam 1998: 277). The market altered 
the character of Ibn Khaldoun from a “cité” (estate) – describing a rationally planned housing project 
(Ben Medien 2004) – to a houma, designating a lived urban neighbourhood unit. The joint organisation 
of the marketplace did not merely build on existing communal ties from Djebel Lahmar, but also 
favoured the emergence of new social networks and solidarities born out of the shared experience of 
both resettlement and market-making. 
 
Kinship solidarities and the expansion of trading networks across the city 
 
While some of the traders in the newly established marketplace were close relatives or former 
neighbours from Djebel Lahmar, others got to know each other in the process of setting up the market. 
This shared experience forged bonds amongst the traders and, as Adel explains, the sense of being 
“different” from the estate’s middle-class inhabitants reinforced such feelings of solidarity: “neighbours 
were looking at us, it was clear they were afraid or didn’t want us here (…), so this made us stick 
together when we came to Ibn Khaldoun”. He adds, “we were Wulad Ayar, from the same “arsh” 
(clan)”. While Adel’s family migrated to Tunis from Makthar in Tunisia’s North-West and his father 
thus linked memories of his rural origins and local traditions to the lineage of the Ayar, other fripe 
traders in Ibn Khaldoun did not share the same origins or were indeed born in the capital city. 
Nevertheless, evoking clan-based solidarity – “arushiya” 86 – became a powerful mechanism for 
asserting a group identity amongst the fripe traders, a precondition to expanding their influence beyond 
the confined marketplace. 
 
Similar to the fripe market in the Hafsia, the traders’ success in Ibn Khaldoun hinged on their capacity 
to organise purchases and deliveries collectively. As the eldest son, Adel joined his father in the market 
when he was just 15 and recounts the strong local demand for used clothes and shoes that encouraged 
more and more traders to switch from fresh produce to fripe trading. Not only men residing in the estate, 
also family members who were still living in Djebel Lahmar, like Adel’s older cousin Slim87, joined 
 
85 Conversation with the mother of a main interlocutor, see Appendix II. Interlocutor 3; 
86 The Arabic term “‘asabiya” to denote tribal solidarity is also used, but is less prevalent in the Tunisian context; 
87 Appendix II. Interlocutor 4; 
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the cluster of fripe stalls that formed on one side of the marketplace. Due to his pre-existing contacts 
with wholesalers in the Hafsia, Adel’s father assumed a leadership role amongst the Ibn Khaldoun fripe 
traders and initiated the joint renting of garages for storage and the shared investment in an old pick-up 
truck for weekly deliveries. While such shared infrastructures at first simply reduced costs and 
improved supplies of the local marketplace, the fripe traders rapidly built on their effective collaboration 
and centrally located storage infrastructures to begin trading in “aswak isbouaiya” (weekly markets) 
all over the capital city. Especially young men, like Adel and his cousin Slim, soon began to tour the 
weekly markets with the pick-up truck on six out of seven days a week, often bringing along tents or 
sleeping on the fripe bales in the marketplaces overnight to set up their stalls again early in the morning.  
 
By the early 1980s, the Ibn Khaldoun traders had established a prominent presence in weekly souks all 
over the peripheries of Tunis and had turned the fripe trade into a “commerce familial” (family 
business), with tight-knit social networks and clan-based solidarities making entry difficult to outsiders 
(Jemmali 1986: 137). Slim affirms that shop assistants or transporters were usually recruited from the 
extended family or from Djebel Lahmar, because, as he puts it, “the Wulad Ayar are clever trading 
people, it is in our blood as we were always “tujjar” (traders).” Both his narrative of a shared past as 
‘traders’ and the identification of all workers in the fripe market as “Ayari” point to the new meaning 
kinship and tribal belonging acquired in the fripe trade. Particularly amongst second generation 
migrants, like Adel and Slim, the identification as “Ayari” emerged from the “shared experience of 
migration and urban living” (Gago 2017: 80) and especially the experience of growing up as 
descendants of rural migrants in Djebel Lahmar. The attempt to jointly occupy a part of the urban fripe 
market added to the importance of evoking and “reinventing” (ibid: 99) a shared base of identity, as 
different tribal and regional identities had ordered urban trades in the capital city since the 19th century 
(Clancy-Smith 2012: 135). In addition, the hostile environment of the middle-class estate reinforced the 
need for a positive assertion of group identity amongst young migrant traders. Identifying as “Ayari” 
thus became “an affirmation of modernity, not a manifestation of tradition” (Miller 2009: 388, 392) and 
was tied to tacit forms of knowledge and codes of language and behaviour that came to govern the fripe 
souks of Tunis. 
 
While resettlement to Ibn Khaldoun had been underpinned by a vision of assimilation that would dispel 
the forms of ‘backward’ communal ties deemed characteristic of gourbivilles like Djebel Lahmar, the 
fripe traders mobilised clan-based solidarity as a powerful organisational resource for expanding control 
over the urban fripe trade. The traders of Ibn Khaldoun – only a small proportion of whom were actually 
residing in the estate – thus rapidly gained notoriety as a powerful group of traders with considerable 
influence beyond their neighbourhood market. What looked like a haphazardly built marketplace at the 
core of the Ibn Khaldoun estate thus in fact formed the basis for city-wide fripe trading networks, 
foreclosing attempted relocation and conferring substantial clout to the fripe traders in consecutive 
phases of urban renewal. 
 
 
4. The fripe traders as unlikely stakeholders in the ‘completion’ of renewal  
 
Different migrant trader constituencies had thus succeeded in consolidating the first permanent fripe 
marketplaces at the heart of the Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun neighbourhood, and had thereby positioned 
themselves in wider economic circuits of the urban fripe trade. While the Hafsia had thus turned into 
the main wholesale quarter for the fripe trade, Ibn Khaldoun now formed the distribution hub for fripe 
merchandise across all weekly souks of Tunis. When the second phase of urban rehabilitation resumed 
in the Hafsia in the mid-1970s, the authorities perceived the fripe traders as unwanted squatters and 
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thus declared the demolition and relocation of the fripe market as a precondition to renewal. Similarly, 
when socio-economic crisis escalating into riots in 1984 prompted the government to resume its 
intervention in the unfinished Ibn Khaldoun estate, the auto-constructed fripe marketplace at its core 
became an immediate target of the security forces because it was seen as an emblem for the ‘anarchy’ 
that reigned in the neighbourhood. While renewed state intervention in the Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun 
thus first resulted in open confrontation between the authorities and the fripe traders, the following 
sections explore how these relations subsequently transformed and resulted in diverse forms of 
incorporation and co-production that reshaped the renewal sites. 
 
As this close-up look at the second phase of state intervention demonstrates, changing political 
conjunctures and new economic priorities had resulted in the “incremental emptying of planning of its 
former socio-economic objectives” (Bou Akar 2018: 147). Plans for profitable real estate development 
and the need to pacify political hotspots had now taken priority over ambitious post-independence 
visions for socio-spatial transformation. This opened up unlikely opportunities for the fripe traders to 
gradually reposition themselves through “pragmatic deal-making” and “provisional agreements” 
(Simone 2014: 38), from illegitimate encroachers to stakeholders of urban renewal: first, the flourishing 
fripe trade began to use commercial infrastructures and land that the municipality struggled to capitalise 
on. Second, the money from the fripe provided the necessary private investment to co-finance profitable 
real estate development, allowing traders who had successfully joined the ranks of wholesalers or had 
established control over weekly souks to finance and shape the outcomes of the renewal operations. 
 
 
a. Co-financing rehabilitation and transforming the Hafsia into a commercial district 
 
By the time the alternative rehabilitation proposal was finalised by the ASM in 1973, the Hafsia had 
developed into the largest fripe market in the city. The new proposal for rehabilitation, elaborated in 
collaboration with UNESCO, aimed to preserve the remaining historical fabric of the neighbourhood 
and was supposedly tailored to local needs as it was based on a broad survey conducted with local 
residents in 1972. Despite the fripe market’s prominent positioning at the heart of the neighbourhood, 
the fripe traders remained however excluded from the assessment and were seen to stand in the way of 
project completion. Already from 1968, the municipality had sought to halt the expansion of the fripe 
market, periodically demolishing market stalls that encroached further on municipally-owned land and 
organising police raids to expel itinerant traders (Van Groen and Lozer 1976: 14).  
 
Negotiating relocation, maintaining presence: a collective double strategy 
 
To free up space for renewal, the municipality launched a more comprehensive relocation project for 
the Hafsia fripe market in 1970. The goal was to move all traders to Mellassine, a working-class area 
to the West of the Tunis medina that already featured a large marché aux puces. Instead of entering into 
negotiations with the traders, Hamadi and Najib recount that the “baladiya” (municipality) simply 
began to dismantle the market stalls that were to make way for the main neighbourhood street and a 
new commercial infrastructure. With demolitions already in progress, the municipality offered the 
traders new boutique spaces in the Mellassine market as compensation. Faced with the collective 
indignation of the Hafsia traders, the municipality further agreed to attribute an empty patch of land to 
itinerant fripe traders displaced from the Hafsia, and promised to develop a new, covered fripe 
marketplace in Mellassine with 130 boutiques (Van Groen and Lozer 1976: 25). Confronted with the 
threat of relocation, the fripe traders adopted a double strategy: while signalling their willingness to 
enter into negotiations with the municipality and agreeing to partially relocate to Mellassine, they 
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simultaneously retained what Hamadi and Najib refer to as “the inner part of the fripe market” adjacent 
to Souk El Grana. 
 
The stall owner for whom Najib worked was one of those leading the negotiations. While he set up a 
new shop in Mellassine, he asked Najib to run business on his stall in the Hafisa for a profit share. 
Fearing a drop in revenues as Mellassine lacked the centrality and reputation of the Hafsia, he preferred 
to hold onto his original trading space and to await an opportunity to return to the Hafsia. As Hamadi 
recounts: “We inside (the inner market) weren’t directly affected by the first demolitions and we had 
built proper “boutikat” (boutiques). We were almost 200 people working in the market at the time, 
most of us had “batendas” (licenses) and “bons” (purchasing vouchers) and we were paying taxes so 
the municipality couldn’t simply tell us to leave”. As the fripe traders rightly calculated that the 
authorities’ priority was to clear the land destined for immediate redevelopment and that the 
municipality wouldn’t try to forcibly remove the inner market, they cooperated and agreed to a partial 
relocation to Mellassine. Meanwhile, the traders retained the core of their market and thus their presence 
and future leverage over the area’s development. 
 
Returning to the Hafsia as private stakeholders 
 
While the first phase of the ASM’s rehabilitation project foresaw the reconstruction of the demolished 
Souk El-Hout, and thus the creation of a covered commercial infrastructure with about 100 shop spaces 
(Abdelkafi 1986: 562), no plans were initially made to accommodate the fripe traders. The development 
of new commercial spaces and offices along the Hafsia’s main road were equally destined for “new 
economic activities” (ibid) and thus explicitly ostracised the fripe as backward and marginal trade. 
However, when the first phase of rehabilitation was coming to an end in the late 1970s, the municipality 
faced unanticipated difficulties in selling the new commercial and office spaces in the Hafsia. Little 
thought had in fact been given to what kind of “new economic activities” would be willing to move to 
the dense and still ill-reputed inner-city area. As the rehabilitation of 600 housing units and the provision 
of subsidised social housing and infrastructure relied on the profitable sale of commercial spaces and 
private housing carrying a surcharge for the overall project, the failure to sell the newly developed 
commercial spaces threatened to stall the entire project.   
 
Faced with this bleak prospect, the municipality altered its initial strategy. It remains disputed who 
started negotiations with the fripe traders, as some place responsibility with the municipality and others 
say the local party cell of the Neo-Destour, referred to as “the real administrators of the project at the 
time” initiated the negotiations 88. What is certain is that the new market-building project in Mellassine 
was shelved and over 80 fripe traders instead returned to the Hafsia and moved into the new, covered 
commercial infrastructure. While neither Hamadi nor Najib were able to buy shop spaces in the new 
infrastructure, they benefitted indirectly from the new role of the fripe trade in the second phase of 
renewal. Most importantly, the transformation of the new commercial infrastructure into a fripe trading 
centre put an end to the municipality’s relocation plans and affirmed the Hafsia’s status as an undisputed 
retail centre for the fripe in Tunis. Generating a new sense of security and legitimacy, this provoked a 
process of transferring ownership of market stalls between the fripe traders, despite the factual absence 
of any formal “milkiya” (ownership titles). Najib and other former shop assistants with limited 
resources were now able to buy the “batenda” (license) of stall spaces vacated by those who moved to 
the better-positioned “souk al-jdid” (new market) adjacent to the newly constructed main road of the 
 
88 Appendix I, Interview 31 and 33; 
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Hafsia.  For Najib, who had arrived in the capital city less than a decade before with nothing but the 
clothes he wore, the purchase of his own trading space reasserted his legitimate presence in the Hafsia.  
 
The fripe wholesalers and the co-production of a contingent success story 
 
Despite the agreement with the fripe traders, the first phase of urban renewal in the Hafsia ended in 
overall financial loss. As a result, the second phase of the project aimed primarily at filling the 
remaining gaps and vacant plots in the neighbourhood (Abdelkafi 1986: 581) with a view to increasing 
the attractiveness of the neighbourhood in order to raise property values. Initiated in 1985, the second 
phase was no longer executed by the public housing agency SNIT, but was handed over to the newly 
created governmental agency Agence de Réhabilitation et Rénovation Urbaine (ARRU), and was 
backed by a loan from the World Bank, which had begun to finance urban rehabilitation on a large scale 
in Tunisia during the 1980s (Miossec 1999: 105). In the assessment for the second renewal phase, 
“vacant areas occupied by ambulatory vendors” were seen to be “spreading deterioration” and were 
thus identified as damaging to local property values (Unit of Housing and Governance et al. 1999: 3). 
The planning of modern commercial infrastructures that could replace anarchic trading landscapes thus 
formed a core objective of the second project phase (Abdelkafi 1986: 585) and the financial viability of 
the project was to be ensured through the enhanced participation of private investors, who could now 
buy serviced sites in the Hafsia to develop their own residential or commercial projects.  
 
Inadvertently, a substantial part of the private investment for the second phase of renewal came from 
stakeholders in the fripe economy, especially those who had ascended in the ranks of the wholesale 
business or were involved in the lucrative import of fripe to Tunisia. By 1976, an estimated 20 
wholesalers had acquired storage spaces and offices in the Hafsia and were working as unlicensed 
intermediaries between fripe sorting companies and traders all over the capital city (Van Groen and 
Lozer 1976: 10). Due to the wholesalers’ exclusive access to the sorting factories and considerable 
leeway over price-setting, their profit margins were significant and rapid expansion translated into 
growing demand for storage spaces and parking lots in the Hafsia. Especially the outer part of the 
neighbourhood, where the protectorate authorities had created the Bab Cartagena – an archway and 
access road – to facilitate vehicular access to the medina (Ferjani 2017: 144), had become the 
preferential operating ground of the wholesalers. This was also where the second phase of renewal was 
concentrated. Consequently, the Hafsia became a prime investment site for the large sums of cash 
earned by importers and wholesalers during the 1980s and 1990s, with stakeholders from the fripe 
buying both developed real estate and acting as private developers, purchasing empty plots and building 
their own commercial infrastructures89.  
 
It was thus the role of the Hafsia as fripe wholesale and retail centre that drove up real estate prices 
exponentially during the 1980s and 1990s, and proved central to the completion and overall profitability 
of the renewal project. While this benefitted fripe wholesalers and other private investors, most of the 
original, low-income inhabitants of the neighbourhood were displaced over the course of renewal 
operations90. While zoning regulations had been designed to guarantee the preservation of a mixed-use 
environment, many of the housing units or office spaces were gradually readapted for commercial 
purposes, “not surprisingly”, as an architect involved remarks, “because it was essentially the money 
of the fripe that completed the project”91. While numerous residents were thus displaced, fripe traders 
like Hamadi and Najib in the inner market successfully held on to their initial trading spaces. As Najib 
 
89 Appendix I, Interview 19; 
90 Appendix I, Interview 33;  
91 Appendix I, Interview 31; 
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remarks with pride, the “souk al-qdim” (old fripe market) thus represented a stable core for a 
neighbourhood undergoing radical transformations. Pointing to the dusty ground under his stall, Najib 
remarks: “A lot of things changed around us but we (the fripe traders) stayed (…). I am trading today 
where I used to sleep 50 years ago”. The fripe traders’ prominent role in the second phase of renewal 
thus dramatically altered the project outcome, transforming the Hafsia from a predominantly residential 
area into a dynamic commercial district.  
 
Both the first and the second phase of the Hafsia renewal project won a prestigious Aga Khan Award 
for architecture and thus became the most widely known success story of urban renewal in post-
independence Tunis. While the jury praised exceptional “community involvement” in both project 
phases and heralds “the excellent public-private partnership that guaranteed the financial and economic 
viability and success of the project” (Davidson et al. 1995), it fails to mention the fripe traders’ role in 
the project. In an evaluation of the renewal project, completed between 1994 and 1995, the success of 
the project is summarised as a “dramatic increase in property values” which guaranteed “a leverage 
ratio of 3.4 Tunisian Dinar for every 1 Dinar of public investment” (Unit for Housing et al. 1999: 24, 
36). While the profitability of the project is credited to the active role of the “private sector” (ibid), the 
fripe commerce remains again conspicuously absent from the report (Association de Sauvegarde de la 
Medina 1999). The systematic obfuscation of the fripe trade’s role in shaping the outcome – and indeed, 
in enabling the completion – of renewal in the Hafsia is not only evident in project documentation, but 
is also echoed in contemporary discourses of those who were directly involved in the project92. It must 
be seen as indicative of a desire to uphold differentiations between original planning visions and 
perverted outcomes, and official stakeholders and illegitimate encroachers, obscuring the diverse modes 
of co-production and mutually beneficial agreements that blurred such lines. 
 
 
b. The contested remaking of the Ibn Khaldoun estate 
 
In January 1984, the Cité Ibn Khaldoun became a hotspot of rioting during the “émeutes du pain” (bread 
riots) that rocked Tunisia. The spectacular moment of rioting represented the culmination of a broader 
conjuncture of aggravated economic and political crisis in the capital. The state’s withdrawal from 
public housing provision, combined with continued urban growth93 and a “laissez-faire policy” towards 
informal settlements (Chabbi 1989: 260) had resulted in the expansion of the so-called “ceinture rouge” 
(“red belt”), a ring of informally built-up, consolidated urban settlements that accommodated a 
staggering 400,000 inhabitants by 198494 (Lafi 2017: 51). At the same time, rapidly rising youth 
unemployment led to mounting frustration and a concentration of poverty in these dense urban areas 
(Miossec 1999: 99). Eruptions of violence during the 1979 general strike and the consecutive 1984 
bread riots demonstrated the political explosiveness of the situation, triggering targeted state operations 
in what were now referred to as “urban problem territories” (Chabbi 1999: 194). The resumption of 
state intervention in Ibn Khaldoun must be understood in this context, coming as a direct reaction to the 




92 Appendix I, Interview 30; 
93 From Tunisia’s independence in 1956 to 1984, the population of Tunis almost tripled, from 540,000 to 1.4 million (Lafi 
2017: 51); 
94 In differentiation from the earlier gourbivilles, most settlements that were built-up informally during the 1970s and 1980s 
offered good quality housing and a move to these areas from the dilapidated inner city signalled social ascension; 
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In addition to such political motives, the municipality recognised the potential for profitable real estate 
investment on the large patch of land that had remained undeveloped in the lower part of the Ibn 
Khaldoun estate. As the municipality hoped to develop a new ‘commercial centre’ in the lower part of 
the estate, it planned to dismantle and replace the auto-constructed marketplace in the upper part of the 
estate that had functioned as an informal neighbourhood core. However, the powerful opposition of 
different trader groups, and first and foremost the fripe traders who had turned the small marketplace 
into the physical centre of their business in the weekly souks, forced the municipality to shelve initial 
plans. Instead, the municipality gradually entered into agreements with the fripe traders that effectively 
turned them into key stakeholders in the development of the lower part of the estate: instead of being 
expelled from the neighbourhood, the fripe traders in fact established a new, expansive marketplace 
that lastingly reshaped the entire urban area.  
 
Attempts to reassert control and replace the auto-constructed marketplace 
 
The bread riots of 1984 were first sparked as a reaction to cuts in wheat subsidies in the South of the 
country95, and then spread to the “ahyah shaabiya” (working-class areas) of Tunis on January 3rd 1984 
(Seddon 1989: 179).  The Ibn Khaldoun estate was rapidly enveloped by violent protests and in the 
night from January 3rd to January 4th, young men in the estate burnt cars of local middle-class 
households, pillaged the Magasin Moderne – the supermarket located in the lower part of the estate – 
and set fire to the local secondary school (Ben Slimane 1995: 280). Widespread media reporting on the 
rioting in Ibn Khaldoun brought the housing estate back to the centre of public attention, now casting 
what had been considered a "success story of planning policy for social housing" as a “social failure” 
and a “zone urbaine dangereuse” (“urban danger zone”) (ibid). Explicit attacks on symbols of the state 
reinforced fears of the Cité becoming a hub for oppositional politics. The proximity of Cité Ibn 
Khaldoun to both the Tunis Manar University campus, which had become a centre for left-wing student 
politics, and to the gourbiville of Djebel Lahmar, which was considered a recruitment ground for 
Islamists (Vasile 1997: 113), further augmented the sense that intervention was urgent. 
 
The construction of, first, a police station and, a little later, a party office of the unitary party in Ibn 
Khaldoun were thus intended to regain control over the estate (Ben Medien 2004). Both were erected 
in utmost proximity to the auto-constructed marketplace, which had expanded into adjacent residential 
areas through the transformation of garages and ground floors into shop spaces, and was thus considered 
emblematic for the generalised “breakdown of order” in the neighbourhood (Ben Slimane 1995: 277). 
Police interventions then began to target the market and its urban surrounds, and young market traders 
became subject to stop and search actions. Particularly young men like Slim, who were coming from 
Djebel Lahmar on a day-to-day basis, faced constant police harassment: “The police sometimes waited 
for us on the way, they would just stop us from going to work”, Slim remembers, “or they just suddenly 
stormed the market, picked up young men and drove us to the detention centre to beat us up”. What the 
security forces described as anti-Islamist security operations in fact often resembled “indiscriminate 
raids” that resulted in “arrests of young men from ordinary spaces like bus stops or cafes in the Ibn 
Khaldoun neighbourhood” (ibid: 280). 
 
Tensions between the security forces and market traders were thus already running high when the 
municipality decided to construct a new neighbourhood centre in the yet undeveloped lower part of the 
Ibn Khaldoun housing estate. The planned expansion of the “metro léger” (light rail system) to the 
 
95 Under pressure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government had announced plans to cut wheat subsidies in 
December 1983; 
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lower part of Cité Ibn Khaldoun gave new impetus for the development plans, as the municipality hoped 
to transform the vast empty space into a booming commercial hub that could cater to the rapidly 
growing upper middle-class areas of Northern Tunis. The goal was thus two-fold: firstly, to replace the 
sprawling and anarchic souk in the upper part of the neighbourhood with a covered municipal “marché” 
(market) in the lower part of the estate and to thus re-establish control over the neighbourhood centre. 
Secondly, to commercially exploit a still undervalued municipal land resource that was strategically 
located adjacent to a future transport hub. 
 
When the new market infrastructure was completed in 1988, the municipality began negotiations with 
fruit and vegetable traders and butchers to relocate to the lower part of the housing estate. As was the 
case with other planned, municipal markets, the new infrastructure was reserved for fresh food products 
and thus excluded the fripe traders. While the municipality offered tax reductions to incentivise the 
move to the new market, the food traders feared to be cut off from the flourishing upper market and 
their local clientele and thus refused to relocate to what in fact resembled an isolated infrastructure 
between yet unfinished tram tracks and empty patches of undeveloped land. Faced with the reluctance 
of fresh food traders to relocate, the municipality decided to dismantle the auto-constructed marketplace 
in the upper part of the estate. Adel says he will never forget the day when police forces, accompanied 
by municipal workers, stormed the marketplace and began to demolish market stalls, without prior 
warning. “Everything escalated really fast”, he recounts, “everyone came to protect their own stall and 
we called friends, “wouled l-houma” (lit. “boys from the area”, here meaning those still residing in 
Djebel Lahmar) that came to help. (…) The police arrested some traders and then things went really 
violent. It (the clashes) continued during the whole night, and some of us tried to burn the police 
station.” After a day and night of violent clashes and subsequent rioting, the market emerged largely 
intact, but several youths and policemen had been injured.  
 
The Wulad Ayar as powerful stakeholders in the transformation of Ibn Khaldoun  
 
Taken aback by the fripe traders’ collective defence of the market and their clout over the upper part of 
the estate, the municipality quickly scrapped plans to demolish the auto-constructed marketplace. Slim 
says that it took the violent response of the traders for the municipality to realise that “we fripe traders 
actually controlled a big part of the market (…) and we were running our “bizness” (business) from the 
neighbourhood”. The tight-knit social bonds and organisation of the fripe traders that had been key to 
consolidating the marketplace and to expanding control over weekly souks now proved essential for 
entering into negotiations with the municipality. As Adel explains, “the baladiya (municipality) realised 
they needed to speak to “fripiers” (fripe traders) like my father who could then talk to the others and 
convince them to cooperate.” Eventually, the deal concluded between the municipality and the traders 
was mutually beneficial: the fripe traders, who had been struggling with limited trading space and 
difficult vehicular access in the upper part of Ibn Khaldoun were offered a lease of land from the 
municipality in the lower part of the estate. This allowed them to relocate a part of their trading activities 
to the empty grounds adjacent to the newly constructed municipal market and the soon-to-be-completed 
tram station. In return, they would register for annual municipal “batendas” (licenses) and pay rent to 
the municipality. 
 
Within a short time span, the power hierarchies from the upper market were thus transferred to the much 
larger and formally authorised marketplace in the newly emerging centre of Ibn Khaldoun, providing 
the fripe traders with a strategic position right at the core of the municipality’s new development project. 
Those belonging to influential trader families, like Adel and Slim, benefitted disproportionately from 
the deal, as they received several batendas and ample trading space in the new market, and thus 
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ascended in the ranks of the fripe retail business. Slim and Adel, who had toured weekly souks around 
the capital city before, now received their own, permanent trading spaces and were able to employ 
others to drive their van and carry out the physically exhausting work in the souks of Tunis on their 
behalf. At the same time, other fripe and fresh food traders kept their stalls in the auto-constructed 
market of the upper estate, and the municipality never attempted to dismantle it again. 
 
The relocation of the fripe market to the lower part of Ibn Khaldoun proved to be an immediate success 
and the market rapidly expanded beyond the originally attributed, gravelled field, enveloping the 
municipal market, the spaces along both sides of the tram tracks, as well as the surrounding 
neighbourhood streets. Several factors explain this success: first, the relocation coincided with the 
opening of the new tram station, and the commercial development of the lower part of the estate, turning 
it into an attractive shopping destination both for lower social classes from Djebel Lahmar and the inner 
city, and for car-owning middle-class inhabitants of the residential areas to the North of Ibn Khaldoun. 
Second, the increase in fripe imports to Tunisia and the professionalisation of fripe sorting during the 
1990s transformed the fripe into a mainstream consumer good. Particularly the availability of a new 
category of “crème” (luxury) used garments now increasingly attracted a middle-class clientele to the 
fripe and provided an opportunity for the traders to specialise in high-end merchandise. As Slim 
explains, “the clients in the new market were completely different from the old market up in the houma 
(local neighbourhood). We specialised in original brands and increased the prices in the lower market, 
and then resold the leftovers in the upper market, to our local clients.”  
 
Less than a decade after the bread riots in 1984, fripe trading had thus transformed Cité Ibn Khaldoun 
in ways wholly unanticipated in original planning visions or municipal redevelopment plans. The 
juxtaposed market landscapes in the upper and lower part of the estate now turned the neighbourhood 
into the second largest fripe trading centre of Tunis, secondary only to the Hafsia. As a young woman 
who grew up in Ibn Khaldoun during the 1990s explains, “the fripe colonised the entire area (…) and 
for us, as teenagers in Ibn Khaldoun, the fripe market was the only place to go to in the neighbourhood, 
it was both our evening outing and weekend outing” 96. For the municipality, meanwhile, the flourishing 
fripe market not only translated into a substantial increase in tax revenues, it also contributed to the 
rapid appreciation of yet undeveloped municipal land in the lower part of the estate. By the early 2000s, 
the plots adjacent to the municipal marketplace had become highly attractive for private commercial 
development and the municipality entered into negotiations with a developer who aimed to construct a 
new supermarket. However, the general appreciation of both residential and commercial real estate in 
Ibn Khaldoun – to which the fripe traders had undoubtedly contributed – once again turned the 
sprawling fripe marketplace into a point of contention. As the municipality attempted to develop more 
and more parcels of land that the fripe traders had occupied, police clearances and conflicts between 
the traders and the municipality erupted and especially since the 2000s, the burgeoning fripe market is 
once again perceived as a nuisance by the authorities.  
 
Envisioned by planners as a self-sufficient neighbourhood that would generate “social harmony and 
equilibrium” amongst diverse social classes, Ibn Khaldoun in fact always remained a majority middle-
class residential area whose car-owning inhabitants intentionally minimised interactions within the 
neighbourhood (Ben Slimane 1995: 269, 276). For working-class families meanwhile, who were 
resettled to the estate from Djebel Lahmar, the incomplete housing project represented an alien urban 
environment and only the auto-construction of the marketplace and its embedding in city-wide fripe 
trading networks allowed them to gradually appropriate and transform the estate. In the process, 
 
96 Appendix I, Interview 34; 
 80 
stigmatised rural migrants and their descendants from Djebel Lahmar lastingly positioned themselves 
as a central constituency in the urban fripe trade, building upon – at times imaginary – shared lineages 
as Wulad Ayar. This positioning then qualified them as key stakeholders in the remaking of the lower 
part of the housing estate, transforming what was considered a “failed estate” in 1984 (ibid: 280) into 
an economic success story. Inadvertently, the fripe market therefore produced a version of the social 
complexity that the estate’s planners had desired. Until today, few marketplaces in contemporary Tunis 
attract a clientele as socially diverse as that of the Ibn Khaldoun market, breaking up the “entre-soi” of 
urban elites in the residential North of the capital (Ben Othman 2009(b): 89) and testifying to the fripe 





“Ayari, Ayari”, echoes through the fripe markets of Tunis several times a day. On handcarts, vendors 
sell the popular “casse-croûte Ayari” (Ayari sandwich), consisting of egg and harissa spread out on 
round flat breads and known for being filling and unbeatably cheap. Inseparably linked to the fripe 
markets, the “Ayari” sandwich testifies to a history of migration and poverty as it derives its 
denomination from a tribal identity that gained new signification in the urban fripe trade. It also stands 
for the capacity of particular migrant constituencies to carve out space for themselves in a specific 
economy and in the city, and to confer new meaning to identities shaped by both rural pasts and urban 
presents. While denominations like “Ayari” have entered current language and have become closely 
intertwined with the fripe trade, the central role of different generations of migrant traders in shaping 
the contemporary socio-spatial order of Tunis remains largely unacknowledged or continues to be 
dismissed as a mere act of encroachment97.  
 
The counter-histories constructed in this chapter show how two prominent urban renewal projects in 
post-independence Tunis – originally designed to break up pockets of rurality in the city – inadvertently 
opened possibilities of space-making to different migrant constituencies who built urban livelihoods in 
the fripe trade. The goal of presenting these counter-histories is not merely to “confer recognition” to 
“spaces of poverty and forms of popular agency that often remain invisible or neglected” (Roy 2011: 
224). Rather, the aim is to challenge dominant epistemologies of ‘the urban’ in contemporary Tunis by 
deconstructing the performative binaries that have long underpinned accounts of urban development in 
the post-independence city. First, this chapter destabilises the normative distinctions between ‘rural’ 
and ‘urban’ that continue to reverberate in present-day systems of differentiation that exclude the fripe 
and its constituencies from ‘the urban order’. Instead, these counter-histories show how ‘the rural’ was 
itself transformed in the city and became in turn a structuring element to the social and spatial order of 
Tunis. Second, the deliberate rewriting of the history of two renewal projects highlights the blurry 
distinctions between ‘planned’ and ‘unplanned’ urban space as it brings into view the – often unlikely 
or unpredictable – alliances and diverse modes of co-production through which ‘urban projects’ actually 
come to life in the city. 
 
Finally, a focus on a particular commerce for investigating processes of city-making allows these 
counter-histories to posit a mundane realm of the urban economy as a productive starting point for 
investigating processes of urban transformation. By centring on the auto-construction and consolidation 
of marketplaces, this chapter challenges dominant portrayals of the urban fripe trade in Tunis as 
 
97 Appendix I, Interview 30; 
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ahistorical and devoid of structure. It thus problematises contemporary discourses that frame fripisation 
as an ephemeral process and cast the specific market forms of the fripe trade as unplanned or unordered. 
Anchoring the fripe trade in specific socio-spatial histories that are entwined with broader narratives of 
urban transformation is therefore essential to comprehending contemporary processes of market-
making in Tunis and the ways in which these are variably included in or excluded from what can be 
recognised as ‘the urban order’. 
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Figure 5   Itinerant fripe traders at a weekly souk in Ezzahra, a Southern Tunis suburb (2018) 
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Part Two: Introduction 
Collective enactments of valuation work: researching a singular urban economy 
 
 
The two fripe marketplaces discussed in the preceding chapter – the Hafsia and Ibn Khaldoun – 
continued to represent central sites of fripe retailing in the capital when I began field research in June 
2017. However, they had lost their long-standing monopoly position. Innumerable specialised fripe 
trading spaces were now in competition against one another, and rapid processes of market proliferation 
were unfolding across the city: fripe trading was enveloping unbuilt patches of land on the urban 
peripheries, transforming inner-city streets into dense market landscapes, and taking over former 
vegetable markets, grocery shops and workshops. I thus encountered the fripe trade as a prominent 
factor of urban change, captured in the vernacular word creation fripisation. 
 
The second part of this thesis sets out from fripisation and the explicit link the term establishes between 
economic processes and urban change, or market- and space-making. The three chapters comprising 
the second part specifically address the third question set out at the beginning of this thesis, investigating 
how contemporary processes of market-making with diverse fripe circulations co-constitute urban 
space. In doing so, they also provide answers to the first two questions, regarding the fripe’s contingent 
remaking as a specific commodity form in Tunis and the economy’s contested positioning in the 
present-day city. In differentiation from Part One, which built an account of the fripe as a historically 
constituted urban economy, Part Two focuses on an ethnographic understanding of contemporary 
micro-level processes of market-making: valuation, circulation and exchange. Motivating this empirical 
focus on economic practices is an interest in how the fripe economy operates in and through space, and 
thus is an agent of urban change. The subsequent sections discuss the methodological choices and 
research process underpinning this account, setting out from the following questions: first, how does 
the fripe as an unstable commodity provide an entry point for researching cycles of valuation, 
circulation and exchange in Tunis? Second, how does an emphasis on the diverse actors involved in 




1. Fripe valuation as a basis for market-making 
 
During initial market observations, “picturing practices” that focused on fripe displays and market 
arrangements proved central for developing “techniques of seeing” (Crang 1997: 366) the fripe as a 
heterogeneous material basis for the economy. In addition to sharpening the focus through the camera 
lens on inert fripe materials within hectic and bustling market landscapes, the photographs themselves 
captured eclectic collections of ‘stuff’, from Christmas decorations dangling next to carnival costumes 
and worn-out diving equipment, to Donald Trump T-shirts advertised next to a jumper printed for the 
voluntary fire brigade of a German village in the Black Forest. Both the practice of taking photographs 
and the resulting images highlighted the heterogeneous material assemblages of the fripe that pose a 
“problem of unordered diversity” (Miller 1998(a): 6) in Tunis marketplaces. Normally, commodities 
are transformed through legally binding product standards into equal units at their production, ensuring 
the stabilisation of their exchange value (Çaliskan and Callon 2010: 6; Østbø Haugen 2018(a): 1297). 
In the absence of a centralised locus of production however, and due to the fripe’s origin stories of 
disposal, donation or destocking in Europe and North America, it is impossible to convert the garments 
and objects “into transactable commodities by rendering their qualities stable and known” (Berndt and 
Boeckler 2009). Rather, diverse material and immaterial “inscriptions” (Appelgren and Bohlin 
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2015(a):160) on the fripe materials testify to their heterogeneous “economic and social biographies” 
(Kopytoff, 1986, 67). The uncertain quality and value of the fripe materials disclosed in the Tunis 
marketplaces underlines the contingencies inherent in requalifying garments and objects for their 
“commodity situation”, an always context-specific social relation (Appadurai 1986: 13, 19). Garbage 
containers overflowing with second-hand shoes at the end of market days, or women sifting through 
unwearable textile materials disposed of in large piles on the market peripheries, testified to the often-
blurry lines between discard and commodity form in the Tunis fripe markets.  
 
The fripe’s uncertain commodity status therefore shifted attention to the continuous efforts involved in 
requalifying – or valuing – it for circulation and market exchange in Tunis. “Value” has been theorised 
as the “starting point for all economic analysis”, as it “focuses attention both on what economic activity 
is about and on how it is practiced” (Lee 2006: 417). Here, contingent attempts at requalification of the 
fripe foregrounded a conception of value not as a stable and intrinsic quality, but as a variable category 
that is constituted in process (Hutter and Stark 2015). Since Thompson’s reflections on “rubbish” as 
“malleable category” (1979: 88), analytical attention to valuation as a non-linear and contingent process 
has characterised scholarly work on waste, reuse or second-hand economies in diverse contexts (Corwin 
2018; Brooks 2015; Gregson et al. 2010; Herod et al. 2014; Lepawsky and Mather 2011; Norris 2010; 
Rosenfeld 2018). Study of transnational waste economies in particular has highlighted the social and 
cultural situatedness and thus fluidity of value categories over space and time, allowing “things” to 
“move into and out of the commodity phase” (Gregson et al. 2010: 848) in different contexts. As the 
fripe materials travel from diverse locations of donation or disposal to the Tunisian sorting factories 
and, subsequently, retail spaces, they are exposed to different “cultural processes of value definition 
and performance” (Guyer 2004: 21). Seemingly mundane, micro-level practices of fripe valuation are 
thus bound up with intricate and contingent translation attempts that turn the Tunis fripe marketplaces 
into sites for researching “the unexpected and unstable aspects of global interaction” (Tsing 2011: 3). 
 
Empirically then, valuation draws attention to “the study of what people do with objects” (Miller 
1998(a): 19), or the concrete material practices that enact translations in fripe materials allowing them 
to re-circulate as commodities. Analysing the distinct “world of practice” (ibid) underpinning fripe 
valuation is thus a starting point for comprehending market-making, or the enactment of the fripe as 
urban economy, in Tunis. In certain reuse or waste economies, valuation can be observed through 
physical processes of coming-apart (Gregson et al. 2010: 853) or re-assemblage and repair (Corwin 
2018: 22), and thus the mutability of materials in circulation. Elsewhere, as is the case in the fripe 
economy, valuation occurs “without industrial labour through a process of translation” (Tsing, 2013: 
23, 30). While the physical transformation of garments through processing is an important element of 
value creation in the global second-hand clothes economy – for instance documented in the shoddy 
blanket industry for the humanitarian aid sector (Norris 2010, 2012) – “reuse is often more lucrative 
than recycling” (Corwin 2018: 22).  
 
In Tunisia, processing of textile materials plays a subordinate role in the valuation of the fripe, despite 
the legal obligation of sorting factories to reprocess at least 20% of all garment imports98. Consequently, 
most garments and objects imported as fripe remain largely intact, or even physically unchanged, in 
their trajectories from the shipping container to the marketplace in Tunis. In order to comprehend the 
often-invisible transformations that requalify the fripe as “commodity form” (Tsing 2013:23), a close-
up engagement with people’s micro-level practices with diverse fripe materials – including sorting and 
 
98 Decree n°2005-2038, amending decree n°95-916; 95-2396 of 2 December 1995; While some factories operate fibre 
processing machines, producing white industry cloth or insulation materials for European car manufacturers, the percentage 
of processing remains far beneath the legally binding 20%; 
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repackaging, warehousing, display and sale, transport, or washing and resale – thus became 
indispensable. While many of these valuation processes can be found in other second-hand economies 
(Ayimpam 2016; Hansen 2000(a); Valenciano-Mane 2018), their enactment is also always specific. The 
‘fripe’ is thus historically and culturally constituted as a distinct commodity form in Tunis; at the same 




2. Researching ‘valuation work’ through talk with expert market-makers 
 
Given such importance of valuation to market-making with fripe materials, this research employs the 
term valuation work to capture the ethnographic focus on the diverse agencies involved in contingently 
requalifying the fripe for commodity circulation and exchange. Valuation work here becomes a starting 
point for examining “how people enact economies” (Gibson-Graham 2014: 149) and thus for 
ethnographically uncovering “the actual practice of economy” (Miller 2002: 224). The term ‘work’ 
intentionally leaves open “what counts as work” (Massey 2013: 10), allowing consideration of diverse 
practices – at times embodied and material, at others more indirect forms of enacting translations in 
things – that unsettle clear-cut differentiations between formal and informal work, production and 
consumption, or income-generation and forms of care work or private provisioning. Consequently, 
investigating valuation work requires engaging with diverse actors, loci and processes of value 
production, and opens the “multiple social relations and conceptions of value” that constitute “the 
economic” at any given point in time (Lee 2006: 414). Researching valuation work as a basis for market-
making in the fripe economy thus constitutes “a performative act” that “widens the field of economic 
realities” that can come under consideration (Gibson-Graham 2014: 149, 151). 
 
Empirically, scrutinising valuation work in the fripe rapidly highlighted the “limits of observation” – 
both directly and through the camera lens – in trying to grasp intricate economic practice (Keshavarzian 
2007:35). Over the first six months of research, most of my market observations comprised “a 
phenomenology of economic practice” (Roitman 2007: 158), recording the unfiltered experiences, 
atmospheres, embodied performances and gestures, scents and melodies of valuation work in writing, 
photographs, and sound recordings. While these ethnographic practices were crucial to rendering the 
“irreducibility of experience” of the fripe markets (Anjaria and Anjaria 2020: 239), such observations 
proved insufficient for comprehending the logics and meanings underlying people’s valuation work. 
However, as those warning me against the fripe’s status as a ‘black box’ or a ‘closed world’ had 
predicted, performing a shift from a largely incognito observer to an interlocutor in the fripe 
marketplaces proved difficult and time-consuming. The biggest hurdle was mistrust, as the explanation 
of my research undertaking and introduction as PhD student99 at times qualified me as “sahafa” 
(journalist) or, worse, “jasusa” (spy) in the eyes of fripe traders. Negative press coverage of the fripe –
and especially the search for scandals that often motivated journalists to come to the marketplaces – 
had resulted in a hostile attitude towards anyone asking questions, let alone trying to record interviews 
or take photographs. In addition, the systematic criminalisation of research under the Ben Ali regime 
until 2011 (Ben Amor 2013; Bendana 2017) rendered the very idea of ‘research’ suspect and potentially 
threatening. As my questions grew more informed and precise over time, a new suspicion crept in, 




99 I handed short, written explanations of my research project (in Arabic and French) and my Durham card with my Tunis 
phone number to all the people with whom I spoke; 
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Such suspicion and at times outright hostility greatly complicated field research, and forced me to accept 
a definition of “ethnography” as “improvisational practice” (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 164) that 
embraces methodological openness and flexibility. Instead of a pre-determined or contained ‘field site’, 
I thus began to do research in different fripe markets simultaneously, engaging in a sort of “patchwork 
ethnography” (Günel et al. 2020) that seized opportunities wherever these arose. While the fripe is 
commonly referred to as “alam rijal” (men’s world) and fripe marketplaces remain directed by the 
bodily performances of male traders and often hyper-masculine codes of behaviour that are linked to 
the fripe’s social history as trade exercised by male migrants, I rapidly noticed substantial differences 
from one market to another: in some fripe markets – especially those with a very masculine clientele – 
it was evident that “the presence of women always has to be explained and accounted for” (Rabo 2005: 
21), so that any attempt to dwell or observe translated into unsolicited invitations or sexual harassment. 
In other markets, I felt more at ease and began to develop careful routines of observation, which became 
the basis for opening up direct engagements with different market participants. To enter into talk with 
market traders and customers alike, it was crucial to drop the formalities that typically frame interview 
encounters, from written consent forms to recording devices or pre-scheduled meetings100. Instead, I 
learnt to integrate research conversations into market routines, recognising how regular, seemingly 
mundane interactions that focused narrowly on people’s concrete valuation work could build trust and 
normalise my presence over time. 
 
The persistent return to the ever-same locations and interlocutors became the single most important 
factor in gradually establishing myself as a trusted counterpart. Inadvertently, the time-consuming 
process of moving three times within central Tunis – each time into proximity of another fripe market 
– helped “erase pre-given boundaries between professional and personal life” (Günel et al. 2020). 
Chance encounters with fripe wholesalers through negotiations over bike storage, routinised 
conversations with fripe traders during daily commutes or grocery shopping, or the introduction of my 
family members in the markets, opened unexpected doors and became the basis for establishing 
personal rapport. Most importantly, my consistent return over time eventually convinced market traders 
that I was indeed a ‘researcher’ and gradually normalised the idea of the fripe as an object of scientific 
research. Najib, the Hafsia trader whose life story is discussed at length in Chapter II was one of the 
first traders to jokingly refer to me as “ustaza” (teacher/professor) and to ask inquisitively about the 
space his character was going to take in my “book on the fripe”, as he liked to refer to it101. Other 
interlocutors similarly developed a greater interest in my research findings over time, so that my initial 
one-sided questioning soon gave way to two-way conversations during which my interlocutors often 
challenged my limited understanding, helped re-orient my questions, or pointed out gaps in my 
narrative. I also shared some of my material with interlocutors, especially photographs and copies of 
archival material on the history of the fripe trade or specific marketplaces. To mitigate the illegibility 
of my main research output – first and foremost, written text in English – I also collaborated with the 
traders of the Hafsia fripe market in a participatory research and artistic project with children and youth 
from the local area102, and involved three interlocutors in an exhibition that combined photography, 
sound and reuse objects to render visible some of the valuation processes in the fripe103. 
 
 
100 While formally scheduled interviews (see Appendix I) were recorded and written consent was given, I used verbal consent 
for ethnographic encounters and most of my conversations remain unrecorded, apart from life history interviews (see 
Appendix II); 
101 In such conversations, I highlighted the principles of confidentiality to explain why names will be changed and no 
photographs of interlocutors will be used; 
102 The Hafsia project in November and December 2019 was supported by the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (ifa) and 
implemented in collaboration with El-Warcha/Collectif Créatif; 
103 The photo exhibition and art installation “Tbarbich” was supported by the Institut de Recherche sur le Maghreb 
Contemporain (IRMC) and organized at the Maison de l’Image in December 2020; 
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Encountering diverse market participants as ‘experts’, thus “dislocating the ethnographer as subject of 
knowing” (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 2011), formed the basis for my research interactions in the fripe 
markets from the beginning. Centring on people’s rehearsed practices with fripe materials – from 
sorting or probing as customers, to display or sale strategies as vendors, to the collection of repair items 
as resellers – helped mitigate the multiple axes of social difference (Nagar and Geiger 2007: 268) that 
could have otherwise complicated in-depth conversations. A precondition to speaking with my 
interlocutors as market-makers was qualifying for ‘expert talk’ in the fripe, and thus learning to ask 
meaningful – and yet open – questions that would enable my counterparts to provide at-length 
explanations and expert advice. Navigating diverse forms of market knowledge with attention to 
seemingly mundane detail (Geertz 1973), and accepting diverging narratives, explanations and forms 
of meaning-making as co-constitutive to the economy proved central to comprehending the significance 
of diverse forms of valuation work. Especially heightened attention to the “vocabularies of practice” 
(Bhan 2019: 15) my counterparts used to describe their valuation work helped uncover not only the 
specificity of economic practices, but also their situated meaning. This research thus remained 
deliberately with “moments of untranslatability” as something generative (Jazeel 2019: 15), engaging 
with “lughet al-fripe/al-aswak” (the language of the fripe/market) – as the inside parlance of the fripe 
is often referred to – as both possessing an ontological status in shaping processes of revaluation, and 
as a crucial epistemological tool. The refusal to translate certain key terms was indeed central to opening 
up the complexity of valuation work: for instance, an individual term like “al-farz” describes practices 
that reach from wage labour in the factory to informal resale activities in the marketplace, and moreover 
becomes the linguistic root for a descriptor of a distinctly female professional identity in the fripe 
economy.  
 
In-depth talk with diverse market-makers in the fripe economy, and explicit attention to their language 
and ways of describing economic practices, was therefore crucial to grasping the multi-layered 
meanings of valuation work. Importantly, such engagements countered framings of work in the fripe 
economy as mere subsistence strategies (Brooks 2012) that people engage in largely for a lack of choice 
(Gruntz 2019). Instead, market-makers’ accounts opened up an understanding of the different present 
and future aspirations, situated forms of knowledge and expertise, and forms of sociability bound up 
with valuation work. Similar to Millar’s account of ‘waste work’ as intimately connected to many 
people’s “forms of living” – rather than as a mere income source (2018: 9) – valuation work in the fripe 
thus carries differentiated meaning for different market-makers, and is often reflective of hierarchies of 
work, social status and professional identities in different sites of valuation work. Ethnographic 
engagement with the ways in which people “render meaningful their conditions of existence” (Gidwani 




3. Expanding ‘the field’: distributed agencies of valuation work  
 
The closer I engaged with people’s valuation practices, the more evident it became that valuation work 
could not be understood as contained in ‘the marketplace’, or indeed in any other bounded location. 
Rather, observation and talk with market-makers highlighted the crucial importance of multiple 
circulations beyond the physical marketplace – of fripe merchandise, but also of cash, credit obligations, 
people or information – as the basis for people’s situated performances of valuation. Diverse material 
and immaterial circulations thus connected fripe shopkeepers, stall owners and nassaba (street vendors) 
in the marketplaces to multiple other processes, actors and sites of value production. Consequently, the 
ethnographic focus on valuation work resulted in a gradual expansion of ‘the field’, both geographically 
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and relationally: first, while this ethnographic research had been multi-sited from the outset, I now 
expanded its scope from diverse fripe trading spaces to sorting factories, wholesale warehouses and 
innumerable sites of semi-private resale or fripe consumption. Second, while I maintained the in-depth 
engagement with fripe traders over the course of the research, I now extended my talk and observations 
to female factory workers, importers, wholesalers, transporters and informal resellers. Rather than 
proceeding with this geographical and relational expansion in any systematic manner, I allowed diverse 
“contingent openings” (Tsing 2011: 267) – from chance encounters with transporters or fripe customers 
in marketplaces to contacts I received through the networks I had established with traders – to determine 
the gradually evolving contours of my field. 
 
Although interested in the fripe’s enactment as ‘urban economy’, I abstained from pre-determining any 
fixed geographical ‘limits’ for my field research. Accepting urban space as a “product of interrelations 
(…) that is always in the process of being made” (Massey 2005: 9), the administratively defined 
boundaries of ‘Greater Tunis’ – or any other fixed and delimited notion of ‘the city’ or ‘the urban’ – 
never defined the scope of the field. Indeed, visits to sorting factories in other Tunisian cities like Bizerte 
and Sfax, repeated trips to the Tunisian South to meet with influential wholesalers, as well as research 
on the Tunisian-Algerian fripe trade in the border town El Kef were central to grasping the fripe’s 
dynamics as ‘urban economy’ in the capital104. While I never intentionally followed transnational fripe 
circulations to or from Tunis, research on the import-export business selectively extended my research 
to wholesale centres in Cairo, as well as a commercial collection company and vintage shop chain in 
Paris105 that entertains intimate connections to particular sites of fripe valuation in Tunis. In addition to 
keeping the geographical scope of this inquiry open and flexible throughout the research process, an 
expansion of the field through individual encounters and snowballing contacts allowed me to bring into 
view typically overlooked locations for value production. Beyond the sorting factories, the Tunis 
wholesale quarter and diverse fripe marketplaces, particularly the engagement with female sorting 
workers, resellers and fripe customers shed light on largely invisible sites of valuation work, from 
private living rooms to exclusive fripe boutiques or women-owned tailor shops and beauty salons on 
the peri-urban fringes. 
 
Such new loci of valuation work also automatically brought into view a wider set of market-makers and 
thus a more diverse array of valuation practices. First, these diverse locations for valuation work shed 
light on the crucial and myriad forms of distinctly female valuation work performed in the fripe 
economy, despite its perception as male-dominated. In most Arab cities, the majority of economic actors 
operating in public space, such as the “market trader” (Rabo 2005: 73) or the “workshop master” 
(Elyachar 2005: 118) remain emblematic masculine figures. The same holds for the fripe economy, 
where visible work in the wholesale and retail business – and particularly open-air sales practices – are 
almost exclusively performed by men. Women’s valuation work meanwhile remains largely invisible 
because it is contained in factories or discrete interior resale spaces, or remains unrecognised as 
‘economic activity’106 because it is bracketed as “reproductive work and care work” (Gago 2017: 89). 
In this research however, the open definition of ‘work’ could account for diverse forms of female 
valuation work, such as the informal sorting and resale activities of predominantly female, self-
employed “farazet” (sorters) in the marketplaces, or the tedious consumption work performed by a 
majority-female clientele in the Tunis fripe markets. Second, exploration of fripe valuation in diverse 
 
104 Research trip to El Kef, October 20th–23rd 2017; two consecutive research trips to Sfax, 2nd–9th of July and 28th to 30th of 
October 2018; research in sorting factories on Bizerte, Sfax and Tunis periphery (see Appendix I); 
105 Research in Paris, see Appendix I, Interview 4 and 41; Research in Al-Wakalah, Cairo, September 15th–16th 2018; 
106 According to the ILO country estimate for women aged 15+ in 2019,  24% of women participate in the labour market in 
Tunisia; this estimate obfuscates the disproportionate role of women working informally; accessed May 2nd 2020, 
available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?end=2019&locations=1A-TN-DZ-&start=1990; 
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urban locations rapidly debunks portrayals of the fripe as an a priori non-state economy. Indeed, 
observations and talk with both formal and informal market-makers – from factory workers and 
shopkeepers to unregistered wholesalers and informal street vendors – highlighted the ubiquitous 
participation of the state in practices of fripe valuation. Approaching the state as an active market-maker 
revealed the multiple levels and capacities at which it intervenes in the economy: at times, particular 
entities of the local state assume the role of regulators or law enforcers, and extract formal taxes from 
those engaged in valuation work; at other times, state employees, officials or members of the customs 
or security forces participate informally in value extraction, selectively enabling or obstructing fripe 
circulations.  
 
The ‘expanded field’ of valuation work thus brought into focus some of the locations, actors and 
processes involved in enabling, first, the contingent requalification of diverse fripe materials as 
commodities, and second, their circulation and exchange in contemporary Tunis. By gradually 
increasing the scope of this research it was possible to highlight additional – and at first invisible – 
market-making agencies, together with the multiple material and immaterial circulations that create 
connections and interdependencies between seemingly contained sites and actors of value production. 
This approach thus extends studies of urban economies that have focused on a single marketplace 
(Bestor 2004; Keshavarzian 2007; Monteith 2016; Rabo 2005) or have been orientated around a 
particular worksite, for instance in the study of urban waste economies (Fahmi and Sutton 2010; Millar 
2018; Samson 2015). It also shifts empirical focus from individual practices of livelihood-making, often 
at the heart of ethnographic studies of work in cities of the Global South (Di Nunzio 2019; Mains 2012; 
Thieme 2013; Weiss 2009), to the collective processes and power structures that determine individual 
opportunities for participation in market-making. 
 
 
4. Mobile ethnography: understanding market-making as a relational practice 
 
To go beyond an understanding of valuation work as contained in particular urban locations, it also 
became crucial to complement situated and immersive research in selected sites of fripe valuation with 
mobile methods that could allow me to analyse the diverse linkages and dense webs of relationships 
that underpinned the valuation work of my interlocutors. To comprehend the variegated patterns of 
movement and interactions involved in people’s valuation work, I employed two forms of “mobile 
ethnography” (Büscher and Urry 2009): first, I shadowed the working routines of different interlocutors 
as they navigated fripe wholesale and retail spaces that serve as hubs or passage points for multi-layered 
circulations in the contemporary fripe economy. Second, I practised go-alongs with a narrow group of 
key interlocutors across and beyond the city to comprehend how individual market-makers enhance 
their opportunities for market participation by inserting themselves into multiple networks, processes 
and geographies of fripe valuation. 
 
Heightened attention to people’s strategies for navigating hubs of fripe wholesale and retail through 
shadowing practices proved central to revealing the complex patterns of movement and dense webs of 
relationships that provide the basis for what I had initially perceived as ‘individual valuation work’. To 
gain such insights, it was important to replace largely static observations and conversations – in 
warehouses, shops or around stalls – with shadowing practices that allowed me to follow different 
interlocutors over entire working days in particular sites of valuation work. This was premised on 
knowing interlocutors well, because it required not only their full trust but also their willingness to 
tolerate my presence for extended periods of time. In locations like the sorting factory and the Tunis 
wholesale quarter, my opportunities to shadow particular interlocutors remained thus largely limited to 
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one-off occasions. In different fripe trading places however, and especially, in the Rue du Liban fripe 
market and in a female-owned shop space in Lafayette, the repeated shadowing of the same interlocutors 
over weeks and even months opened up an intricate understanding of working routines. For instance, 
following highly different market participants as they navigated the Rue du Liban fripe market and its 
urban surroundings (discussed in Chapter IV) proved central to comprehending the marketplace as 
evolving socio-spatial configuration and crucial basis for collective valuation work.  
 
In addition, the practice of “go-alongs” (Kusenbach 2003: 455) with a narrow circle of key interlocutors 
turned into a central tool for grasping valuation work as a relational practice that is often premised on 
movement beyond a bounded ‘workplace’, instead involving insertion into different networks, and 
elaborate strategies of navigating urban space and diverse voluntary and involuntary encounters. Over 
the course of this research, I undertook – at times repeated – go-alongs with a fripe transporter, a sorting 
factory worker, two wholesalers, diverse fripe traders, employees of the municipal market authority, 
and two all-female groups of fripe customers107. In some cases, this meant following my counterparts 
from their ‘workplace’ – such as the factory or marketplace – to diverse other sites of valuation work, 
for instance informal resale locations on the urban peripheries. In other cases, go-alongs translated into 
accompanied shopping trips from private homes to different bale openings, or extended truck journeys 
between factories, warehouses and distribution sites. In the process, the different market-makers I 
accompanied often crossed boundaries between care and wage work, consumption and production, or 
roles as market regulators and market participants.  
 
Moving through different spaces alongside my interlocutors allowed for intimate one-on-one 
conversations that were rarely possible in people’s work places, where interruptions were frequent and 
other people usually joined the conversations. In addition, the go-along holds the “potential to access 
some of the transcendent and reflexive aspects of lived experience in situ” (Kusenbach 2003:455, 456) 
and the shared navigation of space and confrontation of particular situations often triggered talk about 
subjects that interlocutors would normally avoid. However, the intimacy produced in go-alongs also 
proved problematic at times, particularly in the case of car or truck rides with male interlocutors that 
not only meant putting up with their driving habits but also exposed me to situations of prolonged 
confinement with no easy exit. Initial, negative experiences thus forced me to limit go-alongs to a 
relatively narrow circle of trusted interlocutors and female market-makers. While this clearly curtailed 
my opportunities for engagement – especially in the exclusively male wholesale business – the focus 
on repeated go-alongs with a narrow group of key interlocutors also presented advantages: as shared 
commutes, delivery rides or shopping trips only took place after months of observation and talk in 
people’s ‘work places’, my counterparts felt at ease with sharing working routines that, for instance, 
required granting access to private spaces, or providing insight into illicit or deceitful practices and thus 
demanded trust. 
 
Both shadowing practices and go-alongs became crucial tools for gaining an insight into the complex – 
and at times incommensurable – calculations that underpin different people’s valuation work. First, the 
movement alongside interlocutors highlighted that market-making in the fripe economy implies 
entering into diverse alliances, “expanding spaces of operation” (Simone 2005: 517) through complex 
webs of relationships. Countering portrayals of market calculation as disentanglement, alternative 
vocabularies for calculative agencies – such as “hustling” (Thieme 2017), “knotting” (DeBoeck 
2015(b)) or “manoeuvring” (Di Nunzio 2019: 129) – have long highlighted the multi-layered relational 
processes underpinning economic practices in different African cities. Similarly, in the fripe economy, 
 
107 See key interlocutors listed in Appendix II; 
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tending to diverse social relations often constitutes a central, rather than auxiliary, aspect of working 
routines: for instance, the daily routines of fripe transporters were structured around strategic 
sociabilities, from the morning coffee in the wholesale quarter where key information circulates, to 
visits – and favours offered – to policemen stationed in strategic positions, to evening beers in 
marketplaces where competition was rife. Second, observing people’s multi-layered interactions 
through mobile methods illuminated the “mixture of forms of exchange” (Miller 2002: 222), and thus 
diverse registers of value production, many market-makers engage in as part of their valuation work. 
Accordingly, only some of the “marginal gains” (Guyer 2004: 69) achieved through valuation work 
were quantifiable as material profit. For example, female farazet (sorters) who ensured that regular fripe 
supplies from the factories reached their extended families or neighbourhood acquaintances, often 
operated on the grounds of intangible forms of relational value, which highlighted the centrality of 
distinct moral economies in guiding valuation work. 
 
Finally, mobile methods revealed how individual opportunities for valuation work are premised on the 
continuous negotiation, and successful navigation, of unequal power relations that structure value 
production and extraction in the fripe economy. Shadowing practices and go-alongs thus shed light on 
“the making of the market as political process, involving power and subjectivity” (Mukhopadhyay 
2014: 206). The shadowing of people’s situated working routines elucidated the strict hierarchies 
determining differentiated opportunities for market participation – and thus fripe valuation – within 
particular marketplaces, sorting factories, or the Tunis wholesale quarter. Yet following people beyond 
these confined locations of valuation work simultaneously showed how individual market-makers 
attempted to circumvent or mitigate such “politics of value” (Warnier 2008:8) by opening up new 
opportunities for value production. For instance, “nassaba” (street vendors), whose market 
participation often hinged on contestations over limited vending space, improved their positioning by 
working in groups and extending their radius of operation to multiple supply and resale locations, so 
that they could flexibly shift from one marketplace to another when conflict erupted with permanent 
traders or the authorities.  
 
While becoming directly involved in my interlocutors’ strategic navigation of a highly competitive and 
often-contested sphere of value production proved central to grasping the contingencies inherent to fripe 
circulation, it also resulted in difficult situations. First, go-alongs particularly, meant that I was in 
situations where bribes were being exchanged or where I turned into a confidant about illicit import or 
wholesale practices being prepared or executed. I was thus particularly careful to retain my positioning 
as an observer and to protect the confidentiality of my interlocutors, which included a refusal to speak 
to local media or publish sensitive material that could have compromised research participants. At the 
same time, such direct observations proved vital to make sense of the often-complex intersection 
between “social and cultural un/acceptability” and the “legal/illegal binary” (Gregson and Crang 2017: 
209) that unsettles stable definitions of what is considered licit or illicit by different actors and in 
different spaces of the fripe economy. Second, mobile methods always carried the risk of associating 
me too closely with particular interlocutors, a danger that was compounded by researching an economy 
where “everybody knows everything about everybody”, as one of the largest fripe wholesalers in 
Tunisia once put it to me. To avoid losing access to other sites or market-makers, I thus learnt to 
periodically switch ‘field sites’ and never to rely on individual gatekeepers in order to maintain a 
position of neutrality within the field of power of the urban fripe economy. 
 
Mobile methods were therefore essential for understanding how situated practices of valuation work 
comprise wider economic processes. In urban studies, mobile methods have primarily been used to 
examine individual strategies of navigating the city, often bound up with questions of livelihood-making 
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(Langevang and Gough 2009; McFarlane and Silver 2017; Simone 2005). Here, moving alongside 
diverse market-makers enabled this research to show how individual opportunities for market-making 
rely on dense webs of connections and “reciprocal exchange relations” (Appadurai 1986: 33), yet also 
a hierarchical politics of value. It thus foregrounds an understanding of valuation work as always 
situated, and yet never fully contained, in particular urban locations. Even if market-makers remained 
relatively immobile during their working routines, their performances of valuation relied on multiple 
material and immaterial circulations beyond their situated ‘work place’. Moments of sudden stoppage 
rendered particularly visible the interdependencies and unequal power relations structuring value 
production and extraction in the fripe economy. 
 
 
5. ‘Collective enactments’ of valuation and the production of urban space  
 
My ethnographic engagement with valuation work in the fripe markets was explicitly “geographical” 
(Hitchings and Latham 2020: 973) from the outset, as it not only situated valuation in particular urban 
locations, but explicitly investigated how valuation work produces urban space. In encounters with 
diverse market participants, emphasis thus lay on comprehending how valuation work hinged on, and 
in turn co-constituted, particular socio-spatial configurations and tangible urban transformations. This 
meant encountering interlocutors not merely as market-makers, but also as space-makers, whose 
routinised economic practices reshaped both the situated urban locations in which they were organised 
and wider webs of connections and interdependencies across and beyond the city.  
 
The term ‘collective enactment’ is employed to analyse how different forms of valuation work rely on, 
but also become co-constitutive to, particular socio-spatial relations and physical urban forms. 
‘Collective enactments’ of fripe valuation work produce both situated and dispersed urban change 
processes. On the one hand, fripe valuation often depends on the ‘collective enactment’ of particular 
urban locations as sites for valuation work, for instance by consolidating a street as a physical 
‘marketplace’ or by staging consumption performances that produce temporary forms of urban 
publicness. On the other hand, processes of valuation also set into relation disparate urban locations and 
market-makers, thus becoming constitutive to coordinated urban rhythms of movement and – often-
contested – social and political configurations that structure urban space.  
 
To grasp these situated urban change processes resulting from collective enactments of fripe valuation, 
my research in different sites of valuation work was never temporally flat. Instead, comprehending how 
market-making co-produces urban change often required an intentional effort to go back in time, 
expanding my research from a focus on market-makers to those inhabiting, working in, or governing 
diverse sites of fripe valuation. For instance, studying the ways in which the fripe wholesale trade had 
transformed a formerly residential neighbourhood involved conversations with local residents renting 
to wholesalers, a former car garage owner priced out by the fripe trade, a member of the Tunis 
municipality and an urbanist who conducted research in the area. Other urban change processes could 
be observed and recorded first-hand over the course of this research. In addition to 18 months of 
ethnographic research, a decision against any neat – geographical or temporal – separation between 
‘fieldwork’ and ‘analysis’ helped me expand such direct observation over a period of more than three 
years: living in Tunis from 2017 to 2020 allowed me to alternate my analytical work with regular returns 
to various field sites, enhancing my understanding of marketplaces as entities in-process. I used photos 
as mnemonic devices for recording tangible changes in the urban environment or socio-spatial ordering 
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patterns in the markets108. To capture more subtle changes to working rhythms, densities or 
atmospheres, I continued to routinely frequent diverse marketplaces after the supposed ‘end’ of field 
research. “Being enveloped” (Anjaria and Anjaria 2020: 237) in such field sites proved a precondition 
to grasping “the sensual, affective and visceral” experiences (ibid: 239) that often indicated a fripe 
market’s rise or demise as site for valuation. 
 
This introductory section discussed the methodological and conceptual implications of the two 
questions posed at the beginning: first, centring on the fripe as an unstable commodity requires 
ethnographic attention to people’s practices with fripe objects, here approached as valuation work, as a 
basis for researching processes of market-making. Second, an emphasis on the diverse actors involved 
in these processes highlights the need for mobile methods across disparate locations in order to grasp 
what are termed collective enactments of market-making in urban space. In combination, this approach 
enables an account of the fripe economy as an agent of urban change, showing how fripisation is both 
constitutive to situated transformation processes and to the emergence of rhythms of movement, 
geographies of circulation and socio-material densities that tie together diverse actors and urban 
locations.  
 
The sequence of the three following chapters is chosen deliberately to connect situated enactments of 
valuation work to wider urban geographies of fripisation. To help visualise the market- and space-
making processes analysed, photos taken as part of this research are integrated into the second part of 
this thesis. The photographic material captures the distinct materialities of the fripe economy, illustrates 
the diverse forms of valuation work discussed, and provides insight into the fripe’s role in structuring 
urban space. Chapter III emphasises the linkages and interdependencies between different sites, actors 
and processes of valuation work that come to the fore through a focus on a particular fripe circulation. 
Chapter IV and V then each investigate fripisation in a specific marketplace: first, the transformation 
of a street into a fripe marketplace, and second, the collective performances of fripe consumption that 
enact a particular marketplace. While the latter two chapters thus examine how collective processes of 
fripe valuation result in temporary and situated forms of spatial production, their analysis is premised 
on an understanding of the circulatory mechanisms and the politics of value revealed in Chapter III. 
Taken together, the three following chapters develop an account of the fripe as a singular urban 
economy by showing how specific collective enactments of market-making co-constitute urban space 
in contemporary Tunis. 
 
 
108 While photography was part of my ethnographic practice, I remained acutely aware of its risks, abstaining from picturing 
people unless explicitly asked to/allowed to do so, and from taking photos in places/of practices deemed sensitive, such 












Figure 6   Protecting fripe shoes against the rain in Sidi Bahri (2020) 
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Chapter III 
Urban fripe shoe circulations: the contested valuation of an illicit commodity 
 
 
Rades container port, Tunis, November 11th 2019: 
From his large office window, Mr. H. overlooks the entry to one of the container terminals of Rades 
port109. When I comment on the view, Mr. H. laughingly responds: “Sometimes I wish I couldn’t see 
the ships as it reminds me of the excruciatingly slow handling time (of containers) in Rades, it’s one of 
the slowest in the entire Mediterranean”. Later, as we tour the container port in Mr. H.’s SUV, he 
explains that his shipping company has stopped transporting fripe several years ago. “I will show you 
why”, he continues, as we take a turn towards the Southern exit of the port area. To our left, piles of 
containers come into view, some of them half overgrown. “This is abandoned cargo, there is a lot here 
in Rades, because of slow processing, high import duties and problems with the customs”. As we 
continue driving past innumerable abandoned containers, Mr. H. adds: “When the value of goods in a 
container is uncertain or low, as with used clothing, the risk of abandonment is highest. If there are 
delays or extra costs, the merchandise never gets picked up and we (the freight company) have to deal 
with the problem and often make a loss”.   
 
Bab El-Falla, Southern faubourg of the Tunis medina, October 20th 2018: 
On Saturday mornings, the entrance to the Bab El-Falla market is permanently congested as grocery 
shoppers and those coming to buy fripe compete for space in the narrow market street. Ahmed110 and a 
group of university friends have come to Bab El-Falla specifically to look for second-hand sneakers 
and thus enter the market through its ‘new entrance’, directly opening up to what they refer to as “nahaj 
al-sbadriyat” (the sneaker street). In the dense row of sturdy metal shops, colourful sneaker displays 
dominate the view, with polished shoes suspended from shop ceilings and marquees. The vendors’ calls, 
“kima jdid” (like new) echo through the market street, competing with Tunisian rap music that blasts 
from rattling speakers. Inspecting a pair of Nike sneakers, Ahmed complains that “prices have gone up 
again, this pair now sells at 140 Dinar (appr. 43 €)”. He points to the Adidas sneakers he is wearing and 
remarks that he got them “for only 100 Dinar in the same shop 6 months ago”. The fripe vendor, who 
overhears the conversation, tells Ahmed impatiently: “these are the wholesale prices for original 
sneakers, what can we do. If this is too expensive, go across the street and get the same sneakers in 
counterfeit, for a third of the price”. 
 
Linking the container port and the marketplace are different types of fripe circulation that co-constitute 
the complex urban geographies of fripisation in contemporary Tunis. This chapter focuses on the 
circulations that connect different sites of fripe valuation work and thus reveals disparate and at times 
inconspicuous processes of market- and space-making, beyond the visible expansion of fripe 
marketplaces in the inner city. In order to trace such evolving geographies of fripisation, this chapter 
focuses on a particular fripe product, namely shoes, examining how distributed processes of valuation 
work allow them to circulate as commodities in the city. The analysis of valuation work in this chapter 
focuses on three locations that feature prominently in the urban trajectory of most fripe items – the 
sorting factory, the wholesale quarter, and the marketplace. The chapter focuses on fripe shoes 
specifically to show how despite a shared urban trajectory, processes of valuation and geographies of 
circulation are differentiated according to product type. Fripe shoes particularly allow for disentangling 
these differences due to their illicit status: they have been nominally banned from circulation on the 
domestic market. Both despite and because of this illicitness, fripe shoes have turned into particularly 
 
109 Appendix I, Interview 8; 
110 Appendix II., Interlocutor 5; 
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sought-after and expensive commodities in Tunis, and especially original brand sneakers have become 
a popular consumer choice amongst young people from diverse social classes. At the same time, the 
shoes’ illicitness sheds light on the wide range of state- and non-state actors involved in enabling 
contingent commodity circulations, offering a particularly complex insight into a collective enactment 
of fripe valuation across the city. Analysing the contingent movement and stoppage of fripe shoes in 
Tunis brings to the fore an evolving politics of valuation that creates differentiated opportunities for 
participation in value production and extraction from this commodity circulation. 
 
The chapter provides close-up ethnographic analysis of situated processes of valuation work with fripe 
shoes in the sorting factory, the wholesale quarter and a specialised fripe shoe market. It shows how 
valuation work produces socio-spatial relations that transform these three urban locations, at times 
resulting in visible processes of fripisation. The situated understanding of valuation work this chapter 
develops provides a precondition to analysing the multiple circulations beyond these sites on which 
fripe valuation is premised and which it in turn produces. Paying explicit attention to these circulations 
– not only of fripe merchandise, but also of people, money, information or bribes – elucidates the 
linkages and webs of interdependencies that tie together diverse actors and spaces involved in valuation 
work. Consequently, the account this chapter constructs connects seemingly disparate urban change 
processes bound up with fripe shoe valuation, from the wholesale quarter to a specific market street. 
Showing how such urban transformations are the product of a particular fripe circulation renders visible 
the interconnected urban geographies of fripisation in contemporary Tunis. 
 
The first section sets out how researching fripe shoe circulations elucidates the collective enactment of 
valuation work and its role in producing urban space. Subsequently, the chapter turns to three sites that 
are illustrative of the complex valuation processes fripe shoes undergo in present-day Tunis. First, the 
fripe ‘sorting factory’ here denominated SITEX, where imported materials are graded and packaged 
and are thus transformed from a heterogeneous pile of discard into commodity units of comparable 
value that can circulate on the market. Second, the fripe wholesale quarter Zahrouni where strategic 
mechanisms of stoppage and movement become the basis for transforming illicit fripe circulations into 
risky, yet also particularly valuable merchandise. Third, the ‘sneaker street’ in Bab El-Falla, where 
valuation work in individual shop spaces is premised on the collective enactment of a specialised retail 
environment that cultivates a particular culture of consumption. For each site, this account begins with 
an analysis of the situated valuation processes performed with fripe objects, and in particular fripe 
shoes; it then explores the distinct socio-spatial relations that are produced or transformed through such 
valuation work; and finally, it investigates the multiple circulations that embed seemingly contained 





Figure III.1   Fripe sneakers are displayed in a Tunis shop space (2018) 
 
 
1. Fripe shoe circulations and urban geographies of fripisation  
 
The final market price of fripe sneakers in the Bab El-Falla marketplace cannot simply be traced back 
to a “bounded locus of production” (Jain 2002: 42) but is the result of a complex and always-contingent 
urban process. Therefore, comprehending how fripe shoes are transformed from heterogeneous 
container loads of fripe materials arriving in Rades container port into desirable commodities in Tunis 
marketplaces demands close-up attention to the “dispersed intersubjective realm of circulation and 
exchange” (ibid) through which value is produced and extracted by diverse actors and in different urban 
locations in contemporary Tunis. As the next section (a) explains, fripe shoe circulations in Tunis are 
thus approached as contingent outcomes of situated processes of valuation work. Section (b) then 
explains how valuation work is researched as constitutive to socio-spatial relations, transforming the 
particular urban locations in which it takes place, but also establishing new linkages across space. 
Finally, section (c) sets out how the illicit nature of this contingent commodity circulation illuminates 




a. Circulation and valuation work 
 
Two approaches to studying commodity circulation have influenced this research: one starting point to 
researching commodity circulation has been to follow material things, placing emphasis on their 
trajectories – and transformations – from production to consumption to discard, and vice versa (Cook 
2004; Hulme 2015; Knowles 2014). A second starting point, prominently represented in francophone 
geography, has been to study social networks and their role in enabling transnational commodity 
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circulation: from North-African diaspora networks running a cross-Mediterranean suitcase trade 
(Peraldi 1999, 2002; Tarrius 1995, 2002); to Maghrebi trader communities handling circulations of 
made-in-China commodities between Asia and North Africa (Belguidoum and Pliez 2014; Choplin and 
Pliez 2018; Pliez 2012); and networks of particular ethnic groups moving used cars, rikshaws and 
jewellery (Østbø Haugen 2018(b); Rosenfeld 2018; Tastevin 2014); such literature provides insight into 
the multi-layered, and often contested, social relations that underpin commodity circulation. This 
analysis of fripe shoe circulation examines both material things in circulation and their attendant social 
configurations. However, its focus on the fripe as an unstable commodity places emphasis on situated 
processes of valuation work as a precondition to circulation.  
 
This understanding of circulation and valuation as mutually constitutive has been central to scholarship 
on transnational waste and second-hand economies (e.g. Brooks 2015; Crang et al. 2013; Gregson and 
Crang 2015; Hansen 2000(a), 2000(b); Herod et al. 2014; Lepawsky 2015). This literature has long 
challenged linear views of value production and commodity circulation. Shifting attention from a single, 
centralised locus of value production, such research has highlighted the geographically disparate 
processes of valuation that enable goods to circulate and, through this, in turn transform those 
circulating materials or objects. Instead of a “commodity chain bracketed by beginnings and endings” 
(Lepawsky and Mather 2011: 245) – with a single production location marking the ‘beginning’ and 
consumption habitually defining the ‘end point’ – such scholarship draws attention to the diverse after-
lives of objects and processes of value production that transform discard materials into commodities at 
the back end of global value chains. It thus highlights the complex “circuits, networks and meshworks 
of economic activity” that underpin circulation as always-contingent process (ibid). This chapter draws 
upon such approaches through its focus on valuation. The emphasis however lies not on understanding 
transnational dynamics of circulation and value production, but on the valuation processes that allow 
fripe shoes to circulate at an urban scale. Rather than merely signalling a change in scale, this implies 
a different focus in researching the specific entanglements between circulation and valuation: 
emphasising valuation work as a situated practice and as constitutive to urban space.  
 
 
b. Valuation work and the production of urban space 
 
This account hones in on three locations that have assumed a central role in the valuation work required 
to bring fripe shoes into circulation in present-day Tunis: the sorting factory, the wholesale quarter and 
a specialised market street for sneakers. While the first two sites form part of an urban geography of 
circulation that determines the trajectories of diverse fripe items, the third site highlights the 
differentiated patterns of circulation of high-end fripe shoes. Sorting factories on the urban peripheries 
of Tunis have turned into central sites of value production in the fripe economy since the centralisation 
of sorting through the 1995 sector restructuring. The contemporary wholesale quarter on the South-
Western outskirts of Tunis was consolidated during the late 1990s, when a small group of wholesalers 
established a monopoly over the distribution of merchandise from the sorting factories. The specialised 
market street for sneakers emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution through an unauthorised 
process of auto-construction, establishing a specialised consumption space for original branded 
sneakers. 
 
Zooming in on intricate valuation processes in the sorting factory, the wholesale quarter and the 
specialised sneaker street, this chapter approaches valuation work as situated in particular urban 
locations and social configurations. It therefore builds on close-up studies of work processes that 
reattribute value to waste or second-hand materials in situ, for instance in e-waste repair shops (Corwin 
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2018; Grant and Oteng 2012), on the dumpsite (Millar 2018) or in second-hand marketplaces in diverse 
contexts (Appelgren and Bohlin 2015(b); Ayimpam 2016; Gregson and Crewe 2003; Hansen 2000(a); 
Stamatopoulou-Robbins 2019). Such literature hones in on material practices of transformation that 
requalify waste and second-hand objects as commodities, and on mechanisms of circulation and 
exchange that bestow “new social and commercial value” on “second-hand things” by altering their 
meaning (Appelgren and Bohlin 2015(a): 145). These studies also investigate how various practices of 
recycling, repair and reuse, which are often dismissed because they “do not fit easily into capitalist 
categories of labour and notions of work” (Millar 2018: 9), in fact become the basis for professional 
identities and modes of social and political organising. 
 
This chapter builds upon such scholarly work, but interrogates more explicitly how valuation work is 
not merely situated in, but also constitutive to, distinct socio-spatial configurations. Rather than 
approaching distinct sites of valuation as mere spatial containers in which valuation work unfolds, this 
account asks how different forms of valuation work with fripe shoes transform and produce urban space 
in contemporary Tunis. This means, firstly, examining how situated valuation work with fripe shoes 
transforms the urban locations in which it takes place, becoming manifest in particular social hierarchies 
and collaborative relations, as well as in distinct physical urban forms. While most fripe shoes follow 
the same trajectories of circulation as other fripe merchandise, their particular material constitution, 
status as consumer good, and nominally ‘illicit’ character on the domestic market produce differentiated 
processes of valuation work. From the separate shoe section of the sorting factory, to secret backstreet 
warehouses for shoes in the wholesale quarter, and a specialised market street for sneakers, this account 
thus investigates how valuation work with shoes produces distinct socio-spatial arrangements that 
transform situated urban locations. 
 
Secondly, valuation work is analysed as situated but never contained in particular urban locations. 
Instead, valuation work is shown to be both reliant on and constitutive to webs of relations and 
interdependencies. This requires emphasising the mechanisms of circulation that generate connections 
between different sites of valuation, bringing to the fore the multiple contingencies inherent to the 
uninterrupted movement of fripe commodities in the city.  This empirical focus renders visible 
circulation not as a seamless flow, but as a complex process of “friction” that requires “interaction in 
defining movement, cultural form, and agency” (Tsing 2011: 6). In exploring the particular social and 
political configurations that enable the movement of fripe shoes in Tunis, this research highlights the 
periodic “creative adjustments” necessary to uphold “economic circuits” (Cholez and Trompette 2016: 
148), or the need for “constant adaptation” at the micro-level to sustain a seemingly mundane 
commodity flow (Hulme 2015: 70). Such evolving mechanisms of circulation are here in turn 
considered as productive to urban space: patterns of movement, but also strategies of intermittent 
stoppage, generate distinct urban geographies of fripisation, connecting situated processes of urban 
transformation that occur at sites of fripe valuation. 
 
 
c. Shoes as ‘illicit’ circulations and their politics of valuation 
 
The connections between different sites of valuation work also draw attention to the diverse state- and 
non-state actors involved in the contingent circulation of fripe commodities, especially illicit ones. 
While classical commodity chain literature typically departs from an assumption of centralised 
governance – habitually through a lead firm (Hughes 2005: 496) – other research has highlighted the 
often-contested and shifting power relations between various formal and informal, and state and non-
state actors that actually determine commodity circulations (Hughes et al. 2015, Østbø Haugen 2018(a), 
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2018(b)). Similarly, in the urban fripe economy, power must be understood as distributed across a wide 
range of actors involved in valuation work. Consequently, this chapter attends to a particular politics of 
valuation, meaning the unequal power structures determining individual opportunities for participation 
in the valuation of fripe shoes. First, a quasi-monopoly position for a small group of fripe importers and 
wholesalers who assume central agency in price-setting, determines – and constrains – all other 
valuation processes in the fripe sector. Second, strict social hierarchies and tacit “moral economies” – 
a concept prominently used in economic anthropology to designate social norms and customs ordering 
economic processes (Guyer 2004; Roitman 2005) – structure valuation work in the three locations here 
analysed. This draws attention to the differentiated positioning of sorting workers on the factory floor, 
and unequal power relations between small and large wholesalers, or between shopkeepers and mobile 
vendors, as well as the norms that mediate these relations. At the same time, the micro-politics of 
valuation that condition fripe shoe circulations also reveal how individuals can circumvent and at times 
change their positioning within such rigid power structures by devising alternative strategies of value 
production. 
 
Additionally, this chapter’s deliberate focus on a fripe commodity that has been banned from sale on 
the domestic market highlights the active role of the state in co-producing a politics of fripe shoe 
valuation. While ‘the illicit’ might at times be understood as a sphere lying beyond the influence of the 
state, this account demonstrates how the fripe shoes’ illicit character on the contrary guarantees distinct 
avenues for state involvement in shoe valuation. Second-hand shoes have been banned from circulation 
on the domestic market since 1995111, with legislation stipulating that all shoes imported as ‘fripe’ have 
to be re-exported directly from the sorting factories (Journal Officiel 1995). In reality, this ban never 
prevented the sale of fripe shoes on the local market. Instead, it turned “illicitness” into a “quality of 
circulation” (Gregson and Crang 2017: 207) that is contingently renegotiated between diverse state- 
and non-state actors. Rather than a mere legal category, the notion of the ‘illicit’ is hence variably 
defined by situated moral economies, that enable diverse actors to benefit from this quality of circulation 
by participating in “fractal accumulation” (Gago 2017: 15). This examination of the politics of valuation 
with fripe shoes draws upon accounts that have highlighted how the “co-production of norms pertaining 
to the illicit” results in an “institutionalisation of transgressive practices” (Bennafla 2014: 1340) that 
become the basis for economic activity. At the same time, it shows how these politics of valuation 
remain volatile, at times turning the state into “an array of highly erratic obstacles” (Rabo 2005:10) that 
have to be variably circumvented or accommodated. The ‘illicit’ – as performative and negotiable 
category – is thus productive of both contingencies to circulation and of particular opportunities for 
profit-making, as it turns the fripe shoe trade into a particularly risky market niche with few competitors. 
 
 
111 Like leatherwear, toys and headwear, shoes were banned allegedly to protect public health but more plausibly to shield 




Figure III.2 Three key sites of valuation work with fripe shoes 
 
2. The sorting factory: transforming discard into categories of comparable value 
 
The fripe containers that are transported from Rades port to sorting factories all across Tunisia contain 
a dazzling variety of garments, shoes and objects, mostly second-hand charity donations but also 
undeclared surplus stocks and textile waste. Second-hand shoes of all shapes and sizes, spanning worn-
out hotel slippers to broken high heels and basketball shoes, are among the wares unloaded in the 
factories. This section provides an analysis of the particular processes of valuation that take place within 
a “maamal al-farz” (sorting factory), located on the North-Western outskirts of Tunis and denominated 
SITEX in what follows112.  
 
The first part examines how labour-intensive sorting processes are organised on the SITEX factory floor 
to transform heterogeneous piles of fripe materials into neatly graded and separately packaged 
categories of comparable quality and value that can circulate on the domestic market. Particular 
emphasis lies on the work accomplished in the separate shoe sorting section of the factory. The second 
part then explores how such mechanisms of value production are constitutive to distinct socio-spatial 
relations within the factory. A prerequisite for the qualification of SITEX as a productive entity is the 
skilled valuation work of senior “farazet” (sorting workers), which confers a relative position of 
authority to senior sorting workers and becomes the basis for a shared occupational identity that is 
brought to bear in negotiations with the factory management. As the final part examines, the valuation 
work performed with shoes in SITEX triggers multiple ‘illicit’ circulations from the factory onto the 
domestic market. At times, such unofficial ‘leakages’ hinge on agreements with wholesalers and diverse 
state actors; at other times, individual faraza – as in this case, the senior sorting worker Safa – establish 
new geographies of circulation that allow them to expand their valuation work beyond the factory gates. 
 
112 Appendix I, Interview 39; 
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a. Valuation through sorting: an unorthodox production process  
 
Heterogeneous fripe merchandise, often mixed with trash and the plastic bags in which charity 
donations were originally given away, are piled up at the SITEX factory entrance. Inside the factory, 
over 100 predominantly female workers engage in tedious practices of segregation, grading and 
packaging, which are often subsumed under the term “farz” (sorting) in Tunisian Arabic. The creation 
of value through processes of separation, segregation and sorting lies at the basis of diverse reuse and 
recycling economies, as it allows for the retrieval of “usable items in a system of downcycling” (Crang 
et al. 2013: 17). Moving ‘down’ the value chain thereby often implies a linear dwindling of overall use 
and exchange values over time. A close-up look at sorting processes in SITEX challenges such a linear 
narrative and instead demonstrates how sorting lies at the basis of renewed valuation. 
 
The processes of valuation that gradually transform the amorphous heaps of materials unloaded at the 
SITEX factory entrance involve neither major physical alterations of the fripe materials nor their 
processing into new commodities. Instead, careful manual assessments of similarity and difference 
insert the fripe objects into new structures of value and meaning, with the possibility of being 
transformed and becoming something different. While the individual garments or shoes often remain 
largely unchanged as they enter and exit the factory, subtle processes of translation move them into new 
“commodity situations” (Appadurai 1986: 13), allowing them to circulate as merchandise on domestic 
and re-export markets. Sorting must thus be understood as “a performative process of translation” that 
“purifies objects as commodities” by breaking negative social ties – here an origin story of discard – 




Figure III.3   Unsorted fripe merchandise unloaded at the factory entrance (2017) 
 104 
Hierarchies of skill, seniority and gender on the factory floor 
 
Most of the sorting, grading and packaging is organised in the large main factory hall. A strict division 
of tasks thereby structures the SITEX factory floor and translates into a hierarchy of valuation work, 
differentiated along the lines of gender, skill and seniority. 
 
First, while women carry out the bulk of low-paid, labour-intensive sorting tasks, men occupy positions 
of authority in the factory, such as the operation of machinery or barcoding and stocks management113. 
This division of work along gender lines must be understood as a result of the feminisation of sorting 
labour that occurred through the reorganisation of fripe sorting as an offshore activity and as factory 
wage labour through the 1995 framework legislation. While sorting had previously been accomplished 
mainly by male fripe traders in the marketplace, the proliferation of sorting factories during the late 
1990s and their formal attribution to “qitaa al-nasij” (the textile sector) triggered a framing of farz as a 
priori women’s work. This was guided by the same exploitative logic of “lower wages” and “easy 
disciplining” that prompted the hiring of women elsewhere in the offshore textile industry in Tunisia 
(Ruiz 1993: 51)114. Until today, the vast majority of the 8000 -10,000 workers employed in 47 currently 
active fripe sorting factories115  in Tunisia are female, and the factory management habitually justifies 
their hiring policies by referring to the “patience of women with tedious tasks” and the greater 
sensitivity they bring to textile materials and stylistic choices116.  
 
Second, an invisible hierarchy of skill and seniority separates the ‘front rows’ from the specialised 
sorting tables on the SITEX factory floor. In the ‘front row’, women separate trash and plastic bags 
from wearable garments with their bare hands and then dispatch different garment and product types to 
specialised sorting tables in metal containers on wheels. The handling of discard and the risk of injuries 
through sharp objects found in the piles of fripe materials render this work particularly unpopular and 
most women thus start their work in the SITEX factory in the front rows. Most of the front row workers 
in SITEX are in their early twenties and many have no prior work experience or training after secondary 
school. Most women joined the factory through personal acquaintances or family members who already 
worked in SITEX and were hired after a short probation, without prior training. The repetitive 
separation work in the ‘front row’ of SITEX comes closest to what is often devalued as “mindless 
factory work” in the Tunisian textile sector (Ruiz 1993: 51) and is associated with an unskilled 
workforce of predominantly young women (Hassine 2014: 20). 
 
As the knowledge required for sorting is difficult to abstract or transform into a formal training 
programme, on-the-job instruction by senior farazet takes on crucial importance. Sorting workers with 
rapid hand movements and a capacity to concentrate for long hours, but also “with an eye for garments”, 
as a senior sorting worker explains, can move on rapidly from the ‘front row’ to specialised sorting 
tables, where different product types, such as “summer dresses and skirts” or “men’s sportswear”, are 
graded into separate categories of value. Senior farazet are promoted to the position of supervisors and 
perform quality checks on the product and value categories assembled by their colleagues. As the 




113 This was the case in the three sorting factories in which research was conducted for this thesis; 
114 In 2012, 35.7% of industrial employment in Tunisia was in the textile sector and 86% of textile workers were women 
(Hassine 2014: 20); 
115 Appendix I, Interview 35; the number of workers might be significantly higher as undeclared work in the sector is rampant;   




Figure III.4   Sorting workers at the specialised garment tables (2017) 
 
Shoe sorting and assembling the “crème” category 
 
All fripe items that are formally banned from sale on the domestic market – and thus reserved for re-
export – are transported in metal containers to a separate concrete barrack behind the main factory hall. 
Here, shoes, toys, hats and leatherwares are sorted and packaged separately, without entering factory 
inventories. 
 
Like ‘front row’ sorting tasks, work in the separate shoe section of SITEX is unpopular because the 
farazet have to work in a bent-down position to assemble matching pairs of shoes amongst the footwear 
scattered on the concrete floor. Safa, who started her career in the shoe section, recounts that in addition 
to constant back pain, she and her fellow workers were suffering from extreme cold in winter, and heat 
in summer, as the corrugated iron roof provides no insulation and a single door ventilates the large 
barrack. Once the farazet have tied together matching pairs of shoes, they sort them into different 
product groups – such as women’s sandals, slippers or sports shoes – and package them into large, non-
transparent tarpaulin bags, habitually referred to as “shkair” in Tunisian Arabic. In differentiation from 
the bales that are wrapped around second-hand garments and closed under a bale press in the main 
factory hall, the shkair filled with shoes receive neither bar codes nor factory labels and thus cannot be 





Figure III.5   The ‘shoe section’ of the sorting factory (2018) 
 
Only the best quality shoes are scrubbed and dried against the back wall of the factory, and then set 
aside on a large metal table. Safa117, who has now worked in SITEX for almost two decades, oversees 
the work of those who grade the luxury category of fripe shoes, referred to as “crème” (cream) in the 
jargon of the fripe. She thus comes to the shoe section several times a day to collect and transfer the 
best shoewear to what the farazet refer to as “beit el-krema” (lit. transl. room of the crème). Separated 
from the rest of the factory by high, wooden shelves, beit el-krema resembles a confined room in the 
midst of the buzz and noise of the factory and is the place where the crème merchandise is assembled 
and packaged separately into see-through zipper bags, so-called “sachets”. Safa works alongside six 
other female colleagues in beit el-krema, all of whom were promoted to the post due to their long-
standing expertise. Working in beit el-krema implies particular responsibility. By taking the final 
decision over which shoes enter the see-through zipper bags reserved for crème products, Safa watches 
over the quality of the most expensive fripe category, a task that she deems crucial for building 
confidence in the ‘factory label’. By grading garments into a separately packaged and labelled product 
category, Safa and her colleagues thus “strip away one category of value and replace it with another”, 
as “the factory label overwrites the individual labels subsumed under it” (Botticello 2013: 41). This 
process is crucial for restoring the circulatory capacity of second-hand shoes: first, it constitutes a 
prerequisite to bringing the shoe merchandise into circulation as packaged and thus easily movable 
commodities for which a fixed price per unit can be negotiated; and second, it confers specific meaning 
and value to different fripe shoes and thus becomes the basis for new commodity situations on the 
domestic market or various re-export markets to which the shoes are sent from Tunis.  
 
117 Appendix II., Interlocutor 6; 
 107 
b. Remaking socio-spatial relations within the factory 
 
The sorting processes that take place in SITEX not only transform fripe shoes through segregation, 
grading and re-packaging. The valuation work also generates distinct socio-spatial relations that are 
constitutive to SITEX as a productive entity and thus indeed as ‘factory space’. As the next section 
explores, the skilled sorting work that allows for value production within SITEX hinges on the tacit and 
embodied knowledge and experience of senior sorting workers, whose on-the-job training constitutes a 
continuous investment. As a second section examines, this confers a position of authority to senior 
sorting workers, favouring the emergence of a female occupational identity as faraza/farazet that 
becomes the basis for renegotiating working conditions and pay in the factory. 
 
Skilled sorting work as a basis for value production 
 
Unlike typical Fordist factory work, where mechanisation accelerates the manufacture of standardised 
products, the unorthodox production process accomplished in SITEX cannot be totally mechanised nor 
standardised. While the ‘front row’ work in the factory can be delegated to unskilled workers who are 
often paid at or below the minimum wage118, and who can be easily replaced like elsewhere in the 
export-oriented Tunisian textile industry (Aliriza 2020(a): 21; Hassine 2014: 27), this is not the case for 
more subtle grading decisions at the specialised sorting tables. As sorting decisions depend on situated 
assessments of similarity and difference, the knowledge acquired by farazet is both “tacit and 
embodied” (Botticello 2012: 49) and relies on a combination of experience and sensitivity in the 
handling of heterogeneous material objects. Safa repeatedly affirms that is it impossible to “explain” 
how sorting has to be done, and that it has to be learnt “by doing”, until you “simply know what goes 
into which category, what feels right and what doesn’t.” The lack of formalised product standards or 
fixed selection criteria in the fripe economy further complicates sorting tasks and renders an implicit 
knowledge of what ‘kind’ of garments enters which grade and category indispensable. Safa explains 
that especially the supervisors need “a real understanding of “qimet al-silaa” (the value of 
merchandise)”, as they need to ‘balance’ slightly higher and lower quality and different brands and 
styles to produce bales of comparable content.  
 
In addition, as the knowledge that underpins sorting decisions evolves with changing structures of offer 
and demand, sorting work is premised on a continuous learning process. As has been shown in the case 
of Igbo apprentices involved in clothes sorting processes in the United Kingdom (Abimbola 2012: 192), 
the capacity to read fine cultural codes and understand consumer tastes in different contexts is crucial 
to successful valuation through sorting. Safa and her colleagues thus adapt their sorting decisions in 
accordance with fast-paced fashion trends and varying consumer preferences in different re-export 
destinations119. As the high-end fripe products from beit el-krema increasingly supply vintage shops in 
Europe, they regularly study “catalogues de tendance”, which announce fashion trends and help them 
guide their sorting decisions for the European market. At times, Safa and her colleagues also receive 
targeted training sessions, either by the “grand patron”, as Safa refers to the factory owner, or by clients 
visiting the factory. As a senior sorter with good command of French, Safa is also in direct contact with 
two vintage shop owners in France and Belgium who receive high-end merchandise from the sorting 
 
118 According to sorting workers in two different factories, junior workers are often paid below the minimum wage for the 
textile sector (0.61€ hourly minimum wage (SMIC) in July 2017); 
119 While export locations vary over the years, the largest quantity of wearable garments is re-exported from Tunisia to West 
Africa, especially Guinea, see OEC 2017, accessed May 2nd 2020, available at: 
https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/tun/show/6309/2017/; 
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factory. They update her via whatsapp about the latest colours, brands and cuts in demand and one of 
them visited the factory to organise a personalised training session for Safa120.  
 
Occupational identities and shifting power relations  
  
The quality of sorting and the production of value in SITEX thus rely on the informed sorting decisions 
of Safa and her senior colleagues, who therefore control a substantial part of the immaterial means of 
production in the factory. “What is this factory without us”, Safa’s younger colleague Mariam asks 
rhetorically, gesturing towards the workers in the factory hall. “If you imagine this without us farazet, 
you see just an empty hall and some tables.” Indeed, replacing experienced farazet who can assume 
roles as supervisors and trainers in the factory is both difficult and costly, and retaining senior sorting 
workers is thus indispensable to the productive capacity of the factory. This distinguishes senior farazet 
from “disposable” factory workers in mechanised manufacturing, who can be exploited through “a rapid 
turnover rate” (Wright 2006: 150). As a consequence, the gradual accumulation of experience and skill 
required to assume seniority in the sorting factory underpin the emergence of an occupational identity 
as faraza/farazet that takes on meaning both within and beyond the factory.  
 
Mariam and Safa thus proudly identify as faraza and define their sorting work as a ‘craft’ that has 
earned them “ihtiram” (respect) in the factory. Deprived of any formal recognition of their status, and 
in the absence of contractual rights or lawful labour representation121 in the factory, the farazet build 
on informal alliances and mechanisms for exerting pressure on the factory management. As monthly 
wages in fripe sorting factories are regulated in accordance with the Tunisian textile sector and remain 
low despite a regular progression with longevity (Hassine 2014: 20), senior farazet negotiate informal 
concessions or bonus payments that work to their benefit. 
 
 
120 Re-export to European vintage shops is common practice, see Appendix I, Interview 4; 
121 Like the vast majority of sorting factories, SITEX has no “naqaba” (union); Only 10% of workers in the Tunisian textile 




Figure III.6   High-end merchandise is packaged into see-through zipper bags in beit el-krema (2018) 
 
 
c. Shoe sorting as a basis for multiple circulations beyond the factory 
 
The valuation work performed by farazet within SITEX cannot be understood as ‘contained’ but 
becomes the basis for diverse fripe shoe circulations in disparate geographical locations. As the 
following section explores, this is so despite the illicit character of fripe shoe circulations on the 
domestic market, which turns circulations from the factory gates onwards into ‘unofficial leakages’ 
from a nominally offshore space that must be embedded in a distinct politics of valuation. In addition, 
senior farazet expand their skilled valuation work beyond the confines of the factory by transporting 
selected fripe merchandise from their formal work place to diverse resale locations. A subsequent 
section thus examines how Safa capitalises on her commutes across the city to give meaning to, and 
realise profits from, her occupational identity as faraza beyond the factory gates. 
 
Leakages from the ‘offshore’ factory space 
 
The law stipulates that all second-hand shoes sorted in SITEX need to be directly re-exported from the 
factory, under the oversight of the customs agent who remains permanently stationed on the factory 
grounds. A large sign at the entrance of SITEX reads “area under customs control”, recalling the legal 
status of the factory as partially “offshore” and thus as “legal space of sovereignty” that is supposedly 
sealed from the domestic “onshore” (Appel 2019: 39). In reality, however, the day-to-day functioning 
of the factory is premised on continuous leakages, many of which contain fripe shoes that leave SITEX 
through “bawab al-tilania” (the back doors), as one of the factory supervisors puts it. These unofficial 
leakages or ‘illicit’ circulations into ‘onshore’ territory rely on a complex politics of valuation that links 
the factory to diverse state- and non-state actors across the city. For instance, all fripe shoe sales to 
Tunisian wholesale traders hinge on agreements with rotating customs agents in the factory, as well as 
 110 
the police, who are often deliberately positioned in proximity to sorting factories to seize ‘illicit 
merchandise’ on the road to wholesale warehouses. While most of the shoes graded in the shoe section 
of SITEX thus never enter the factory’s inventory and the revenues from their sale do not surface in 
official accounts, a complex array of ‘exit fees’ or informal taxes are routinely deducted to enable their 
circulation on the domestic market. A form of “customary illegality” (Gregson and Crang 2017: 209) 
that requires broad coordination between the factory, wholesalers and diverse state actors thus 
underpins the circulation of shoes from SITEX to the wholesale warehouses. 
 
The grading and separate packaging of shoes within SITEX thereby determines trajectories of shoe 
circulation in Tunis beyond the wholesale warehouses. For instance, the separately packaged, high-end 
category of crème shoes only circulates to select marketplaces and boutiques that are either located in 
upper-middle-class areas or have developed a special reputation for original brand shoes, as is the case 
with the specialised Bab El-Falla ‘sneaker street’ to which the last section of this chapter turns. In 
differentiation, the non-transparent shkair that contain the rest of the shoe merchandise – and typically 
carry no inscription apart from the weight and the overall shoe category – circulate to innumerable 
different permanent and weekly marketplaces or fripe boutiques in the capital, as well as other cities 
and towns across Tunisia or in Algeria. 
 
Expanding valuation work from the factory to the living room 
 
Smaller contingents of crème shoes meanwhile leave the SITEX factory hidden in trolley bags of senior 
farazet like Safa and Mariam, who have used their negotiating power vis-à-vis the factory management 
to broker weekly allowances of garments and shoes that they can take home from beit el-krema as 
informal supplements to their wages. The regular transport of fripe materials from the factory thus 
becomes the basis for expanding occupations as faraza outside the formal workplace, generating 
opportunities for value production beyond the wage. Following Safa from the factory to her home on 
the urban peripheries as she transports fripe merchandise for resale shows how she transfers her 
professional identity as faraza to her intimate living environment and produces new spaces for fripe 
consumption and female-only sociability.  
 
While Safa at first only supplied her family and friends, she rapidly professionalised her resale activities 
in her houma on the sprawling outskirts of Oued Ellil, where fripe merchandise is in high demand as 
the commercial offer remains scarce and many women find it difficult to access marketplaces due to 
bad transport connections. Safa produces value not only through the process of careful and often 
personalized selection in the factory, but also by transporting the garments across the city and by re-
embedding them in the intimate social context of her private home. After months of negotiation, Safa 
convinced her husband and son to leave the house every Saturday afternoon, allowing her to turn the 
private living room into a temporary space of resale and female-only sociability in a peripheral 
neighbourhood where meeting places for women and girls are almost non-existent. Safa thus transforms 
a private space into a site of value production once a week. As she explains, this has allowed her not 
only to earn crucial additional income for the family, but has also brought her recognition as an 
experienced faraza, establishing social networks that have supported her family on numerous occasions. 
For example, Safa proudly recounts that her husband found temporary work as an electrician through 
her connections and that neighbours agreed to assist with otherwise expensive repair works in the house. 
Even though a need for extra income thus clearly motivated her resale practices in the first place, Safa’s 
valuation work has also generated incommensurable “relational value” (Elyachar 2005: 7) that has 
altered her standing within her own household and the local houma over time. 
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3. The wholesale quarter: valuation through strategic stoppage and movement 
 
Many of the shkair leaving the SITEX factory are transported to Zahrouni, an urban area to the West 
of central Tunis, on the shores of the “sabkha” (salt lake) of Sijoumi. A dense cluster of fripe wholesale 
warehouses lines Zahrouni’s main street, a busy and often-congested connecting road to the Western 
peripheries. Since the late 1990s, Zahrouni has developed into the capital city’s main storage and 
distribution hub for fripe merchandise, with expansive wholesale warehouses and innumerable transport 
businesses. Zahrouni functions as what Rosenfeld describes as “marché-lieu” (market-place), a physical 
space where disparate flows of merchandise are centralised, reordered and displayed to allow for the 
encounter of offer and demand (Rosenfeld 2018: 65).  
 
Approaching “commodity storage as vital to the production process” (Banoub and Martin 2020: 6), the 
first part investigates how different wholesalers and intermediary traders extract value from fripe 
circulations through a complex combination of both intermittent stoppage and coordinated movement. 
Storing and distributing illicit circulations like fripe shoes therefore requires particular warehouse 
infrastructures, and implies both risk and distinct opportunities for performing valuation work. As the 
second part examines, Zahrouni’s continued functioning as fripe distribution hub hinges on distinct 
socio-spatial configurations, and has considerably transformed neighbourhood dynamics over the past 
two decades. The final part then examines how valuation work with illicit shoe merchandise in Zahrouni 
depends on day-to-day circulations that are underpinned by a contingent politics of valuation, tying the 
wholesale quarter to disparate actors and places across the city. 
 
 
a. Producing value through different storage infrastructures 
 
The diverse warehouse infrastructures of present-day Zahrouni provide differentiated capacities for 
strategic stoppage and movement of fripe merchandise, both of which are vital to valuation in the 
wholesale quarter. While the goal of wholesalers is often the rapid circulation of merchandise through 
their warehouses to expediate sales and maximise profit margins, the “planned, intentional pausing” 
(Gregson et al. 2017: 384) of circulations equally figures prominently in strategies of value capture. 
This is particularly true for the storage of illicit fripe circulations, like second-hand shoes. As their 
storage is risky, fripe shoes need to be hidden away in specific backstreet warehouses, which incurs 
extra costs for the wholesalers, but also produces a market niche with fewer competitors and thus 
distinct possibilities for profit-making.  
 
Warehousing as valuation work  
 
The glistening tarpaulin covers of the fripe bales – packaged in green, blue and white – which are piled 
up in front of the warehouses, dominate Zahrouni’s main street. White pick-ups and smaller three-
wheeled vehicles are parked in front of the warehouses and groups of men sit on piles of bales or on 
plastic chairs between them. Zahrouni developed into the central fripe wholesale quarter of Tunis during 
the late 1990s, when a surge in fripe imports following the 1995 offshore legislation rendered the 
existing, inner-city wholesale quarter of the Hafsia impractical due to its narrow, congested roads. 
Wholesalers in Zahrouni recount that a powerfully positioned fripe importer with a sorting factory in 
Jendouba, a city in Tunisia’s North-West, promoted the rapid transformation of Zahrouni into the city’s 
new wholesale hub. He strategically positioned members of his “arsh” (clan) of “Ayar” in the 
warehouses, the same kinship group that had gained prominence in the urban fripe trade since the 1960s 
(as explored in Chapter II). Transporters and intermediary traders then gradually followed suit, pricing 
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out local car garages that had dominated the quarter’s main road. Until today, the routinised 
collaboration between large wholesalers – often referred to as “grossistiyya” – with smaller 
wholesalers, diverse intermediary traders and transporters underpins processes of valuation in the 
wholesale quarter.  
 
A spatial cluster of warehouse infrastructures forms the material basis for performing valuation through 
storage and distribution in Zahrouni. Warehouses of varying size attract a differentiated clientele: 
intermediary wholesalers or traders redistributing merchandise to Algeria generally prefer large 
warehouses with a wide choice so they can buy in bulk for several months. Retailers meanwhile, who 
often buy on a weekly basis, prefer to deal with smaller intermediaries who adapt their limited offer to 
changing market demand. As the experienced wholesaler Aymen 122  explains, the “debowat” 
(warehouses) on Zahrouni’s main road actually function predominantly as ‘showrooms’, with larger 
warehouses like his own, located off the main road, guaranteeing their continuous supply. Ibrahim123, 
who owns a 2x5m sales room on Zahrouni’s main road, has limited storage capacity and thus receives 
supplies from larger warehouses on a weekly basis. As Ibrahim insists, the rapid circulation of high-
quality merchandise in his ‘showroom’ make him popular with retail traders and allow him to charge a 
mark-up on the “real wholesale price”, as he puts it.  
 
While the main street ‘showrooms’ focus on adapting their displays to fluctuating market demand, the 
strategies of value extraction of larger wholesalers like Aymen often hinge on strategic stoppage rather 
than “motion without friction” (Tsing 2011: 15). This occurs because “being ahead of the season”, as 
Aymen puts it, or “disclosing the right merchandise at the right time” is key to earning a considerable 
mark-up. Such strategies of stoppage are all the more important as the wholesalers need to 
counterbalance seasonal cycles of charity donation: “the factories in Tunisia get summer clothes when 
people in Europe get rid of them in autumn, so we receive them in winter, but my clients of course want 
bales of winter clothes then.” The intentional retaining of merchandise in backstreet warehouses 
moreover allows for the creation of artificial scarcity in the front street ‘sale rooms’, triggering an 
inflation of wholesale prices. While this form of strategic stoppage is common practice amongst 
wholesalers all year round, it becomes particularly lucrative during festivities like Aid Al-Fitr (the end 
of Ramadan), when demand for children’s clothes soars and the appearance of shortages can 
significantly increase profit margins. 
 
 
122 Appendix II., Interlocutor 7; 




Figure III.7   Bales of fripe merchandise stacked in a Zahrouni warehouse (2018) 
 
Backstreet warehouses for fripe shoes 
 
Performing valuation through the storage of illicit fripe circulations like second-hand shoes presents 
both particular challenges and opportunities to Zahrouni wholesalers. As registered wholesale 
warehouses are taxed by the local authorities and are subject to regular inspections by al-diwana, the 
storage of shkair filled with shoes is too risky in these official warehouse infrastructures. The visibility 
of the Zahrouni main street showrooms similarly precludes the display of shoe merchandise. 
 
Therefore, unofficial warehouses, habitually referred to as “debowat al-tilania” (backstreet 
warehouses) by the wholesalers, have been set up in the basements of residential houses, private car 
garages or even rental apartments. Invisible to the outsider, these backstreet warehouses specialise in 
the storage of fripe merchandise that is banned from sale on the domestic market. Backstreet warehouses 
tend to have limited storage capacity and are expensive to maintain because wholesalers have to 
compete with prices on the regular housing market. At the same time, the extra costs and risk involved 
in the storage of fripe shoes produces a niche with fewer competitors. Aymen, who only reveals after 
repeated visits and interactions that he runs several small backstreet warehouses in Zahrouni, explains 
that only large wholesalers can afford to join “bizness al-sbabit” (the shoe business), because renting 
backstreet warehouses requires substantial starting capital and because the risk of customs raids imply 
the need for political connections and savings to be able to mitigate potential losses. This limits 
competition, allowing wholesalers like Aymen, who possess or rent backstreet warehouses, to charge 
extra fees for the storage of fripe shoes and to produce artificial shortages that add a considerable mark-
up to the original wholesale price.  
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b. Socio-spatial transformations and the constitution of a fripe wholesale quarter 
 
While the cluster of warehouses provides the visible, material basis for valuation through storage and 
redistribution, the valuation work performed in Zahrouni also hinges on, and in turn constitutes, multi-
layered webs of less tangible socio-spatial relations that safeguard transactions and the movement of 
substantial amounts of fripe merchandise and cash through the wholesale quarter. First, the absence of 
formal contractual relations in the fripe economy and the uncertain quality of the packaged fripe 
merchandise have rendered tight webs of personal relations and efficient mechanisms of social control 
vital to stabilising a set of norms that governs value extraction in Zahrouni. Second, the 
neighbourhood’s transformation into a specialised fripe wholesale quarter relied on particular spatial 
parameters and urban change processes that lastingly altered local urban dynamics, benefitting property 
owners but also alienating many local residents, and displacing both commercial and residential tenants.  
 
Tacit social norms for regulating value extraction 
 
Shared origins and the belonging to the same arsh (clan) feature prominently in accounts of how 
Zahrouni first emerged as a wholesale hub. As different wholesalers and transporters confirm, a 
particular moral economy that is grounded in family histories of rural-urban migration from Tunisia’s 
North-West, and thus kinship identities, governs interactions in the wholesale quarter until the present 
day. Consequently, social norms in the wholesale business – reaching from tacit codes of behaviour to 
gestures of group solidarity – remain linked to Zahrouni’s origin story and are closely intertwined with 
“arushiya” (clan-based solidarity). Particularly the reference to the clan of the “Ayar” – originally a 
tribal identity from Tunisia’s North-West that gained new importance in the urban fripe trade (see 
Chapter II) – thus remains of central importance. Even young wholesalers like Ibrahim, who were born 
in the capital, frequently mobilise their identity as “wulad Ayar” (sons of Ayar) as a form of “urban kin 
arrangement” (Pfirsch and Araos, 2017: 4) that serves as a resource for organising working relations. 
In addition, while many wholesalers profess to only employ warehouse assistants or transporters from 
the same arsh, they in fact rarely recruit from extended family circles today. Rather, they evoke kinship 
as a form of social control and thus recruit young men from the local neighbourhood, considering that 
their birth or residence in Zahrouni incorporates them into the moral economy that governs the 
wholesale business.  
 
Ibrahim affirms that the two key assets of a successful wholesaler are “alaqat” (relations) and “ism” 
(lit. ‘a name’), meaning a social reputation that “has to be continuously achieved” (Rabo 2005: 73). The 
central importance of reputation built on personal trust – frequently reiterated by all traders in Zahrouni 
– mirrors the uncertainties and risks of the fripe wholesale business. First, the fripe merchandise itself 
is of uncertain quality and the act of “buying bales blind” (Brooks 2012: 231) carries substantial risk, 
especially for smaller retailers who need to make profits from every bale to recuperate costs and buy 
new merchandise the following week. As is the case with other commodities of uncertain value, non-
transparent bales and shkair reinforce the importance of “knowability” and highly personalized 
relations in transactions (Carrier et al. 2018: 10). The Tunisian saying “tishri qatous fil-shkara” (lit. 
you buy a cat in the bag), prominently employed by fripe wholesalers and retailers alike, captures the 
risk of buying substandard merchandise or being tricked. This uncertainty qualifies the fripe as 
“entangled objects” that “can only be known through the actors accompanying them” (Østbø Haugen 
2018(a): 1303, 1296), rendering repeated interactions with the same trader a key strategy for mitigating 
the risk of deceit. 
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Second, the handling of large sums of cash and credit outside the formal banking system renders 
mechanisms of social control crucial for safeguarding transactions. As Aymen confirms, almost all 
purchases concluded in Zahrouni are made “ala kredi” (on credit) and a time lag between flows of fripe 
merchandise and payments thus characterises his day-to-day transactions. Aymen’s diligently kept 
notebooks constitute the only written record of his multiple credit relations, and repeated interactions 
and trust are thus crucial to ensuring repayment. Credit and debt therefore not only structure relations 
between wholesalers and clients, but also amongst different wholesalers, intermediaries and transporters 
within Zahrouni, resulting in “an interdependency between actors and the common assumption of risk” 
(Yukseker 2004: 55). If a debtor defaults on a payment, all other credit relations are affected, and a 
person’s “creditworthiness” is compromised (Jain 2002: 45). As an intermediary trader, Ibrahim is often 
debtor and creditor simultaneously, and the temporal coordination of cash flows is often challenging. 
As has been shown in other realms of commerce that are “essentially credit-driven (…), 
creditworthiness is a moral as much as an economic quality” (ibid) and for Ibrahim, it represents a 
crucial precondition for participating in the fripe trade.  
 
Contested urban transformations through shoe warehousing 
 
In addition to distinct markers of collective identity that became the basis for collaboration, Zahrouni’s 
transformation into a wholesale hub hinged on the abundant availability of space, both in the form of 
still undeveloped land and in the form of existing garage infrastructures that could be taken over by the 
wholesalers. Until the mid-2000s, the fripe wholesale business remained largely confined to Zahrouni’s 
main road, where traders gradually priced out car garages, but also other shops and production spaces 
that had served the predominantly residential neighbourhood. Seif, who used to run a plumbing business 
on the main road, was forced to leave by his landlord in 2004, when next-door fripe wholesalers outbid 
him by offering to pay a higher rental price. He describes the arrival of the fripe wholesalers in Zahrouni 
as a “takeover” of the neighbourhood that has alienated many inhabitants and local shop owners. Sitting 
in one of the last remaining cafes in Zahrouni’s main street, Seif deplores: “Our entire houma has 
become a “debo” (warehouse).” And after a short pause he adds, “the wholesalers are a mafia, they 
became rich in no time. I saw them arrive here with nothing but their “shleka” (slippers) and now they 
drive big cars”.  
 
A boom in the fripe wholesale business during the mid-2000s then further expanded spatial 
transformations beyond Zahrouni’s main street. Especially the flourishing trade with illicit fripe 
circulations like shoes pushed the wholesale business further into the area’s residential quarters for the 
creation of unofficial backstreet warehouses. The relatively low density of Zahrouni thus allowed the 
gradual filling of vacant lots through the construction of warehouses, garages and housing extensions. 
While the adjacent urban quarter Hayy Ezzouhour had been built up as a dense public housing project 
during the 1970s (Sethom 1995: 201), Zahrouni had become urbanised incrementally through the 
unauthorised construction of detached residential houses on subdivided and privately purchased 
farmland (Chabbi 1989: 260)124. This meant that family homes with relatively wide private terraces, 
gardens and garages dominated the area, allowing fripe wholesalers to gradually enter into competition 
for previously residential spaces. Through the commercial use of private housing by wholesalers, rental 
prices in Zahrouni soared. An elderly couple who rent their ground floor as a storage space for shkair 
explain how they hesitated at first as they worried about raids by the customs. However, they eventually 
decided to rent out the space because, as the woman remarks, “they (the wholesaler(s)) are paying more 
 
124 Zahrouni thus belongs to a second generation of informal settlements, built up after 1975 and classified as “habitat spontané 
périurbain” (spontaneous peri-urban housing) to differentiate them from the more improvised, squatter settlements of the 
first generation (Belhedi 2005: 3,5); 
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rent than in the city centre, 600 Dinar (appr. 200€) for this (…) and it is humid and hasn’t been painted.” 
She says she doesn’t mind the deliveries and pick-ups and is happy to not have “the usual noise of 
downstairs neighbours”, now that the ground floor is used as a storage space. Like the elderly couple, 
many property owners in Zahrouni benefit from backstreet warehouses as a lucrative income source, 
adapting pragmatically to the changed realities of residing in a wholesale quarter. Meanwhile, the 
increase in rental prices provoked by the wholesalers adversely affected local tenants, pushing out 
former residents by converting living into storage spaces.  
 
A distinct politics of value extraction from fripe shoe circulations has thus emerged within Zahrouni 
over time, with neighbourhood change provoked by the wholesale activities producing both winners 
and losers. Today, skyrocketing rent prices, overall scarcity of space and a gradual erosion of the moral 
economy that had long guaranteed the functioning of Zahrouni as a wholesale quarter threaten the 
neighbourhood’s status as the undisputed wholesale hub of Tunis. First, wholesalers recount that 
soaring prices and the lack of availability of large warehouses has caused a gradual relocation towards 
more peripheral neighbourhoods of Tunis, like Sidi Hassine or Fouchana. As Ibrahim explains, while 
this comes with the disadvantage of losing the density of clients and opportunities for collaboration 
available in Zahrouni, it considerably reduces monthly expenses and limits competition. Many 
wholesalers moreover deplore the gradual weakening of Zahrouni’s distinct moral economy – based on 
enduring social norms and relations – due to the rapid proliferation of unlicensed wholesalers and 
intermediary traders, especially in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. As Aymen recounts, cut-throat 
competition has given way to covert price-cutting and mutual poaching of clients, eroding trust between 
wholesalers and marking a breakdown of the mechanisms of social control that used to govern value 




Figure III.8   A van is loaded with shkair containing fripe shoes, to be dispatched to Tunis marketplaces (2018) 
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c. Contingent shoe circulations to and from the wholesale quarter 
 
The functioning of Zahrouni as a wholesale quarter relies not only on a fragile, internal politics of 
valuation between different wholesalers and transporters, it is also dependent on continuous, 
coordinated flows of merchandise, cash and customers that animate the wholesale quarter. These 
diverse circulations embed Zahrouni in a broader politics of value extraction in the fripe economy that 
incorporates various state actors, nominally on the grounds of the fripe shoes’ character as ‘illicit 
circulations’ on the domestic market. This section thus examines, first, how seemingly mundane, day-
to-day shoe circulations into and out of the wholesale quarter are in fact premised on complex profit-
sharing agreements and contingent negotiations with various state actors that participate in the urban 
fripe economy. Second, it hones in on the valuation work performed by Hassan, a young man from 
Zahrouni who has expanded his valuation work beyond the wholesale quarter. By transporting shoe 
merchandise between the backstreet warehouses and marketplaces across the city, he navigates a multi-
layered politics of valuation that holds both risks and opportunities. 
 
Contested value extraction from illicit circulations  
 
In Zahrouni, wholesalers recount that “symbiotic relations” with various state actors always regulated 
shared value extraction from fripe shoes and other nominally banned circulations, creating common 
stakes in their “illicitness” (Bennafla 2014: 1348) over time. From the establishment of the first 
warehouses, Aymen recounts, political accords at the highest level secured the neighbourhood’s role in 
distributing banned fripe merchandise to Tunis marketplaces.  
 
However, many wholesalers and transporters working in Zahrouni complain that “al-thawra” (the 
(2011) revolution) has rendered encounters and collaboration with different state actors increasingly 
unpredictable. Power reconfigurations at the micro-scale – often directly related to the post-2011 
breakdown of clientelist party politics which had functioned as a “one-stop shop” (Allal 2016: 26) – 
triggered a destabilisation of the political accords governing shared value extraction from fripe shoe 
circulations. Therefore, diverse members of the police forces, the customs authorities, as well as local 
officials – all of whom tend to be indiscriminately referred to as al-hakim by the fripe wholesalers – 
have come to participate in rent extraction from shoe circulations “ala hisabhum” (on their own 
accounts), as Ibrahim declares. What wholesalers and transporters describe as a decentralisation of 
corruption over the past two decades has thus produced new uncertainties that render it more risky and 
costly to handle shoe circulations than ever before. Frequent fires in Zahrouni, often provoked to pre-
empt raids by the customs or police, have become emblematic for a breakdown of stable profit-sharing 
agreements from illicit circulations. At times, raids have even triggered open confrontations between 
security forces and wholesalers in Zahrouni (Espace Manager 2016(a)). Referring to a fire in a shoe 
warehouse in February 2018, Ibrahim reflects on the wholesale quarter as “an electric circuit”. He 
ponders: “As long as everything runs smoothly you don’t think about it, but once the connection is 
broken, nothing works and one spark can set the whole thing on fire”.  
 
Performing valuation work with risky circulations 
 
Processes of value extraction from fripe shoe circulations through warehousing in Zahrouni depend on 
the subsequent movement of shkair from backstreet warehouses to marketplaces and boutiques across 
the city. This risky undertaking not only requires close collaboration between wholesalers and 
transporters in Zahrouni, but also wider agreements with various state actors across the city. As a 
consequence, transporters who earn a living from handling shoe circulations to and from the wholesale 
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quarter on a day-to-day basis are both particularly exposed to, and at the same time a constitutive part 
of, the evolving urban politics of valuation that characterise the ‘fripe shoe business’. 
 
Hassan125 was born in Zahrouni and began working in his uncle’s small wholesale warehouse when he 
was only 16, after having dropped out of secondary school. He recounts that he hated working as a 
warehouse assistant for his uncle, because of “bad relations” but also the physically demanding work 
of moving fripe bales in the warehouse, and loading and unloading trucks. Hassan put aside all of his 
savings for years and then invested in a second-hand, white pick-up truck three years ago that now 
allows him to work as “chauffeur kamyouna” (lit. van/truck driver) between Zahrouni and diverse 
markets and boutiques of the capital. Hassan recounts that he decided to specialise in the transport of 
shkair, and particularly fripe shoes, from the outset, describing it as a “booming market” and “an 
opportunity” because many transporters shy away from handling illicit circulations. 
 
For Hassan, “moving goods” represents “a means of realising profits” (Gregson and Crang 2017: 212) 
and the greater the risks of stoppage and interruption he faces, the greater his potential profit margin. 
Hassan explains: “Everyone can transport fripe, but work with sbabit (shoes) is more difficult, you need 
a lot of connections, in Zahrouni, in the markets and with “al-bolis” (the police).” On his transport 
rides with shkair between Zahrouni and diverse urban marketplaces, Hassan thus continuously 
mitigates risks of stoppage, confiscation and fines. At times, he uses tactics of evasion, involving 
lengthy detours or collaboration with transporters who operate with handcarts and can enter markets 
like Bab El-Falla through narrow back alleys. Alternately, Hassan times his deliveries according to the 
rotation of particular police officers, with whom he has developed routinised mechanisms for profit 
sharing. He usually pays set fees in cash from the glove box of his van, depending on the amount of 
merchandise he carries, and says the fees can amount to about 20% of the value he carries in the loading 
area. When set agreements or strategies of circumvention break down, Hassan can also be confronted 
with the confiscation of his entire merchandise or with temporary arrest and fines. 
 
In exchange for navigating this difficult and risky terrain on a day-to-day basis, Hassan says he reaps a 
substantial risk bonus for every successful journey he completes and occupies a market niche with fewer 
competitors. His capacity to extract value from fripe shoe circulations therefore depends on webs of 
social relations that stretch across the entire capital city, from Zahrouni to innumerable fripe retail 
spaces and diverse branches of the security forces. Hassan thus explains that he strategically devotes a 
substantial part of his working time to socialising with traders in different marketplaces, visiting 
wholesalers in the warehouse quarters, and paying favours to al-hakim. As he details, attending to these 
different levels of “alaqat” (relations) – and investing both time and parts of his profits in them – is a 
routine part of his valuation work and allows him to mitigate future uncertainties.  
 
 




Figure III.9   Illicit shoe merchandise often enters the marketplaces on handcarts through back alleys (2018) 
 
 
4. The sneaker street: performing valuation in a specialised consumption space 
 
The most expensive category of shoes transported from Zahrouni to Tunis marketplaces – at times 
packaged in shkair and at times enclosed in the see-through sachets reserved for the crème merchandise 
– are often second-hand sneakers, a commodity in high-demand on the Tunisian market. Especially 
original branded sneakers are thus usually transported to high-end retail spaces in the capital that are 
frequented by an upper-middle-class clientele, such as the covered Menzah VIII market or the Ibn 
Khaldoun fripe market. In addition, specialised boutiques and market streets offering exclusively fripe 
sneakers have proliferated in Tunis over the past decade, with one of the most reputed shopping 
destinations located in the Bab El-Falla market in the Southern faubourg of the Tunis medina. 
 
The following section centres on “nahaj al-sbadriyat” (the sneaker street) in Bab El-Falla, to examine 
how vendors perform valuation through distinct strategies of display and the joint curation of a 
specialised shopping environment catering to a young, predominantly male clientele and a consumer 
culture that valorises the “original” over what is “new”. Subsequently, the second section explores how 
the valuation work performed in nahaj al-sbadriyat hinges on, first, the spatial cluster of auto-
constructed shoe shops that forms an informal expansion of the existing Bab El-Falla fripe market; and 
second, on mechanisms of social coordination amongst fripe shoe vendors that enable coordinated bi-
weekly rhythms of shoe circulation and thus a rapid renewal of merchandise. The final section then 
investigates the diverse mechanisms of collaboration with actors beyond the confined sneaker street 
that ensure uninterrupted circulations of sneakers into, and out of, the shoe shops and thus provide the 
basis for valuation work: first, contingent negotiations of ‘illicitness’ – regarding both the traded 
merchandise and the shoe shops’ unauthorised occupation of municipal land – characterise relations 
between the shoe traders and diverse local state actors. Second, multi-layered distribution relations 
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between individual shoe traders – here the sneaker shop owners Fethi and Montassar – and diverse 
formal and informal traders and resellers transform the sneaker shops from “points of final 
consumption” into starting points for new circulations and thus “meshworks of economic activity” 




Figure III.10   The Bab El-Falla fruit and fripe market with the sneaker street 
 
 
a. Valuation work with second-hand sneakers 
 
Diverse forms of valuation work are performed with second-hand sneakers in the different shop spaces 
of Bab El-Falla, with vendors devising intricate strategies of display that help them maximise sales, as 
well as mechanisms of differentiation that set their shops apart from adjacent competitors. At the same 
time, such individual valuation strategies are embedded in a collective effort to cultivate a specialised 
retail space that caters to, and invigorates a nascent consumer culture around second-hand sneakers. 
Turning the ‘sneaker street’ into an attractive environment for a predominantly young and male clientele 
who have come to value ‘original’ branded sneakers over new shoe merchandise thus forms the 
necessary basis for performing successful valuation work in the different shop spaces. 
 
Curating the ‘sneaker shop’ and strategies for distinction 
 
Fethi126, who alongside his younger cousin Montassar127, owns a prominently positioned shop at the 
centre of the sneaker street of Bab El-Falla, can be easily recognised by the brightly coloured baseball 
caps and sneakers he wears all year round. Fethi, who has now worked in the same shop space for 
almost ten years and has specialised in the sale of high-end fripe sneakers from the outset, spends most 
 
126 Appendix II., Interlocutor 9; 
127 Ibid; 
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of his time in the shop, even on Mondays when the market is closed. While he assures that he has “no 
particular strategy” for curating his shop’s interior or for displaying his wares, a close-up observation 
of his careful valuation work in the sneaker shop demonstrates the opposite.  
 
Before and after market closing hours, as well as on the days with little customer traffic, Fethi dedicates 
considerable time and effort to the reorganisation of his shop’s interior, creating new sneaker displays 
at least twice a week. Fethi explains that he and Montassar quickly decided on a division of work 
whereby Montassar manages purchases, payments and supplies outside the shop, while Fethi is 
responsible for the shop space itself. Whenever he receives new merchandise from Zahrouni, Fethi 
inspects the pairs of sneakers one by one before deciding which of them will be exhibited in the shop. 
“I only choose original brands and best quality for the shop”, Fethi proudly proclaims, as he points to 
a pile of footwear behind him that he has judged substandard. With the help of his young shop assistant, 
Fethi then cleans the sneakers that will be displayed, sitting on a small plastic stool at the centre of his 
shop. “When the farazet in the factory do a shitty job”, Fethi laughs, “we use these brushes”, and he 
shows an array of brushes of different size, with the smallest resembling a toothbrush. When the 
sneakers are clean, he polishes them with a cloth and then applies shoe shine spray and fragrance to 
them. The smell of the fragrance and shoe spray linger in Fethi’s shop, which he judges important, 
“because this takes the typical fripe smell away and replaces it with something fresher”. The most 
thought and time then go into the curation of the new shop display, a task Fethi visibly enjoys and never 
delegates to his assistant. He has installed iron bars on the ceiling from which he suspends shoe 
merchandise on metal chains, with each pair of sneakers dangling from a hook at a particular height of 
the chain. This display system allows Fethi to exhibit a large amount of sneakers, and produces a 
particular visual effect for customers looking in from the outside, heightened by Fethi’s skilful play 
with the colour spectrum of the sneakers. 
 
In addition, Fethi has invested into what he refers to as “tasmim al-hanout” (shop design), aiming to 
curate a shop environment that effectively stages the exclusivity, or “brand authenticity” (Edensor and 
Kothari 2006: 330) of his sneaker offer. The shop’s interior, featuring a sparklingly clean tiled floor, 
and colourful neon lights, intentionally distinguishes it from adjacent shoe shops. Even Fethi’s powerful 
sound equipment that drowns out the music of surrounding competitors and his young age and 
fashionable style contribute to the special aura that turns his sneaker shop into one of the most popular 
attractions of the sneaker street, despite high prices. “We are all side by side (the shoe shops)”, says 
Fethi as he points up and down the shoe street, “so I always need to do something that looks a bit 





Figure III.11   A vendor cleans a pair of fripe sneakers in his shop (2019) 
 
Cultivating a consumer culture of the ‘original’ 
 
While the shoe traders in Bab El-Falla at times complain about fierce competition amongst adjacent 
shop spaces, they also highlight the competitive advantage they gain from forming a specialised cluster 
of shops. The sneaker vendors have thus invested collective effort into the curation of a specialised 
retail space for second-hand sneakers. As Fethi and Montassar explain, “al-sbadriyat” (sneakers) have 
become an important status symbol amongst young men in Tunisia, and the circulation of global 
imagery, especially linked to rap music, determines rapidly changing local fashion trends. The 
specialised retail space of the ‘sneaker street’ thus both shapes emerging consumer cultures, and the 
space is itself constituted by evolving consumption practices (Lemarchand 2011). The shiny sneakers, 
neat shop displays, and loud music attract young men from across Tunis, like Ahmad and his friends 
who pass by regularly after university. As Ahmed smilingly confides, they often come for “shoufing”, 
a pun combining the Arabic word “shouf” (see) and the ending of “shopping” to designate a shopping 
tour that consists of “seeing what is new without buying”. Fethi says this is exactly what the shop 
vendors want, “nahaj al-sbadriyat needs to be an attraction, a place young people like to go to even if 
they don’t have money but just some time to kill”. Indeed, many of the young men coming into Fethi’s 
shop do not necessarily come to buy, but want to see new sneaker models and designs, or seek Fethi’s 
expertise on particular materials or technologies developed for the sneakers. On a special shelf, Fethi 
thus sets aside what he calls “special and rare sbadriyat” that he excludes from sale but proudly presents 
to his clients, demonstrating his expert knowledge. 
 
The specialised retail environment of the Bab El-Falla sneaker street thus both capitalises on, and 
further cultivates, a consumer culture amongst young Tunisians that values “al-assil/al-original” (the 
original) – here in the form of branded second-hand sneakers – over “al-jdid” (the new). The spatial 
separation of the sneaker street from the Sidi Boumendil market just across the road, which is specialised 
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in “silaa kontra” – as counterfeit merchandise is often generically referred to – is thus crucial to 
upholding the fripe sneaker street’s reputation for selling only ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ brands. While 
the second-hand sneakers in Bab El-Falla often sell for three times the price of the same models in the 
counterfeit market, Ahmad underlines his preference for “original brands and designs”. He explains: 
“you can get the kontra shoes cheaper, sometimes the same models, but you feel the bad quality of the 
materials and they just don’t look the same. I can see from a distance whether someone wears originals 
or fakes.” As is the case in other contexts, the dominance of counterfeit products has attached new 
significance to “authenticity” which is often equated to brand identity (Ayimpam 2016: 271; Edensor 
and Kothari 2006: 330). Branded sneakers that are imported new to Tunisia remain unaffordable for the 
vast majority of young people, therefore buying them second-hand is the only option for accessing 
internationally circulating brands and fashionable designs in the ‘original’, albeit with a time lag. When 
Ahmed thus laughingly refers to the fripe as “demoqratiya haqiqiya” (real democracy), he alludes to 
the opportunities it brings for participating in what has been described as “youth cosmopolitanism” 
(Scheld 2007: 248) or “globalized youth culture” (Weiss 2009: 42), prominently expressed in practices 
of dress that both imitate and reinvent global fashion. The prominent role of smartphones in the Bab 
El-Falla sneaker street underlines the “transnational character of the commodity culture” (Crang et al. 
2003: 447) that has emerged around the desirable second-hand circulations. In situated negotiations 
over quality and market price in the sneaker street, both vendors and clients frequently employ their 
smartphones to establish connections to the ‘original’ products, comparing market prices in the US or 
Europe to Tunisian second-hand retail prices or images of the new shoes to the models arriving as 
second-hand wares in the Tunis marketplace. 
 
 
b. Constructing and enacting the ‘sneaker street’ as a specialised retail environment 
 
The different forms of valuation work currently performed in the sneaker street are premised on 
particular socio-spatial parameters that emerged, first, through a process of auto-construction in the Bab 
El-Falla market and, second, the collective enactment of a dense row of shops as the ‘sneaker street’. 
While the ‘sneaker street’ has become consolidated as a physical structure and has developed a 
reputation as a specialised retail environment over time, it depends on continuous processes of temporal 
coordination amongst its traders to continue functioning as a basis for valuation work. 
 
The auto-construction of an unauthorised market extension 
 
Until the 1990s, Bab El-Falla was mainly known for its sprawling fruit and vegetable market (Berry-
Chikhaoui 1994: 348). Fripe traders then began to gradually establish a permanent presence in the main 
market street during the mid-2000s, and a decade later, fripe trading had taken over at least half of the 
market. The weakening of public oversight and police presence in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, 
which triggered a rapid proliferation of street markets (Brown et al. 2017) and made-in-China trade in 
central Tunis (Doron 2015), then provided a window of opportunity to expand the already-booming 
fripe market in Bab El-Falla.  
 
A group of young male traders thus seized an unoccupied patch of municipal land adjacent to the 
existing fripe market that had been used before as a football pitch by children and youth from the 
neighbourhood. Fethi and Montassar, both of whom had grown up in Bab El-Falla and had previously 
worked in the market, recount that a group of young fripe traders from El-Morouj, a Southern suburb 
in Tunis, joined forces and occupied the plot overnight in the early summer. They erected concrete 
foundations for their shop spaces in record time to pre-empt immediate attempts of removal by the 
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municipality. Fethi and Montassar – as well as other young people from the area – were then quick to 
join the occupation, setting up the foundations for their own shop space “in a single night”, as they 
affirm. “Whoever could find an empty plot just took it”, Montassar remembers, “some got lucky and 
others didn’t”. He recounts that the young men who had initiated the process of auto-construction had 
agreed upon a standard plot size and had limited construction to two dense rows of shops that would 
form a new ‘market street’, preventing traders from seizing the plots in the middle. Benefitting from 
the political turmoil in summer 2011, the traders remained undisturbed by the authorities during the 
auto-construction of 23 sturdy metal shop spaces over the following weeks. Fethi explains that everyone 
was building in a frenzy, borrowing construction materials from one another and pooling resources to 
accelerate the overall process for fear of confronting al-hakim (the state) before the market street’s 
consolidation. By June 2011, the auto-constructed shops formed a dense new entrance to the Bab El-
Falla market, connecting it to the Sidi El-Bechir thoroughfare, the main vehicular access to the area.  
 
While fears of instantaneous confrontation with al-hakim proved unfounded, the young traders were 
instead faced with the anger of established fripe traders in Bab El-Falla, who opposed the unauthorised 
and unjust process of appropriation by ‘outsiders’ and feared the additional competition the new traders 
would generate. As Fethi and Montassar had close connections to traders in the ‘old market’, they 
assumed a central role as mediators in this conflict, preventing attempts to destroy the auto-constructed 
shop spaces. “What really helped in the negotiations with the other fripe traders”, Montassar explains, 
“was the decision to specialise in merchandise that was not really traded in the market until then. Some 
of us were thinking about selling sneakers anyways, because business with sneakers was really 
becoming big, and now we had another reason (to do so)”. Convincing other traders that the new market 
street would function as a specialised retail space that would cause no direct competition to existing 
fripe shops and stalls, and would even attract a new clientele to the market, thus gradually appeased 
relations. Following the principle of specialised trading streets in the historical “souk” or “bazaar”, the 
auto-constructed market street of Bab El-Falla thus turned into a specialised ‘sneaker street’. For the 
young traders, the sneaker business provided a promising market niche and the cluster of specialised 
shops could become a basis for building a reputation. Reiterating the principle of the souk that “a good 
shop location is where both customers and competitors thrive” (Rabo 2005: 31), most fripe traders of 
the Bab El-Falla fripe market today agree that the ‘sneaker street’ has played a crucial role in 
consolidating the market’s reputation and in drawing customers from across Tunis. 
 
Mechanisms of coordination for the specialised sneaker street 
 
Transforming the auto-constructed market street into a specialised sneaker street required distinct 
patterns of temporal coordination and mechanisms of collaboration amongst the traders from the outset. 
Until today, the dense row of shop spaces needs to be continuously enacted as a ‘sneaker street’, with 
joint, bi-weekly rhythms of purchase, delivery and turnover of merchandise determining the 
temporalities of valuation work performed within it. 
 
First, the joint organisation of purchases, deliveries and payments in Zahrouni greatly increases the 
shoe vendors’ negotiating power vis-à-vis the wholesalers and allows them to benefit from bulk prices 
for the expensive sneaker wares. In addition, pooling the transport of illicit sneaker merchandise 
considerably reduces costs for individual traders and means that the risk of confiscation or fines is 
distributed across several traders. Rhythms of delivery of new sneaker merchandise in the Bab El-Falla 
shoe street are thereby structured around the bi-weekly “halan al-bala” (bale opening), the moment 
when new merchandise is disclosed in the marketplace (expanded upon in Chapter V). While the days 
of joint bale opening in Bab El-Falla remain unwritten rules, most fripe vendors synchronize 
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temporalities of delivery and disclosure in order to hold bale openings on Tuesday and Saturday 
mornings.  
 
The traders in the new sneaker street joined these coordinated rhythms of bale opening to benefit from 
the particular socio-material densities these generate in the marketplace. Over time, especially the 
Saturday bale opening in the sneaker street has turned into “an attraction”, as Fethi says, that draws 
clients from across Tunis to the shoe street in the hope of being the first to inspect ‘new’ merchandise. 
The bi-weekly bale openings in the sneaker street are thus crucial to accelerating transactions and allow 
traders like Fethi to rapidly offset their investment in new merchandise by earning the bulk of his profits 
on two mornings a week. Meanwhile, the rapid turnover of sneaker merchandise required to uphold this 
bi-weekly rhythm of bale opening would be impossible to maintain alone, as both Fethi and Montassar 
affirm. Not only strict temporal coordination, also diverse mechanisms of cost-sharing and mutual 
assistance amongst the traders in the sneaker street thus form a crucial basis for successful valuation 




Figure III. 12   A handcart is being pushed into the narrow Bab El-Falla sneaker street (2019) 
 
 
c. Enabling uninterrupted circulations through the sneaker street 
 
The exceptional popularity of the Bab El-Falla sneaker street must thus in part be linked to the bi-
weekly renewal of offer – and thus the rapid circulation of sneakers into, and out of the market street – 
that guarantees clients new finds during each visit. Valuation work is therefore premised on 
uninterrupted circulations, which in turn hinge on contingent agreements with diverse state and non-
state actors operating beyond the confines of the sneaker street: first, ensuring flows of nominally illicit 
merchandise to the specialised retail space – itself precariously positioned on squatted municipal land 
– necessitates agreements with the police and local officials that generate common stakes in the shoe 
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business. Second, upholding the rhythms of circulation that guarantee the rapid renewal of offer in the 
shoe shops requires traders to devise systems of redistribution with diverse resellers.  
 
Negotiating the ‘illicit’ as a quality of circulation 
 
For shoe vendors to ensure the uninterrupted circulation of sneakers both into, and out of, their shop 
spaces twice a week, they also rely on a careful tending to “co-produced norms” (Bennafla 1999: 37) 
with various state actors that govern the shoes’ illicitness in circulation. Generating and distributing a 
“situational rent” (ibid) is crucial to creating common stakes in the continuation of the profitable fripe 
shoe trade. Notions of the ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’, which pertain not only to the shoe merchandise, but also 
to the shop spaces’ unauthorised occupation of municipal land, are thus renegotiated through various 
tacit accords with customs officials, the police and local authorities in Bab El-Falla.  
 
A current working agreement with the police for instance limits interference to ‘merchandise-in-
circulation’, meaning moments of delivery of new shkair from the wholesalers. Once the fripe shoes 
have entered the Bab El-Falla shop spaces and are displayed to consumers, the police abstain from 
confiscations or fines. This modus operandi, which limits illicitness temporally to a particular 
commodity situation, avoids jeopardising the flourishing trade in the sneaker street and yet ensures 
regular opportunities for rent extraction by the police. A separate agreement with local officials has so 
far protected the unauthorised shop spaces of the sneaker street against demolition. While most shop 
owners now possess “batendas” (licenses) and are thus de-facto formalised through tax payments, 
municipal officials also informally collect profit shares, using this type of “’rashwas’ (bribes) as a way 
of informing citizens about rules and regulations” (Rabo 2005: 152). At other times, profit shares are 
offered to local officials as “favours”, as Montassar says, to ensure support in critical moments. The 
importance of investing in good relations with local officials became apparent in July 2017, when the 
Tunis governorate initiated a clearance campaign targeting informal markets (Le Monde 2017). While 
the perimeters of the campaign included Bab El-Falla, only one fripe shop fell victim to the clearances. 
The municipal official who was later charged with the relocation of displaced vendors in Bab El-Falla 
agreed that “all of this (the sneaker street) should have been removed in the “hamla” (campaign)”, but 
then also added that “the market works, it’s a success, so what interest do we have in destroying it?” 
 
Provisioning relationships beyond the shop space 
 
On the other hand, the need to renew merchandise in the shop spaces twice a week necessitates a rapid 
recuperation of costs and the cultivation of multiple “provisioning relationships” (Bestor 2001: 77) 
beyond the sneaker street to ensure the regular resale of leftover merchandise. The weekly rhythms of 
trade in the sneaker street thus demonstrate that the shoe shops do not merely represent “endings” of a 
value chain (Lepawsky and Mather 2011: 247), but rather function as simultaneous spaces of 
consumption, redistribution and divestment where some circulations end, and others begin.  
 
Between the bi-weekly bale openings, Fethi and Montassar’s shop thus intermittently turns into a 
redistribution location, as leftover shoe merchandise is sorted into different categories of quality and 
brand value, is then re-packaged in shkair and distributed on the basis of multi-layered agreements. 
Attending to the multiple relations of provisioning and supply that extend from the small shoe shop “is 
a full-time job”, as Montassar explains, who says he is “on the road all week”. Both Fethi and Montassar 
underline that it would be impossible to run the shoe shop alone. “I’m the face of the shop, I need to be 
here for clients and to settle issues with other market traders”, Fethi explains, “so I need a second person 
who moves around, either to get “silaa” (merchandise) or to distribute what is left.” Montasser only 
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joins Fethi inside the shop on the bale opening days to assist with sales, and laughingly teases him as 
he adds, “I am glad I don’t see his face much during the rest of the week.”  
 
Montassar explains that it’s not the procurement of new shkair from Zahrouni, but the redistribution of 
leftover silaa from the shop space that takes up the bulk of his working hours. The primary customers 
for unsold sneakers are other fripe traders, mostly those running smaller “boutikat” (shops) who do not 
take the risk to buy directly from wholesalers, but purchase at reduced bulk prices from marketplaces. 
The fact that Fethi grew up in Bab El-Falla and that part of his family still reside in the area helped him 
strike relationships to various boutique owners in the surroundings, whom Montassar visits on a bi-
weekly basis to offer leftover merchandise for resale. He also supplies several boutikat in his new 
residential area Mourouj that have either specialised in shoes or sportswear. The second-choice shoe 
merchandise is meanwhile passed on to “nassaba” (street vendors) who resell the sneakers on market 
peripheries or on the sidewalks of the central city. As Fethi explains, trusted relations with several 
nassaba have been crucial to the success of his business from the outset, guaranteeing a rapid disposal 
of second-choice merchandise in exchange for a profit share. Montassar usually hands over the leftover 
merchandise to the nassaba for free, and then receives a fixed percentage of the profits in return. A 
final, smaller part of the unsold merchandise goes to “farazet” (sorters), mainly women who frequent 
the market after closing hours or before new deliveries are made to sift through leftovers and buy 
cheaply at bulk prices. Fethi usually sets aside a pile of sneakers which he judges substandard for the 
farazet, charging a symbolic bulk price or even handing out damaged or worn-out shoes for free. The 
destinations of the fripe shoes from Fethi’s shop space are thus multiple, and many shoes enter new 
trajectories of valuation and circulation, on the “berwitas” (handcarts) of street vendors or in female-








The Bab El-Falla sneaker street was spared from the 2017 clearance campaign of the Tunis governorate 
against informal markets and street vendors in the city centre. However, many of the nassaba that had 
been reselling the leftover merchandise of the sneaker shops were displaced in the violent police 
campaign. This in turn adversely affected business in the sneaker street, as bi-weekly resale agreements 
with the nassaba collapsed and as shoe shop owners consequently saw themselves confronted with a 
surplus and storage problem, as well as a lack of income from resales. Therefore, the shop owners of 
the sneaker street delayed purchases from Zahrouni, affecting wholesalers running backstreet 
warehouses and transporters specialised in the movement of risky shoe merchandise. 
 
While only the nassaba, and thus resellers positioned at the bottom of hierarchies of valuation work 
with fripe shoes, were directly impacted by the governorate’s campaign, it nonetheless had knock-on 
effects for multiple actors and locations implicated in fripe shoe valuation in the capital. This indicates, 
first, the crucial importance of diverse circulations as – always contingent – basis for situated valuation 
work. Second, it renders explicit how seemingly contained sites and processes of valuation work are 
premised on connections across space and collaborations between diverse state- and non-state actors. 
Finally, it underlines both the stark hierarchies and multiple layers of interdependency that define an 
evolving politics of fripe shoe valuation in contemporary Tunis. Even the various state actors who 
routinely participate in value extraction from the nominally ‘illicit’ fripe shoe circulations were thus 
affected by the ruptures caused by the Tunis governorate’s market clearance. 
 
This chapter has examined how fripisation occurs through situated valuation work with fripe shoes in 
in three key sites of value production in the contemporary urban fripe economy, resulting in localised 
urban transformations. Through a focus on the mechanisms of circulation linking these valuation sites, 
it has also shown how seemingly localised processes of urban change are interconnected through 
particular rhythms and patterns of fripe shoe movement and stoppage. This renders visible the urban 
geographies of valuation work that set into relation seemingly disparate processes of fripisation in 
contemporary Tunis: it connects different sites and processes of urban change, from prominent sites of 
fripisation in the central city to habitually invisible spaces of valuation work, like private living rooms 
on the urban periphery or backstreet warehouses.  The specific politics of valuation with fripe shoes 
examined in this chapter conditions where and when opportunities for market- and space-making arise 
and determines who can become an agent of urban change, thus shaping evolving geographies of 
fripisation. The next chapter builds upon the understanding of city-wide mechanisms of fripe circulation 
developed in this chapter to analyse a situated process of market-making that transforms a central Tunis 
street into a specialised fripe marketplace.  
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Figure 7   Summer fripe displays in Rue du Liban (2018) 
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Chapter IV  
The fripisation of Rue du Liban: the conflicted remaking of market boundaries 
 
 
Walking past the covered Sidi Bahri market for fresh food products, the ever-growing prominence of 
fripe traders around the main market square is unmistakeable. Fripe stalls have taken over some of the 
former trading spaces for fruit and vegetables and fripe boutiques have opened up in old butchers and 
grocery shops, so that second-hand backpacks and summer dresses are now dangling from canopies 
next to fresh chicken and dried red peppers. Continuing northwards from Sidi Bahri into the street Rue 
du Liban, a continuous fripe trading landscape stretches across two intersections and the tram lines, far 
into the colonial-era residential quarter of Lafayette128. In the most densely occupied middle section of 
Rue du Liban, fripe boutiques occupy the left side of the road, while the opposite roadside is taken up 
by stalls selling fripe merchandise. A mix of roofed metal stall structures and more improvised vending 
stalls are positioned side-by-side, offering a dazzling array of second-hand bags, belts, accessories, 
shoes and garments that change with the season. 
 
Mariam129, who has lived in Rue du Liban for over 50 years, deplores what she describes as a process 
of fripisation that has unfolded in front of her ground-floor living room window. Like Mariam, other 
residents of Rue du Liban have witnessed their street transform rapidly, from a residential space dotted 
with some neighbourhood commerce and small workshops, into one of the most popular and densely 
occupied fripe markets in the centre of Tunis. This chapter examines how fripisation has transformed 
Rue du Liban into a consolidated marketplace and continues to drive processes of market proliferation 
in and beyond the street today. The analysis shows that this fripe marketplace is neither a static spatial 
entity nor a mere ephemeral appropriation. Rather, through a close-up examination of the processes of 
market-making that underpin fripisation, the market appears as a ‘place’ that operates in a tension 
between spatial consolidation and proliferation. The practices of diverse fripe traders form the empirical 
basis of this examination of market-making, showing how their making of the market as a physical 
space is inextricably linked to the creation of a joint circulatory mechanism for fripe merchandise. The 
traders’ dependence on a consolidated marketplace for performing valuation work through fripe sale is 
in tension with the market’s dependency on rapid temporalities of movement, primarily of merchandise, 
but also of people, payments or waste. Therefore, processes of making and unmaking market boundaries 
are central to comprehending the entanglements between market- and space-making that comprise the 
fripisation of Rue du Liban.  
 
This focus on fripisation as an on-going process of boundary-making shows how fripe marketplaces 
are constituted as evolving forms of socio-spatial order. This contrasts with legacies of governing urban 
marketplaces through visible orders of spatial enclosure, explaining why fripe markets like Rue du 
Liban have been selectively targeted as ‘problem spaces’ by the city authorities. While the fripe has 
become consolidated as a distinct market form, it has remained illegible under the registers of market 
order devised by government in colonial and post-independence Tunis. This illegibility accounts for 
contemporary uses of fripisation that reduce market-making processes in the fripe to “fawda” (chaos) 
and associate the phenomenon with a weakening of the state in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. To 
analyse the incompatibility of abstract imaginaries of ‘the orderly market’ with actually existing forms 
of market order in a site like Rue du Liban, this chapter discusses the failed implementation of a market 
 
128 Lafayette was built up between 1900–1930 by both European and Tunisian architects, largely as a residential neighbourhood 
hosting a cosmopolitan and multi-faith population. The out-migration of large parts of the Jewish and Christian-European 
populations of Tunis during the 1960s and 1970s led to radical social change in the neighbourhood, see Sebag (1998: 685); 
129 Appendix II, Interlocutor 16; 
 131 
clearance and relocation campaign in the fripe market in 2017. It examines how the attempted relocation 
of the fripe market to an enclosed site and thus the market’s internal reordering upset the market 
processes, meaning the joint mechanisms of circulation that guarantee Rue du Liban’s functioning as a 
fripe market. 
 
To emphasise these complex interrelations between market processes and market forms, this chapter is 
structured in two distinct parts. The first part is devoted exclusively to an analysis of contemporary 
market processes in Rue du Liban to comprehend the evolving socio-spatial order of the fripe 
marketplace; the second part examines the fripe’s historical constitution as a contested form of market 
order, demonstrating how fripisation remains illegible as an ordering process of urban space and thus 
selectively becomes the target of repressive governing. The first part starts by setting out how this 
analysis of fripisation in a Tunis street brings into dialogue research on urban marketplaces – primarily 
interested in markets as ‘places’ in the city – and literature on marketization – analysing processes of 
market-making. It then examines the micro-level processes through which different fripe traders enact 
Rue du Liban as a specialised fripe market, and thus as a site for valuation work through fripe sale. Joint 
mechanisms of circulation and on-going practices of boundary-making render visible the market’s 
socio-spatial ordering patterns and account for its shifting delimitations in space. Against the backdrop 
of this analysis of the fripe market as a spatial entity in process, the second part begins by examining 
the historical stigmatisation of unenclosed and itinerant urban markets and governmental attempts to 
impose order. It then examines how the fripe trade developed as a hybrid market form that evaded both 
fixity and enclosure. A final section returns to Rue du Liban, investigating how a relocation campaign 
by the Tunis governorate failed because its imaginaries of static market order were at odds with the on-




Figure IV.1   Fripe shoes are on sale in a former poultry butcher shop in Rue du Liban (2018) 
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1. Market-making in Rue du Liban: investigating fripisation as on-going process 
 
A complex array of micro-level processes of market-making underpin Rue du Liban’s constitution as 
bustling fripe market. Diverse market traders collectively enact the formerly quiet, residential street as 
marketplace, through circulatory mechanisms that allow for valuation work with diverse fripe materials. 
Mechanisms of spatio-temporal coordination in the market street have become consolidated as socio-
spatial ordering patterns that characterise Rue du Liban as a singular urban market form. At the same 
time, the fripe market’s continued functioning as a site for fripe valuation hinges on routinised practices 
of space-making through which different traders variably draw and enforce, or transgress and blur, 
market boundaries. The fripe market is therefore co-constituted as a spatial entity in-the-making, 
evolving on the basis of negotiations – and at times contestations – between diverse market participants, 
from traders with highly different positionings in market hierarchies, to agents of the local state or the 
police forces. Before turning to an in-depth ethnographic investigation of these market processes in Rue 
du Liban (in 1b and 1c), the next section outlines the distinctiveness of an approach to urban 
marketplaces that centres on the entanglements of market- and space-making that constitute 
marketplaces as spatial entities in process.  
 
 
a. Valuation work and the production of evolving market landscapes 
 
Two opposing conceptions of ‘urban space’ can be distinguished in most academic writing on urban 
marketplaces. A first body of work tends to approach the marketplace as an already-constituted and 
stable spatial entity, and often equates ‘the market’ with a clearly delimited urban infrastructure, such 
as the “covered marketplace” in European cities (Gonzalez and Waley 2013) or the “bazaar” 
(Keshavarzian 2007) or “souk” (Rabo 2005) in Eastern cities. With the spatial parameters of the market 
assumed to be defined and fixed, such research typically focuses on the relations unfolding within the 
marketplace, qualifying them variably as public spaces of encounter and social interaction (Gonzalez 
and Waley 2013; Hiebert et al. 2015; Watson 2009), as sites of cultural production (Appelgren and 
Bohlin 2015(b); Gregson and Crewe 2003) or political mobilisation (Keshavarzian 2007). This static 
conception of space has also informed framings of marketplaces as inherently “authentic” or 
“traditional” urban sites, often in the context of gentrification or urban restructuring (Gonzalez and 
Waley 2013; Gonzalez 2019; Marinelli 2018). Conversely, a second body of literature, predominantly 
but not exclusively concerned with cities in the Global South (Mörtenböck and Mooshammer 2015), 
centres on what tends to be categorised as “informal” or “street markets” (Evers and Seale 2015). This 
literature frequently approaches the spatial parameters of markets as ephemeral or in-flux, focusing on 
the contestations over urban space that come to the fore in continuous cycles of occupation, expulsion 
and re-appropriation (Abaza 2014; Boonjubun 2017; Huang et al. 2014; Morange 2015: 253; Steck et 
al. 2013; Young 2017).  
 
As this chapter shows, these two bodies of literature create a false dichotomy between the market as a 
static ‘place’ and the market as an ephemeral occupation. This dichotomy has perpetuated and 
reinforced often-taken-for-granted distinctions between planned and unplanned, formal and informal, 
or Northern and Southern marketplaces. The on-going process of fripisation in central Tunis discussed 
in the chapter is neither an already-constituted and stable urban marketplace nor is it merely an 
ephemeral proliferation or “kinetic form in constant motion” (Mehrotra 2002: 98). Instead, an empirical 
investigation of fripisation demands investigation of the distinct processes through which urban space 
– here a central street of Tunis – is collectively enacted as site of fripe valuation, and in turn becomes 
consolidated as a specific market form. It thus requires establishing explicit linkages between the 
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ontology of urban fripe marketplaces as sites of circulation and exchange, and their evolving spatial 
constitution and appearance in present-day Tunis.  
 
In order to do so, this chapter builds upon a processual understanding of the market, bringing the explicit 
interest in processes of market-making from marketization literature to conceptualising urban 
marketplaces (Berndt and Boeckler 2011, 2012; Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 2010). While marketization 
literature has placed emphasis on the performative enactment of markets through the models and 
knowledge of ‘economics’ as discipline – and associated calculative devices – the approach has also 
been adopted in empirical studies of the constitution of particular commodity markets (Çalışkan 2010), 
housing markets (Farías 2014) or small enterprise programmes (Elyachar 2005). Such inquiries seek to 
understand how markets are “situationally produced and performed” (Elyachar 2005: 146), emphasising 
the role of “improvisation and experimentation” in producing contingent market encounters (Farías 
2014: 360) and the particular “configurations of power” that allow markets to function at particular 
points in time (Çalışkan 2010: 207). Such approaches to studying complex processes of market-making 
can complement literature on urban marketplaces, which has often shown surprisingly little interest in 
“scrutinising (street) trading per se as an economic activity” (Morange 2015: 253), or, more generally, 
in exploring the economic processes that underpin phenomena of market proliferation in different cities. 
In other words, while the ontology of marketplaces as sites of circulation and exchange is often taken 
for granted, it is rarely brought to bear in the analysis of the spatial constitution or changing forms of 
urban marketplaces.  
 
It is thus the goal of this chapter to explicitly link market processes and market forms, or economic and 
spatial practices, in its analysis of Rue du Liban’s enactment as specialised fripe market: empirical focus 
lies on exploring the complex “work of making order” (Hoffman 2017: 6) that underpins the street’s 
functioning as site of collective valuation work, and in turn determines evolving market forms. As this 
account demonstrates, only a close-up attention to market processes can render intelligible ‘forms of 
order’ that are “travelling the divide between material or immaterial, aesthetic and social patterns” 
(ibid). An ethnographic focus on “routinisation” as a basis for “formal rule-making” (Roitman 2007: 
159) here implies a close-up analysis of the fripe traders’ individual and collective routines of valuation 
work that translate into both consolidated and proliferating market forms in Rue du Liban. 
 
First, section 1b explores how Rue du Liban turned into a prominent ‘marketplace’ for valuation work 
with diverse fripe materials in central Tunis. Multiple circulations – and first and foremost, circulations 
of fripe merchandise – underpin valuation work in contemporary Rue du Liban, therefore requiring 
coordination mechanisms that allow traders to accelerate such circulations through the market street. 
As the following analysis demonstrates, both Rue du Liban’s status as commuter thoroughfare and the 
rapid pace of turnover required for successful fripe valuation influenced such emerging circulatory 
architectures. The synchronised mechanisms of circulation that today distribute opportunities for fripe 
valuation in Rue du Liban across different – permanent and mobile – traders point to market-making as 
a necessarily collective undertaking. In addition, such circulatory architectures have become manifest 
in socio-spatial ordering patterns and physical market infrastructures, providing insight into fripisation 
as a situated urban change process consisting not merely of proliferation, but also of consolidation. To 
examine the emergence of Rue du Liban as a collective enactment of fripe valuation work, the chapter 
relies on, first, ethnographic engagement with diverse fripe traders – both shopkeepers and mobile street 
vendors – who were involved in the establishment of the fripe market. Second, conversations with local 
residents, non-fripe shop owners in Rue du Liban, as well as municipal employees responsible for the 
adjacent Sidi Bahri market provide ‘outside’ perspectives on the change processes brought about by 
fripe trading. Finally, direct observations of the mechanisms and temporalities of circulation in Rue du 
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Liban open up the intricacies of valuation work that underpin what might at first sight appear as simple 
sales practices of individual fripe traders.  
 
Second, section 1c illustrates how the Rue du Liban market’s sustained functioning as a basis for fripe 
valuation is premised on continuous, collective enactments in urban space. Preserving the market’s 
consolidated patterns of socio-spatial order – which in turn stabilise its foundational circulatory 
mechanisms – rely on painstaking efforts of boundary-making through which market traders delimit the 
market and define selective rules of access and participation. Yet the accelerated rhythms of circulation 
required to perform fripe valuation also necessitate diverse boundary transgressions through which 
traders incorporate the confined market street into broader cycles of fripe circulation and valuation. 
These routinised, ongoing practices of boundary-making and boundary transgression thus show the 
market’s co-constitution as an “intricately functioning field of power” that needs to be maintained 
through “continuous interventions” (Çalışkan, 2010: 202, 207). The spatial processes that guarantee the 
market’s functioning exist in a tension between consolidation and periodic movement, involving 
“processes of territorialisation, of sharpening boundaries” and the preservation of a vital “proliferating 
dynamic” through porous boundaries that allow for flexible adaptation or negotiated access (Gago 2017: 
68). Tangible processes of fripisation in Rue du Liban thus appear in a new light, representing not 
ephemeral proliferations but the result of precise mechanisms of circulation and valuation that translate 
into space-making. For this understanding of market boundaries as – often intangible – socio-spatial 
constructs that are variably enforced or transgressed, the chapter builds on observations and 
conversations obtained through the repeated shadowing of market traders in Rue du Liban. Traders who 
occupy starkly different positions in market hierarchies were shadowed, so as to comprehend the 
differentiated market-making practices that co-constitute the market as a porously bounded, and 




Figure IV.2   Fripe shops densely line the formerly residential Rue du Liban (2019) 
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b. Transforming Rue du Liban into a site for collective valuation work 
 
How did the residential street of Rue du Liban, dotted with only a few grocery stores, workshops and 
bakeries in the early 2000s, turn into, first, a site of fripisation, and today, one of the most popular fripe 
markets of central Tunis? What micro-level processes of market-making allowed different fripe traders 
to collectively enact the street as a prominent site for valuation work through ‘fripe sale’? To answer 
these questions, the following section analyses the coordination mechanisms through which 
shopkeepers and “nassaba” (street vendors) collectively transformed Rue du Liban into a fripe market, 
thereby enhancing their individual valuation work with diverse fripe materials. In the first part, it 
explores the collaboration between shopkeepers and nassaba to devise a system of two-fold circulation 
for fripe merchandise through the market street. In the second part, it turns to the synchronised rhythms 
of circulation that allow traders in Rue du Liban to achieve a rapid turnover of merchandise, accelerating 
cycles of valuation and increasing the attractiveness of the marketplace. The account centres on Kamel 
as a key protagonist, one of the first fripe shopkeepers in Rue du Liban and a resident of the street who 
witnessed and co-produced its gradual transformation. 
 
Mechanisms of double circulation as a basis for market-making 
 
During the day, Rue du Liban appears as a densely occupied street market, with shop front displays and 
diverse “nasba” (vending stalls) – from tarpaulin-roofed metal structures, to handcarts and more 
improvised cardboard tables – occupying the sidewalks and part of the roadside. The narrow 
passageway in the middle is permanently clogged with pedestrians, motorbikes and delivery trolleys. 
Only in the early morning or after market closing hours does the street’s original layout become visible, 
as stall structures are dismantled or stored away in the fripe shops. Rue du Liban’s division into 
permanent shop spaces and mobile vending stalls in fact lies at the heart of comprehending the process 
of fripisation that transformed this formerly residential street.  
 
The fripe trader Kamel130, now in his late fifties, recounts that he was one of the first traders in Rue du 
Liban who transformed his grocery store into a fripe boutique in 2005. Living two floors above his shop 
space, Kamel observed the success of fripe street vendors from his balcony in the early 2000s: “The 
nassaba reselling the fripe of the Sidi Bahri boutiques started to come up to our street, because it gets 
a lot of movement”, he remembers. Indeed, as a direct axis between the Sidi Bahri market, the adjacent 
central bus station and innumerable office spaces, Rue du Liban always constituted a prominent 
commuter route and thus presented a strategic location for the nassaba.  Kamel recounts the immediate 
success of his fripe boutique, which subsequently encouraged a neighbouring grocery shop and a former 
metal workshop to follow his example. With the success of the fripe shops, demand rose for commercial 
spaces in Rue du Liban by the late 2000s, and Kamel and his neighbours were thus quick to rent out 
empty garages as shops or unused hallways as storage spaces, accelerating the transformation of Rue 
du Liban. Soon, Kamel recounts, commuters intentionally re-routed their way to and from work through 
Rue du Liban, attracted by the growing cluster of fripe shops. In turn, this drew in increasing numbers 
of nassaba who relocated with their stalls from other marketplaces like the Hafsia, where customer 
movement was largely limited to the weekends. 
 
While some of the shop owners and local residents opposed the influx of nassaba and the growing 
commercial density in Rue du Liban, Kamel claims that he immediately recognised the opportunity that 
lay in striking accords with the itinerant traders. Considering that “trade brings trade and customers 
 
130 Appendix II., Interlocutor 10; 
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bring customers” – a basic principle that has governed specialised market streets in souks for centuries 
(Rabo 2005: 31) – Kamel assessed that the nassaba could be of great help in solving the storage problem 
in his small shop space. He thus began to hand over fripe merchandise that had remained unsold or that 
he judged substandard to the nassaba, who resold the merchandise at reduced prices and paid him an 
approximate share of their profits in return. Two young street vendors, who set up their stalls directly 
opposite Kamel’s shop space, became his first trading partners. As he explains, they paid a fixed daily 
amount, “like a rent”, in exchange for the vending space and for storing their merchandise and sales 
tables in Kamel’s shop overnight. Kamel also negotiated with the local police on their behalf, paying 
what he refers to as “regular taxes” to protect them against police harassment and stabilise their 
occupations of the street and sidewalk. The deal with the two young nassaba considerably improved 
Kamel’s revenue and allowed him to renew his fripe offer more frequently, which in turn improved his 
shop’s reputation with customers. Over time, other fripe shopkeepers in Rue du Liban thus followed 




Figure IV.3   Fripe shops and stalls of the nassaba occupy opposite roadsides in Rue du Liban (2017) 
 
The collaboration between shopkeepers and nassaba in Rue du Liban gradually stabilised into a system 
of two-fold circulation of fripe merchandise that became manifest in a particular market form. After a 
first round of sale in the shops, unsold merchandise is resold at reduced prices on the stalls of the 
nassaba, usually directly opposite. Through lasting working arrangements between shop owners and 
nassaba – at times verging on non-formalised employment relations – many stall traders have 
consolidated their vending positions in the street over time. Particularly in the dense middle section of 
Rue du Liban, the vendors have marked their initials in bright colours on the wall of the adjacent parking 
lot to entrench their day-time occupations. While during the day-time, the stalls and boutiques of Rue 
du Liban seem to function as autonomous entities, at night-time the stall structures and their 
merchandise are neatly stored away in the shops. As nodal points in the system of two-fold circulation, 
the day-time ‘boutiques’ of Rue du Liban transform into storage spaces overnight, or what have been 
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referred to as “magasin-entrepôts” (shop-warehouses) in the made-in-China trade in Tunis (Doron 
2017:11). Intricate systems of re-packaging and stacking merchandise, and folding or disassembling 
temporary stall structures and street furniture thus occur at sundown in Rue du Liban. Once the metal 
shutters of the fripe boutiques have been closed, nothing but the colourful initials on the wall of the 
parking lot and leftover pieces of the characteristic tarpaulin packaging of the fripe on the tarmac testify 
to the existence of the dense day-time market. While the nassaba’s appropriations of the sidewalks and 
street space violate official regulations, profit-sharing agreements with state employees and the police 
have stabilised such occupations. Both employees of the “mouatamadiya” (district administration) – 
who regularly frequent the fripe shops of Rue du Liban to collect taxes – and local police units thus 
unofficially tax the nassaba, earning profit shares from the lucrative system of two-fold circulation. 
 
While the division of Rue du Liban into permanent shops and improvised stalls seems to indicate a clear 
hierarchy between shopkeepers and nassaba, the working agreements between different traders in fact 
testify to mutual dependency in the enactment of the specialised fripe market. For shop keepers, the 
cooperation with nassaba not only increases overall profit margins and turnover speed, it also decreases 
the risk that comes with buying “silaa khaiba” (bad merchandise) from the wholesalers. The possibility 
of immediately passing on substandard or faulty fripe products to the nassaba allows shopkeepers to 
recover at least a part of their costs, without risking the reputation of their shops by exposing bad quality 
garments. The nassaba on the other hand depend on the permanent shop infrastructures and leftover 
merchandise to operate in the street at minimal cost and risk. Through resale at reduced prices, they 
often attain a higher overall volume of transactions and in fact generate the bulk of profits made in the 
Rue du Liban fripe market. Most importantly, as the next section explores, the rapid pace of turnover 
required to extract maximum value from fripe merchandise can only be upheld through continuous 
spatio-temporal coordination between shopkeepers and nassaba, defining market-making as a 




Figure IV.4   The Rue du Liban fripe shops turn into storage spaces overnight (2020)  
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Synchronised mechanisms of circulation and the emergence of distinct market forms 
 
The rapid movement of fripe merchandise through Rue du Liban – one of the key preconditions to 
successful valuation work in the market – relies not only on resale agreements between shopkeepers 
and nassaba, but also on strict temporal coordination of weekly circulations through the market street. 
While the speed of turnover is crucial for profit-making in any marketplace, the rapid decline in value 
that follows the moment of bale opening in the case of the fripe renders the swift circulation of 
merchandise particularly crucial for the generation of value in fripe markets. As the moment of “halan 
al-bala” (bale opening, discussed in Chapter V) – or the disclosure of new merchandise – and its 
immediate aftermath constitute peak value for fripe commodities, the frequency of bale openings in part 
determines the success of fripe marketplaces. Therefore, as this section outlines, strict mechanisms of 
temporal coordination are the basis of the collective enactment of Rue du Liban as fripe market: 
synchronised circulations – not only of fripe merchandise, but also of cash, tax payments, leftovers and 
waste materials – constitute a key competitive advantage for valuation work and thus in part explain 
the rapid fripisation of Rue du Liban. 
 
On Wednesday and Saturday mornings, the slogan, “bala jdida, bala jdida” (new bale), “malla bala” 
(look at this bale) or, “silaa jdida, min bala jdida” (new merchandise, from a new bale) echo from the 
house walls of Rue du Liban. On these two days, halan al-bala is collectively organised in the market 
street and customers from across Tunis are attracted by the opening of new fripe bales. Even outside 
the coordinated bale opening times, fripe traders in Rue du Liban can often be observed cutting open 
new bales, whenever the crowd is dense enough to make the performance worthwhile.  A “desire for 
newness” attracts customers to the public bale openings, with ‘newness’ in the context of the fripe 
translating as “wrinkles and folds” from the bale press to ensure that bales haven’t been pre-inspected 
or pre-sorted, but come directly from the sorting factory (Hansen 2000(a): 183). In the beginning, Kamel 
recounts, the fripe shops of Rue du Liban lacked a coordinated rhythm for halan al-bala, which meant 
that different traders opened bales at irregular intervals depending on individual cycles of purchase and 
delivery. As a consequence, Kamel explains, clients didn’t consider Rue du Liban “a real fripe market”, 
but merely a “street with some shops”. Through the stabilisation of resale agreements with nassaba, the 
speed of turnover in the fripe boutiques accelerated and new bales were purchased more frequently. The 
logistics of purchase and payment in the wholesale quarter, as well as transport to and from the market, 
consumed time and money and eventually prompted fripe shop owners to agree on a joint rhythm of 
deliveries. Receiving new merchandise in bulk, at first once a week and with growing success twice a 
week, reduced transport costs and minimised the congestion caused by delivery vans in the narrow 
market street. When levels of trust grew, some of the fripe traders also pooled purchase and payment in 
Zahrouni, with experienced traders like Kamel negotiating on the others’ behalf.  
 
The synchronisation of deliveries enabled a regular, bi-weekly rhythm of bale opening that continues 
to structure the working week of fripe traders in Rue du Liban. This includes the nassaba who receive 
leftover merchandise twice a week, before the arrival of new bales. The acceleration of deliveries and 
thus, the renewal of offer in the shop spaces, has prompted Kamel and other shopkeepers to expand 
their collaboration with nassaba over time: frequent, almost exclusively cashless transactions thus 
characterise routinised interactions between different fripe traders in Rue du Liban today. “Everything 
works on credit now, we know each other (…), we owe the “grossistiya” (wholesalers), we owe each 
other amongst the fripiers (fripe traders) and the nassaba owe us for the merchandise”. Both circular 
credit obligations and collaboration agreements remain unwritten, and trustful relations with other 
shopkeepers and nassaba are thus of central importance. Sharing a coffee with the neighbouring 
shopkeeper Anis one morning, Kamel recounts that some shopkeepers were hesitant or refused to adapt 
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to the synchronised rhythms of circulation in the market street. Both Kamel and Anis however assert 
that those who “wanted to do business on their own” failed to survive in the market street. Anis, who 
converted his hardware shop in Rue du Liban into a fripe boutique roughly a decade ago, emphasises: 
“in the fripe trade you quickly realise you are nothing as an individual (…), our success here is based 
on working together”. Anis stresses that the collaboration of traders is not only required to “move 
merchandise through the shop” but also to “manage relations” with wholesalers as well as diverse local 
state actors who want to extract profit from the flourishing market. 
 
Rue du Liban’s distinct circulatory architectures – which in turn underpin frequent bale openings and 
the rapid renewal of fripe offer – are central to explaining the market’s exceptional success, and thus 
status as a prominent site for fripe valuation. This success has prompted fripe traders from across Tunis 
to relocate to Rue du Liban, resulting in soaring rent prices and competition for space: Wassim131, who 
moved to Rue du Liban from the Hafsia fripe market, explains that the frequent halan al-bala motivated 
his decision. He recounts: “In the Hafsia, no one opens bales during the week, many of the traders are 
old and just sell the stuff they already have”. According to Wassim, this has not only tarnished the 
Hafsia’s reputation over time, it also caused storage problems in his shop and resulted in the rapid 
devaluation of his fripe merchandise. Specialised in second-hand fur products during the winter months, 
and beachwear in summer, Wassim says his coats were ruined by humidity and moths, while the 
summer merchandise suffered from exposure to the sun and dust. “The fripe is best when you first pull 
it from the bale, that’s when you can charge the highest prices”, he explains, “but after you need to 
lower prices quickly, and storing the merchandise or hanging it outside means it gets ruined quickly.” 
Therefore, trading in a marketplace that keeps pace with a bi-weekly rhythm of turnover and enables 
rapid cycles of resale is central to generating profits as an individual vendor. While Wassim’s new shop 
in Rue du Liban is smaller and more expensive to rent, he says that “barsha circulation” (a lot of 
movement) in the new location compensates for these higher costs.  
 
Countering portrayals of fripisation as ephemeral market proliferation, the joint circulatory mechanisms 
and harmonised market temporalities that underpin collective valuation work in Rue du Liban show 
market-making as an intricate, collective enactment that transformed the formerly residential street into 
a bustling fripe market. The two-fold circulation of fripe merchandise – as well as diverse other 
circulations through the market street – are enabled through the traders’ careful “calibration and 
measure” (Simone 2018: 18) that reveals the specificities of market-making with the fripe. From the 
fripe merchandise’s ever-uncertain quality and short-lived peak value, to the market street’s physical 
division into permanent shop spaces and mobile stalls, distinct “cooperative hierarchies” (Keshavarzian 
2007: 195) underpin the Rue du Liban market’s functioning as a ‘stage’ for valuation work. Over time, 
these cooperative hierarchies have become stabilised in distinct “spatial and temporal frameworks” 
(Bestor 2004: 20), and thus market forms. At the same time, however, as is explored next, upholding 
the market’s functioning as a site of collective valuation work requires continuous efforts of space-
making that both consolidate market occupations and flexibly accommodate movement into and out of 
the market to preserve its circulatory essence.  
 
 




Figure IV.5   Fripe bales are unloaded in Rue du Liban (2019) 
 
 
c. Market-making as an on-going spatial process: enacting a porous boundary regime 
 
In Rue du Liban, the term fripisation isn’t merely used to describe the residential street’s transformation 
into a fripe market. It is also employed to capture a sense of constant proliferation and movement of the 
market, as remaining garages and shops are being converted into fripe boutiques, and as the nassaba 
relocate northwards and southwards, as well as into perpendicular residential streets. While the middle 
section of Rue du Liban thus features relatively stable occupations, the extraordinary commercial 
success of the market street has attracted ever-greater numbers of traders and customers, translating into 
shifting market densities and evolving patterns of occupation. Consequently, the fripe market remains 
in-the-making, with market boundaries being periodically redrawn or redefined. 
 
The following two sections thus explore how market-making in Rue du Liban occurs through on-going 
spatial practices through which market boundaries are performatively enacted and reconfigured. For 
this purpose, the routinised practices of boundary-making and boundary transgression of three traders 
are analysed: Kamel, the shopkeeper introduced in the preceding part; Bilel132, a young nassab 
specialised in fripe trading; and Mohamed133, an elderly vendor who makes a living on the market 
peripheries. Focusing on three traders occupying starkly different positions in the market hierarchies 
sheds light on market boundaries as relational constructs that become visible only in their effects on 
different market participants. On the one hand, collective valuation work in Rue du Liban hinges on the 
persistent enforcement and policing of market boundaries, and different market traders thus draw lines 
between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that define selective conditions for access and regulate circulations 
 
132 Appendix II., Interlocutor 11; 
133 Appendix II., Interlocutor 12; 
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through the market street. On the other hand, valuation work inside the market street relies on 
continuous circulations across market boundaries, so that traders establish relations that extend the 
marketplace outwards or negotiate exceptional rights of access and possibilities for navigation that 
render market boundaries porous. Taken together, such practices co-constitute the Rue du Liban fripe 
market in a continuous tension between consolidation and movement, with on-going processes of 
fripisation ensuring the market’s continued functioning as site of valuation work. 
 
Consolidating the marketplace: performances of boundary-making  
 
Through routinised practices and on the basis of mostly-tacit agreements and calculations, different 
fripe traders partake in defining, patrolling and enforcing intangible market boundaries in Rue du Liban, 
often on a day-to-day basis. Especially in light of the fripe market’s success and the increased pressure 
on space and congestion this has entailed, such practices of boundary-making are central to preserving 
consolidated patterns of spatial occupation, as well as the market’s character as specialised fripe trading 
space. Both factors in turn guarantee the synchronised mechanisms of circulation that enable valuation 
work in Rue du Liban, turning continuous boundary-making into a prerequisite for the market’s 
functioning. 
 
As proprietor of his own fripe boutique and pioneer fripe trader, Kamel occupies a prominent position 
at the heart of the now-thriving market and often assumes an informal leadership role amongst the 
shopkeepers of Rue du Liban. For instance, he entertains close relations to local officials of the district 
and municipality who frequent the market for tax collection and handles relations to local police agents, 
negotiating what he refers to as “doukhul al-souk” (market entry), an intangible line at the Northern 
end of Rue du Liban. Kamel explains: “You see the vegetable stalls up there at the intersection? This is 
where the fripe market ends, if it extends any further, we are in trouble with al-hakim (the state/police)”. 
While Kamel collaborates with nassaba on a day-to-day basis for resale, he also intervenes to limit the 
entry of street vendors into Rue du Liban. “To make the market work down here”, he points up and 
down the densely occupied middle section of Rue du Liban, “we need to limit entry over there, otherwise 
everything will be blocked”. With the growing popularity of the market street, congestion and disputed 
rules of entry have multiplied quarrels with mobile vendors, but also amongst shopkeepers. Kamel often 
mediates such conflicts. On one of these occasions, he asks shopkeepers to gather in front of his shop 
after closing hours. The plastic chairs he sets up for the gathering remain unused as the vendors’ 
discussions unfold standing, with wild gestures and elevated voices. Some shopkeepers are accused of 
exacerbating congestion and endangering the reputation of the market by hiring mobile nassaba with 
“berwitas” (handcarts), allowing them to occupy the interstices between existing shops and stalls to 
maximise their profits. After lengthy negotiations, the traders agree on respecting an invisible “khatt” 
(line) that limits the entry of mobile vendors. Besides reducing congestion, Kamel hopes this will keep 
out “nassaba that are “mush moutrabiin” (not well behaved) as he fears that, “their language and 
manners scare away our best clients (…), and the low quality of the (fripe) merchandise they sell can 
ruin our reputation.” 
 
In differentiation to Kamel, Bilel neither owns nor formally rents any permanent trading space. Instead, 
he occupies a stall space adjacent to the wall of the parking lot at the Southern end of Rue du Liban. 
Based on a stable resale agreement with the fripe shop located opposite, Bilel has marked his vending 
position with a capital B in blue paint on the wall where he sets up the iron structure of his roofed stall. 
Bilel’s reliability and exceptional wit as nassab have earned him a reputation amongst shopkeepers and 
other nassaba. Bilel explains that his positioning “fil-kiass” (in the street) means that he is forced to 
constantly negotiate occupations with other traders, in differentiation from “tujar l-hawanet” (shop 
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traders) who possess permanent, indoor vending spaces. Indeed, Bilel spends an important part of his 
working day preventing encroachments into the main market street, especially by vendors trading 
“chinwa” (made-in-China commodities) or other non-fripe products. As his stall is positioned close to 
the intersection with Avenue de Madrid, which marks the intangible boundary between “souk al-fripe” 
(the fripe market) and the more heterogeneous market landscape around the Sidi Bahri market, Bilel 
highlights his central role in affirming the identity of Rue du Liban as an exclusive fripe market. “Our 
reputation is the fripe, so we need to avoid chaos”, he insists. Pointing towards the fripe shops, he then 
adds that, “many of the shop owners don’t even see how we (the nassaba) struggle all the time to protect 
the souk, if we weren’t here, Rue du Liban would no longer be a fripe market”. 
 
One of the traders who works beyond the intangible market boundaries Kamel and Bilel monitor and 
keep in check is Mohamed, a skinny white-haired vendor offering a small selection of used clothes on 
two banana boxes. As Mohamed is not allowed entry into Rue du Liban, he trades around the corner in 
Avenue de Lyon, on the narrow sidewalk adjacent to the tram lines. Next to him, other traders set up 
improvised stalls on the sidewalk and their number fluctuates with the weather and weekday. Rather 
than fripiers or nassaba, Mohamed and those trading in Avenue de Lyon are typically referred to as 
“zwawila” (poor people) by the fripe traders of Rue du Liban. While many of them sell second-hand 
garments and shoes, they also trade in a diverse array of other used goods, such as kitchen utensils or 
electronics. Bilel dismissively describes these vendors’ wares as leftovers or old household items that 
cannot be qualified as “fripe” – a term he and other fripe traders reserve for sorted merchandise bought 
in bales from wholesalers. The distinction between professional fripe traders and used-good vendors 
underpins the exclusion of Mohamed and other traders from the main market street, which in Bilel’s 
and Kamel’s eyes is a key prerequisite to protecting the fripe market’s reputation. While Mohamed 
occupies a vending position right at the intersection with Rue du Liban, he considers himself “barra al-
souk” (outside the market). Rather than contesting his position, Mohamed actively defends the invisible 
market boundary by disciplining other used good vendors to respect their vending positions along the 
tram tracks. He moreover uses his positioning to intervene whenever vehicles attempt to turn into the 
main market street. Even though traffic isn’t formally banned from Rue du Liban, Mohammed appeals 
to the common sense of drivers to suggest alternative routes, thus protecting market transactions by 
avoiding congestion and the interruption of commuter flows. While Mohamed thus enforces boundaries 
from which he remains himself excluded, his proactive role as market-maker reinforces the legitimacy 
of his occupation, allowing him to navigate market boundaries more flexibly than most other peripheral 
traders. 
 
The three traders portrayed here actively invest in boundary-making as part of their market routines, 
underlining the labour-intensive processes of space-making required to preserve the market’s 
mechanisms of coordinated circulation that function as a basis for valuation work. The market 
boundaries of Rue du Liban thus reflect “the stabilization of particular forms of organization of market 
relations” (Callon 1998: 48), here first and foremost the consolidation of particular patterns of spatial 
occupation and social cooperation. The positioning of different traders within the “patterned social 
order” (Bestor 2004: 15) of the fripe market determines how traders relate to, interpret or contest market 
boundaries, and how they experience these boundaries as differentiated effects of inclusion and 
exclusion. The active participation in boundary-making – even for those who trade beyond the 
marketplace’s spatial confines – thereby often functions as a performative act of legitimising one’s 
belonging to the market, here denoting the complex web of relations that enacts Rue du Liban as an 





Figure IV.6   Resellers work along the tramlines beyond the fripe market’s boundaries (2018) 
 
Transgressing or negotiating porous market boundaries  
 
While enforcing boundaries is thus crucial to stabilising consolidated working mechanisms in the 
market, the need to sustain a rapid pace of fripe circulation simultaneously requires market-making 
practices that either transgress, or render porous, market boundaries. Indeed, the calculative agencies of 
different fripe traders in Rue du Liban testify to the centrality of periodically overstepping market 
boundaries – both in a physical and figurative sense – to avoid a slowdown of circulations and thus 
transactions in the market. First, following the nassab Bilel shows how movement beyond the market’s 
spatial confines flexibly expands market relationalities outward, integrating the market into broader 
mechanisms of exchange and resulting in shifting densities and spatial proliferation. Second, honing in 
on the ways in which the peripheral trader Mohamed – who remains nominally positioned outside the 
market – negotiates access to, and participation in the Rue du Liban fripe market underlines the selective 
porosity of market boundaries. As this section demonstrates, market boundaries rendered porous 
through relational webs extending beyond the confined market are central to Rue du Liban’s enactment 
as a site for fripe valuation: continuous relations of fripe supply and distribution beyond market 
boundaries uphold the market’s rapid pace of turnover and high volume of transactions, avoiding the 
fripe’s devaluation within the marketplace. 
 
Apart from short cigarette or tea breaks, Bilel remains in constant movement throughout his working 
routines. His dense webs of relations and physical movement beyond the confined space of the market 
street are in fact central to explaining Bilel’s exemplary success as nassab. In addition to his eccentric 
vending performances, it is Bilel’s high-quality merchandise that sets him apart from competitors in 
Rue du Liban. Nominally, Bilel’s vending position relies on a resale agreement with the opposite shop 
space, as is the case for most other nassaba. In reality however, Bilel receives most of his high-end 
fripe supplies from exclusive fripe boutiques in the surrounding Lafayette neighbourhood. After market 
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closing hours, Bilel thus often visits different boutique owners, such as Nessima134, who opened a small 
fripe boutique in Avenue de Londres two years ago to provide for herself and her son after her divorce. 
Nessima and the much younger Bilel share sweet mint tea and cigarettes on small stools in front of the 
shop in the evening, chatting about wholesale prices and the latest gossip in the market. Bilel first met 
Nessima when he toured fripe shops in Lafayette, offering to buy unsold merchandise at bulk prices 
from boutique owners. Nessima had just entered the fripe business at the time, “with no experience in 
commerce at all”, as she admits chucklingly. Struggling in the male-dominated fripe wholesale business 
that is characterised by tacit insider knowledge, Nessima struck a deal with Bilel, asking him to help 
with purchases in Zahrouni in exchange for receiving fixed quantities of her exclusive fripe women’s 
wear for resale. 
 
Trading himself exclusively with crème fripe products, Bilel in turn delegates the resale of the 
merchandise he takes over from the Rue du Liban shop space to other nassaba. He thus recruited family 
members and friends from his houma in Ettadhamen, a working-class neighbourhood on the North-
Western periphery of Tunis, to resell the fripe on berwitas in the interstices or on the outskirts of the 
Rue du Liban market. As Bilel supplies the mobile vendors with merchandise, negotiates access to the 
marketplace on their behalf and organises storage spaces for their berwitas overnight, he assumes the 
role of an informal employer and obtains profit shares in return. Bilel’s day-to-day cooperation with 
fluctuating numbers of mobile vendors often triggers conflict with the police and other market traders, 
especially the shopkeepers, who blame handcart vendors for obstructing customer traffic and ruining 
the reputation of the market street. Bilel, on the contrary, stresses the crucial role of mobile vendors in 
accelerating turnover and in keeping Rue du Liban attractive as a market: “To sell quickly and at cheap 
prices, the berwita vendors move with the commuters, (…) they adapt and go where the movement is”. 
As Bilel himself cannot vacate his position at the centre of the market for long, he relies on the extended 
radius of movement of mobile vendors to ensure the rapid resale of large quantities of fripe merchandise. 
Since the narrow main section of Rue du Liban has become increasingly congested, Bilel explains that 
many commuters intentionally bypass the busy main market street, necessitating a repositioning of 
vendors with berwitas at the intersections in order to capture the re-routed pedestrian flows. 
  
Bilel’s modest vending stall in Rue du Liban therefore represents the nodal point of a complex web of 
fripe circulations that depend on his capacity to forge relationships of supply and resale beyond market 
boundaries. The mechanisms by which he expands the market relationally have both consolidating and 
proliferating effects on the physical marketplace: on the one hand, Bilel’s networks contribute to the 
upholding of the bi-weekly rhythms of bale opening in Rue du Liban because he ensures the rapid resale 
of leftovers and thus enables the renewal of merchandise. On the other hand, Bilel’s resale agreements 
channel movement towards or beyond the negotiated confines of the market, resulting in shifting market 
densities and market proliferation.  
 
 




Figure IV.7   Handcarts and plastic crates are used by the nassaba to extend market boundaries (2019) 
 
Meanwhile, shadowing the market routines of the peripheral used-good trader Mohamed provides a 
different perspective on the porosity of market boundaries. While he remains nominally ‘outside the 
fripe market’, he negotiates access to the market and participates in its diverse exchange relations. He 
is one out of many largely invisible market participants who navigate boundaries flexibly, on the basis 
of mutually beneficial exchange agreements with shopkeepers and nassaba. Foundational to 
Mohamed’s market participation is the uncertain commodity status and rapid devaluation of fripe 
merchandise. As a variable percentage of purchased fripe merchandise fails to qualify for market 
exchange, different mechanisms for reuse and recycling as well as strategies for cost-efficient removal 
are crucial to prevent the cluttering of fripe boutiques and an accumulation of textile waste in Rue du 
Liban, both of which would damage the market’s reputation.  
 
Mohamed thus regularly collects damaged or worn-out fripe garments in the market, particularly on 
Friday mornings, when traders like Kamel empty their shops before the Saturday bale opening. While 
Kamel professes to give to poor people like Mohamed out of religious duty135, their exchanges in fact 
point to a more utilitarian form of “gift exchange” (Mauss 1966). In return for some wearable garments, 
Mohamed organises waste disposal free of charge, transporting large quantities of textile cast-offs out 
of the market on a shopping trolley. Using a backstreet staircase to sort the materials, Mohamed screens 
out wearable items that he either sells on his own improvised stall, or distributes to other peripheral 
vendors. He then hands over damaged or worn-out clothes to female farazet (sorters), who come to the 
fripe markets specifically to forage for leftovers that they can repair or process. While few of the 
exchange relations Mohamed entertains result in monetary transactions, they translate into “exchanges 
in modalities of sociability” (Elyachar 2005: 125) that establish Mohamed as a market participant with 
a central role in the redistribution of leftover merchandise and guarantee his prominent vending position 
 
135 “Zakat” is the religious obligation to provide a fixed proportion of one’s earnings to the poor in Islam;  
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at the central intersection of Rue du Liban. As other ethnographic accounts of work in urban 
marketplaces have demonstrated, people often “invoke an idea of the market as a common resource or 
institution capable of providing for all those that live and work there" (Monteith 2018: 7). While 
Mohamed is clearly positioned at the lower end of the strict social hierarchies that determine 
opportunities for valuation work in Rue du Liban, his role and responsibility in the collective enactment 
of the market street grant access to the fripe market as a ‘shared resource’. Not only Mohamed, but also 
multiple other relatively invisible market participants – who often do not partake in market exchanges 
in a monetary sense – thus play a role in upholding the fripe market’s circulatory mechanisms by 
navigating porous market boundaries.  
 
In addition to Bilel’s and Mohamed’s routinised practices of boundary transgression in Rue du Liban, 
the selective negotiation of porous market boundaries also implies the strategic opening of channels for 
market participation to various ‘outsiders’. As different fripe traders recount, Rue du Liban’s growing 
popularity and status as a preeminent site for fripe valuation – and thus profit-making – resulted in the 
emergence of resentment and jealousy, and thus attempts to either participate in, or thwart, valuation 
work in the market street. As a local resident who depends on the contested terrain of Rue du Liban for 
both his income and private life, Kamel is thus particularly aware of the need to balance short-term 
profit maximising strategies with investments in lasting political and social alliances. First, he recounts 
mounting anger amongst local residents who suffer from noise, accumulating waste, and staircases 
being repurposed as fripe storages. In addition to the disturbances, many feel unjustly excluded from 
the flourishing fripe business enveloping their neighbourhood, and some have thus started to mobilise 
against the market, lobbying the municipality to intervene through market clearance. Second, the 
precarious positioning of much of the Rue du Liban market in the open street requires continuous 
negotiations with local state officials and the police, who exert ever-higher profit shares from the 
burgeoning market. Kamel thus frequently intervenes to mediate between local residents, diverse state 
agents and other fripe traders, often solving conflict by opening new avenues for participation in 
valuation work. In his own shop space, Kamel moreover entertains hybrid exchange agreements that 
remain incommensurable as pure ‘market transactions’ because they are comprised of “a mix of market 
and non-market logics, values and practices” (Berndt et al. 2020: 16). From diverse formal and informal 
tax payments to temporary employment creation for local residents and the provision of high-end 
merchandise to neighbours; many of Kamel’s exchange practices are devised to sustain the porosity of 
market boundaries, protecting market transactions in Rue du Liban in the long run.  
 
This exploration of the diverse calculations underpinning strategic processes of boundary-making and 
boundary transgression in Rue du Liban demonstrates how the fripe market is co-produced in a tension 
between spatial consolidation and periodic adaptation or proliferation. The market’s confinement “to a 
symbolic and geographic territory” (Gago 2017: 68) provides a crucial basis for collective valuation 
work with diverse fripe materials. Protecting and enforcing market boundaries is thus indispensable to 
preserving both the consolidated patterns of socio-spatial order that underpin the street’s synchronised 
circulatory mechanisms, and the overall “vending location that has become synonymous to the 
commodities” (Milgram 2012: 207) – here the fripe – over time. Yet, the market’s continuous 
“proliferating dynamic” (Gago 2017: 68) is also crucial to maintaining the rapid turnover cycles of 
merchandise that set the Rue du Liban market apart from other fripe markets in central Tunis. The 
continuous transgression, or negotiated porosity of market boundaries is generative of “structures of 
prolonged entanglement” (Mörtenböck and Mooshammer 2008: 357) that imbricate the fripe market in 
an expansive set of provisioning and exchange relations, blurring physical delimitations of the 
marketplace and undermining clear-cut distinctions between market participants and outsiders.  
 
 147 
Taken together, such routinised practices of boundary-making and boundary transgression co-constitute 
the fripe market as a socio-spatial entity that remains in-the-making. While Rue du Liban has thus today 
become consolidated as a densely occupied market street and has gained a city-wide reputation for its 
exclusive fripe offer, it nevertheless remains in-motion, as densities periodically shift outwards, and as 
market boundaries are renegotiated or redrawn. Ethnographic insight into market-making as an intricate 
and on-going spatial practice helps overcome the false dichotomy between marketplaces as either static 
or kinetic spatial forms. While the term fripisation is often employed to capture a sense of ephemeral 
market proliferation in Rue du Liban, close-up investigation instead reveals how market forms evolve 
as a result of highly specific market processes. Rather than “matters of spontaneous flows”, the socio-
spatial ordering patterns of the fripe market reflect specific “connections, interdependencies and 
autonomies persons conceive and operationalise with each other” (Simone 2018: 9). Nevertheless, as 
the next part discusses, the distinct ‘market forms’ of the fripe market remain invisible or illegible to 




Figure IV.8   Mohamed uses a shopping trolley to transport leftover garments to his sorting location (2019) 
 
 
2. Fripisation as a problem of urban governance 
 
When local residents or the owners of the remaining patisserie and grocery shop in Rue du Liban evoke 
the term fripisation, they often do so not to describe a concluded transformation process but rather on-
going changes reshaping their immediate surroundings. To outsiders, the dominant impression the fripe 
market gives is one of uncontrolled sprawl, with fripe trading gradually enveloping ever-greater parts 
of the Lafayette neighbourhood. Such unfolding change processes are often understood within the 
context of a post-revolutionary conjuncture, in which local media outlets and citizens’ initiatives cast 
the unchecked proliferation of trading activities in central Tunis as an emblem of weakening urban 
governance (Brown et al. 2017). Consequently, sites of fripisation – and especially those located in the 
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heart of the capital, like Rue du Liban – were increasingly framed as ‘problem spaces’, requiring state 
intervention to halt processes of urban degradation and to reimpose law and order. While diverse local 
state actors and members of the security forces were thus routinely involved in co-producing processes 
of fripisation in Rue du Liban, the Tunis governorate eventually singled out the bustling fripe market 
as the target of a top-down clearance and relocation campaign in 2017.  
 
To explain how fripisation has become a selective target of repressive government in present-day Tunis, 
the second part of this chapter relates historical legacies of governing urban marketplaces and the fripe’s 
historical constitution as a contested form of market order to the contemporary clearance and relocation 
campaign in Rue du Liban. The next section examines the dichotomy between souk and marché that 
originated during the colonial era and underpins the enduring stigmatisation of unenclosed marketplaces 
in present-day Tunis. The subsequent section details the fripe trade’s systematic exclusion from planned 
marketplaces and its development as a hybrid market landscape, explaining how this has positioned the 
fripe as an unwanted agent of urban change. The final section then returns to Rue du Liban to investigate 
how the 2017 attempt of forced market relocation upset the socio-spatial ordering patterns that underpin 
collective valuation work in the fripe market. 
 
 
a. Governing marketplaces in Tunis: the dualism between souk and marché  
 
Colonial policies in diverse contexts sought to impose economic and political control over marketplaces 
by imposing static, spatial confines and mechanisms of enclosure. In colonial India for example, 
perceptions of the “bazaar as paradigmatic open space” that “is not subject to a single set of enclosing 
rules” triggered acute political fears (Chakrabarty 1991: 22, 25). Similarly, in colonial Egypt, “urban 
market streets” were seen “as lines of penetration from outside the city” that undid “separations between 
inside and outside” (Mitchell 1988: 56), allowing inherently uncontrollable populations such as street 
vendors – described as “pests” by the colonial authorities – to infiltrate the inner city of Cairo 
(Kuppinger 1995: 75). Colonial authorities in different contexts thus sought to enforce “legible urban 
structures” and “fixed urban forms” on marketplaces (ibid: 58), often through built enclosures that were 
then governed by strict hygiene regulations (Monteith 2019; Sundaram 2009). As a direct consequence, 
pre-existing forms of urban commerce that were organised outside the newly created enclosures were 
criminalised under anti-vagrancy or anti-loitering laws, prohibiting for instance the occupation of public 
space for hawking (Morange 2015: 252) or outlawing vendors’ cries in the city (Sharma 2021: 25). 
 
In colonial Tunisia, the souk was equally perceived as a transgressive and ungovernable site, as it 
represented a central rural-urban interface that brought together diverse flows of merchandise, people 
and information, and thus established linkages between disparate spaces and people (Jemmali 1972: 
30). Indeed, the Arabic term “souk” is derived from the verb “to go towards” or “drive”, thus testifying 
to the emblematic role of markets as radiating centres of movement that often became the basis for new 
settlements136 (Chérif 2006: 431). Attempts to ordain fixed spatial parameters for marketplaces were 
initiated under Ottoman modernisation reforms in the late-19th century and were subsequently expanded 
and systematised by the French colonial authorities (Meddeb 2012: 97, 98). The result of policies of 
market enclosure and regulation was the emergence of opposing urban market forms, captured in a new 
lexical differentiation between souk and marché that persists until the present day. Over time, this 
dichotomy came to describe separate categories of governing, underpinned by normative distinctions 
 
136 This origin story is reflected in the names of many Tunisian cities, for instance “Souk El Arbaa” (lit. “Wednesday 
market”), the former name of the present-day city Jendouba in Tunisia’s North-West; 
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between backward and modern, and unplanned and planned marketplaces, that continue to stigmatise 
unenclosed and proliferating market forms in Tunis.  
  
Systematic attempts to govern souks in Tunisia by regulating their spatial parameters began with the 
“tanzimat” modernisation reforms under Ottoman rule in Tunisia. In 1840, a Beylical decree expanded 
control over weekly souks, regulating market times and their spatial confines to facilitate tax collection 
(Chérif 2006: 431). Meanwhile, the authorities had invested in an expansion of the covered “aswak” in 
the capital city, a “network of highly specialized markets” that were governed as semi-public spaces by 
different guilds from the 17th and 18th century onwards (Ferjani 2017: 44, 68). A newly created 
municipal council, or “majlis”, became responsible for inspecting and taxing all urban marketplaces 
from 1858 onwards (Lafi 2005: 234). With the increasing regulation of urban marketplaces in Tunis, 
pre-existing forms of “petty commerce, hawking and door-to-door sales”, practised particularly by poor 
European migrants from Malta and Southern Italy, were criminalised and prosecuted, with the 
“dabtiya” (urban police) regularly arresting vendors and clearing streets and sidewalks (Clancy-Smith 
2012: 133, 135,137). 
 
French colonial rule then further enhanced control over marketplaces through a systematic policy of 
forced enclosure. In rural areas, the temporal and spatial regulation of weekly souks became a tool for 
controlling and sedentarising nomadic or semi-nomadic populations (Bennafla 1999: 30; Meddeb 2012: 
98). Meanwhile, in the capital city, the colonial authorities incorporated the construction of urban 
marketplaces – modelled after French covered market infrastructures and thus denominated marchés – 
into their project of European city-building. Mirroring a “colonial urban order that was segregationist 
and dualist by definition” (Belhedi 2005: 4), the Tunis medina and its faubourgs with sprawling, open-
air souks were now juxtaposed to the newly planned European districts that featured enclosed marchés. 
The new central market of Tunis, completed in 1891, became the epitome of the ‘modern market’, 
complete with an office for sanitary control and tax inspection responsible for oversight of all municipal 
markets (Ben Yedder 2016). The model of the marché was subsequently replicated across the European 
districts and new decrees formalising health and safety regulations for fresh food markets in 1904 
legitimised the forced enclosure of the remaining open-air souks in the city centre137. In addition to the 
juxtaposed market forms of souk and marché – which mirrored a broader system of “differential 
regulations” for European and native districts under French colonial rule (Abu-Lughod 1980: 187) –
trading “in the public domain” of the city was now outlawed, unless explicitly authorised and taxed by 
the municipality138. Accordingly, legal provisions formalised in 1884 banned “colportage” (hawking) 
from all public spaces 139 and streets were now regulated as mono-functional spaces for mobility (Ferjani 
2017: 98, 99). 
 
The juxtaposition between souk and marché outlasted independence, with urban modernisation efforts 
in the capital initiating a process of “dé-soukalisation” that aimed to eradicate sprawling, open-air 
market forms (Belhedi 2005: 7; Berry-Chikhaoui 1994: 237). For this purpose, the colonial-era model 
of the covered municipal marché was upheld and expanded further, both in new urban areas of Tunis 
and through the forced enclosure of remaining open-air marketplaces in the inner city. At the same time, 
weekly souks in the capital city were now framed by the authorities as “archaic forms of trade lacking 
spatial order” that are “unable to contribute to economic progress” (Jemmali 1986: 31). This led to 
attempts to, first, completely prohibit, and then, severely restrict the parameters of weekly souks on the 
 
137Appendix III., Source 11; 
138Appendix III., Source 12; 
139 Anti-loitering laws were passed by the French colonial authorities in 1895, as part of broader regulation pertaining to 
public space; 
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capital’s peripheries (ibid). However, urban policies of dé-soukalisation had limited success on the 
ground. Policies to outlaw or restrict weekly, open-air souks for fresh produce were shelved as they 
triggered widespread resistance from traders, local residents and the municipalities, whose tax revenues 
depended on the markets (ibid: 25). With accelerating urban sprawl and the emergence of peri-urban 
neighbourhoods that lacked any commercial offer, weekly souks even gained in importance in the 
capital during the 1970s (Miossec 1985). In addition, relocation projects to covered marchés often 
remained incomplete, and the market infrastructures frequently remained underutilised – as had been 
the case under the colonial authorities140 – because traders considered open-air vending a key 
competitive advantage and refused to pay occupancy taxes.  
 
Beyond the normative governmental categories of souk and marché, diverse new, hybrid market forms 
developed in the capital city, posing new challenges for governing urban marketplaces. As most planned 
commercial infrastructures, particularly supermarkets and the first shopping malls created from the 
1980s onwards, remained targeted towards the upwardly-mobile middle-classes (Miossec 1990), 
markets trading with “silaa kontra” or “mrahba” (counterfeit/smuggled merchandise) or “hajat 
mustamla” (second-hand things) came to supply ever-larger numbers of urban dwellers who remained 
excluded from ‘formal’ consumption spaces (Lafi 2017). For instance, Nahj Zarkoun in the medina 
turned into an emblematic space for suitcase trade with European consumer goods141; the former 
warehouse quarter of Moncef Bey came to host a market specialised in smuggled electronics; and the 
shores of the “sabkha” (salt lake) Sijoumi became the site of a giant used car and spare part market. 
Escalating socio-spatial segregation in the capital (Belhedi 2005: 4) thus became visible in urban market 
landscapes, with proliferating, unplanned markets – often framed as “mawazi” (informal/parallel) – 
catering to the urban majority. Two such market forms assumed particular prominence and came to 
transform urban market landscapes: first, the so-called “souk Libya”, specialised in the trade with 
smuggled “chinwa” (made-in-China) commodities, that proliferated as a result of the flourishing cross-
border trade between Libya and Tunisia from 1987 onwards (Boubakri, 2001; Doron, 2015; Meddeb 
2012)142. Second, al-fripe, which developed into a ubiquitous urban market form and highly 
differentiated urban trading landscape. As the next section demonstrates, fripe trading was never 
accommodated in official marketplaces and thus had to develop its own, hybrid market landscape, 
blurring ideal-type distinctions between souk and marché and producing new market forms in-process, 
like that of Rue du Liban. 
 
 
b. The fripe as hybrid market landscape and unwanted factor of urban change 
 
In many African and Arab cities, second-hand retail landscapes are confined to a single, central 
marketplace, with wholesalers and retailers often operating as part of the same spatial cluster (Hansen 
2000(a); Rosenfeld 2019; Valenciano-Mané 2019)143. In Tunis, on the contrary, fripe trading has 
developed into a highly differentiated and specialised “urban retail landscape” (Findlay et al. 1990), 
with innumerable boutiques, chain stores, permanent and temporary markets, and mobile traders 
catering to a diverse clientele and specialising in distinct product categories or price and quality 
segments. As a partially consolidated and highly complex retail landscape, the fripe can thus not be 
 
140 Appendix III., Source 13; 
141 The suitcase trade between France and North Africa is discussed at length in Peraldi (2002), and the role of Tunisian 
migrants in suitcase trading from France and Italy is most recently analysed in Mandhouj (2018); 
142 While these markets continue to be denominated souk Libya in Tunis today, a lot of the chinwa merchandise is now 
smuggled across the Tunisian-Algerian border, especially since the outbreak of war in Libya, see Saadaoui (2018); 
143 In Cairo – in the Al-Wakalah market – and Beirut – in Souk Al-Ahad –, a single marketplace assumes central wholesale 
and retail, as well as redistribution functions in the city; 
 151 
subsumed under categories such as “informal urban commerce” or “street vending”, frequently 
employed to describe market landscapes in African cities (e.g. Nagati and Stryker 2016; Spire and 
Choplin 2017; Racaud et al. 2018; Young 2017). Rather, the contemporary fripe trade draws attention 
to interrelated retail landscapes at the urban scale and to distinct, historically constituted market forms. 
It thus mirrors other types of commerce that have lastingly transformed urban market landscapes and 
have produced their own market forms, without ever being officially accommodated in planned 
commercial infrastructures. In the North African context, the most prominently researched example is 
the trade in made-in-China commodities, which has reshaped wholesale and retail markets and has 
triggered the emergence of entirely new commercial districts in Egyptian, Moroccan, Algerian and 
Tunisian cities over the past three decades (Bennafla 2015; Bouhali 2018; Doron 2018; Gherbi et al. 
2016). Building on this literature, the following section examines how the fripe trade in Tunis developed 
from an itinerant trade into a ubiquitous urban market landscape, and thereby emerged as a prominent, 




Figure IV.9   The most important fripe marketplaces in central Tunis 
 
In pre-colonial and colonial-era Tunis, both the collection and resale of “ruba fikia” (second-hand 
clothes) were organised as itinerant trade, and used clothes traders were thus described as a nuisance by 
the colonial authorities in the early 20th century (Liauzu 1976: 615). After independence, trade in 
imported fripe from the United States gradually replaced bartering and resale of ruba fikia. As fripe 
trading remained excluded from both covered municipal marchés in the inner-city and weekly souks on 
the urban peripheries, the absence of permanent trading spaces soon became a problem for the rapidly 
growing number of fripe traders in Tunis. This led to the auto-construction of marketplaces, most 
prominently in the Hafsia during the 1960s, and in Ibn Khaldoun during the 1970s (as discussed in 
Chapter II). In addition to such specialised souk Kennedy, fripe traders soon occupied the fringes of 
most inner-city marchés, and came to appropriate ever-larger trading areas in the weekly souks of Tunis 
(Jemmali 1986: 47, 135). By the early 1970s, fripe traders already accounted for over 30% of the overall 
number of traders in weekly souks on the capital’s peripheries (Miossec 1985: 51). While such processes 
of appropriation at times triggered conflicts with “al-baladiya” (the municipality), local officials also 
rapidly entered pragmatic agreements with the fripe traders, levying ad hoc taxes per trader-occupied 
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square metre on market days and thus gradually normalising and consolidating the fripe traders’ 
presence (ibid: 133). 
 
The watershed moment of 1995 (discussed in Chapter I), when legal reform translated into a profound 
restructuring of “quitaa al-fripe” (the fripe sector), then resulted in another rapid expansion and 
differentiation of fripe retail landscapes in Tunis. An overall surge in fripe imports from the late 1990s 
onwards spurred on the domestic fripe trade, and the centralisation of fripe sorting in factories resulted 
in an unprecedented differentiation of fripe merchandise into value and product categories. Increased 
competition amongst traders and the availability of neatly graded product types encouraged 
specialisation, triggering the emergence of fripe boutiques and marketplaces offering either exclusively 
“fripe de luxe” (luxury fripe) or specific product types, such as shoes, accessories or sportswear.  With 
high-end fripe merchandise available at prices that would have been unthinkable in the fripe a decade 
earlier, it became crucial to attract an upper-middle and middle-class clientele to the fripe markets. 
Consequently, new, exclusive fripe markets emerged in wealthy residential areas, for instance in 
Menzah VIII, where fripe traders gradually took over the municipal marché in the early 2000s. As the 
covered market infrastructure – originally designed as a fresh food market – had been chronically under-
utilised, the municipality agreed to the change in occupancy, benefitting from increased tax revenues. 
Ever since, the marché has functioned as a high-end fripe market, complete with a parking lot and 





Figure IV.10   Only high-end fripe merchandise is on sale in the Menzah VIII market (2019) 
 
By the late 2000s, the fripe trade had thus morphed into a ubiquitous form of urban commerce that 
spanned hybrid market landscapes in the capital, blurring dichotomies between souk and marché. 
Indeed, fripe trading had moved into diverse existing marketplaces – from municipal marchés to weekly 
souks and historic open-air markets in the inner-city – at times transforming them into specialised fripe 
 153 
markets over time. In addition, fripe trading created its own distinct retail landscapes in Tunis: in some 
cases, clusters of formal boutique spaces in peripheral neighbourhoods like El-Aouina formed new 
commercial centralities that transformed neighbourhood dynamics. In other cases, processes of auto-
construction or appropriations of public space allowed for establishing market extensions or entirely 
new trading spaces. While some fripe marketplaces had thus become highly consolidated, others 
remained in-the-making, triggering processes of proliferation and shifting commercial densities that 
frequently violated official planning regulations or infringed upon public space or property. This turned 
the fripe into a prominent, yet often-contested, agent of urban change, triggering conflict, but also 
establishing diverse, mutually beneficial settlements between fripe traders, public authorities and the 
security forces. 
 
Change processes in urban fripe trading landscapes accelerated in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. 
First, an unchecked increase in fripe imports spurred on the proliferation of fripe trading. Second, a 
temporary weakening of public oversight in the period of political upheaval following the revolution 
allowed for unprecedented levels of informal building activities in the capital (Kahloun 2014: 15). The 
unauthorised expansion and auto-construction of fripe marketplaces thus conferred new prominence to 
the term fripisation in post-2011 Tunis, capturing the fripe’s tangible role in transforming urban space 
across the capital. From handcart vendors in central city squares, to sprawling fripe markets in peri-
urban areas and newly consolidated market streets like Rue du Liban, the fripe trade often expanded on 
appropriated municipal land or in public space, multiplying conflicts with the local state and the police. 
Mirroring post-independence attempts to contain “soukalisation”, fripisation thus became increasingly 
defined as a ‘problem’ of urban governance in post-2011 Tunis. While diverse state actors had in fact 
always co-produced fripisation, such processes were now increasingly framed as emblematic for ‘state 
absence’, translating into urgent calls for intervention to reign in deviant market forms and their 
seemingly unstoppable proliferation. 
 
 
c. Halting fripisation: the attempted transformation of Rue du Liban into an ‘orderly’ market 
 
Mounting public pressure on local authorities to curb processes of fripisation – particularly in the central 
city – eventually resulted in a series of forced market clearances and relocation campaigns in post-2011 
Tunis, one of which explicitly targeted the Rue du Liban fripe market in December 2017. The “hamla” 
(campaign) was initiated single-handedly by the then-governor of Tunis Omar Mansour and relied on 
external police units, thus taking by surprise the employees of the district and municipal administration, 
as well as the local police agents, who had extracted profit shares from the fripe market for over a 
decade. The following discussion of the clearance campaign thus illustrates how “state practices can 
become illegible” even “within institutions of the state” (Das 2004: 234), showing how the initially 
uninformed Municipal Market Authority144 was charged with executing the governorate’s plan to 
relocate the displaced nassaba to an adjacent parking lot. 
 
The planned relocation of the sprawling Rue du Liban fripe market to an enclosed and ‘orderly’ 
marketplace was once again underpinned by the fictitious dichotomy between kinetic and static market 
forms, or souks and marchés, that has dominated legacies of governing urban marketplaces in Tunis. 
As has been the case with attempts to forcibly displace and reorder marketplaces in diverse urban 
contexts (Milgram 2015; Spire and Choplin 2017; Racaud et al. 2018), the relocation of the Rue du 
Liban fripe market failed and the market soon returned to its original set-up in the street. However, this 
 
144 Direction des Marchés Municipaux, referred to as “market authority” in the following; 
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chapter returns to this particular incident because it aptly demonstrates the impossibility of abstracting 
market forms – in this case through the imposition of a formal market order – from the highly specific 
market processes analysed in the first part of this chapter.  
 
Clearing the street, enclosing the market 
 
As was the case in other Tunis marketplaces, the police clearance of the Rue du Liban fripe market in 
October 2017 occurred without prior warning, taking not only the fripe traders by surprise, but also 
local police agents and employees of the municipality145 who remained uninformed of the campaign. 
Many of the nassaba in Rue du Liban thus saw their merchandise confiscated and stall spaces destroyed 
by the police, and only few of them succeeded in saving their belongings by storing them in the boutique 
spaces on the opposite roadside. The permanent stationing of police forces in Rue du Liban in the 
aftermath of the campaign precluded a return of the nassaba to the street, upending the mechanism of 
synchronised, two-fold circulation that had underpinned the rapid pace of turnover in the market street. 
In the two months that passed between the violent clearance and the opening of the market relocation 
site on the adjacent parking lot in December 2017, the Rue du Liban fripe market thus came to a 
standstill, with most nassaba relocating elsewhere and shopkeepers complaining about lost profits and 
the inability to pay for rent or purchase new fripe bales from wholesalers. While the governorate’s 
hamla thus exclusively targeted the nassaba, and was indeed intended to deflect the negative image of 
fripisation by clearing the street space, it in fact impacted all fripe traders and compromised Rue du 
Liban’s functioning as a site for fripe valuation.  
 
About a month after the clearance campaign, Mr. S.146 sits in a worn-out leather chair in his office in 
the market authority, marking the five planned relocation sites designated by the governorate on a fold-
out map of the Tunis city centre147. Four out of the five relocation sites are walled tarmacked spaces 
that were used as parking lots before, amongst them the site designated for the relocation of the Rue du 
Liban fripe market. Opening a folder stacked on a large pile of paper, Mr. S. flicks through the list of 
displaced nassaba registered for relocation. He explains: “The governor announced on television that 
over 1000 street vendors will receive new trading spaces in a “souk mounatham” (orderly market), but 
in reality the governorate never planned “al-tafassil” (the details), they simply delegated it to us”. Not 
only Mr. S. shows himself disgruntled with “hamlet al-wali” (the governor’s campaign), as the 
municipal employees sarcastically refer to the market clearance and relocation campaign, which in their 
eyes served primarily as a spectacular media performance to make the name of the new governor. As 
Mr. M.148, the youngest of Mr. S.’s colleagues remarks over a cigarette on the office balcony, “it is easy 
to tidy up and earn praise for emptying the streets, but now we are left with the chaos”. 
 
In December 2017, when Mr. S. and Mr. M. open the parking lot adjacent to Rue du Liban as the 
relocation site, frustration therefore runs high amongst the fripe traders, who have lost two months of 
income as a result of the violent clearance. As the municipal employees explain the detailed relocation 
plans to the shopkeepers and the nassaba who have gathered around them, they face open resentment 
from the traders. Mr. S. repeatedly exclaims, “go and complain in the governorate” and explains angrily 
that the market authority was never consulted or involved in al-hamla, and is now simply executing the 
governorate’s orders. In line with long-standing representations of the ‘orderly marketplace’ as a static 
and enclosed urban site, the relocation projects drawn up by the market authority all follow similar 
 
145 Appendix I, Interview 36; 
146 Appendix II., Interlocutor 15; 
147 Appendix I, Interview 37; for following engagements see Appendix II, Interlocutor 15; 
148 Appendix II., Interlocutor 15; 
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ordering principles: first, physical enclosures, in this case the concrete walls of the parking lot, 
guarantee the market’s separation from the open street and preclude proliferation. Second, abstract 
ordering principles define the market’s internal order, with homogenous vending plots and stall spaces 
arranged according to a grid-like structure. As Mr. S. and Mr. M. explain to the traders, a lottery system 
will ensure the fair attribution of the vending plots, numbered rectangles of equal size that have been 
painted in glistening white paint onto the tarmac. A model stall space has been erected by the market 
authority next to the parking lot’s entrance gate and all those who are attributed a vending plot in the 
relocation site will be responsible for constructing a stall of the exact same measures and materials. 
 
The relocation plan Mr. S. and Mr. M. presented to the fripe traders of Rue du Liban reflected a 
standardised, spatial exercise of planning on a blank slate. It was conceived by municipal employees 
unfamiliar with the working mechanisms or set-up of the diverse marketplaces for which these 
relocation schemes were intended. Consequently, such visions for market relocation remained 
indifferent to the ways in which distinct market forms are both a contingent outcome of, and constitutive 
to, specific processes of market-making. In Rue du Liban, it became rapidly apparent that the plans 
outlined by the market authority went contrary to the basic circulatory mechanisms that underpinned 




Figure IV.11   The model shop designed by the Municipal Market Authority for the relocation site (2017) 
 
The static spatial ‘market order’ as a threat to valuation work 
 
In February 2018, Mr. S. and Mr. M. return to Rue du Liban to inspect the relocation site after two 
consecutive nights of break-ins and vandalism in the ‘new marketplace’. Leaning against the metal 
framework of a half-burnt stall structure, Mr. S. shows little surprise about the scale of destruction. 
Instead, he calmly explains: “This already happened in the other relocation sites (…), the traders are 
angry because of the clearance, residents are angry about losing their parking spaces and local 
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unemployed youth want a vending plot in the new marketplace.” Mr. M., who sits on an empty crate 
next to Mr. S. shrugs his shoulders resignedly: “we work in markets all the time, it is our job, so unlike 
the governorate, we know you can’t simply move traders, and especially not the fripe”. He points 
towards Rue du Liban and adds, “this is a market that works with and because of the street”. 
 
This conversation followed two months of open confrontation between the market authority and the 
fripe traders that had derailed the relocation project. Despite the shopkeepers’ and nassaba’s 
differentiated positioning in the market hierarchies of Rue du Liban, they rapidly agreed that the 
relocation project proposed by the municipality constituted a threat rather than an opportunity for the 
fripe market. Therefore, the nassaba refused to participate in the relocation scheme and – while no one 
openly admitted responsibility – the fripe traders likely hired or cooperated with the “bandiya” (thugs) 
who repeatedly vandalised the relocation site and attacked vendors attempting to relocate from 
elsewhere in the city. Faced with the collective refusal of the fripe traders and the damage in the 
relocation site, both Mr. S. and Mr. M. recognised the incompatibility of the static and homogenous 
market forms they had been asked to devise on behalf of the governorate with the complex working 
principles of the Rue du Liban fripe market. The attempted translation of an abstract spatial order into 
a concrete new market form thus revealed how the proposed relocation scheme endangered the market-
making processes that co-constituted the ‘street’ as a specialised fripe market. 
 
First, the project of market clearance treated the fripe shops and nassaba in Rue du Liban as separate 
entities, judging the latter as “intissab al-fawdawi” (lit. chaotic standing) – a pejorative term often used 
for street trading – that has to be eradicated to bring back ‘order’ to the street. While the hamla thus 
ostensibly intervened to clean up the chaos that had taken over a central Tunis street, the fripe traders 
on the contrary stressed how the governorate’s campaign first upset and then threatened to lastingly 
dismantle the cooperative hierarchies that had governed the fripe marketplace for over a decade. In an 
impromptu gathering in front of Kamal’s shop space about three weeks after the clearance, different 
fripe traders of Rue du Liban deplored the havoc created by the governorate’s campaign, as it had 
upended the stable working agreements between shops and nassaba required to uphold a rapid pace of 
turnover of fripe merchandise in the market street. “They call our market “fawdawi” (chaotic)”, one of 
the elderly traders exclaimed, “but “al-hakim” (the government) understands nothing about this market 
(…), they don’t come to talk to us, as you see they simply destroy everything and they (are the ones 
who) leave chaos behind”.  
 
Second, plans to relocate the nassaba to the enclosed parking lot adjacent to Rue du Liban – and thus 
to separate them from the open street – undermined the traders’ joint reliance on porous and periodically 
evolving market boundaries. While in the eyes of the governorate, the walled character of the new 
market site guaranteed its capacity to contain market proliferation, the traders considered the physical 
and visual delimitation from the open street as a key impediment to fripe valuation. The nassaba’s 
removal “min al-kiass” (from the street) not only translated into a loss of Rue du Liban’s characteristic 
market densities, it also deprived the nassaba of their key competitive advantage. As Bilel explained, 
“kliounatna” (our customers) in Rue du Liban are mainly commuters, they buy and look while walking, 
so it is our task to catch them “bil-ithniya” (on the way) and to make transactions fast as they don’t 
have time”. The market’s separation from the street space would now strip the nassaba of their capacity 
to flexibly adapt to changing commuter movements and shifting densities. As Bilel put it, “we (nassaba) 
work to move things and people (…), our job is to get everything in the right place at the right time, so 
we don’t sit still on a chair and wait for customers to come.” In addition, the fripe traders feared that 
the need to ‘enter’ a walled enclosure – not observable from the open street – would translate into a 
drastic decrease in profits, as the fripe market would lose its vital commuter traffic. While the relocation 
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site thus offered permanent vending plots and stall spaces to all nassaba, including those whose trading 
spaces in Rue du Liban had often remained contested, the enclosed marketplace contradicted the very 




Figure IV.12   Vendors’ names are marked on their allocated relocation plots (2017) 
 
Finally, the relocation plans outlined by the Market Authority threatened to undermine Rue du Liban’s 
status as a specialised fripe market. While Mr. S. and Mr. M. promised all nassaba displaced from Rue 
du Liban to be relocated in situ, the market relocation site opened in Rue du Liban was also destined to 
accommodate street vendors that had been displaced in similar clearance campaigns elsewhere in the 
city. According to the same lottery system devised for the nassaba of Rue du Liban, other traders were 
thus to be allocated vending plots on the former parking lot alongside the fripe traders. As both Kamel 
and Bilel emphasised, this arbitrary allocation system would ruin the hard-earned reputation of their 
fripe marketplace. “We worked day and night to build a fripe market, and people now come here for 
fripe”, Kamel asserted, and then added, “we have a good clientele, professionals from the administration 
and offices in Lafayette, they wouldn’t come here if it wasn’t for the quality”.  Bilel asked indignantly, 
“how can I do my work when I have a chinwa vendor next to me from Barcelone149?”. In the eyes of 
both traders, losing Rue du Liban as a “symbolic location” (Gregson and Crewe 2003: 49) for the fripe 
trade risked reversing years of tiresome efforts to establish a specialised marketplace. 
 
Similar government interventions to the one examined in Rue du Liban occur regularly in different fripe 
markets of the capital, with the questions of when and why a particular fripe market is singled out as a 
‘problem space’ often remaining unanswered. Underlying such contemporary interventions is the fripe 
trade’s long-standing positioning as a hybrid market form that transgresses governmental categories of 
souk and marché and resists fixity, because it remains in-the-making in diverse urban spaces. 
 
149 “Barcelone” refers to the central train station of Tunis, a hub for street trading affected by the 2017 clearance campaign; 
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Particularly in the post-revolutionary conjuncture, portrayals of fripisation as processes devoid of 
‘order’ and beyond government control have turned spaces like Rue du Liban into priority sites for 
spectacular performances of urban governance. The emphasis of such interventions lies on ‘clean-up’ 
campaigns that rapidly free public space of illicit occupations or seemingly ephemeral market 
infrastructures, with little or no regard for the broader socio-spatial ordering patterns and market 
processes of which these frequently form an inherent part. As has been the case with forced market 
relocation campaigns in diverse cities of the MENA region since the 1990s – often informed and 
supported by international development agencies (Gertel 2009) – attempts to superimpose a static 
spatial order on complex economic processes has produced recurrent failures. The illegibility of, or 
deliberate disregard for, existing ‘forms of order’ underpinning the targets of such campaigns, leads to 
an interruption of market processes and thus often triggers mechanisms of resistance or circumvention 
(ibid: 389). In the case of the fripe therefore, the consecutive failure of similar efforts of market 
relocation have perpetuated, or even accelerated, processes of market proliferation, thus reinforcing 









Almost exactly a year after the clearance campaign in Rue du Liban, Wassim sits with his morning 
coffee in front of the small shop space he rents at the bustling intersection of Rue du Liban and Avenue 
de Madrid. The market street has regained its buzz and is once again densely occupied by market stalls 
and display tables of the fripe shops that stretch far into the street space. Pensive, Wassim points at the 
activity in the street and remarks, “this is the “circulation” (traffic/movement) I was missing before; 
this is why I decided to come here”. And after a while he adds, “you know, the fripe keeps moving and 
either you move with it, or it’s over”. 
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Tendencies to approach urban marketplaces as either stable spatial containers or ephemerally evolving 
kinetic forms have reinforced a fictitious dichotomy between planned and unplanned, or formal and 
informal marketplaces. This division has often precluded an explicit interrogation of the connections 
between market- and space-making that underpin the emergence of evolving market forms in the city. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, a close-up ethnographic engagement with the micro-level market-
making practices of diverse traders provides insight into the fripe markets’ constitution through a 
continuous tension between consolidation and movement, and thus as spatial entities that remain in-
the-making or as sites of on-going fripisation. In the Rue du Liban market, newcomers like Wassim 
recount that it was only by joining the market’s strictly coordinated circulatory mechanisms that they 
began to grasp the singular patterns of ‘market order’ that underpin what Wassim describes as an 
exceptional basis for valuation work, and what outsiders tend to perceive as mere “fawda” (chaos). 
 
Such evolving forms of market order remain however illegible, or are deliberately disregarded, in the 
governance of urban marketplaces, and particularly of fripe markets in Tunis. Especially since the 2011 
revolution, fripisation has thus become constituted as a problem of urban governance and prominent 
sites of proliferating fripe trading activities, like Rue du Liban, can hence turn into targets of violent 
clearance without prior notice. Such selective performances of state power are often combined with 
attempts to impose a static ‘market order’, or what has become legible as such through long-standing 
normative distinctions between the market forms of souk and marché in Tunis. As such static ordering 
principles remain decoupled from specific market processes, and indeed often run counter to the fripe 
trade’s reliance on a continuous impetus for movement, state interventions frequently result in 
displacement and new efforts of market-making elsewhere, thus spurring on rather than inhibiting 
processes of fripisation in the city.  
 
This chapter has examined the tensions between spatial consolidation and proliferation in the making 
of marketplaces that underpin contemporary processes of fripisation. It has demonstrated how diverse 
fripe traders collectively enact a particular Tunis street as a ‘marketplace’, emphasising how this process 
of space-making is a precondition to the valuation work they perform. Fripisation is thus examined as 
a process of localised transformation that results in the consolidation of specific socio-spatial ordering 
patterns, but is also contingent on complex circulatory mechanisms that link it to other sites, actors and 
processes across the city. Together, this produces the synchronised rhythms of circulation that underpin 
periodic market densities and thus become a basis for collective performances of bale opening in the 








Figure 8   Customers scrutinising the displays of a Tunis shop advertising “luxury fripe” (2017) 
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Chapter V 
The bale opening and the public renegotiation of cultures of consumption 
 
 
As Yasmina150 pours a second round of coffee for the female friends gathered in her living room, she 
explains: “We call this weekend get together café-fripe, we meet in different houses depending on which 
“halan al-bala” (bale opening) we decide to go to.” Taking a bite of her croissant, her friend Wiem151 
interjects, “sometimes we decide spontaneously, it depends on “al-jaou” (the atmosphere) we look 
for.” As the friends turn up the ventilator to let the hot summer air circulate, they recount anecdotes 
from fripe markets across Tunis. Attending bale openings, Yasmina chucklingly remarks, has become 
“an addiction” or “a weekly sport”. For the group of friends gathered in her spacious house in the upper-
middle-class residential area Hayy Ennasr, buying from the fripe is not an economic necessity. Rather, 
attending bale openings constitutes a weekend pastime and female-only social activity. The promise of 
finding something special in the newly disclosed fripe bales, combined with the excitement of touring 
diverse marketplaces together, motivate the regular outings. “For us, fripe shopping is a pride and joy”, 
Wiem exclaims, “even my daughters now prefer the fripe to the mall, they can see it is more interesting”.  
 
While second-hand consumption in diverse contexts in the Global South is often discussed with a focus 
on socio-economic constraints, and remains thus primarily associated with social marginality or 
poverty, the above encounter with Yasmina and her friend group opens up a more complex 
understanding of the motives underpinning fripe consumption in present-day Tunis. Indeed, the fripe 
marketplaces of Tunis have today turned into highly popular urban spaces frequented by urban dwellers 
of different age groups, social class and gender. The term fripisation is thus increasingly evoked to 
capture not only the proliferation of fripe trading in urban space, but also a broader sense of the 
prominence of the fripe in people’s consumption habits, in their practices of leisure and dress, and in 
their patterns of mobility across the city. This chapter argues that the “halan al-bala” (bale opening) – 
or the coordinated disclosure of new fripe merchandise in different marketplaces, for which Yasmina 
and her friends gather – is central to comprehending the distinct cultures of consumption that account 
for the fripe markets’ contemporary appeal. The bale opening as a collective performance promises not 
merely the act of purchase, but also the joy of discoveries, leisurely strolls and time spent with friends, 
and offers opportunities to assume the role of a spectator in a public event. Fripe consumption therefore 
provides a crucial perspective on the ways in which the fripe economy constitutes urban space. It shows 
how a physical marketplace becomes enacted as a site of temporary publicness and cultural production, 
positioning the specific cultures of consumption of the fripe as inherent to fripisation. 
 
The disclosure of new fripe bales – referred to simply as al-halan (the opening) by many traders and 
customers – occurs in hundreds of Tunis fripe marketplaces, usually at bi-weekly intervals that differ 
from one marketplace to another and function as a central structuring element for the urban fripe 
economy: from temporalities of delivery and payment, to the coordinated turnover of fripe merchandise 
in diverse marketplaces and customer mobilities, the halan determines rhythms and dynamics of 
valuation work with fripe merchandise all across the capital. While the bales arriving in the marketplace 
are usually labelled to identify the product type and value category, the exact content of the non-
transparent tarpaulin packages remains unknown. This uncertainty creates an atmosphere of suspense 
and often precludes uniform price-setting, turning the disclosure of new merchandise into a moment of 
collective valuation work, in which vendors, market customers, and often accidental bystanders or 
spectators reassess and negotiate the commodity status of diverse fripe items. Beyond the simple 
 
150 Appendix II., Interlocutor 17; 
151 Ibid; 
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moment of disclosure of new merchandise, the recurrent and ritualised performance of valuation in the 
bale opening must be understood as a quintessential moment of economic, spatial and cultural 
production that constitutes the fripe as an urban economy.  
 
While bale openings occur in most fripe marketplaces of Tunis, this chapter focuses on an analysis of 
the specific halan in the Bab El-Falla fripe market. Before examining how the halan is curated and 
performed in Bab El-Falla, the first part sets out why an analysis of the bale opening is central to 
grasping the distinct cultures of consumption that co-produce fripisation in contemporary Tunis. It links 
the collective valuation work performed in fripe marketplaces to processes of spatial and cultural 
production that account for the fripe markets’ popularity as sites of sociability and unpredictable 
encounter, setting them apart from other urban consumption spaces. The second part subsequently 
explores the specific rhythms and rituals that stage the socio-material encounters and collective 
valuation work of the bale opening in Bab El-Falla. The two remaining parts then examine the 
implications of the bale opening’s staging as ‘public event’, demonstrating how it results in particular 
forms of spatial and cultural production. First, it illustrates how markers of social difference that 
normally structure access to, and interactions in the public realm, are weakened in the bale opening, 
creating distinct conditions for appearance and opportunities for ‘being in public’. Second, it shows 
how collective encounters with fripe objects from ‘elsewhere’ become the basis for contingent 
translation attempts between diverse registers of value. This can result in objects being either 




Figure V.1   Fripe bales are displayed in the Bab El-Falla market before the opening (2018) 
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1. The bale opening and the distinct cultures of consumption of the fripe  
 
The following three sections outline how this chapter approaches the distinct cultures of consumption 
of the fripe, centring on an analysis of the bale opening. The three sections together show how acts of 
consumption in the fripe are tied to recurrent, collective performances that constitute urban space. The 
first section sets out how the valuation work with fripe objects that qualifies the bale opening as a central 
site of shared value production extends scholarship examining second-hand consumption practices. It 
highlights a conception of consumption as inseparable from production, and as a social act. The second 
section interrogates understandings of marketplaces as a priori public spaces, explaining how the 
analysis of the bale opening foregrounds a conception of publicness as always hybrid and as 
contingently performed. It thus positions consumption practices as constitutive to temporary forms of 
publicness and particular conditions of appearance. The third section outlines how the socio-material 
encounters of the bale opening draw attention to material culture. It emphasises the role of the fripe as 
transnationally circulating objects in transforming consumption into an open-ended process of cultural 
and political negotiation. 
 
 
a. Second-hand consumption as valuation work  
 
Attempts “to standardise the value of commodities as precisely as possible” (Douglas and Isherwood 
1979: 108) remain imperfect in the fripe economy, despite centralised sorting processes in factories that 
aim towards a degree of standardisation. Consequently, the fripe materials arriving in Tunis 
marketplaces often carry “thick layers of inscription” (Appelgren and Bohlin 2015(a): 160) that render 
their commodity value uncertain, and at times their very commodity status disputed. In urban spaces of 
fripe exchange, commoditisation must thus be approached as an incomplete and on-going process 
(Kopytoff 1986: 64), with market prices emerging as contingent outcomes of open-ended social 
relations (Narotzky and Besnier 2014). This account emphasises such incompleteness, and thus the 
importance of the fripe’s materiality in determining differentiated processes of valuation that unfold in 
the bale opening in Tunis marketplaces. 
 
The uncertain value of the commodities exchanged confers particular agency to consumers in 
participating in valuation. As research on second-hand consumption has demonstrated, labour-intensive 
processes of manual sorting and selection precede the act of purchase and transaction (Hansen 2000(a): 
89; Valenciano-Mane 2018: 160), involving market customers in diverse registers of valuation work. 
Market customers and traders in second-hand markets thus jointly perform “hard work, a kind of 
invisible production” that “does not constitute the end point of the economic process but helps fuel its 
beginnings" by requalifying discarded objects for exchange (Hansen 2000(a): 184, 196). In Tunisia, the 
term “farz” (sorting) – discussed in Chapter III as an umbrella term for complex work processes in 
sorting factories – is also used to designate the often-tedious “consumption work” (Hansen 2000(b): 
257) in which fripe customers become enrolled in the marketplace. This repositions “consumption as 
integral to the creation of value” (Sheperd 2008: 143) and underlines the diverse forms of expertise 
through which consumers engage in value production. 
 
The heterogeneity and uncertain commodity status of the objects disclosed in the marketplace thus 
confers a crucial role to spaces of exchange as sites for continued valuation work. In the fripe economy, 
such processes of valuation are centralised in the recurrent, collective performances of bale opening. 
The rhythms and rituals of the bale opening thus provide a framework that allows vendors, resellers, 
customers, spectators, or accidental passers-by to jointly engage in market-making, and to enter open-
ended valuation processes on an equal footing. Echoing critical scholarship on consumption practices, 
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an analysis of the bale opening precludes a neat separation of consumption from processes of exchange 
or production, foregrounding instead how “production and consumption are (…) part of a circular 
productive process” (Douglas and Isherwood 1979: 106) and how collective “exchange performances” 
(Guyer 2004: 97–98) take on a central role in value production.  
 
Beyond an understanding of second-hand consumption as ‘work’, an analysis of collective valuation in 
the bale opening also underlines the particular thrills and joys associated with handling second-hand 
objects. This counters a reductionist view of second-hand consumption as being purely motivated by 
socio-economic constraint, echoing research that has demonstrated how distinct cultures of dress and 
fashion animate second-hand markets in Zambia (Hansen 2000(a): 247) and the Philippines (Isla 2013: 
227), or in the “rabish” markets of Palestine where traders and consumers give new value and meaning 
to Israeli cast-offs (Stamatopoulou-Robbins 2019: 80). The bale opening also shows how consumption 
represents a co-constituted “social process” (Jackson and Holbrook 1995: 1914), speaking to literature 
that has emphasised the particular sociality of spaces of used good exchange as a motivation for second-
hand consumption (Gregson and Crewe 2003; Appelgren and Bohlin 2015(a)). 
 
 
b. Marketplaces and the production of ‘publicness’ 
 
Marketplaces have often been described as public spaces of a particular quality, especially in cities of 
the Global North. Their “everyday sociality” that becomes generative to “casual encounters” and “forms 
of rubbing along” has been prominently discussed in research on urban marketplaces (Watson 2009: 
1579). In addition, scholarly work has often underlined the prominent role of markets in bringing 
together people across difference, “creating a spatial concentration of diversity” in otherwise segregated 
urban environments (Hiebert et al. 2015: 15). Literature on gentrification processes and the 
displacement of traditional retail markets through different corporate retail environments (Gonzalez and 
Waley 2013; Gonzalez and Dawson 2015; Marinelli 2018) has even sought to measure the distinct 
“community value” or “cultural and social value” that defines urban marketplaces as particularly 
important public urban spaces (Bua et al. 2018: 7). 
 
This chapter abstains from any a priori categorisation of fripe marketplaces as stable ‘public spaces’. 
Instead, underpinning this analysis is a conception of publicness as necessarily “evolving” and “hybrid”, 
because the “complex ‘where’ and ‘when’ of publicity and privacy” in the city “remains in flux” (Iveson 
2007: 8). This chapter therefore examines how the bale opening as a particular performance of 
consumption results in the contingent enactment of hybrid forms of publicness. It investigates how bale 
openings “become happenings” that are “greater than the sum of their parts” (Tsing 2015: 13), 
producing temporary forms of togetherness in urban space that account for their special appeal as sites 
of consumption, but also of leisure time, work and sociality. A conception of ‘publicness’ as a 
contingent result of a collective performance draws attention to the role of norms and rituals in 
temporarily suspending or replacing the ordering mechanisms that habitually constitute “the public” as 
“a normative and hegemonic construction” (Warner 2002: 49). Performances of consumption like the 
bale opening thus have the power to unsettle “the regimes of visibility” (Staeheli et al. 2009: 642) that 
condition the appearance of particular bodies or social groups as transgressive and therefore exclude 
them from the public realm. In doing so, the bale openings not only provide possibilities for ‘being in 
public’ to those for whom “urban public spaces” are in fact often defined as “prohibited spaces” 
(Sawalha 2010: 14), they can also open up opportunities for agency in shaping the collective 
performances and their outcomes. 
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Through this analysis of the bale opening, this chapter therefore demonstrates how fripe marketplaces 
are contingently enacted as hybrid forms of ‘public space’. This is shown, first, through the role of 
collective consumption performances in conferring a particular quality of ‘publicness’ to the fripe 
market that sets it apart from other urban consumption spaces. Second, it illustrates the hybrid 
publicness that emerges in fripe markets, as the bale opening oscillates between the anonymity of a 
recurrent public event and the peculiar intimacies that emerge through shared valuation work with 
second-hand garments and objects. Finally, the chapter underlines how the emerging publicness is 




c. Material encounters and the contingent emergence of new cultural forms 
 
The bale openings not only become the site of dense, social encounters and interactions, they also 
provide the framework for staging “messy and surprising encounters across difference” (Tsing 2011: 3) 
with dizzying arrays of fripe materials – from used garments to diverse second-hand objects – that are 
disclosed in the marketplaces. As the fripe objects are imported from a distant and often-unknown 
‘elsewhere’, they represent “transnational commodities” that are “grounded in several places and in 
complex ways” (Crang et al. 2003: 452). This also implies that the fripe objects disclosed in the bale 
opening lie “embedded in multiple, often incompatible, value regimes” (Narotzky and Besnier 2014: 
S9), which complicates their situated valuation in the Tunis marketplace. The bale openings thus 
generate socio-material encounters across diverging cultural understandings (Appadurai 1986) and 
demonstrate how commodification hinges on an-always singular “symbolic system that defines what is 
important, meaningful, desirable or worthwhile” in a particular place and point in time (Graeber 2001: 
439).  Consequently, the bale openings become a stage for complex and open-ended attempts of 
“translation” or “processes of establishing commensurability” between different value regimes (Miller 
2008: 1129).  
 
A close-up analysis of the performative processes of translation (Tsing 2013: 23, 30) that unfold in the 
socio-material encounters of the Bab El-Falla bale opening highlights how dense social interactions are 
essential for ascribing new meanings to fripe objects in circulation. Emphasis thus lies on 
comprehending the complex “cultural work of valuation” (Kirsch 2013: 436) that forms a prerequisite 
for the “production of the conditions of consciousness in which buying can occur” (Appadurai 1997: 
42) in the fripe marketplace. The “specific materiality” of the fripe objects encountered in the 
marketplace matters to such contingent processes of cultural production, as it often “interconnects with 
the symbolic dimension of objects” (Mansfield 2003: 178). To highlight the complex and contingent 
attempts of incorporation that underpin fripe consumption, this chapter centres on socio-material 
encounters with used objects, such as toys or sports equipment, in the Bab El-Falla marketplace. More 
so than used garments, the great heterogeneity and often-alien character of these fripe objects makes 
apparent the active translation work that occurs in the bale opening. 
 
This account thus adds to writing that has disputed and empirically debunked the simplistic assumption 
that globalisation, and in particular transnational commodity circulation, triggers a homogenisation of 
consumer cultures (Jackson 1999: 97). Scholars of material culture have amply demonstrated the 
complex cultural work through which consumers contingently incorporate diverse ‘global forms’ into 
local contexts of use (Miller 1998(a): 18, 19), thereby “sublating the general form back into specificity” 
(ibid 1998(b): 185). Building on such approaches, literature on second-hand clothes consumption has 
equally disproven the idea that global used garment circulations would simply translate into an 
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assimilation of clothing habits and the disappearance of locally specific dress. On the contrary, the 
active role of local used garment consumers in forging locally specific, hybrid practices of dress 
(Hansen 2000(a): 5) – often by creatively combining imported garments with forms of local dress 
(Milgram 2012: 206) – has been highlighted in diverse contexts (Ayimpam 2016; Besnier 2004; Hansen 
2000(a); Isla 2013; Norris 2010). A close-up focus on the contingent production of the fripe as 
commodity form in the bale opening similarly testifies to consumption as an act of cultural co-
production: at times, different scales and registers of value can be rendered commensurable, allowing 
for incorporation into local contexts of use and exchange. At other times, direct incorporation proves 
difficult, thus giving rise to collective strategies of adaptation or reinvention that highlight the 
“intrinsically cultural construction” (Bestor 2004: 129) of commodity forms.  
 
As writing on used good and second-hand consumption has emphasised, such attempts to remake 
commodity forms are open-ended and can pose “irresolvable dilemmas” (Stamatopoulou-Robbins 
2019: 35), resulting in the untranslatability of material objects and thus disqualifying them from market 
exchange. When attempts at incorporation fail, this is often due to material or symbolic inscriptions that 
render objects incompatible with local registers of value. In addition, such inscriptions can expose 
second-hand objects as somebody else’s “discarded personal effects” (ibid 2011: 70), thus rendering 
visible unequal hierarchies of global consumption. The marketplace therefore becomes a stage for 
debating moral questions of worth, or the “unequal value of humans and things” (Pipyrou 2014: 542), 
positioning collective performances of consumption like the bale opening as sites for the articulation of 
a particular politics of consumption. As the next part of this chapter explores, producing the rhythmic, 
socio-material densities that underpin such processes requires the deliberate ‘staging’ of the bale 




Figure V.2   Children inspect fripe toys displayed on lowered tables (2019) 
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2. The staging of collective performances of valuation in the marketplace 
 
The temporalities of bale opening differ from one fripe marketplace to another and at times vary 
intentionally to reduce competition. As the timings of bale openings remain unwritten, knowing the bi-
weekly intervals at which merchandise is disclosed comprises part of the tacit skill set of experienced 
customers. As Yasmina and her female friends152 explain, “connoisseurs” of the fripe like themselves 
know dozens of such timings by heart, but also weigh up the particular fripe products on offer and “al-
jaou” (the atmosphere) when deciding which halan to attend. The halan in the Bab El-Falla fripe 
market, the women agree, is best for women’s bras and nightwear but is also attractive for its dense, 
inner-city flair, as it is located in the historic Southern faubourg of the Tunis medina153. “When do I get 
to go to the medina if not for the fripe”, Wiem rhetorically asks, “we have to park our car a bit far, so 
we take a long stroll in an area I never usually go to”. 
 
Like Yasmina, Wiem and their friends, urban dwellers from across Tunis time their market visits to Bab 
El-Falla to coincide with the bi-weekly bale openings, triggering distinct patterns of urban mobility. 
The bale opening not only promises customers the chance of being the first to examine the “bala jdida” 
(new bale) – as originally packaged in the sorting factory – it also constitutes a ritualised, public 
performance that invites active participation. For traders on the other hand, the uncertain value of the 
fripe commodities contained in the bales they disclose turns the collective performance of ‘opening’ 
into a crucial prerequisite for market exchange and transactions. Strict calibration and a tacit set of rules 
are necessary to stage collective performances of valuation: first, synchronised rhythms and ritualised 
performances mediate the dense, socio-material encounters of the bale opening. Second, differentiated 
mechanisms of valuation work invite people to participate in processes of probing, negotiation and 
research that turn them into active market participants, and confer to the halan the character of a curated 
‘public event’.  
 
 
a. Staging dense, socio-material encounters in the Bab El-Falla bale opening 
 
On Saturday and Tuesday mornings, the entrance to the Bab El-Falla market is congested with 
handcarts selling oranges, with elderly vendors offering fresh herbs on cardboard boxes, and shoppers 
trying to push into the main market street with heavy use of elbows. A bit further up the Bab El-Falla 
street, butcher shops and fruit and vegetable stalls give way to shops and stalls selling fripe, with 
everything from second-hand women’s underwear, to sports equipment, socks and children’s toys on 
offer. The fripe trade dominates the upper part of the Bab El-Falla market and wooden and metal 
barracks form an extension of the main market street. With more than 200 active fripe trading spaces154,  
the former fresh-food market has today become one of the most popular fripe markets of the capital, 
and its bi-weekly bale openings attract people from all over Greater Tunis.  
 
Bale openings in the Bab El-Falla fripe market mediate the collective encounter with diverse second-
hand garments and objects through a distinct spatio-temporal framework, recurrent bodily performances 
and a set of tacit rules that govern interactions between diverse market participants. None of the fripe 
 
152 I accompanied both male and female friend groups as well as mixed-gender family groups to different bale openings; 
repeated go-alongs were conducted with two female friend groups, one from the upper-middle class area Hayy Ennasr 
(Appendix II, Interlocutor 17), and the other from the working-class neighbourhood Kabaria (Appendix II, Interlocutor 
18);  
153 The Bab El-Falla neighbourhood derives its name from the Southern gate to the Tunis medina, and was built up as ‘rbat’, 
or faubourg, to the historic old city from the 12th century onwards (Berry-Chikhaoui 1994: 28); 
154 This number fluctuates rapidly and is here based on an average of four separate counts by the author in October 2018; 
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traders in Bab El-Falla remembers when, how or why the bale opening times were set to Tuesday and 
Saturday. Albeit unwritten, the temporalities of bale opening are strictly adhered to and determine not 
only the working routines of market traders, but have become a structuring element for the entire market 
and neighbourhood over time. As many customers time their visits to the fripe market to coincide with 
the disclosure of new bales, exceptional socio-material densities emerge in the market twice a week. 
Al-halan typically occurs in the morning, but follows no exact timing. While customers underline the 
need to “come to the market early” for bale openings, this remains vaguely defined, as market opening 
hours and bale opening times vary with the weather, the seasons and, most importantly, with the number 
of customers in the market. After opening the metal shutters of their shop spaces, traders normally 
display the closed bales on empty stalls or tables positioned in front of the shops. The white or colourful 
tarpaulin of the bales thus dominates the market street, with the non-transparent material reflecting the 
tension between uncertainty and promise that renders the bale openings so attractive to market 
customers.  
 
With increasing levels of density in the main market street, customers begin to cluster around particular 
stalls or tables. While some carefully inspect the labels on the bales for product type, value category 
and sorting factory before choosing their position, others determinedly seek out a familiar trader or shop 
space. Friend or family groups who attend the market together tend to position themselves strategically, 
either at opposite ends of the same stall or around different bales located in proximity, so that 
communication via rapid hand signals allows for switching table or stall if one bale turns out to be 
particularly promising or disappointing. The ritual of disclosure begins when the traders decide that a 
sufficiently large group of customers has gathered around their bale: as Mouin155, a fripe trader 
specialised in women’s garments, explains, he waits until “customers stand shoulder to shoulder” on a 
good market day. Once one trader begins, this usually triggers a chain reaction throughout the market, 
testifying to the strict, albeit always-tacit, temporal coordination that underpins synchronised rhythms 
of bale opening. 
 
The exact choreography of the bale opening then differs from one fripe product type to another, as 
distinct rituals mediate the encounter with diverse garments and used objects in the marketplace. The 
degree of heterogeneity of the packaged fripe materials differs, and labelling practices vary with 
different product types, facilitating the stabilisation of exchange value for some fripe items but not for 
others. For example, neatly labelled garment bales have already been graded into garment type and 
quality segment – such as “crème”, “first choice” or “second choice” – by farazet in the sorting 
factories. As the most tedious valuation work has thus already been completed in the factories, such 
product and value categories often allow market vendors to set a uniform price for all garments 
contained within a bale.  
 
In front of Mouin’s shop for women’s clothes, the bale opening thus typically unfolds as follows: Mouin 
lifts up his knife as a symbolic starting sign, before cutting the plastic cord of the bale and announcing 
a standard price per item. Repeating the price per item, intercepted by “bala jdida, bala jdida” (new 
bale) at the top of his voice, he then unfolds the tarpaulin, laying bare the folded and pressed clothes, 
and pulls them apart one by one. None of the customers touches the clothes before Mouin, and he often 
intentionally prolongs the process of opening to increase dramatic tension. Only once Mouin throws 
garment items into the middle of the table can customers surrounding the stall pick them up, with their 
rapid hand movements deciding who is the first to inspect a clothing item. The opening of garment bales 
often unfolds in concentrated silence and communication is limited to routinised gestures. The focus of 
 
155 Appendix II., Interlocutor 19; 
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participants lies on the rapid inspection of clothing items, for brand, material and size, but also signs of 
wear, or faulty cuts or seams. As speed is decisive for securing garments, many women have developed 
intricate movements and tricks that allow them to assess an item within seconds, and a growing pile of 




Figure V.3   The opening of a fripe garment bale in the main market street (2020) 
 
In stark contrast, the disclosure of so-called “mixed bales” containing garments that do not neatly fit 
into sorting factory categories, requires more flexible price-setting mechanisms and thus more drawn-
out processes of negotiation in the bale opening. Most strikingly, tarpaulin bags filled with used objects 
– sorted in broad object categories, such as “toys and sports”, “accessories” or “household utensils” –
often contain eclectic collections of ‘stuff’ with highly uncertain meaning and value. Fripe objects 
categorised as “jouets” (toys) – officially banned from sale on the domestic market and thus packaged 
in shkair and exempt from labelling practices in the factory, like shoes – typically represent one of the 
most heterogeneous product groups in the market. As sorting workers in the factories confide, the 
category “jouets” often functions as a form of ‘last resort’, when workers fail to recognise or assign an 
object to a more precise product category. Consequently, a single tarpaulin bag inscribed with ‘toys’ 
can contain a dizzying array of books and games in diverse languages, sports equipment, cuddly toys, 
diverse accessories or decoration items. This not only confronts traders with great uncertainty regarding 
the content of the shkair they purchase from wholesalers, it also forces them to abstain from uniform 
price-setting, conferring even greater importance to collective valuation work as a precondition for 
exchange and transaction in the marketplace.  
 
The difference in the way the bale opening unfolds can thus be gauged from afar, as a buzz of excited 
voices emanates from the toy stalls in Bab El-Falla and as a large crowd typically gathers around them. 
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Amine’s156 large, wooden stall specialised in the sale of second-hand toys attracts a mix of loyal 
customers, curious spectators and accidental bystanders for the disclosure of new merchandise. While 
regular attendees bring chairs from the adjacent café and place their steaming coffee cups on the vending 
tables in front of them, others remain standing as spectators at a safe distance. Amine and his two 
younger shop assistants stand behind the stall, facing their audience and each holding a white tarpaulin 
bag. When a critical mass has formed around the stall, Amine begins to pull the fripe objects from the 
tarpaulin bag, lifting them up one-by-one for everyone to see. Amine and his assistants are the first to 
inspect the objects, at times calling out what they are and setting a price for them immediately, and at 
other times handing them over for inspection to the audience. The objects are then passed around the 
stall for collective assessment, resulting in expressions of interest or the contestation of the initial price. 
When the quality, origin, or use of an object are in dispute, vociferous guessing, joint research and 
creative reinvention are set in motion.  
 
Strictly synchronised temporalities, as well as ritualised and dense socio-material encounters, form the 
basis for ‘staging’ collective valuation work with diverse fripe materials in the Bab El-Falla 
marketplace. First, the halan’s occurrence at regular intervals is crucial to conferring to the bale opening 
the character of a recurrent ‘event’, and thus helps to produce the bi-weekly market densities that enable 
collective performances of valuation. Second, the halan’s routinised sequence renders it predictable, 
allowing diverse market participants to decide ahead of time in what capacity they want to participate. 




Figure V.4   Customers start to gather at a Bab El-Falla toy stand for the disclosure of new merchandise (2017) 
 
156 Appendix II. Interlocutor 20; 
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b. Collective performances of valuation work 
 
On a particularly cold Tuesday morning in December, Heba157, who comes to the bale opening in Bab 
El-Falla from the southern working-class neighbourhood Kabaria, scolds me for not wearing gloves. 
Pointing first to her own fingerless gloves and then my stiff, colourless fingers, she chastises: “You 
need to work with your hands, and you want to be able to move your fingers, otherwise you’ll miss an 
open seam or a hole (…) or one of these”. She directs my attention to a discoloration of the denim 
material of the jeans I had been inspecting. “Bleach”, she states with affirmation and then, triumphantly, 
points to a second stain of the same colour. “See, you wouldn’t have found this by just holding up the 
pants the way you do”. Similar instructions or advice are frequently exchanged amongst – 
predominantly female – bale opening participants, including amongst complete strangers. Rather than 
just ‘sighting’ garments, experienced fripe customers subject them to intense material probing and make 
use of a complex repertoire of gestures to assess quality and size. The tacit knowledge underpinning 
such manual valuation work is shared with generosity and a sense of pride during the bale openings, 
and is seen as an inherently feminine skill. The discovery of flaws – especially those not apparent at 
first sight – is thus often celebrated as indicator of the high quality of “farz” (sorting) accomplished and 
becomes the basis for negotiating reductions. As the trader Mouin complains, “even when I open 
“crème” (the highest value category), my customers “yifrizu” (sort) more diligently than the workers 
in the factory, so I lose out.”  
 
When purchasing second-hand garments, consumers thus engage in routinised, manual valuation work 
that is considered a necessary form of expertise for participating in bale opening events. Research on 
second-hand markets in other contexts has similarly highlighted the intricate handy work that 
consumers tend to perform alongside traders (Ayimpam 2016; Hansen 2000(a); Valenciano-Mané 
2018). Even the linguistic designations for second-hand clothes often reflect the central importance of 
skilful, manual probing for second-hand consumption: While in Zambia, the term for second-hand 
clothes, “salaula”, translates as “selecting from a pile in a manner of rummaging” (Hansen 2000(a): 
89), the equivalent in Equatorial-Guinea, “asamsé”, means “to agitate or manipulate things with your 
hands” (Valenciano-Mané 2018: 160). In Tunis, the term farz for ‘sorting’ has changed meaning with 
the proliferation of sorting factories, becoming an umbrella term for the complex process that 
transforms container loads of heterogeneous fripe materials into neatly graded, packaged tarpaulin bags. 
However, the verb “faraz” (to sort) also continues to designate the specific activity of searching through 
piles of fripe merchandise in the marketplace. As such, the activity of farz is thus defined as a shared 
activity of professional sorters, traders and customers of the fripe alike, and is central to the act of both 
vending in, and buying from the fripe. During the halan, the hoarse calls of traders, “ifriz”, inviting 
customers in the imperative to ‘sort through’ the piles of merchandise they offer, thus dominates the 
soundscape of the Bab El-Falla marketplace. 
 
The valuation work performed through sorting in the halan thereby often blurs distinctions between 
professional sorting and private consumption. As is the case in other second-hand marketplaces, “self-
employed resellers” have appropriated the marketplace as their “work site”, therefore ‘shopping’ not 
for private use but for income generation (Ayres 2019: 123). In Bab El-Falla, predominantly female 
“farazet” (sorters) participate in most bale openings and remain largely indistinguishable from other 
market customers, apart from their characteristic hand trolleys and ability to negotiate bulk prices for 
larger quantities. Some farazet have established close relations with individual traders and stay behind 
after the end of al-halan to sift through leftovers or screen damaged garments for reusable textile 
 
157 Appendix II. Interlocutor 18; 
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materials. As is the case with female second-hand resale activities in other contexts (Ayimpam 2016: 
276), the farazet’s sorting work and transport of selected garments is frequently combined with other 
valuation work such as washing, repair or systematic re-packaging, often organised in distant urban 
places. The valuation work through farz in the bale opening thus blurs the lines between “labour and 
leisure, production and consumption” (Ayres 2019: 145) and the elusiveness of the productive process 
accomplished through sorting means that these activities often fail to be recognised as ‘work’ in the 
fripe. While the visible working public of fripe marketplaces like Bab El-Falla is almost exclusively 
male, tedious consumption work is mainly accomplished by women and in most bale openings women 
clearly outnumber men. 
 
The valuation work performed at fripe stalls trading in diverse used objects is no less complex, but 
different in character to the bale opening dynamics at the garment stalls of Bab El-Falla. While for fripe 
garments, focus lies on detecting traces of wear and tear, or faulty cuts or material deficiencies to contest 
the set price, the disclosure of new merchandise at used object stalls normally sets in motion an open-
ended process of collective valuation. This occurs because of the great heterogeneity and at times alien 
character of the objects pulled from the shkair, for instance at Amine’s stall for fripe toys. Some of the 
fripe objects fit seamlessly into the category of ‘toys’ and are familiar in the Tunisian use context, 
posing the relatively simple task of evaluating the objects’ functionality and their market price. Others, 
however, have uncertain use and exchange value in the Tunisian context, thus necessitating drawn-out 
processes of joint inspection and assessment. As Amine explains, it is crucial for customers to feel “that 
we (the traders) respect their opinions (…), so if several people agree this or that item can no longer be 
sold or needs to be sold at a very cheap price, I respect this as the decision.” In differentiation from 
Mouin who sets a uniform price from the outset, Amine thus has to enter the price-setting process on 
an equal footing with the people gathered around his stall. As he underlines, negotiations over “al soum 
al-shih” (the correct price) or “soum behi” (a good price) need to result not only in a “just price”, to 
use Roitman’s term, that “suits both vendors and buyers” (2003: 220), but hinges on the approval of a 
majority of those participating in the halan.  
 
The collective, open-ended character of valuation at Amine’s stall is of particular importance for those 
objects carrying layers of inscription that risk either rendering them out of place, or disqualifying them 
from commodity exchange. ‘Inscriptions’ can mean quite literally writing on the objects, for instance 
in the form of nametags of previous owners or product descriptions in foreign languages. In a more 
figurative sense, inscriptions can refer to various material and immaterial traces that give the objects 
temporal depth and render palpable their complex “economic and social biographies” (Kopytoff 1986: 
67). From tangible traces of wear and tear, to invisible layers of symbolic meaning, previous life cycles 
and origin stories remain often inscribed in the fripe objects, rendering them “historically, socially and 
narratively embedded” (Appelgren and Bohlin 2015(b): 5). Consequently, consumers must engage in 
“possession rituals” (Gregson and Crewe 2003: 7, 167) to reappropriate the material objects: one of the 
strategies frequently observed at Amine’s toy stand is to devise narratives of previous use and 
divestment in the context of origin to make sense of an object’s arrival in the marketplace and to create 
a basis for discussing future use. In addition, taking illegible objects apart – especially games with 
product descriptions in foreign languages – often enables the reuse of its material components or the 
recognition of its logic of play beyond the inscription. 
 
As a close-up look at the bale opening in the Bab El-Falla fripe market shows, “the act of exchange 
performs far more than the mere transmission of value" (Lee 2006: 416). Rather, the recurrent, 
collective performances that unfold in the halan demonstrate how value must be “socially constructed” 
(ibid) between market traders and customers, but also curious spectators or accidental passers-by who 
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can assume a central role in differentiated valuation work with a wide array of fripe merchandise. The 
open-endedness of valuation and the positioning of diverse market participants as equal in their value 
assessments are central to constituting the bale opening as a ‘public event’, inviting people to participate 
in diverse capacities and for diverging motives, from professional resale, to household consumption or 
simple curiosity and pastime. This section has underlined how the physical marketplace and its distinct 
spatio-temporal framework forms a crucial basis for the staging of collective performances of valuation. 
As the next section sets out, the collective enactment of al-halan also simultaneously co-constitutes the 
fripe market of Bab El-Falla as a distinct site ‘for being in public’ in the city, setting it apart from other 




Figure V.5   Spectators at the Bab El-Falla bale opening often remain in the second row (2018) 
 
 
3. Fripe consumption and the production of temporary publicness 
 
When Yasmina and Wiem meet to attend a bale opening, they often spend the first part of the morning 
“dressing up or down”, as Yasmina puts it. As Wiem explains, “disguising is part of the fun”, and she 
adds, “what you wear depends on which fripe (market) you go to. I can go to Menzah VIII (a high-end 
fripe market) all made up, but I leave my handbag behind and wear no mascara when I go to Sidi Bahri 
(inner-city fripe market)”. The goal of disguise, as the women explain, is not only to gain an advantage 
in price negotiations. Rather, intentional dressing down and shedding make-up, jewellery and other 
markers of social identity result in a form of anonymity that turns the fripe bale openings into particular 
opportunities for ‘being in public’. As Wiem explains, “in the fripe you are incognito, you can talk as 
you want (…), you find a bank director sorting (clothes) next to a cleaner, you will never know”.  
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The third part of this chapter examines how the collective valuation work accomplished in the bale 
opening not only depends on a regular enactment in urban space, but also becomes itself constitutive to 
a temporary togetherness that qualifies the fripe marketplaces as particular forms of ‘publicness’ in the 
city. First, the following section explores how valuation work in the bale opening hinges on the co-
production of social value, and thus the bale opening’s staging as a recurrent ‘public event’ that offers 
diverse avenues for participation and results in dense encounters between diverse urban dwellers. 
Subsequently, the second section analyses the particular, “hybrid publicness” (Iveson 2007: 9) that 
emerges through the temporary togetherness in the collective performances of valuation: while the bale 
opening guarantees unrestricted entry and exit with the anonymity of a ‘public event’, it also offers a 
framework for the often-intimate and personal interactions that emerge from joint valuation work, 
unsettling habitual social or gender norms structuring the public urban realm. The final section 
investigates the particular opportunities for ‘being in public’ the framework of the bale opening offers 
to those whose conditions for “visibility and appearance” (Staeheli et al. 2009: 642) – but also for active 
participation – often remain subject to social control, controversy or outright repression.  
 
 
a. Staging valuation as a spectacular public enactment  
 
Research on second-hand marketplaces has often emphasised how “sliding pricing systems and 
interpersonal relations of exchange” (Gregson and Crewe 1998: 39) compensate for the uncertain value 
and commodity status of the used goods exchanged. Trusting and intimate vendor-client relationships 
that develop through repeated interaction and over an extended period of time have therefore often been 
highlighted as characteristic feature of used goods markets (Appelgren and Bohlin 2015(a): 147). While 
personal vendor-client relations and market intimacies are indeed crucial to many transactions in Bab 
El-Falla, collective performances of valuation at the same time rely on the ‘public’ character of the bale 
opening. As is the case in other marketplaces, “a high degree of openness” and “low entry barriers” 
(Hiebert et al. 2015: 6) minimise the commitments and engagements that come with market 
participation, thus facilitating “consumer capture at the micro-level” (Cochoy 2007: 206). 
Consequently, al-halan in Bab El-Falla is intentionally curated as an ‘open event’ that offers diverse 
avenues for participation, even for those who do not formally engage in ‘market exchange’. 
 
First, the bale opening’s organisation in open-air spaces – usually in front of shops or on stalls 
positioned in the open street – reflects the crucial importance of attracting passers-by as spectators or 
participants. As Mouin explains on a rainy Saturday morning, he prefers to skip the bale opening rather 
than setting it up inside his shop: “Customers won’t enter the shop, only those who come specifically 
for my bale will enter and I can only sell a small part (…), so I prefer to keep it (the bale).” Meanwhile, 
Amine emphasises that his stall’s location right at the intersection that forms the Southern entrance of 
the Bab El-Falla fripe market constitutes a crucial competitive advantage: “When you cross the rails 
and the street towards the fripe, the first stall you see is mine”, Amine stresses, “and because the street 
space is wide here, I can gather a lot of people”. In fact, the drawn-out bale openings at his toy stand 
are animated by a continuous flow of passers-by making their way from the Southern bus terminal and 
residential quarters into the fripe and food market. Bab El-Falla’s long-standing reputation for being 
the “least expensive food market of central Tunis” (Berry-Chikhaoui 1994: 409, 391) benefits the 
adjacent fripe traders, as many of the commuters make a brief stop at the bale openings or get drawn 





Figure V.6   Customers are tightly packed around a newly opened garment bale (2017) 
 
Second, the bale opening’s curation as a public event that invites both passive observers and active 
participants and provides flexible rules of entry and exit, is crucial to enhancing its open character. 
People thus join for diverse motives and assume different roles in the bale opening, with only some of 
them participating in market transactions in a classical sense. At Amine’s toy stall, a group of loyal 
clients forms the stable core in the bi-weekly gatherings, and most of them enjoy his theatrical 
performances in a seated front row position and for extended periods of time. While these regulars 
participate vociferously in the valuation process, they rarely buy anything. As Amine confirms, second 
row clients are more important in terms of transactions. While they tend to remain standing, assuming 
the role of distanced spectators, these customers start to approach the stall and join the valuation process 
as soon as a particular item attracts their attention. Again other people frequent the bale openings for 
specific motives that remain largely invisible, or only become apparent over time. For instance, Fawzi, 
a white-haired, small man from the adjacent Montfleury neighbourhood, attends most weekend bale 
openings at Amine’s stall to collect damaged toy items that are collectively assessed to be unfit for 
market exchange. Like Fawzi, other bale opening participants take part in inspection and price-setting, 
but never make any purchases. Instead, they collect leftovers for repair or further processing, at times 
for bulk prices but more often for free on the basis of tacit, mutually beneficial agreements with the 
fripe traders. 
 
Finally, staging al-halan as a spectacular performance that entertains and amuses its participants not 
only increases its appeal, it also helps to break the ice amongst those gathered around the stall and thus 
constitutes a precondition for collective valuation work. The fripe traders assume a central role in 
generating an atmosphere conducive to the temporary togetherness required to perform joint value 
assessments and engage in drawn-out negotiations amongst complete strangers and in often highly 
heterogeneous social constellations. As has been observed in used good markets elsewhere, the tactical 
employment of “the theatrical and the carnivalesque” (Gregson and Crewe 2003: 61) in staging the 
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disclosure of new merchandise allows fripe traders to bind spectators to the ‘event’ and to put people at 
ease with one another. Heba, who says she comes to the Bab El-Falla bale openings at least once a 
month, stresses that “al-jaou” (the atmosphere) is at times more important than “al-silaa” (the 
merchandise) in guiding her decision which particular bale opening to participate in. “I prefer traders 
who are funny, (…) so I choose those where I know they will make good jokes and “yamelou jaou” 
(create good atmosphere)”. Acknowledging the importance of al-jaou, most fripe traders use repetitive 
chants and slogans – at times repeated through megaphones or played from recorders – to attract clients 
and take up elevated positions to maximise visibility. As the bale opening unfolds, theatrical gestures 
and humorous remarks – often directed at individual clients – trigger laughs and responses from 
customers and set the scene for joint valuation work. Once the bale opening is in full swing, the traders 
often step into the background. The highly ritualised interactions and fixed sequence of the bale opening 
now structure the collective encounter, reducing the traders’ role to that of a moderator. 
 
In contrast to other consumption spaces, where exchange values are fixed and transactions only require 
minimal interaction, spaces of second-hand consumption often do not allow for “encounters without 
the dignity of recognition” (Gidwani and Reddy 2011: 1641). This is because the unstable commodity 
value of diverse fripe merchandise requires an exchange relation that takes into account “what is valued 
by both producer and consumer and hence validated in terms of social reproduction” (Lee 2006: 416). 
To stage the complex processes of collective assessment and negotiation that precede fripe exchange, 
the bale opening must thus not only be accessible and inviting as a public event, it also needs to generate 
temporary forms of togetherness, or intense sociability. Research on diverse second-hand trading spaces 
has shown the “particular sociality” (Appelgren and Bohlin 2015(a): 147) and forms of “relationality” 
engendered by their specific exchange practices (Gregson and Crewe 2003: 200). In the case of the 
Tunis fripe markets, the “successful fusion of consumption with leisure and entertainment” that has 
often been associated with the shopping mall (Zukin 1998: 830) is crucial to grasping the markets’ 
particular appeal and in turn their functioning as sites for collective performances of valuation. The 
multiple opportunities for participation offered through the bale opening turn collective moments of 
valuation into temporary forms of togetherness that enable encounters across difference. 
 
 
b. The ‘hybrid publicness’ of the bale opening event  
 
Through the bale opening’s staging as public event, the Bab El-Falla marketplace becomes the site of 
a distinct, temporary togetherness – or multiple encounters and interactions across difference around 
the bale opening tables – on a bi-weekly basis. The bale opening guarantees open entry and exit with 
only minimal commitments, and follows a ritualised sequence that affords the same rules for all 
participants, thus qualifying as a public event. Yet, the shared valuation work that unfolds in the bale 
opening requires close interactions between strangers, resulting in a temporary relaxation or suspension 
of habitual markers of difference, particularly social and gender norms. The bale openings thus produce 
a “hybrid” form of “urban publicness” (Iveson 2007: 9), enabling highly intimate and personal 
exchanges that would normally be deemed unacceptable in the public realm. 
 
The temporary forms of togetherness the bale openings produce in Bab El-Falla are characterised by 
great social diversity, allowing the rituals and norms that structure collective valuation to mediate 
difference. While the social dynamics of bale opening differ markedly from one fripe marketplace to 
another – with a market’s location and price range determining its specific clientele – the exceptional 
mobility most bale openings trigger often turn them into socially diverse gatherings that bring together 
different gender, age and income groups. The ritualised and strictly coded interactions of the bale 
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openings, which standardise client-vendor relations and thus ensure equal treatment to diverse bale 
opening participants, are crucial to mitigating the stark heterogeneity that characterises the social 
constellations emerging around the bale. The temporary semblance of equality when gathering around 
the bale is reinforced by strategies of disguise, especially amongst upper-middle-class participants, like 
Wiem and Yasmina, who deliberately conceal their social identity and purchasing power in the Bab El-
Falla bale opening. Shedding markers of social differentiation – most obviously dress, but also manners 
and even language – is encouraged by flexible price formation in the fripe, resembling a “social process 
that is determined in the bargaining process by factoring in various criteria pertaining to the consumer” 
(Roitman 2003: 220). Pushing into the background typical markers of difference creates a vital basis 
for valuation work, shifting collective attention to the fripe garments and objects disclosed. 
 
Around the bale, temporary forms of hybrid publicness emerge as the joint valuation work becomes the 
basis for often intimate conversations or negotiations that run counter to habitual social or gender norms. 
As Heba explains, “the bale opening is special, everyone talks to each other, people give advice, it is 
“adi” (normal)”. Particularly when Heba attends bale openings alone, she often relies on the help or 
opinions of others, especially as few of the Bab El-Falla fripe shops or stalls possess changing cabins 
or full body mirrors. At times then, bale opening situations result in deeply private exchanges that would 
otherwise be unthinkable between complete strangers and in public urban space. Particularly 
noteworthy in this regard are the interactions unfolding around women’s underwear stalls, for which 
the Bab El-Falla marketplace has developed a reputation in recent years. While intimate women’s wear 
would typically be traded in a gender-segregated environment, all fripe underwear traders in Bab El-
Falla are male. With bras constituting one of the most sought-after and expensive fripe items in the 
market, an increasing number of male traders have specialised in high-end intimate wear, and have 
normalised mixed-gender interactions during the bale opening over time. Male underwear traders not 
only demonstrate their expertise in assessing the comfort and quality of different bras and underwear 
brands, they also provide tricks for assessing size and fit and provide professional one-to-one guidance. 
As underwear evokes highly sensitive topics – such as changing body size or female sexuality – the all-
female bale opening situations animated by male traders often trigger discussions of other taboos in the 
midst of the marketplace. For instance, a mother and daughter looking for underwear in anticipation of 
the daughter’s wedding sparked a debate about appropriate intimate wear for a married, young woman, 






Figure V.7   Women gather around a male trader who unpacks new fripe underwear (2018) 
 
When participating in bale openings, individuals thus become part of a temporary, collective 
performance that oscillates between the openness and anonymity of a public event and the intimacy that 
comes with engaging in a shared valuation process. Particularly around garment bales, where market 
customers often stand shoulder to shoulder and thus form a closed circle, the collective performance of 
valuation provides both a physical and figurative frame for close interactions across social and gender 
divides. As many fripe customers highlight, pledging allegiance to this temporary collective offers 
psychological relief or even has a therapeutic effect. Wiem, who deplores the accelerated rhythms of 
her job in banking, puts it succinctly: “Once you enter (the bale opening), you forget who you are and 
what you were doing just before (…). You are just there, concentrated with the others, everyone does 
exactly the same thing, the same movement. For me, the bale opening always works like a therapy, it 
has a calming effect like nothing else when I feel anxious or stressed.” Like Wiem, many other market 
participants explain the enjoyment they find in being subsumed by the collective dynamic of the bale 
opening and in surrendering to its rhythms and normed interactions. For the limited duration of the bale 
opening – varying from a quarter of an hour at a garment stall to an entire morning at the toy stalls – a 
particular form of hybrid publicness emerges that opens up unique encounters and conversations that 
are crucial to experiencing what market customers describe as “al-jaou al-khass” (the special 




c. Temporary opportunities for ‘being in public’ in the bale opening 
 
By generating temporary forms of hybrid publicness, the bale openings offer opportunities for ‘being 
in public’ to diverse urban dwellers, including those who do not have the means or intention to actively 
partake in market transactions. While urban space is essential for the making of publics (Massey 1994: 
254), the “conditions for appearance and visibility” (Staeheli et al. 2009: 642) in urban space are always 
unequally distributed. For particular gender and social groups that are constrained in their access to 
urban space and thus deprived of their capacity to shape distinct forms of urban publicness, the fripe 
bale openings thus become a stage for appearance and active participation: both female market 
customers – especially from working-class neighbourhoods – and young fripe traders from deprived 
urban areas use the bale openings to become visible in the central city and to take agency in shaping 
both temporary and enduring forms of publicness. 
 
First, while the Bab El-Falla fripe market remains a male-dominated environment in many respects, 
the collective moments of bale opening temporarily unsettle the market’s gendered hierarchies. 
Women’s mobility across the city for the bale opening translates into a clear female majority in the 
marketplace. Their presence contests gender norms that limit women’s visibility and movement to 
neighbourhood public spaces with a high degree of social control, not only in Tunis but also in other 
North African cities (Hakim 2001; Shehayeb 1994). In conversations with Heba and her daughter 
Haifa158, the fripe clearly appears as a central motive for leaving their “houma” (local neighbourhood). 
Female neighbours from Kabaria often attend the Bab El-Falla bale opening together to buy either for 
resale or for the private household, or simply using the fripe as a social outing. 16-year-old Haifa, who 
has attended bale openings with her mother, “since I can walk”, as she laughingly states, explains that 
she loves the fripe because, “the halan is the best excuse to go to “wust al-asima” (the centre of the 
capital)”. As the women from Kabaria and other working-class neighbourhoods of the capital 
repeatedly emphasise, attending bale openings outside of their houma is not only a question of quality 
and breadth of choice, but is also a means to escape the narrow social control of their immediate living 
environment. 
 
While performances of sale and trade in the fripe market remain thus inextricably tied to the masculine 
body – with male voices, poses and theatrical performances dominating market life – bale opening 
situations are thus often majority or exclusively female. The dense gathering of women around the bales 
produces a temporary ‘inside space’ that shields participants from “the dominant male gaze” of the 
market (Jain 2002: 49). Many women therefore proclaim to feeling protected from harassment and petty 
crime in bale opening situations, as customers and traders look out for one another and often store 
personal belongings in their midst or under the bale opening tables. As has been noted in other 
consumption environments, such as shopping malls (Abaza 2001: 117), the bale opening thus offers 
women exceptional opportunities for appearance and dwelling, reducing the pressures they normally 
face in a male-dominated public realm in which “the presence of women (…) always has to be explained 
and accounted for” (Rabo 2005: 21). Simultaneously, the interactions unfolding safeguard a degree of 
anonymity, allowing women to take on diverse roles without fearing the social control and value 
judgments they face in their local neighbourhoods. As Heba stresses, participating in bale openings 
outside Kabaria allows her “to be treated like anyone else, to get advice from woman to woman (…)” 
and frees her from worries “about what others say or think about my choice or spending.” While many 
women frequent the bale openings with friend or family groups, most female customers navigate the 
different stalls on their own and with great ease, benefitting from the temporary, female-dominated 
 
158 Appendix II. Interlocutor 18; 
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publicness that opens up spontaneous interactions and opportunities for simply ‘being in public’ rarely 




Figure V.8   Bale openings for women are at times intentionally staged away from the open street (2018) 
 
Second, the bale openings equally offer distinct possibilities of public appearance and agency for many 
male fripe traders. Young traders, especially those residing in deprived urban areas, are often judged as 
“transgressive to normalized values” and their bodies are seen as incompatible with “existent notions 
of publicity” in the city (Staeheli et al. 2009: 642). Fripe traders often use the term “hogra” (lit. 
“disdain”) to describe the disrespectful treatment they suffer at the hands of “al-hakim” (the 
state/police). Yassine159, the 21-year-old cousin of Mouin who comes to Bab El-Falla from Fouchana 
to help during the bale openings, recounts often being stopped for identity controls on his commutes. 
He links the hogra he faces to his address: “when they (the police) see I live in a “houma shaabiya” 
(popular neighbourhood), they tell me to ‘go home’, as if it’s forbidden for me to move around like 
anyone else”. Such statements echo the territorial stigma that has been shown to restrain access to public 
space in Tunis amongst youth from lower social classes (Haj Salem 2020; Lamloum and Ali 2015; 
Melliti et al. 2018). For Yassine, the Bab El-Falla fripe market thus constitutes an exceptional space 
for ‘being in public’ in the central city. First, he often takes the lead role in performances of bale opening 
when the marketplace is crowded, thus temporarily assuming the authoritative position of a market 
trader. While Yassine admits to having been “a bit shy” at first, he now performs his role with ease and 
self-confidence, and visibly enjoys the respect paid to him as price-setter and expert vendor. Second, 
the contact with diverse clients but also with other fripe traders turns the market into an intense space 
of sociality outside of Yassine’s narrow friend and family circle in his houma, and he frequently stays 
in the market after closing hours to drink and smoke with other young vendors. 
 
 
159 Appendix II. Interlocutor 19;  
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Finally, as a stage for public appearance and interaction, the bale opening also enables intimate vendor-
client relationships of both temporary and enduring character. Such relations are frequently struck 
across divides of gender, social class, age and origin, and many of them emerge on the basis of shared 
valuation work in the framework of recurrent bale opening situations. Over time, mostly female clients 
begin to qualify as what fripe traders refer to as “kliounat khassa” (special clients): while such intimate 
relations are carefully concealed in front of other clients to preserve a semblance of “equality in front 
of the bale” as Mouin puts it, tacit agreements in fact guarantee such customers advantageous treatment. 
Invisible hierarchies between different clients determine who is invited to inspect new merchandise 
first, with kliounat khassa being informed of arrivals over the phone and at times allowed to pre-sort 
merchandise before the actual bale opening. While certain shkair or transparent plastic bales can be 
easily re-sealed, the “newness” (Hansen 2000(a): 182) of the garment bales is closely scrutinised by 
market clients and precludes such pre-sorting practices. Traders thus often resort to discretely setting 
aside items under the bale opening table, or grant generous reductions once other participants have left 
the stall. Trader-client relationships thus often take on a deep intimacy over time: as Yasmina recounts, 
she places great trust in her favourite fripe traders’ advice, allowing him, as she says, “to manage my 
wardrobe and compose outfits for special occasions”. Laughing, she adds, “he has better taste than me, 
and sometimes I feel he knows me better than my family or friends”. 
 
The emerging, hybrid publicness of the bale openings attracts urban dwellers from all walks of life and 
with diverse motives for market participation, turning al-halan into a unique space for encounters across 
difference and intense sociality framed by distinct codes of behaviour. As such, the bale opening 
situation temporarily alters norms of interaction in the public sphere, enabling intimate exchanges 
across divides of gender and social class, and offers opportunities for appearance, especially for those 
disadvantaged in their access to public urban space. The hybrid publicness that characterises the bale 
opening is thus crucial to comprehending the distinct ‘cultures of consumption’ that characterise the 
contemporary urban fripe economy in Tunis. From weekend outings amongst all-female friend groups, 
to weekly routines of those collecting for resale and repair, and the acquisition of new social roles 
amongst youth from deprived neighbourhoods, the fripe markets constitute urban spaces of great social 
complexity that open opportunities for ‘being in public’ to highly diverse market participants. In the 
unfolding of collective assessments and negotiations of value at the bale opening, fripe garments and 
objects from ‘elsewhere’ take on the role of material mediators, and become the starting point for the 





Figure V.9   The heterogeneous array of fripe toys displayed at a Bab El-Falla stall (2019) 
 
 
4. Material encounters and the contingent production of new cultural forms  
 
Even though Yasmina’s and Wiem’s daughters are now teenagers, the women spend many hours at 
fripe toy stalls during the bale openings. While rarely buying anything, the two friends enjoy curious 
finds amongst the heterogeneous array of used objects disclosed at the toy stalls. As Yasmina remarks 
while waiting for a shkara of fripe sports equipment to be disclosed, “I love not knowing what I will 
discover when I go to the fripe, it’s always a surprise”. Both Yasmina and Wiem recount innumerable 
anecdotes about unexpected discoveries in the fripe, and deduce a lot of their knowledge or ideas about 
Europe and North America – and more specifically, Western consumer behaviour – from such material 
encounters in the bale openings. As Wiem explains while presenting her impressive wardrobe and 
accessory collection, “it is thanks to the fripe that my style is always special, I keep changing looks and 
people often make compliments but don’t realise it is all thanks to the fripe and the new ideas it brings”.  
 
Like Yasmina and Wiem, many regular attendees of the bale openings stress that the fripe markets’ 
appeal lies not only in their distinct sociality and recurrent, collective performances, but also in the 
unpredictable material encounters they offer on a bi-weekly basis. The wide array of garments and 
objects from ‘elsewhere’ that are disclosed in the bale openings take on the role of contingent, material 
“mediators” between diverse registers of value, as well as social and cultural meaning (Douglas and 
Isherwood 1979: 38). As the fourth part of this chapter explores, the Bab El-Falla bale opening thus 
triggers collective translation attempts, which aim to incorporate fripe objects from ‘elsewhere’ into 
local contexts of use. At certain times, the resulting processes of reappropriation or reinvention result 
in the contingent co-production of new cultural forms or the hybridisation of local cultures of 
consumption. At others, such incorporation attempts break down, disqualifying fripe materials from 
commodity exchange. When such moments of failed incorporation expose the fripe as ‘discard’, they 
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lay bare the global inequalities that underpin fripe consumption, yet can also become the grounds for 
the affirmative formulation of distinct local cultures of consumption. 
 
 
a. Translation work with objects from ‘elsewhere’ and the co-production of commodity forms 
 
In some of the fripe shops and stalls of Bab El-Falla – particularly those specialised in globally 
recognisable branded merchandise, like the sneaker shops (discussed in Chapter III) – processes of 
incorporation rarely pose a major challenge as they are normally limited to assessing wear and tear, and 
to negotiating market prices on this basis. However, at the toy stalls or other fripe shops selling 
heterogeneous used objects, unpredictable material encounters during the bale openings set in motion 
“subtle and discriminatory processes of incorporation and rejection” (Miller 1998(a): 18). Collective 
encounters with objects from ‘elsewhere’ in the bale opening thus determine whether and how particular 
fripe objects enter local contexts of use, transforming not only the meaning and uses of circulating 
objects but also local cultures of consumption in the process.  
 
As fripe imports evolve with changing patterns of consumption and donation in Europe and North 
America, a continuous renewal of the types of fripe merchandise disclosed in the Bab El-Falla bale 
opening poses ever-new challenges of incorporation. Usually, the introduction of new commodities to 
a consumer market requires elaborate strategies designed by “médiateurs marchands” (market 
mediators) that accompany such novel products through marketing and advertising campaigns to 
stabilise the commodity’s meaning and value (Cochoy 2001: 176). At the used object stalls of Bab El-
Falla however, the continuous arrival of new or alien merchandise – from a dizzying array of toys, to 
medical bandages or kitchen utensils that are at times pulled from the same tarpaulin bag – is only 
mediated by the collective performances of valuation during the bale opening. Attempts to incorporate 
these diverse fripe objects into local contexts of use are often complicated by, first, visible and invisible 
inscriptions on the material objects and, second, differences in consumer habits between Tunisia and 
the fripe’s multiple destinations of origin. For example, used object traders in Bab El-Falla have found 
themselves inundated with flasks and reusable coffee mugs in recent years, reflecting a trend towards 
the use of reusable drinking containers in Europe and North America. In the Tunisian context however, 
where low-quality tap water requires reliance on bottled water and coffee is mainly consumed on-site 
or in small paper cups, the diverse bottles and mugs have no obvious use and thus accumulate on the 
shelves of the Bab El-Falla fripe boutiques. Fripe traders also often confront objects carrying symbolic 
inscriptions that transgress local notions of acceptability and thus risk damaging the trader’s reputation. 
For instance, Hakim160, who sells accessories in a tiny shop in Bab El-Falla, hides away little owl 
figurines during a bale opening. He later reveals a larger collection of owls he has amassed over time 
and stores away discretely, explaining that, “owls represent “ramz mtaa al-nahs” (a bad omen) in 
Tunisia”. Unable to resolve the clash of meanings – between a symbol of wisdom and a bad omen – 
Hakim’s only hope is to find a foreign customer to whom he can sell his owl collection at a bulk price. 
 
 




Figure V.10   Diverse drinking bottles have recently accumulated in the Bab El-Falla fripe shops (2020) 
 
If straightforward incorporation proves difficult, complex processes of translation contingently attempt 
to remake circulating objects, redefining them as new commodity forms in the local setting (Miller 
1998(b): 185). The collective performances of the bale opening are key to mitigating difficulties of 
incorporation, as dense socio-material encounters provide a stage for the creative adaptation or complete 
reinvention of objects that might at first sight appear ‘out of place’ in the Tunis fripe market. Customers 
or spectators with experience of “al-aisha barra” (life abroad) often speak with particular authority in 
the unfolding negotiations, translating literal and figurative inscriptions with the help of their linguistic 
expertise or knowledge of consumer cultures in the countries of origin. During a particularly crowded 
Saturday bale opening at Amine’s toy stand for example, he pulls a dark leather bag for golf clubs from 
the tarpaulin bag. As he is unsure what the leather container could be used for, he passes the item on 
for inspection to the dense crowd surrounding his stall. Divergent interpretations are offered for what 
the object might have originally represented and what it could be used for in the Tunisian context. A 
young man recounts having seen a similar item as part of a set of hunting equipment on his travels to 
Germany and consults his smartphone to prove his hypothesis. In the meantime, an elderly man decides 
he could use the container to store his fishing equipment. Disagreement then unfolds over the price of 
the container, with the high-quality leather material being evaluated against the outworn straps and the 
unsuitability of the material for wet equipment. Such processes of valuation are always open-ended, at 
times allowing objects like the golf bag to “become something else” (Kirsch 2013: 438) in the new use 
context, and at times leading to its disqualification from market exchange when discrepancies in 
symbolic meaning or consumption habits prove irreconcilable.  
 
Taken together, innumerable moments of such collective valuation work in the bale opening co-
constitute the Bab El-Falla fripe market as a site of contingent cultural production. Through 
incorporation, transnationally circulating fripe garments and objects are adapted or appropriated to local 
use practices or “take on local cultural significance” (Edensor and Kothari 2006: 325), often without 
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physical alteration. At the same time, such contingent processes of incorporation alter local practices of 
dress, leisure or play, and thus translate into changes in local cultures of consumption. A striking recent 
example is the integration of second-hand saris into dress for Tunisian wedding celebrations. As fripe 
traders in Bab El-Falla recount, saris were first imported ‘accidentally’, as part of second-hand 
donations from European and American cities with large South-Asian diaspora populations. Due to 
their alien character in the Tunisian sorting factories, saris were often packaged into so-called “mixed 
bales” alongside other special garment pieces, such as workers’ uniforms or martial arts outfits, or could 
at times be found amongst fripe toy products as the farazet classified them as “carnival costumes”. 
Inadvertently, the saris gained in popularity when Tunisian women began to incorporate them into their 
wedding outfits, a trend that went hand in hand with an increasing fascination for Bollywood films and 
series in Tunisia in recent years. Specialised shops for second-hand saris have now opened up in fripe 
marketplaces like Bab El-Falla, with traders specifically importing them from the United Arab Emirates 
to cater to the increasing demand. The colourful saris are often combined with traditional dresses and 
scarves in Tunisian wedding celebrations, resulting in the emergence of new “hybrid practices of dress” 
and “styles of bricolage” (Reynolds 2012: 5) through the fripe garments’ creative adaptation to local 
contexts of use. 
 
As different types of knowledge, information and aesthetic registers circulate with the fripe materials, 
the Bab El-Falla bale openings bring distant geographical locations, lifestyles and consumption patterns 
into the realm of intimate and embodied encounters. The marketplace thus becomes a stage for complex 
and contingent translation work that shows how “cultures are continually co-produced in global 
interaction” or “friction” (Tsing 2011: 3), here in routinized practices of assessment and exchange 
triggered by encounters with diverse types of fripe merchandise. Cumulatively, such continuous 
translation work in numerous urban fripe markets of Tunis guarantees the gradual incorporation of 
always-evolving flows of fripe garments and objects into local contexts of use. This not only 
demonstrates the “social malleability of things” as they are on the move between different value 
registers (Thompson 1979: 88), it also highlights the central role of collective processes of fripe 
valuation in producing new commodity forms, consumption practices and cultural understandings. The 
promise of discovery that the unpredictable encounters with objects from ‘elsewhere’ hold accounts for 
the fripe markets’ particular appeal as consumption sites. As the next section outlines however, periodic 
failures to incorporate heterogeneous fripe objects into local contexts of use and exchange expose the 
fripe as discard or surplus materials. The collective confrontation with substandard merchandise – or 
indeed trash – in the bale openings thus exposes the contested politics of fripe consumption that is 





Figure V.11   Specialised second-hand sari shops have opened up in the fripe market (2019) 
 
 
b. Failed incorporation and the contested politics of fripe consumption 
 
In nearly all bale opening events, some attempts of incorporation break down, as garments or objects 
fail to requalify for commodity exchange due to their alien character, outworn materials or compromised 
functionality. In such moments of breakdown, the narrow and at times blurry lines between commodity 
and discard come to the fore, exposing the fripe as a transnational flow of surplus materials and charity 
donations. This confronts Tunisian consumers with an imminent “moral dilemma”, revealing “power-
laden relationships between territories connected through used good exchange” (Stamatopoulou-
Robbins 2019: 102). Legacies of fripe imports (discussed in Chapter I) have long positioned Tunisian 
consumers as recipients of donations or discard from Europe and North America and thus inform the 
present-day politics of consumption that surface in Tunis marketplaces. 
 
While layers of inscription on the fripe objects thus at times create intimate “processes of identification 
with the previous owner” (ibid: 70), they can also materialise hierarchies of consumption and the alterity 
that lies in the act of donation. Substandard merchandise in the fripe markets is thus often considered a 
direct reflection of the lack of ‘worth’ of Tunisian consumers, reflecting the intimate and frequently 
politicised relation between market value and feelings of worth. As a German national, I was often 
challenged to explain the moral registers that underpinned the donation practices of my compatriots. 
For instance, the accessory trader Hakim vents his frustration with a batch of heavily damaged watches 
and sunglasses he pulls from a shkara. Addressing me, he angrily remarks, “this merchandise was all 
collected in Germany, and now look at this (…), I mean, how do you explain that the richest people in 
Europe only donate “zibla” (trash)”. Similarly, the toy trader Amine insists on a stark difference in 
quality between fripe merchandise collected in Switzerland and Germany, confronting me repeatedly 
with “completely broken toys from Germany” and concluding once that, “people in your country think 
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their trash is good enough for our children”. In addition, the growing re-export of high-end “crème” 
fripe merchandise to European vintage shops from Tunisian sorting factories is often evoked to 
highlight the Tunisian consumers’ positioning at the very bottom of the global value chain, with even 
high-end used goods being judged as ‘too valuable’ for the domestic market. As the garment trader 
Mouin puts it, “when my father used to work in the fripe during the 70s and 80s, they still found “silaa 
crème” (best-quality merchandise) in the bales, but now all the good stuff is directly sent back to Europe 
because the Europeans pay more for it”. He sighs while sorting pensively through a pile of women’s 
blouses displayed on one of his tables and remarks, “now we are just trading with “les restes du reste 
(leftovers) and need to get used to it”.  
 
Moments of failed incorporation – or more broadly, the expression of frustration about substandard 
fripe merchandise in the bale openings – also triggers broader discussions about the limited 
consumption choices available for ordinary Tunisians, situating fripe consumption within a wider 
politics of consumption in present-day Tunisia. The inadequate choice and quality of consumer goods 
in Tunisia thus often becomes a basis for denouncing the state’s failure to provide for its citizens, 
reflecting the fripe’s historical incorporation into narratives of state care. The low quality of ‘made-in-
Tunisia’ and the gradual demise of local garment production161 has led to the proliferation of import 
wares that are typically referred to as “silaa kontra” (counterfeit merchandise) or chinwa162 on the 
Tunisian domestic market. The flooding of Tunisia’s domestic market with chinwa merchandise 
inadvertently increased the desire for second-hand, as was the case in other contexts on the African 
continent (Ayimpam 2016). The difficult choice between kontra/chinwa and fripe is often debated 
during bale openings, particularly at the Bab El-Falla toy stalls. During the fasting month Ramadan, 
Heba’s sister Nefissa, is searching for Aid163 presents in the fripe for her three children. She explains: 
“It is “haram” (forbidden) to buy from the fripe, I should offer new toys for Aid. But the only affordable 
option is buying chinwa and it is not safe (…), the toys are full of chemicals and children can swallow 
the pieces”. Like Nefissa, many customers of the fripe thus consider the chinwa merchandise not only 
as inferior in quality – captured by the expression “tishri wa tayyish” (buy and throw) – but also as 
inherently unsafe, as the merchandise is associated with “iqtisad al-tahrib” (the smuggling economy) 
and is thus considered to lie beyond state control. Heba voices such concerns when she underlines 
having “thiqa” (trust) in fripe products because “European states protect their citizens, there are a lot 
of regulations and product standards, not like here, where most of what you buy in the “souk Libya” of 
Sidiboumendil164 (Doron 2015) is smuggled.” Hierarchies of ‘worth’ underpinning consumer choices 
in Tunisia are thus not only related to global inequalities, but are also seen as reflective of the Tunisian 
state’s disregard of “al-mawatinin” (its citizens). 
 
While moments of failed incorporation in the bale opening thus reveal the hierarchies and unequal 
power relations that underpin fripe consumption, the tedious valuation work in the bale openings also 
becomes a basis for collectively articulating an affirmative politics of fripe consumption in Tunis. 
Attempts to retrieve value from used objects – even if unsuccessful – are in such cases used to 
demonstrate the moral superiority of Tunisian over Western consumers, as the former exert effort to 
reuse or repair the discard or surplus of the latter. The excess of Western consumer societies is thus not 
 
161 As discussed in Chapter I, the Tunisian textile industry has been predominantly export-oriented since 1972; 
162 This denomination is used as an umbrella term for all cheaply manufactured clothes and consumer goods, irrespective of 
the actual origin of the goods; while some garments and commodities are indeed made-in-China, others are imported 
from South Asia, Turkey or Morocco (and often enter illicitly across the Libyan or Algerian border); 
163 Aid Al-Fitr is the holiday that marks the end of Ramadan, and is celebrated by offering new clothes and toys to children; 
164 The market was transformed through a surge in cross-border trade with Libya during the 1990s, particularly with Asian 
counterfeit and cheaply manufactured products that were imported tax-free to Libya (Meddeb 2012: 63); 
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only considered a result of wealth, but is also ascribed to a more general loss of morals. As Mouin 
explains, “the fripe forces you to think about why people throw things (…), it tells you something about 
European societies, where people just buy and throw without thinking and you realise, they (Europeans) 
have lost the values we still have.” Affirmatively, female fripe customers like Heba or Yasmina thus 
emphasise the “pride” that lies in buying from the fripe as it highlights a capacity to find “qima” (value) 
in things that might appear valueless at first sight, and signals the cultivation of consumer habits that 
emphasise durability and quality over constant renewal and wastefulness. As the fripe accessory trader 
Hakim remarks, “if you buy in the fripe, it means you value the object and pay attention to it as 
something “farid” (unique)”. The increasing presence of unworn garments amongst the fripe – 
frequently exported as leftover stocks by fast-fashion labels and retail outlets – moreover renders visible 
unprecedented surplus production in the global textile economy in Tunis fripe markets. Especially 
young, upper-middle class Tunisians have thus picked up on discourses of sustainability and 
authenticity – often exclusively associated with ‘Western vintage’ – to forge new cultures of 
consumption in the fripe in recent years. From young fashion designers and labels proudly proclaiming 
to work exclusively with materials recovered from the fripe165, to social media influencers gaining a 
reputation for their fashion statements solely featuring fripe garments (Meshkal 2020), a rapid renewal 
of consumer cultures currently alters discourses and politics of fripe consumption in diverse spaces of 
the capital city. 
 
Collective encounters with heterogeneous fripe materials in the Tunis bale openings have triggered 
continuous, open-ended processes of incorporation, sometimes translating into the contingent co-
production of new cultural forms and the alteration of local consumer cultures, and at other times 
triggering moments of breakdown that highlight the incompatibility of different value registers and lay 
bare the contested politics of second-hand consumption. Micro-level processes of incorporation have 
therefore gradually altered understandings of “jdid” (new) and “mustamal” (used) in Tunis, 
complicating commonplace associations of ‘the new’ with what is ‘desirable’. Tunisian consumers now 
routinely identify “prior phases of circulation” as potential “sources of value” (Appelgren and Bohlin 
2015(a): 156), as they demonstrate an object’s durability, allowing the fripe’s status as “assil” or 
“original” (original) to outweigh its secondhandedness. Such cultural understandings are not stable over 
time, but emanate from, and evolve with, situated, socio-material encounters. The dense interactions 
and negotiations of the Tunis bale openings hence offer an intricate insight into the evolving cultures 
of consumption in the contemporary urban fripe economy. 
 
 









Mr. B. walks up and down the spacious studio, where he records his weekly radio show “Chroniques 
de Tunis” (histories of Tunis), which has gained a considerable following due to Mr. B.’s exceptional 
knowledge of the city and talent for finding enticing stories from both past and present166. He gestures 
wildly as he now speaks about the fripe as a “Tunisian passion” and emphasises that the fripe markets 
of Tunis have no semblance with second-hand markets in any of the cities in Europe or North Africa to 
which he has travelled. Suddenly he stops in the middle of the studio and exclaims, “the halan al-bala 
is of course one of the most important events in our city, I mean how is anyone going to understand 
Tunis without attending at least a couple of fripe markets during al-halan?” As if uncertain whether I 
have grasped the significance of his statement, he adds emphatically: “you really need to speak to people 
about the bale openings, you will see it is the only topic you can discuss at any Sunday lunch invitation, 
whether you sit with a family in Daouar Hicher or Hayy Ennasr167, they will have stories to tell about 
al-halan”. 
 
This chapter has provided a close-up examination of the bale opening in one particular Tunis 
marketplace in order to comprehend the specific temporal rhythms, rituals and dynamics of interaction 
that underpin its bi-weekly staging as a ‘public event’. The bale opening is a basis for analysing the 
distinct cultures of consumption that have emerged in the Tunis fripe markets and account for their 
great appeal to urban dwellers of different social class, age and gender, not merely as ‘consumption 
 
166 Appendix I, Interview 38; 
167 Douar Hicher is a dense and predominantly poor, working-class neighbourhood on the North-Western periphery of 
Tunis, see Lamloum and Ali (2015) and Hayy Ennasr is the upper-middle class residential area in which Yasmina and 
Wiem live, see Ben Othman (2009(b));  
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spaces’ but also as destinations for leisure, sociability, or intentional detours on the way home from 
work or grocery shopping. The collective performances of valuation work that unfold in the bale 
openings confer agency to diverse market participants, transforming ‘consumption’ into a co-
constituted act of sorting, probing, assessment and negotiation. Through participation in open-ended 
processes of valuation, market customers become part of temporary publics that allow for dense socio-
material encounters and intimate interactions across difference. Such temporary forms of togetherness 
– or particular opportunities ‘for being in public’ – in turn allow for the joint renegotiation of the fripe 
as inherently contested commodity form. This turns the bale opening into a contingent site of cultural 
co-production, where globally circulating fripe objects can take on new meaning as they become 
incorporated into local contexts of use, or can turn back into discard, laying bare the politics that 
underpin fripe consumption.  
 
As the most visible form of valuation work in the urban fripe economy, the halan al-bala is crucial to 
comprehending fripisation. It shows how the fripe markets produce a prominent contemporary culture 
of consumption in Tunis, influencing rhythms of social life and habits of leisure and shopping, and 
animating patterns of movement and interaction in the city. As a central site of collective valuation 
work in the urban fripe economy, the bale opening draws attention to the multi-layered productive 
processes at work in a consumption space. The marketplace thus becomes visible as a site for the 
emergence of new commodity forms and material practices, with attendant social relations and political 
articulations. Taken together, the innumerable different bale openings in Tunis fripe marketplaces 
should therefore be understood as integral drivers of fripisation: first, they produce socio-material 
densities and create temporary publicness, becoming triggers for the periodic proliferation of fripe 
marketplaces. Second, they generate temporal structures that connect disparate actors, processes and 
sites of fripe valuation across the city. From strictly timed cycles of purchase, delivery and payment in 
the wholesale quarter Zahrouni (explored in Chapter III), to synchronised circulatory mechanisms in 
diverse marketplaces that allow for a bi-weekly turnover of fripe merchandise (examined in Chapter 
IV), every bale opening in Tunis depends on the coordination of disparate actors in the urban economy. 
Third, rather than ‘end points’ of consumption, the bale openings must themselves be understood as the 
start of new cycles of valuation, as collectors of leftovers transform fripe objects through repair or 
disassembly, and as predominantly female farazet transport used garments for resale to women-owned 
tailor shops, private living rooms or other fripe marketplaces. The situated event of the bale opening 














This thesis constructs an account of the fripe as a singular urban economy in Tunis. It does so by 
examining the three questions opened up by the term fripisation in the introduction to this thesis, 
namely: (i) the articulation of a global flow of discards and donations as ‘fripe’ in Tunis and thus as an 
urban commodity form with distinct historicity and cultural significance; (ii) the historical constitution 
of the fripe as a sector of Tunisia’s economy and as a realm of city-making that remains nevertheless 
partially excluded from the ‘formal’ economy and the ‘planned urban order’; (iii) the distributed forms 
of valuation work through which the fripe is enacted as economy in space and becomes an agent of 
urban change in contemporary Tunis. 
 
The inherent untranslatability of the term ‘fripe’ constitutes a generative opening for exploring the 
specific urban articulations of the global second-hand economy in Tunis. The first part of this thesis 
builds a hitherto unwritten historical account of the fripe’s constitution as contested urban economy, 
investigating the systems of differentiation that variably excluded or included the fripe into mechanisms 
of governing and modes of spatial production in post-independence Tunis. The second part of this thesis 
illustrates the entangled processes of market- and space-making through which the fripe is enacted in 
contemporary Tunis and becomes constitutive to urban transformations, as captured in the vernacular 
word creation fripisation. The remainder of the conclusion demonstrates the urgency of the problem 
this thesis addresses – namely what can be known and thus brought to matter as forms of economy in 
contemporary cities – in light of the catastrophic effects of the governance of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on the fripe economy in Tunis over the past year and a half. It shows how a perspective on the fripe as 
singular urban economy provides a tool for reading the present conjuncture of crisis and becomes a 
basis for challenging the narrow parameters of debate that have worked to remove ‘the economy’ from 
the realms of urban expertise, practice and politics that are here shown to constitute the fripe in Tunis. 
 
The urban articulations of a global crisis 
 
The far-reaching impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Tunis fripe economy once again lay bare 
the contingent urban articulations of the global economy. Disruptions to international trade, market 
closures that were ordered as part of consecutive national lockdowns in Tunisia, and a particular politics 
of pricing in Tunis fripe markets are inextricably intertwined, locating the fripe firmly in global market 
dynamics while simultaneously underscoring its singular constitution as a politically salient commodity 
form in Tunis. 
 
The lockdowns imposed in Europe to stem the spread of the COVID-19 virus in spring 2020 caused 
temporary interruptions in collection cycles of charity donations, as well as in the sale of surplus stocks. 
More importantly, a global shipping container shortage and resulting disruptions to international 
shipping slowed down the export-import business between Europe, North America and Tunisia, and 
temporary closures of the Rades container port further delayed arrivals of fripe merchandise to Tunisia’s 
sorting factories. In addition, the re-export business of fripe from Tunisia was severely impacted by 
periodic international border closures, together with the strictly enforced, nation-wide lockdown in 
Algeria that resulted in plummeting market demand and complicated cross-border movement. 
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While these disruptions of the import-export business were first felt by owners of collection and export 
companies in Europe167 or fripe importers and sorting factory owners in Tunisia, their reverberations 
rapidly reached diverse market-makers in the fripe economy in Tunis. From sorting workers who 
suddenly found their factories closed to wholesalers who lost their principal clients – first from Algeria 
and then on the domestic market when a national lockdown was imposed – the crisis resulted in a rapid 
unmaking of scales, demonstrated through its impacts on multiple locations of fripe valuation work in 
Tunis. When the Tunis fripe markets were allowed to reopen with the lifting of the first lockdown in 
early summer 2020, the wholesalers had therefore been left with their winter stocks and summer wear 
remained scarce. To make up for the losses incurred through unsold winter merchandise, they greatly 
inflated wholesale prices, confronting retail traders with a difficult situation: while most had remained 
without income and unsold garments were piling up in their shops or storages, they now had to invest 
in summer merchandise. To buy new bales, many fripe traders were hence forced to borrow money and 
subsequently raised consumer prices to recover at least parts of their expenses.  
 
The global crisis thus became directly palpable in skyrocketing prices in Tunis fripe marketplaces, as 
was the case in second-hand economies elsewhere on the African continent. The particular political 
salience of such price hikes in the Tunis fripe however can only be understood through an insight into 
the fripe’s distinct political economy and socio-spatial histories that associate it with a post-
independence promise of a ‘life in dignity’ for all Tunisians. In the 2011 revolution, the slogan – “amal, 
hurriya, karama wataniyya” (work, freedom, national dignity) – came to underscore the socio-
economic demands of protestors (Dakhli 2013) who deplored the state’s failure to provide the basic 
conditions for a life in dignity (e.g. Ayeb 2011; Allal 2016). Ever since, exacerbating socio-economic 
crisis has only reinforced such grievances, with IMF-imposed austerity and the depreciation of the 
Tunisian Dinar triggering inflation and reducing people’s purchasing power (Aliriza 2020; Ben Rouine 
2018). The import of fripe merchandise in foreign currency entailed price increases even before the 
COVID-19 pandemic, helping to spur on waves of socio-economic protest (Middle East Eye 2018, 
2019, The Washington Post 2021). As the income of the average Tunisian family has shrunk at even 
more dramatic rates over the past year (Meshkal 2021(b)), renewed price hikes compromise the 
affordability of the fripe for increasing numbers of urban dwellers. This signals the rupture of a symbolic 
social contract between the state and its citizenry and turns the city’s fripe markets into potential sites 
for political contestation. 
 
Historically constituted systems of differentiation 
 
Despite the politicised character of fripe pricing, which has prompted the government to repeatedly 
postpone sector reform over the past decade, the governance of the COVID-19 pandemic highlights 
how historically constituted systems of differentiation have deliberately denied the fripe recognition as 
‘urban economy’. As the first part of this thesis demonstrates, contemporary framings of the fripe as 
‘black box’, and thus as a realm beyond formal knowledge on ‘the economy’ and ‘the planned urban 
order’, have emerged through trajectories of partial incorporation of the fripe into modes of government 
and spatial production in post-independence Tunis. Exposing the performative mechanisms of 
delimitation that underpin prefixes like ‘informal’ or ‘unplanned’ sheds new light on the politics that 
position the fripe as contested urban economy. The power of such historically constituted systems of 
differentiation becomes particularly evident – and politically salient – in moments of crisis, as was the 
case with repeated fripe market closures during consecutive COVID-19 lockdowns and a tragic blaze 
that destroyed a part of the oldest Tunis fripe market in May 2020.  
 
167 Appendix I, Interview 41; 
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First, the systematic closure of weekly souks and specialised fripe markets in Tunis, from the initial 
national lockdown in spring 2020 to the latest closures decided on April 7th 2021, accentuate the 
continued disregard for the fripe as an integral part of the urban economy. While official debates on the 
economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic centred on tourism – a crucial source of foreign exchange 
revenue in Tunisia – the catastrophic impacts of forced market closures in and beyond Tunis went 
largely unnoticed. Reflecting the long-standing stigmatisation of unenclosed souks as crowded and 
unhygienic spaces, the authorities ordered the closure of open-air markets in Tunis every time infection 
levels soared, while covered marchés and supermarkets continued to operate without restrictions. In 
addition to jeopardising the fresh food supplies of a majority of urban dwellers, such market closures 
deprived Tunis residents of their access to affordable clothes, shoes or household equipment from the 
fripe. While state aid to those affected by the lockdowns was meagre and patchy to say the least168 
(Meshkal 2021(a)), the non-formalised character of most fripe markets excluded the bulk of those 
earning a living in the fripe trade from any form of state support, leaving not only market traders, but 
also transporters, itinerant vendors and diverse resellers without income. The fripe’s exclusion from 
what matters as ‘economy’ in the midst of an exacerbating socio-economic crisis was facilitated by the 
absence of employment figures, information on revenues generated in the sector, or other forms of 
authoritative knowledge that could have contested its framing as an ‘unproductive’ trade without added 
value to the national economy. 
 
Second, the reactions to a fire that destroyed large parts of the oldest fripe market of Tunis in the Hafsia 
in May 2020 demonstrate that the fripe trade’s presence in the city continues to be ‘tolerated’ rather 
than ‘recognised’, a positioning that is perpetuated by the fripe’s absence from official accounts of 
urban development and change. During the night of Wednesday, May 13th 2020, a blaze spread rapidly 
across an area of 1000 m2, ravaging inflammable wooden market stalls and bales of fripe wares held in 
the adjacent shops and storages. The incident turned to ashes the livelihoods of 13 fripe traders in the 
inner-market and occurred at a time when their businesses had already been thrown into disarray by the 
COVID-19 lockdown, which had forced traders to keep their market closed for two months. While the 
fire attracted widespread media attention (Reuters 2020) and members of the municipal council came 
to visit the destroyed market, the fripe traders were wary of the authorities’ attention, fearing that the 
razing of stalls could be used as a pretext to seize the municipal land on which they had auto-constructed 
the market during the 1960s. To pre-empt losing what one of the Hafsia traders described as "blasetna 
fil medina" (our place in the city), the traders hurriedly erected concrete foundations at the centre of the 
destroyed market. While no attempt was made to seize the municipal land after the fire, the traders’ 
mistrust of “al-hakim” (the state) reflects the fripe trade’s continued exclusion from mechanisms of 
formal recognition – such as titling and registration procedures – even in locations where fripe markets 
became consolidated decades ago and where its trader constituencies assumed a central role in processes 
of urban transformation.  
 
Such moments of crisis expose the enduring and material effects of the systems of differentiation that 
have worked to position the fripe as a contested urban economy in Tunis. This highlights the importance 
of explicitly interrogating the formal regimes of knowledge production that produce and perpetuate 
various pre-fixes – such as the ‘informal’ or the ‘unplanned’ – excluding vast realms of economic 
activity from full recognition in contemporary cities. Understanding the historical constitution of such 
systems of differentiation draws attention to, first, the role of various state actors in producing shifting 
delimitations of the economy, using ambiguous mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion as tools for 
 
168 Two payments of 200 TD (appr. 60€) were made to the head of the household, but only a fraction of applicants were 
accepted; 
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governing. Second, it sheds light on grounded histories of space-making that render legible the 
economy’s role in structuring urban space – from the consolidation of particular urban forms to the 
production of evolving patterns of socio-spatial order – while simultaneously accounting for its official 
exclusion from planning policies and conceptions of what constitutes ‘the urban order’. Beyond the 
context of the Tunis fripe economy, such a perspective makes the case for reconsidering urban 
economies – often framed as a priori ‘informal economies’ in cities of the Global South – as historically 
constituted realms of government and spatial production. This approach to economies provides a 
vantage point from which to investigate processes of urban transformation and the politics that underpin 
them. 
 
Shifting urban geographies of the economy 
 
Comprehending the fripe as an historically constituted urban economy is a precondition to analysing its 
contemporary enactment in and through urban space. The unstable commodity status of fripe imports 
draws attention to the distributed forms of valuation work required to enable their renewed circulation 
in Tunis, connecting disparate actors and sites across the city and providing insight into the fripe’s 
structure as urban economy. An investigation of collective enactments of fripe valuation in urban space 
renders visible the fripe economy’s role as agent of – often contested – urban change. From localised 
urban transformations and temporary collective performances, to webs of interdependencies that tie 
together different sites of fripisation, this exposes the shifting urban geographies of the fripe economy 
in contemporary Tunis. Such an emphasis on the entanglements between market- and space-making 
shows in a new light recent fripe market closures that were imposed as a part of the sanitary measures 
to curb the spread of COVID-19, elucidating the far-reaching impacts of upending collective enactments 
of fripe valuation in urban space.  
 
Repeated fripe market closures in the capital over the past 18 months temporarily disrupted the 
collective enactments of valuation work analysed in this thesis, halting or even reversing different 
processes of fripisation in the city. The forced shut-down of marketplaces not only affected the traders 
and customers frequenting these physical market sites, it also upended the synchronised mechanisms of 
circulation that enable their functioning, thus provoking knock-on effects for diverse market-makers 
and in different sites of valuation work across Tunis. First, the loss of periodic market densities and 
coordinated patterns of turnover of fripe merchandise adversely affected shopkeepers, street vendors, 
waste collectors, female resellers, as well as numerous auxiliary businesses enrolled in the 
marketplaces’ circulatory mechanisms. Second, beyond the physical marketplace, wholesalers, 
transporters and sorting workers who enable the movement and intermittent stoppage of different fripe 
commodities were also impacted. Even when the Tunis fripe markets were allowed to reopen, most 
traders lacked cash to invest in new fripe bales and were thus unable to revive joint temporalities of 
delivery, payment and resale. Consequently, few marketplaces succeeded in resuming regular patterns 
of bale opening; the collective performances of valuation work staging the socio-material encounters 
and negotiations that constitute vital preconditions for fripe consumption, and thus market exchange. 
 
The lasting rupture of diverse collective enactments of fripe valuation translated into visible changes in 
urban space, returning residential calm to the backstreets of the Tunis warehouse quarter and different 
fripe street markets in the inner city, and halting bi-weekly processes of market proliferation during the 
bale openings in different urban districts. In the meantime, however, market closures also prompted 
shifts in urban geographies of fripe valuation, circulation and exchange, driving less visible processes 
of fripisation in other urban spaces. First, itinerant fripe traders and nassaba (street vendors) rapidly 
reorganised to create new commercial densities when the fripe markets closed. At times, they did so by 
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reaching mutually beneficial agreements with the police or local officials to revive parts of the fripe 
markets, building upon existing modes of cooperation between traders and diverse state actors in the 
fripe economy. At other times, the nassaba risked confiscation or arrest to benefit from their new 
monopoly position in providing fripe merchandise by clustering around supermarkets that remained 
open. Second, alternative channels of fripe distribution and sale gained in importance when 
marketplaces were shut down. For instance, many fripe shopkeepers whose businesses were officially 
closed stayed in touch with their loyal clients over the phone, inviting them to collect items or inspect 
leftover merchandise. In some shops, “kliunat khassa” (special clients) were convened for ‘private bale 
openings’, which took place behind closed doors or drawn curtains and allowed traders to charge a 
substantial mark-up. Simultaneously, pre-existing channels of resale – most of which are operated by 
female farazet (sorters) – expanded rapidly over the past year. Diverse, mainly female-run businesses, 
from hair salons or beauty parlours to tailor shops, as well as parts of private houses, were thus 
transformed into fripe resale locations. In addition to guaranteeing access to affordable clothing and 
income generation, such resale locations functioned as rare spaces for female sociability beyond the 
family circle during the lockdowns.  
 
These most recent shifts in urban geographies of fripisation highlight the co-constitutive character of 
economic processes and urban space, demonstrating how enforced market closures lastingly disrupted 
collective enactments of fripe valuation but also provoked inconspicuous forms of spatial production in 
urban locations that have found little room for consideration in this thesis. Analysing the economy 
through the specific processes that articulate it in urban space foregrounds a conception of market-
makers as space-makers (and vice versa), therefore drawing attention to spatial practices – for instance 
of navigation, boundary-making or staging – as integral element to the making of markets. This in turn 
advances an ontology of the economy as both spatially constituted and as a central agent of urban 
transformation. As this thesis highlights, market-making can serve as an organisational basis to 
collectively compete for and remake urban space, especially for those who remain excluded from 
official mechanisms of city-making. Less visibly, routinised practices of market-making of diverse 
urban dwellers – from traders to market customers or resellers – renegotiate boundaries between private 
and public realms, alter the uses of urban space, or expand city limits, and thus co-produce urban 
change. Beyond the particular case of the fripe in Tunis, the evolving urban geographies of the economy 
foreground distributed forms of agency and the politics of their interconnection, thus enabling 
alternative accounts of urban transformation. 
 
Reclaiming ‘the economy’ as a sphere of politics 
 
Initial hopes that the political opening in the aftermath of the 2011 Tunisian revolution would allow for 
reclaiming ‘the economy’ as a sphere of radical politics were rapidly dashed.  While the demise of the 
Ben Ali regime weakened political taboos regarding socio-economic inequalities and corruption in 
Tunisia, attempts to channel revolutionary demands for social and economic justice into a political 
agenda that would formulate alternatives to Tunisia’s extroverted neoliberal growth model failed (Allal 
2016: 19). In fact, the resumption of Tunisia’s long legacy of foreign borrowing from the IMF (Murphy 
1999: 96), renewed in 2013 and subsequently expanded by a series of technocratic governments, worked 
systematically to remove ‘the national economy’ once again from the sphere of politics (Fernández-
Molina 2018: 385). The negotiation of consecutive loan packages – the most recent of which has just 
been concluded – reduced the management of the national economy to a technocratic numbers-game 
dictated by the overlapping conditionalities of IMF-loans, accompanying WB development policy loans 
and political and economic stipulations by the EU and other foreign donors (Aliriza 2020: 37). The 
exacerbated socio-economic crisis since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in Tunisia has not 
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translated into any critical shifts in this narrow political debate on ‘the national economy’. On the 
contrary, the sanitary measures taken by the government reconfirm its disregard for realms of economic 
activity like the fripe that provide employment and vital supplies to large numbers of Tunisians, and yet 
continue to be excluded from what can be officially governed as ‘economy’ due to a lack of authoritative 
economic knowledge and in particular the absence of a production process in the classical sense. 
The crisis that is currently unfolding in the urban fripe economy in Tunis reiterates the urgency of the 
question this research poses, namely what can be known – and thus recognised and brought to matter – 
as practices and forms of economy in contemporary cities. In constructing an account of the fripe as 
singular urban economy, this research intentionally removes ‘the economy’ from a sphere of abstract 
calculation and expert knowledge, anchoring it instead in a realm of practice, knowledge and experience 
that is intimately familiar to a large majority of contemporary Tunis residents. In doing so, this thesis 
advances the notion of the ‘urban economy’ as a tool for extending knowledge production to spheres of 
urban co-production that are normally cast as undeserving of economic analysis in their own right. The 
resulting epistemological and ontological approach contests the narrow parameters of contemporary 
debate on the national political economy in two ways: one is the foregrounding of new types of expertise 
and diverse modes of production as a basis for comprehending what makes the economy and determines 
its evolving spatial forms in the city. The other is the advancement of an understanding of market-
making as a contingent result of concrete negotiations and contestations over urban space and the urban 
order, repositioning a seemingly mundane realm of the economy as a sphere of urban politics. 
Knowing the fripe as an economy relies first and foremost on the practices, expertise and accounts of 
its diverse market-makers. Some of these market-makers, such as first-generation rural migrant traders, 
have historically been excluded from what can be recognised as ‘urban economy’ in Tunis and are thus 
not normally perceived to have economic expertise. Other actors in the fripe economy, such as local 
state agents, female resellers or market customers, tend to be excluded from consideration as market-
makers altogether. Insisting on producing knowledge through an engagement with these diverse market-
makers illuminates the variegated productive processes constituting the urban economy, challenging an 
ontology of the fripe as an ‘unproductive’ commercial activity with discard objects. The understanding 
of the urban economy this account brings to the fore thus demonstrates, first, the grounded socio-spatial 
histories that underpin its present-day structures in the urban realm, highlighting how the economy 
becomes a crucial resource for collective social organising and the co-production and consolidation of 
urban space. Second, it underscores a conception of the economy as a continuous realm of meaning-
making – productive of a distinct language, commodity forms and consumer cultures, and professional 
or kinship identities – that forms an integral element of urban life. Finally, the urban economy here 
emerges as a field of evolving power relations, characterised by exploitative hierarchies and extractive 
modes of government, but also by openings that allow for the circumvention of dominant power 
constellations. Taken together, this approach advances an understanding of the economy through its 
singular articulations and enactments in the contemporary city, contesting the narrow delimitations of 
what can be recognised as ‘economy’ and can thus be brought into the orbit of contemporary political 
debate. 
 
The epistemological and ontological perspective underpinning the notion of the ‘urban economy’ this 
thesis advances thus carries particular political implications. An emphasis on the economy as 
constitutive to, and in turn knowable through, urban space precludes an abstraction of ‘the economic’ 
from the concrete social and political demands and struggles that come to the fore by grounding it in 
particular urban environments. This reorients the politics of economy away from an abstract sphere of 
expert calculation – dictated by loan conditionalities and monopolised by numbers games in 
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contemporary Tunisia – towards different sites of urban practice, and thus places it under renewed 
public scrutiny. The notion of the ‘urban economy’ therefore deliberately highlights the entangled 
governance of spatial and economic processes, calling for modes of urban governance that move away 
from reductive framings of economies as ‘informal’ and ‘unplanned’ and instead recognise and take 
into account their distinct agency in structuring and ordering urban space. Showing how mechanisms 
of spatial governance directly impact processes of market-making hence extends the politics of the 
economy to decisions on conditions for access to urban public space, regulations on construction and 
occupancy rights, and other forms of planning, policy and regulation typically located in the realm of 
‘urban governance’.  
 
The concept of the ‘urban economy’ therefore positions economic activities as drivers of diverse forms 
of urban transformation, including processes of change that circumvent, alter or contest the prevailing 
urban order. Consequently, the economy appears as sets of practices through which urban change 
processes are co-produced and at times become politicised, as captured in the Tunisian context by the 
word creation fripisation. From tangible transformations of the built environment that trigger open 
conflict to inconspicuous alterations of urban space that quietly readjust power relations between gender 
groups or migrant traders and established shopkeepers; processes of market-making hence become the 
basis for renegotiating the officially delimited urban order. Similar to more amply documented urban 
struggles related to housing, access to infrastructure, or public space in contemporary cities, the 
economy is here brought to matter as a crucial sphere of urban politics. Histories of partial incorporation 
of economies that are not officially planned for nor accommodated in the city render particularly visible 
the politics that underpin seemingly mundane, interconnected processes of market- and space-making. 
Beyond redefining what can be known and brought to matter as economies in contemporary cities, 
building accounts of such singular urban economies opens up new imaginaries for the formulation of a 







Only interviews cited in footnotes to the main text are listed and names are only disclosed if explicit consent was 
given. All interviews listed were scheduled as formal research interviews and recorded (unless noted otherwise) 
and written consent was obtained. Many of these formal interview situations resulted in subsequent informal 
meetings (see introductions to Part One and Two for a detailed discussion) that are not included in the table below. 
 
 
Interview N° Name/institution Date and location 
1 Two co-founders of the citizens’ initiative 
Winouetrottoir? (where is the sidewalk?), involved 
in the petition against informal markets/street 
vending to the Tunis governor; 
Coffeeshop in Lac II, Tunis, 
November 28th 2017 
2 Tarek Ben Jezia, Director General of the Institut 
National de la Consommation (INC) (National 
Consumption Institute); 
INC Office, Tunis, August 5th 2018 
3 Senior employee in charge of textile sector, 
Association de la Promotion de l’Industrie et de 
l‘Innovation (APII); 
APII Office, Tunis, April 21st 2018 
4 Vintage shop owner in Paris, subsequent tour of 
two vintage shops and warehouse (not recorded); 
Paris 19th and 20th arrondissement, 
France, November 17th and 18th 2017 
5 Importer/fripe sorting factory owner in Bizerte, 
subsequent factory visit with main factory 
supervisor (not recorded); 
 
Second interview with same sorting factory owner 
(not recorded); 
Sorting Factory, Southern periphery of 
Bizerte, December 4th 2017 
 
 
Chez Joseph Restaurant, Lafayette, 
Tunis, July 21st 2018 
6 Importer/fripe sorting factory owner in Sfax, with 
subsequent factory visit (not recorded);  
Sorting Factory, Northern periphery of 
Sfax, July 8th 2018 
7 Public relations officer, OCT (Office du Commerce 
Tunisien); 
 
Second meeting to receive estimates for fripe 
export/import volumes; 
OCT Office, Tunis, April 20th 2018 
 
 
April 26th 2018 
8 Senior Spanish employee of transnational shipping 
company in Rades Container Port; 
Office of transnational shipping 
company, Rades container port, Tunis, 
October 23rd 2019 
9 Professors of Geography, University of Tunis, Prof. 
Mourad Ben Jalloul, Prof. Hamadi Tizaoui, Prof. 
Fawzi Zerai; 
Including assisted library and catalogue search; 
Three separate meetings, University of 
Tunis, Faculty for Social Sciences, 
October–December 2017 
10 Prof. Hassan Boubakri, University of Sousse/Sfax 
Makrem Mandhouj, University of Sousse/Sfax; 
Including assisted library and catalogue search; 
Field visit of fripe market and Msaken market; 
University of Sousse, Sousse, October 
25th–26th 2019 
11 Prof. Faouzi Saadaoui, Institut Supérieur d’Histoire 
du Mouvement National; 
Manouba University, Tunis, August 
17th 2018 
12 Prof. Bechir Yazidi, Institut de l’histoire de la 
Tunisie contemporaine; 
Including assisted library, catalogue and archive 
search; 
Manouba University, Tunis, May 14th 
2018 
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13 Director of Geography Laboratory SYFACTE, 
Prof. Ali Bennasr and Prof. Fethi Rekik; 
University of Sfax, Sfax, October 30th 
2018 
14 Olfa Ben Medien, Faculté d’Urbanisme, ISTEUB 
(Institut Supérieur des Technologies de 
l’Environnement et de l’Urbanisme); 
ISTEUB, Tunis, November 9th 2017 
15 Nejm Dhaher, Faculté d’Urbanisme, ENAU (École 
Nationale d’Architecture et d’Urbanisme); 
ENAU, Tunis, November 13th 2017 
16 Zoubeir Mouhli, Architect and Director General of 
the Association de la Sauvegarde de la Medina 
(ASM); 
 
Consultation of ASM archives under supervision of 
ASM staff, specifically the Hafsia project 
documentation; 
Dar Lasram, ASM office, Tunis, 




ASM, February 5th–7th 2018 
17 Employee of the Institut National du Patrimoine 
(INP); 
INP, Tunis, September 27th 2017 
18 Public relations officer of Office National de 
l’Artisanat Tunisien (ONAT); 
ONAT, Tunis, September 25th 2017 
19 Former fripe importer (licensed in 1960s, now 
retired), whose son continues to operate in the fripe 
import/wholesale business; 
Private house in Tunis suburb, May 
24th 2019 
20 Wholesaler operating (officially) in Sfax, and 
(unofficially) in all of Tunisia, also managing 
unlicensed imports since 2012 (not recorded); 
Office, warehouse and private houses, 
Sfax, July 6th 2018 
21 Public relations officer in the Ministry of 
Commerce; 
 
Official charged with the “fripe file” in the Ministry 
of Commerce; 
Ministry of Commerce, Tunis, May 
21st 2018 
 
Ministry of Commerce, Tunis, August 
5th 2018 
22 Néjib Karafi, Director General of the Fédération 
Tunisienne du Textile et de l’Habillement (FTTH)  
FTTH Office, Tunis, June 19th 2018 
 
23 Member of the presidential reform committee of the 
fripe sector, official in the Ministry of Social 
Affairs; 
Ministry of Social Affairs, Tunis, 
April 25th 2018 
24 Technical staff member involved in reform process 
of the fripe file; 
Ministry of Commerce, Tunis, May 
21st 2019 
25 Senior official charged with the “fripe file” in the 
Ministry of Industry; 
 
Senior official in charge of “industries de 
l’habillement” (textile industry); 
Ministry of Industry, Tunis, May 21st 
2018 
 
Ministry of Industry, Tunis, May 22nd 
2018 
26 Hamdi Kannou, President of the CONECT 
(Confédération des Entreprises Citoyennes de 
Tunisie) interprofessional grouping representing the 
fripe sector; 
CONECT Office, Tunis 
27 Fethi Bezrati, President of the Chambre Nationale 
des Importateurs, Exportateurs et Transformateurs 
de la friperie UTICA (Union Tunisienne des 
Industries, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat); 
UTICA Office, Tunis, June 26th 2018 
28 Sahbi Maalaoui, President of the Chambre 
Nationale des Commerçants Grossistes de Friperie 
UTICA Office, Tunis, July 24th 2018 
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UTICA (Union Tunisienne des Industries, du 
Commerce et de l’Artisanat); 
29 Senior official in the Ministry of Finance and 
member of the presidential reform committee for 
the fripe sector; 
Ministry of Finance, Tunis, April 25th 
2018 
30 Urbanist/urban planner and researcher formerly 
working with the ASM (Association de la 
Sauvegarde de la Medina), with a central role in the 
Hafsia renewal project; 
Private planning Office, Tunis, May 
10th 2018 
31 Faika Bejaoui, one of the architects involved in the 
Hafsia renewal project on behalf of the Association 
de la Sauvegarde de la Medina (ASM); 
Dar Lasram, Office of ASM, Tunis, on 
June 15th 2018 
32 (Retired) urban planner/architect involved in the 
elaboration of Cité Ibn Khaldoun; 
Private house, Tunis, February 18th 
2018; 
33 Urban planner/architect involved in the Hafsia 
renovation project during the second phase (1980s–
1990s) and the evaluation committee in the 1990s; 
Coffeeshop, La Marsa, Tunis, May 
21st 2019 
34 Resident of Menzah VIII, 30 year old marketing 
specialist, who grew up in a middle-class household 
in Ibn Khaldoun; 
Coffeeshop in city centre, then Ibn 
Khaldoun, June 23rd 2019 
35 Head of the textile chamber in UGTT (Tunisian 
General Trade Union); 
 
Employee of the UGTT textile chamber, in charge 
of factory inspections 
UGTT, Tunis, August 17th 2017 
 
 
UGTT, Tunis, April 26th 2018 
36 Member of the Municipal Council (Délégation 
Spéciale) of Tunis (contacted specifically to 
comment on the market clearance/relocation 
campaign); 
Tunis municipality, Tunis, August 30th 
2017 
37  Employees of Direction des Marchés Municipaux 
(for subsequent interviews, see Annex II/Chapter 
IV) 
Municipal market authority, Central 
Market of Tunis, November 13th 2017 
38 Prominent radio presenter in Radio Tunisie/Radio 
Nationale Tunisienne (Tunisian National Radio) 
Studio of Tunisian National Radio, 
Lafayette, Tunis, May 15th 2018 
39 Importer/fripe sorting factory owner in Tunis; 
Subsequent interview with factory supervisor and 
fripe sorting workers (not recorded); 
Sorting Factory, North-Eastern 
periphery of Tunis/Mornaguia, 
October 5th 2018 
40 Bilel Kammoun, fripe wholesaler in Sfax and 
owner of the fripe chain store Kilostore; 
Two chain stores and warehouse, Sfax, 
July 3rd and 4th 2018 
41 Tunisian-French owner of commercial collection 
company in Paris, active in import/export-business 
with fripe from and to Tunisia since 2003; 
Coffeeshop, Paris, November 18th 
2017; 
Coffeeshop, Tunis, July 26th 2018; 
Phone conversation, December 18th 
2020 




KEY INTERLOCUTORS FEATURED IN THE THESIS 
 
Selected key interlocutors cited in footnotes to the main text are listed. The table aims to provide an insight into 
the ethnographic methods underpinning the accounts constructed in Ch. II-V, but remains non-exhaustive. All 
names are anonymised to respect confidentiality and none of the interlocutors is visible in any of the photo material 




 Name (role, place) Research engagements Time period 
Chapter II 
1. Najib (fripier/fripe 
stall owner, 
Hafsia) 
First meeting at stall space in the Hafsia (introduced by 
Ahmed); repeated visits and conversations at the stall; 
recorded life history interview in Hafsia cafe after market 
closing hours (part I); recorded life history interview at stall 
space after closing hours (part II); regular follow-up visits 
at the Hafsia stall space (Najib’s stall burnt down in the 
May 2020 fire). 
November 4th 2017 – 
December 19th 2020 





Chance encounter with Ahmed in fripe shop in the Hafsia; 
repeated visits and conversations; meeting with Hamadi in 
shop (arranged by Ahmed); recorded life history interview 
with Hamadi (part I and part II) in shop; recorded life 
history interview with Hamadi (part III) in private home in 
Bardo; Private invitation in private home in Bardo and 
follow-up visits of Ahmed in fripe shop (Hamadi can no 
longer travel the long distance to the shop space). 
November 2nd 2017 – 
December 19th 2020 
3. Adel (fripier/fripe 
stall owner and 
itinerant trader, 
Ibn Khaldoun) 
Chance encounter in the lower part of the Ibn Khaldoun 
fripe market; recurrent meetings in the Ibn Khaldoun 
market; tour of the upper fripe market; recorded life history 
interview (with Slim) at the market stalls in Ibn Khaldoun 
on Sunday (part I); two go-alongs to weekly souk of 
Ezzahra and Rades (with two young assistants); recorded 
life history interview (with Slim) in cafe in upper part of 
Ibn Khaldoun, with subsequent tour through the 
cite/neighbourhood; meeting and conversation with Adel’s 
mother in private home (recorded as part of life history 
interview). 
December 12th 2017 
– March 4th 2019 
4. Slim (fripier/fripe 
stall owner and 
itinerant trader, 
Ibn Khaldoun) 
First meeting in the lower part of the Ibn Khaldoun market 
(introduced by Adel); recorded life history interview (with 
Adel) at the market stalls in Ibn Khaldoun on Sunday (part 
I); recorded life history interview (with Adel) in cafe in 
upper part of Ibn Khaldoun, with subsequent tour through 
the cite/neighbourhood. 
April 19th 2018 – 
March 4th 2019 
Chapter III 




Encounter with Ahmed in Fethi’s fripe sneaker boutique 
(introduced by Fethi), conversation; two go-alongs with 
Ahmed and his friends, first to bale opening in sneaker 
street and second to sneaker shop street in El Aouina. 
December 2nd 2017 – 




First meeting in the sorting factory (introduced by factory 
supervisor); shadowing of working practices in the factory 
on two separate working days (second time exclusively 
between shoe section and beit el-krema); two go-alongs 
between factory and home on urban periphery (commute in 
October 5th 2018 – 
November 22nd 2020  
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both directions); participant observation in home resale on 
two Saturdays; follow-up visit in private home. 






First meeting in Zahrouni and tour of showroom/ 
warehouses (introduced by Nessima); Situated shadowing 
of working practices in wholesale quarter with each of them 
for one half day; Two follow-up visits over subsequent 
months; one afternoon spent following sales in Ibrahim’s 
showroom. 
May 21st 2018 – 




Chance encounter in Bab El-Falla marketplace and on-site 
conversation; first (accompanied) go-along between 
Zahrouni and Bab El-Falla; then four all-day go-alongs 
(alone) between Zahrouni and diverse marketplaces of 
Tunis; on two later occasions, go-alongs for fripe deliveries 
(from large wholesalers to smaller wholesalers) outside the 
capital (to Bizerte, Nabeul); Repeated meetings, including 
follow-up meetings, in cafes in inner-city marketplaces, 
mainly the Hafsia. 
October 27th 2017 – 
October 14th 2020 




Chance encounter in Bab El-Falla and repeated on-site 
visits and conversations in shoe shop; observation of 
preparation and routines of bale opening on Tuesday and 
Saturday in shoe shop; one week of daily observations and 
conversations, including shadowing of Montassar’s 
purchases in Zahrouni, distribution relations in and around 
Bab el-Falla, to comprehend weekly shop routines; regular 
follow-up visits of Fethi in shoe shop (Montassar stopped 
working with Fethi after a dispute in December 2019). 
October 21st 2017 – 






Chance encounter with Kamel in fripe shop in Rue du 
Liban; regular visits in shop space, usually after market 
closing hours (on commutes/grocery shopping route); 
recorded interview in front of shop after market closing 
hours (history of market emergence); shadowing of 
working routines on two separate bale opening days (with 
Kamel’s son and wife); visit in private home/introduction of 
family, and two follow-up visits. 
September 2nd 2017 – 
December 17th 2020 
11. Bilel 
(nassab/street 
vendor, Rue du 
Liban) 
Recurrent meetings with Bilel in Nessima’s shop space 
(introduced by Nessima); two go-alongs for purchases in 
Zahrouni (with Nessima); meetings and conversations in 
Rue du Liban; shadowing of Bilel’s working routines for 
two half days, including before and after market 
opening/closing hours to comprehend Bilel’s supply and 
distribution system. 
May 3rd 2018 – 
October 23rd 2018 
12. Mohamed (fripe 
reseller, Rue du 
Liban) 
Meeting with Mohamed in Kamel’s shop (introduced by 
Kamel); regular visits of Mohamed in sale position on 
market peripheries; shadowing of vending practices and 
policing of market entrance on two consecutive days; 
meeting with Mohamed on Monday morning for leftover 
collection in market and subsequent distribution to faraza in 
a garage outside the market. 
April 23rd 2018 – 




Hafsia and then 
Rue du Liban) 
Meeting in the Hafsia fripe market (introduced by fellow 
traders for specialization in fur products); repeated 
conversations in shop; accompanied move from the Hafsia 
to Rue du Liban in December 2018; follow-up visits in the 
new shop in Rue du Liban. 
September 27th 2018 
– December 3rd 2019 
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Meeting in Nessima’s shop space in Avenue de Londres 
(introduced by a student subletting a room in her house); 
recurrent visits and conversations in her shop space; two 
go-alongs for fripe purchases in Zahrouni; over three 
months, assisting Nessima in the shop at least twice a week 
during the afternoon (sorting, storage clearance, display, 
customer advice); recurrent follow-up visits (Nessima 
closed her shop in June 2019 due to caring responsibilities 
in her family). 
October 12th 2017 – 
May 21st 2019 
15. Mr. S. and Mr. M. 
(employees of the 
Municipal Market 
Authority) 
Chance encounter with Mr. S. in the Sidi El Bechir 
relocation site for street vendors; formal interview with Mr. 
S. in the municipal market authority, joined by Mr. M.; 
repeated visits in the market authority; two go-alongs to 
Rue du Liban relocation site and one go-along to El Kherba 
and Sidi El Bechir market relocation site each; follow-up 
visits in the market authority (Mr. S. retired from his 
position in December 2018 due to health problems). 
November 5th 2017 – 
February 22nd 2019 
16. Mariam (resident 
of Rue d’Atlas/ 
Rue du Liban, and 
fripe customer) 
Chance encounter with Mariam in the Rue du Liban fripe 
market; invitation to private home and conversation with 
Mariam and her two daughters about neighbourhood 
changes; repeated follow-up visits to private home. 
October 27th 2017 – 
December 15th 2020 
Chapter V 





Meeting with Yasmina in coffee shop in Hayy Ennasr 
(introduced by Tunisian researcher/colleague); two 
gatherings, one in Yasmina’s and one in Wiem’s house 
(alongside other female friends) with subsequent go-along 
to bale opening in Bab El-Falla and Menzah VIII; meeting 
with Wiem for brunch and subsequent go-along to bale 
opening in Bousalsala. 
May 12th 2018 – 
February 9th 2019 








Meeting with Heba and Haifa in their private home in 
Kabaria (introduced by the mother of a friend, her next-
door neighbour); three go-alongs with Heba, Haifa and 
different female members of her family to bale openings, 
one starting from private home in Kabaria to Hayy 
Ezzouhour, one starting in Bab-El Falla, and one in Hayy El 
Khadra; follow-up Sunday lunch invitation in private home 
of Heba and Haifa in Kabaria. 
May 19th 2018 – 
February 16th 2020 
19. Mouin (fripier/ 
fripe shopkeeper, 
Bab El-Falla) and 
Yassine (cousin 
and shop assistant) 
Chance encounter in Bab El-Falla and repeated on-site 
visits and conversations in clothes shop; participant 
observation (as customer) in repeated bale openings with 
both; observation during pre-inspection of bale for ‘special 
customers’; repeated follow-up visits in the market. 
October 3rd 2017 – 
November 14th 2020 
20. Amine (fripier/ 
fripe stall owner, 
Bab El-Falla) 
Chance encounter in Bab El-Falla and repeated on-site 
visits and conversations at toy stall; participant observation 
(as customer) in repeated bale openings; one go-along for 
purchases in Sidi Hassine (inofficial warehouse); repeated 
follow-up visits in the market. 
October 7th 2017 – 
November 14th 2020 
21. Hakim /fripier/ 
fripe shopkeeper, 
Bab El Falla) 
Meeting with Hakim in Bab El-Falla cafe (introduced by 
Amine); subsequent conversations in specialized fripe 
accessory shop; go-along to warehouse purchase in 
Zahrouni; observation during consecutive bale openings. 
January 24th 2018 – 




ARCHIVAL MATERIALS CITED 
 
Archival materials cited in footnotes to the main text of Chapter I and IV are listed. All archival materials were 
consulted by the author in the Tunisian National Archives in Tunis in 2018. 
 
 
N° Title of document and date Archive location Date of consultation 
Chapter I 
1 « Inventaires de fripe militaire », 
Inventories from warehouses in El-Aouina 
and Djebel Djelloud, from 1946-1948 
Série SG 2, carton 
151bis, numéro du 
dossier 9, n° de pièces: 
81, Archives Nationales 
de la Tunisie (Régence 
de Tunis/Protectorat 
Français) 
Accessed, August 13 th – 
17 th 2018 
2 « Production et Commerce de Textiles », 
1946 
Série SG2, Carton 175, 
Dossier 15, n° de pièces 
56, Archives Nationales 
de la Tunisie (Régence 
de Tunis/Protectorat 
Français)  
Accessed, August 27th – 
31st 2018 
3 « Lettre du Résident Général de France à 
Tunis au Secrétaire Général du 
Gouvernement en France », 21st of March 
1946 
Série SG2, Carton 175, 
Dossier 15, n° de pièces 
56, Archives Nationales 
de la Tunisie (Régence 
de Tunis/Protectorat 
Français)  
Accessed, August 27th – 
31st 2018 
4 « Ravitaillement général de la Tunisie en 
textiles et tissus », 1944  
Série SG 2, carton 
151bis, numéro du 
dossier 9, n° de pièces: 
81, Archives Nationales 
de la Tunisie (Régence 
de Tunis/Protectorat 
Français) 
Accessed, August 13th. –
.17th 2018 
5 « Arrêt du 5 août 1943 créant un Office de 
la Récupération » (J.O.T. 7 août 1943, p. 
481) signed by the Directeur de 
l’Economie Générale, “doté de la 
personnalité civile, chargé de la 
récuperation industrielle, de la liquidation 
et de l’utilisation des produits récupérés” 
Série SG2, Carton 175, 
Dossier 17, n° de pièces 
56, Archives Nationales 




Accessed, August 20th – 
24th 2018 
6 « Notes et correspondances avec le 
Directeur de l’économie générale, le Chef 
de l’Office de la Récupération relatives à la 
récupération du surplus américain en 
textiles, cuirs, habillement, mobiliers et 
matériel de génie civil ainsi que la 
répartition de ces produits en faveur des 
associations et des entreprises publiques », 
1945–1947 
Série SG3, Carton 26, 
Dossier 1, n° de pièces 
72, Archives Nationales 
de la Tunisie (Régence 
de Tunis/Protectorat 
Français) 
Accessed, September 3rd 
– 7th 2018 
7 « Répartition et distribution de la friperie 
américaine et de tissus sur tickets de 
consommation », 1944  
Série SG2, Carton 152, 
Dossier 8, n° de pièces: 
17; Archives Nationales 
de la Tunisie (Régence 





8 « Correspondances entre l’inspecteur 
général du ravitaillement tunisien et le 
secrétaire général du ravitaillement 
tunisien et le secrétaire général du 
gouvernement tunisien relatives au sujet du 
trafic de bons de friperie américaine » 
1944–1947 
Série SG4, Carton 77, 
Dossier 3, n° de pièces: 
82; Archives Nationales 
de la Tunisie (Régence 
de Tunis/Protectorat 
Français) 
Accessed, August 27th – 
31st 2018 
9 « Lettre de l’Inspecteur Général du 
Ravitaillement Tunisien au Directeur de 
l’Économie Générale », 1945  
Série SG2, Carton 175, 
Dossier 15, n° de pièces 
56, Archives Nationales 
de la Tunisie (Régence 
de Tunis/Protectorat 
Français)  
Accessed, August 20th – 
24th 2018 
10 « Rapport de l’Inspecteur général des 
services administratifs », 1945 
Série SG2, Carton 175, 
Dossier 15, n° de pièces 
56, Archives Nationales 
de la Tunisie (Régence 
de Tunis/Protectorat 
Français)  
Accessed, August 20th – 
24th 2018 
Chapter IV 
11 « Correspondances, textes législatifs et 
rapports concernant la réglementation du 
colportage dans la commune de Tunis », 
1922–1946  
Série M5, Carton 11, 
Dossier 504, n° de 
pièces: 244, Archives 
Nationales de la Tunisie 
(Régence de Tunis/ 
Protectorat Français)  
Accessed, September 
10th – 14th 2018 
12 « Correspondances et textes législatifs 
réglementant le stationnement, le 
colportage et la vente des denrées et 
marchandises sur la voie publique dans la 
commune de Tunis », 1890–1956 
Série M5, Carton 11, 
Dossier 676, n° de 
pieces 171, Archives 
Nationales de la Tunisie 
(Régence de Tunis/ 
Protectorat Français)  
Accessed, September 
10th – 14th 2018 
13 « Lettre du Vice-président de la 
Municipalité de Tunis au Directeur 
Général de l’Intérieur concernant le 
problème du colportage et l’échec de la 
planification des marchés municipaux », 
August 24th 1922  
 
(by the vice president of the Municipality 
of Tunis to the Directeur Général de 
l’Intérieur concerning the problem of 
unregulated street trading and the failure of 
municipal markets) 
Série M5, Carton 11, 
Dossier 504, n° de 
pièces: 244, Archives 
Nationales de la Tunisie 
(Régence de Tunis/ 
Protectorat Français)  
 
Accessed, September 
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